EXTAC 1012
MARITIME INTERDICTION
FORCE PROCEDURES
MULTI-NATIONAL MARITIME MANUAL

ORIGINATOR: NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

OCTOBER 1996
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2. EXTAC 1012 provides the objectives of maritime interdiction force (MIF) operations, the principles of inspection, and tactical guidance for conducting maritime interdiction and boarding operations by multinational ships and associated elements from other services.

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M. L. BOWMAN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, Naval Doctrine Command
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<th>ABO. Assistant boarding officer</th>
<th>LPOC. Last port of call</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFC. Assault force commander</td>
<td>MIF. Maritime interdiction force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC. Air mission commander</td>
<td>MIF CDR. Maritime interdiction force commander</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MIF COORD. Maritime interdiction force coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>BO. Boarding officer</td>
<td>OSC. On-scene commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC. Combat information officer</td>
<td>OTC. Officer in tactical command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COI. Contact of interest</td>
<td>RHIB. Rigid hull inflatable boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI. Essential elements of information</td>
<td>ROE. Rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO. Electro-optical</td>
<td>RSP. Recognized surface picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA. Estimated time of arrival</td>
<td>SITREP. Situation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETD. Estimated time of departure</td>
<td>TACAIR. Tactical air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAO. Tactical action officer</td>
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| HAF. Heliborne assault force    | |
|                                 | |
|                                 | |
| IR. Infrared                    | |
|                                 | |
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3. Comments and recommended changes to this document should be sent directly to the address listed below:

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   NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
   686 CUSHING ROAD
   NEWPORT RI 02841-1207

4. References:
   a. EXTAC 1000, Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures.
   b. EXTAC 1001, International HOSTAC.
   d. MTP 2, Replenishment at Sea.
   e. EXTAC 1004, Voice Procedures and Brevity Codewords.
   f. EXTAC 1005, Exercise Manual.
   g. EXTAC 1006, Structured Messages.
   h. EXTAC 1007, Mine Countermeasures.
   i. EXTAC 1009, Diving Safety.
   j. EXTAC 1010, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.
   k. EXTAC 1011, Naval Humanitarian Assistance Missions.
   l. EXTAC 1013, Regional Naval Control of Shipping.
   m. EXTAC 1014, Meteorological Support.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1001 Purpose

EXTAC 1012 provides:

a. The historical aspect of maritime interdiction, the objectives of maritime interdiction force (MIF) operations, and the principles of inspection.

b. Tactical guidance for conducting maritime interdiction and boarding operations by multinational ships and associated elements from other services.

1002 Definition

A MIF operation is the action of denying access to specific ports for import/export of goods to a specific nation or nations.

1003 Overview

1. Nations periodically use military forces to influence a country to conform with international standards of behavior. Maritime interception operations are one of these measures, and are intended to resolve disputes through actions short of armed conflict. They are designed to control the flow of arms and goods into and out of a target country. Commanders, commanding officers, and other key decision-making personnel should have a working knowledge of the principles and law of the sea involved prior to commencing MIF operations.

2. The United Nations will normally establish the provisions for an embargo and authorize the use of force in its enforcement through a U.N. Security Council Resolution. The right to impose an embargo may also be derived from the customary international law that defines the right of a nation, or group of nations, to defend against a threat to the peace or actual breach of the peace (also termed “individual or collective self-defense”).

3. The authority establishing the MIF operation must address the following items in the resolution:

a. Force. The resolution should prescribe the level of force authorized in conducting the MIF operation. Generally, the ROE and national interpretations of the resolution will prescribe the conditions under which, and the extent to which, force may be used in enforcing the resolution.

b. Prohibited Items. The resolution itself will specify the prohibited items. However, when dealing with questionable cargoes, the MIF commander may require clarification of the prohibition status of specific goods from the sanctioning authority. For example, if the resolution bans “petroleum products,” but merchant ships are encountered carrying oil shale, coal, or natural gas, the MIF commander may wish to clarify what is to be stopped by contacting the sanctioning authority through the chain of command. Certain goods are generally exempt from seizure, such as medical and hospital stores, religious objects, humanitarian relief supplies, and humanitarian-related foodstuffs.

c. Geographic Limitations. Although the resolution may set the geographic limitations for the MIF operation and authorize entry into the target country’s territorial sea, the decision regarding whether to allow pursuit into the target country’s territorial sea varies between participating nations. This decision may be modified based on political developments during the MIF enforcement. Some members may prohibit any entry into territorial seas, others may create arbitrary limits on territorial waters, e.g., 3 nm, and still others may authorize pursuit to the coastline. This issue is further complicated by regional geography and the target country’s maritime claims.
d. Disposition. Normally, ships are not seized during a MIF operation; those carrying prohibited items are diverted to an acceptable port or returned to their port of origin. However, in recent MIF operations, such as Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, the U.N. resolution authorized the seizure and subsequent sale of the violating vessels and their contraband.

4. For MIF operations to be recognized as lawful under international law, the provisions thereof must be applied to ships of all nationalities. This means that all ships in transit of the defined area, including those of one's own nation, must be subjected to an inspection. Force may be utilized, if required, to ensure compliance with interception operations.

0104 Objectives of Maritime Interdiction

There are two objectives of maritime interdiction:

a. Primary. The primary objective is to determine if a merchant ship is in compliance with or in violation of the stated reason for interdiction.

b. Secondary. The secondary objective is to gather intelligence about:

(1) The merchant ship's itinerary and future intentions.

(2) Military and merchant activity in and around an embargoed nation's ports.

0105 International Law

The United Nations, individual nations, or other recognized political authorities may provide authority for MIF operations. Reference sources are available to commanding officers to amplify international law of the sea.

0106 Mission

Conduct maritime interdiction of merchant shipping bound to, through, or out of a designated area in support of political authorities stated objectives. Implementation of this interdiction is through the use of multinational combatants (ships and/or aircraft) will be used to place boarding parties aboard merchant vessels. Force may be required (i.e., warning shots, nondisabling fire, and disabling fire), which is referred to in this publication as a "takedown."

0107 Scope

Multinational force ships must be prepared to conduct MIF operations on short notice. In support of this objective, guidance provided herein is applicable to all naval commands that may be involved in the planning and/or execution of MIF operations. The information contained herein may be useful to personnel of other armed services who are also tasked to support MIF operations.

Note: The procedures and guidance provided are applicable only to peacetime MIF operations and do not address procedures for conducting a naval blockade in time of war or declared hostilities.

0108 Examples of Maritime Interdiction

Ships from many nations have been tasked on several occasions to conduct MIF operations in support of various objectives. Examples of MIF operations are:

a. Enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq in support of operations during, and prior to, the Persian Gulf War.

b. Enforcement of United Nations sanctions against the former Republics of Yugoslavia.
CHAPTER 2

Concept of Operations

0201 Concept

1. MIF operations will have great political interest and, as such, require a highly flexible concept of operations. They may be carried out by multinational forces or a single nation in support of specified objectives. Unilateral operations may be conducted by naval forces alone or as part of joint operations involving one or all of the armed forces.

2. Commanding officers should prepare their crews to conduct MIF operations within a wide variety of command structures and operational environments.

0202 Command, Control and Communications

1. The command structure varies according to the political objectives of the MIF operation, but resembles the basic structure described in Figure 2-1. Geography of the operational area has a significant impact on the size of MIF force required and the amount of decentralization within the command structure. In each case, a detailed operations order will be required that must address, among other things:

   a. A definition of “Boarding and Inspection,” as it applies to the resolutions being enforced.

   b. Types of merchant vessels expected to transit the operations area.

   c. Other shipping

   d. Questions to ask the contact of interest (COI) before boarding.

   e. What constitutes reasons for diversion.

   f. What percentages of cargo on various types of shipping should be searched.

   g. Rules of Engagement (ROE).

   h. Criteria for contact classification, cleared vessel, suspect vessel, and possible violator.

2. Command Responsibilities. The following are the key MIF personnel and their responsibilities:

   a. Maritime Interdiction Force Commander. The MIF CDR is the officer in tactical command (OTC) of all forces assigned to conduct the MIF operation.

   b. Maritime Interdiction Force Local Coordinator. The MIF COORD is assigned as required to provide command and control when geography prohibits operations in a single geographic area. There may be a need for a number of MIF COORDs. They are responsible for:

      (1) Conducting MIF operations within the assigned area of interest and exercising tactical control of all MIF forces within the area of interest.

      (2) Assigning boarding and assist ships as required.

      (3) Tasking aircraft or other supporting forces as required so that the on-scene commander (OSC) can conduct a particular merchant boarding.

      (4) Assigning units VHF working channels and night signal colors, to be used for COI interrogation, in order to prevent mutual interference.

   c. On-Scene Commander. The OSC is the officer in tactical control at the scene of all forces assigned to conduct or support the boarding of a COI. The OSC is normally the commanding officer of the boarding ship.
**d. Assault Force Commander.** The AFC is the officer in control of the heliborne assault force (HAF) that conducts the takedown of a COI. The AFC reports to the OSC for duty as soon as feasible after departure from the assembly point. The AFC is responsible for the actual assault on board the COI. Once control of COI has been obtained, the AFC retains control of all forces aboard the COI until the OSC directs him to turn control over to the boarding officer (BO).

**e. Boarding Officer.** The BO is the officer in control of the boarding party. He is responsible for visiting and searching the COI. He remains in control of the COI until the OSC directs him to turn control over to the master of the COI or until he is properly relieved.

**f. Air Mission Commander.** The AMC is the aviation officer assigned as mission commander for all aircraft directly supporting the HAF. The AMC is responsible for:

1. Planning the safe execution of aircraft support to the HAF.
2. Coordinating with the AFC for conducting all aircraft-related portions of the takedown operation.

*Note: Surface combat air patrol and other aircraft in the area not directly supporting the HAF should report directly to the OSC.*
0203 Communications

1. The complex nature of MIF operations requires all participating units to pay particular attention to the compatibility of communications systems. As the OSC, the surface ship is responsible for making adjustments to existing communications plans to ensure a successful boarding operation. The diverse variety of portable radios currently utilized by armed forces compounds this problem. It is unlikely that compatible systems will be available in the near future, so ships must be flexible. The following actions can be taken to minimize problems:

   a. All helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft assigned should be equipped with bridge-to-bridge capable (maritime bandwidth) VHF FM radios.

   b. MIF CDR or MIF COORD should assign designated bridge-to-bridge channels to all units conducting MIF operations to minimize mutual interference. Consideration should be given to local port and merchant usage in the area of interest in an attempt to find little-used channels for MIF operations.

   c. Assault teams and boarding parties should be equipped with UHF/VHF portable radios to enhance communications within the COI. UHF portable radios should preferably be operating in military UHF-band (225-400 MHz) to be interoperable with shipborne UHF transceivers.

   d. Strict circuit discipline should be required on all boarding and assault nets to ensure rapid transfer of urgent information.

   e. Code words should be established for key information in the event clear voice circuits must be utilized.

   f. All units involved in boarding operations should have VHF bridge-to-bridge capability.

   g. Once the boarding has commenced, VHF bridge-to-bridge radios should be used as an emergency backup circuit for all forces involved.

   h. OSC should ensure all participating units are thoroughly familiar with circuits to be used during the boarding.

   i. Assault team and boarding party members should conduct frequent radio checks consistent with the tactical situation.

   j. Extra batteries should be available for all portable radios to be used by assault teams, boarding parties, and boat crews.

2. Figure 2-2 provides a recommended communications plan for MIF operations. If utilized, encrypted (digitized voice), portable radios should be operated in the SECURE mode. Whenever non-secure radios are utilized, station call signs and code words for sensitive information should be prepared locally. Use of SATCOM is considered essential for rapid and reliable communications between MIF CDR, MIF COORD, and OSC.

Note: AFC and aircraft have limited communications equipment available and will only be up on one or two nets at one time. OSC is net control on all circuits, except supporting fire and assault nets, which are controlled by the AFC.
### Communications Requirements

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Secure (Note)</th>
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| MIF Command        | MIF CDR  
                     | MIF Coordinator  
                     | OSC           | SATCOM/HF  
                     | Yes            |
| Boarding           | OSC  
                     | BO  
                     | ABO  
                     | Sweep  
                     | Security  
                     | Boat          | UHF/VHF  
                     | Yes            |
| Air Control        | OSC  
                     | All A/C on scene | UHF/VHF  
                     | No             |
| Assault Coordination| OSC  
                     | AMC  
                     | Sniper  
                     | AFC  
                     | Supporting ships and A/C | UHF/VHF  
                     | Yes            |
| Assault Control    | AFC  
                     | Sniper Teams  
                     | Assault Elements  | UHF/VHF  
                     | Yes            |
| Sniper             | Helicopter Pilots  
                     | Sniper Teams  
                     | OSC Monitor (if feasible)  
                     | AFC Assault Elements  | UHF/VHF  
                     | No             |
| Emergency          | All  | VHF  
                     | Bridge-to-Bridge | No            |

Note: Portable radios may be protected or crypto secure.

Figure 2-2  Proposed Maritime Interdiction Force Communications Plan
CHAPTER 3
Detection and Surveillance

0301 Overview

All contacts within the designated surveillance area should be tracked, identified, and interrogated for possible boarding. All available sensors should be used to detect, identify, and collect intelligence on merchant shipping within the assigned surveillance area. Every contact determined to be a COI should be tracked, observed, and considered to be a potential target for a take-down operation. The identification as a COI is generally determined by the MIF COORD. Maintaining an accurate database of merchant ships previously challenged and/or boarded is critical to prevent multiple interceptions of the same ship as it passes through a geographic area. Merchant contact information must be systematically shared by all units (not just those assigned to MIF duties) operating within the MIF area. Effective operations are critically dependent on support from shore authorities to compile, collate, and disseminate information on merchant ship movements. The generation and exchange of a comprehensive database is a valuable tool. Without significantly disrupting trade it is not possible to search thoroughly every merchant ship entering the area of interest. Therefore, intelligence is vital to target likely embargo breakers. Forces conducting MIF operations must be prepared for ships and/or agents to employ any subterfuge to break the embargo. These ploys may include mechanical breakdown, declaring false destinations, entering cleared ports close to the target area and making a quick dash into territorial waters, crew changes, or multiple changes of ownership.

0302 Detection

1. Picture Compilation. In order to build the recognized surface picture (RSP), identification of all surface contacts in an area of interest must be made with positive identification of friendly, neutral, and suspect units. Units involved in MIF operations are to produce a plot of all surface contacts, while covering the area of interest with a stated percentage coverage against defined targets. This can be done by continuous radar coverage or revisiting (with defined intervals) contacts in the area of interest. This plot of radar contacts must be disseminated to all units involved.

2. Objectives of the Recognized Surface Picture. The building of the RSP aims at one or more objectives as listed below:

   a. Detecting all surface tracks in an area of interest.
   b. Identifying all surface tracks in an area of interest to a level required by the type of operation.
   c. Identifying a specific and defined COI in an area of interest.
   d. Identifying a specific type of COI in an area of interest.
   e. Tracking an identified COI or identified contacts in an area of interest.
   f. Vectoring a platform (air/surface) to identify a COI.
   g. Vectoring a platform (air/surface) to intercept a COI.

3. Size of the Area of Interest. The size of an area of interest that can be covered depends on the following factors:

   a. The assets available to execute the operation.
   b. The type of sensors available.
   c. The objective for the building of the RSP.
   d. The environmental conditions in the area of interest.
   e. The target characteristics.

4. Nonorganic Search Assets. Depending on the nature of the MIF operation, the follow
following nonorganic assets may be available to assist in detecting merchant traffic that will enter the surveillance area:

b. Maritime patrol aircraft.
c. Airborne early warning assets.
d. Carrier or shore-based surveillance aircraft.
e. Tactical data link from other units.
f. Tactical exchange via voice circuits.

5. Organic Sensors. Organic detection assets vary from ship to ship. Every effort should be made to maximize all available sensors. The following sensors may be available:

a. Helicopters. Embarked helicopters should be utilized for radar, visual search, and other correlations. Whenever operating in a multiship effort, air asset coordinators should schedule 24-hour airborne/alert helicopters (if available) to support MIF operations.

b. Surface Search Radars and Visual Search (Lookouts). Surface search radars and visual search should be utilized. Visual search should utilize all available equipment, such as night vision devices, etc.

a. Embargo Operations. Identify suspect vessels, determine vessel’s name, flag, destination, origin, cargo, port of registry, ETD, ETA, ship owner, and agent.

b. Drug Interdiction. Identify a specific suspected vessel on which intelligence has been obtained, or track all contacts and determine which contacts are acting suspicious (suspect) and identify those contacts to the level required by the OTC.

c. Locate Suspected Vessels. Identify a specific vessel as designated by OTC or higher command.

d. Coast Guard/Environmental Patrol. Identify those contacts that are violating national and international laws; register those items required for legal prosecution.

e. Fishery Patrol. Identify those contacts, considered to be fishery vessels, that violate national and international laws and regulations; register those items required for legal prosecution.

f. Refugees. In areas where MIF operations are conducted, there is also a likelihood of refugees attempting to flee the country that is the subject of the operation. Depending on existing policy, patrolling ships must be ready to recover refugees from small boats and hand them over to proper authorities.

2. Essential Elements of Information. EEIs for conduct of MIF operations should include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Number and type (civilian/military) of personnel on board COI and the number, location, and types of weapons carried.

b. Evidence of topside or portable weapons, such as machineguns or shoulder rockets.
c. Photographs of cargo on deck, hatches that lead into ship, bridge configuration, and unusual activity (will greatly assist takedown forces, if required).

d. Nature of cargo and how stowed (cargo status).

e. False waterlines.

0304 Sensors

1. Sensors that may be used during MIF operations are listed in Figure 3-1. The estimated level of identification that can be obtained in day or night operations is listed. The ranges given for identification to listed levels are only an estimate and should be used for planning purposes. Ranges based on information and conditions encountered will need to be updated.

2. Visual, Electro-Optical, and Infrared. Visual, EO, and IR identification and their corresponding ranges will strongly depend on the environmental parameters, such as temperature, humidity, fog, rain, background lights, etc. EO devices, either airborne or shipborne, can be used for identification of the ship and survey of the crew during a boarding by night, depending on its technical characteristics.

   a. Visual identification by night largely depends on the astronomical conditions and/or the availability of a procedure available within approved ROE to employ a searchlight. Identification by name using IR equipment depends on the specifications of the IR sensor.

   b. Identification by visual, IR, or EO means at a farther distance may be facilitated by the ability to compare a contact’s silhouette with a picture or drawing. The following sources on merchant ships, hulls, and superstructures are presently available:

      (1) *Lloyd’s Register of Shipping*. This publication lists data concerning self-propelled seagoing merchants of a Gross Tonnage of 100 and above. Examples of data listed are call signs, flag, port of registry, DWT, hull, size, superstructure, decks, cargo facilities, maximum speed.

      (2) *Jane’s Merchant Shipping*. This publication lists general data concerning merchant shipping, including photographs.

3. Imaging Radar. Imaging radar is only fitted on some US P-3C Orion, S-3B Viking, and SH-60B Lamps Mk III aircraft. Furthermore, UK Nimrod and Sea King AEW aircraft are equipped with Searchwater, which has some imaging capability. To obtain a good imaging radar picture, the aircraft should be positioned in front or astern of the COI. Identification will take place by comparison of hull and superstructure with database information.
### Sensor Level of Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Possible Level of Identification Range (nm)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visual</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Type</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull colors</td>
<td>10-15</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superstructure</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull colors</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/homeport</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IR (IRDS/FLIR IR-goggles)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Type</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superstructure</td>
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<td>Hull colors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name/homeport</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESM</strong></td>
<td>Radar type</td>
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<td>Radar type</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Radar type</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Imaging radar (ISAR)</strong></td>
<td>Type:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acoustic (NR)</strong></td>
<td>Noise sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-1. Sensor Level of Identification
CHAPTER 4
Interrogation, Approach, and Stopping

0401 Overview

This phase sets the tone for all boarding operations, so mature judgment and caution are critical. Effort should be made to be cordial, yet remain cautious, alert, and in control. This phase will present a major opportunity to gather intelligence. If a ship’s helicopter is present, it should be utilized to the fullest extent possible, in concert with other aircraft that have been tasked to support the MIF operation. All helicopters should be equipped with bridge-to-bridge VHF radios to assist with interrogating merchants that are not within VHF FM range of ships.

0402 Shipboard Requirements

1. Watch station manning requirements vary, depending on surveillance equipment installed. In general, normal underway watch stations should be augmented to provide extra bridge-to-bridge radio log keepers and increased surveillance capability. Bridge and combat information center (CIC) VHF monitoring stations should have a copy of the questions with blanks. A separate log should be maintained and a tape recording made, if possible, of all bridge-to-bridge conversations.

2. A Situation Report (SITREP) team should be formed and used to prepare timely reporting to seniors in the chain of command during boarding operations. This team may be comprised of the following members:

   a. SITREP Team Leader. The SITREP team leader acts as a liaison with the commanding officer, tactical action officer (TAO), and other key personnel and relays command perspective to SITREP composer.

   b. CIC Liaison. The CIC liaison collects, correlates, and relays pertinent information (i.e., position data, unknown aircraft, communications received from other units) to the SITREP composer.

   c. SITREP Composer. The SITREP composer properly formats information to ensure all required data is provided.

0403 Interrogation Procedures

1. It is imperative that the overall tone of any hailing or interrogation be firm, yet cordial and nonconfrontational. The bridge watch of the COI may not be proficient in English and may have to locate someone who is; this person may not necessarily be the master. It is important to ensure the COI’s master is present during hailing and interrogation, even if he does not speak English. Due to accents and colloquialisms, the responses may not be easily understood with questions having to be repeated more than once. The hail should be broken down into short phrases to assist in translation or understanding by the COI’s crew. Request that the COI spell words, if necessary. A list of ports in the area of operation should be prepared and used as a ready reference. While maintaining a polite attitude, remain alert for any delaying tactics.

2. Initial Interrogation.

   a. A ship or an aircraft may conduct the initial interrogation. The purpose of this interrogation is to obtain the information about the merchant vessel to determine whether or not a boarding will be required. Units should make initial contact with the vessel on VHF channel 16, having attracted attention by night by the use of appropriate colored light. Interrogation procedures are then conducted on an assigned VHF working channel. In the absence of specific guidance, the following hail, used in the Arabian Gulf, is recommended:

   “Merchant vessel _________, this is (nation) Navy warship/aircraft. Request you state your port of origin, your flag, registry, international call sign, your cargo, your last port of call, next port of call, and final destination, over.”
b. If it is determined that a boarding operation will not be necessary based on stated destination, the following may be used to dispatch the vessel:

"Merchant vessel __________, this is (nation) Navy warship/aircraft. In view of your destination, we intend to conduct no inspection at this time. You are instructed to proceed directly to your destination of ______________. Thank you for your cooperation."

3. **Subsequent Interrogation Prior to Boarding.** If the decision to board is made, this should be relayed directly to the COI’s master. If the COI’s master consents to being boarded, the following additional information should be obtained:

   a. The total number of people on board the COI.

   b. The preferred location for placement of the pilot’s ladder.

   c. In addition, instruct the COI’s master to:

      (1) Have his crew muster in a space in open view of the boarding ship and helicopters (to facilitate counting prior to boarding). A prudent master will not want to abandon key watch stations (i.e., bridge and engineering watchstanders). The crewmembers not present at muster should be clearly stated by the COI’s master.

      (2) Turn on all interior lights (and exterior, if at night).

      (3) Have all unlocked spaces opened as much as possible and keys made readily available for all locked spaces.

      (4) Have all the ship’s papers and crew identification brought to the bridge.

      (5) If boarding by boat, instruct COI to slow to bare steerageway and come to a course suitable for boarding or to stop, depending on tactical situation.

      (6) If boarding by helicopter, advise master of course and speed to steer, position boarding team will transfer to, and actions to be taken by his crew.

**0404 Approach Procedures**

1. The approach maneuver’s purpose should be obvious while maintaining the secure posture of the boarding ship and should consider possible egress routes of the COI.

2. **Single-Ship Approach Procedures.** The single ship approach procedures consist of the following:

   a. The boarding ship should be positioned abaft the beam on the windward quarter of the COI, if possible, at a safe distance until the threat of small arms or shoulder-fired weapons provides a clear arc of fire for the forward weapon system and can be assessed. Remaining abaft the beam reduces exposure to ramming attempts while providing the best possible view of the bridge and superstructure.

   b. If the operation is being conducted at night, all available night vision devices and optical enhancement devices should be employed to observe the COI and gather intelligence.

   c. When the OSC is satisfied with the threat assessment, the boarding ship should close the COI as close as sea state and weather conditions allow.

   d. The windward side of the COI should be utilized to provide protection from possible chemical attack.

   e. During daylight boarding, the sun should be kept behind the boarding ship to aid in observing the COI while making the reverse more difficult.

   f. The wake area of the COI should be avoided because of the threat of mines or own-ship’s screw fouling objects deployed from the COI.

   g. Topside spaces should be cleared of all unnecessary personnel. Personnel remaining topside on the boarding ship should be
instructed to observe the COI and report any activity by the merchant crew to the bridge, where an accurate record of activity should be maintained.

h. The approach and initial time alongside should be characterized by extreme caution since the true intentions of the COI are unknown.

i. Own boats and helicopters should be kept clear of the line of fire of the manned weapon systems.

j. Own-ship’s helicopter should never be so close that spray from rotor wash causes personnel on deck to get wet.

k. For safety, attempt to keep rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB)/motor whale boat transits as short as possible and downsea.

The dual-ship approach procedures consist of the following:

a. The boarding ship should approach in accordance with paragraph 0404.2

b. The second ship (assist ship) should maneuver, when directed by the boarding ship, to the opposite quarter of the COI. The assist ship should remain outside of small arms range in case the boarding ship takes the COI under fire (remaining clear of the boarding ship’s firing arc).

c. If the assist ship is called upon to provide fire support, the boarding ship should open distance from the COI to avoid the field of fire from the assist ship. In effect, the boarding ship and assist ship switch positions with respect to range to the COI, while remaining on their respective sides of the COI.

d. The assist ship should be prepared to take over as boarding ship and OSC in case the original boarding ship can no longer fulfill the duty.

e. Movement of boats, helicopters, and weapon systems of both ships must be strictly coordinated.

4. Defensive Considerations. The boarding and assist ship should be in an increased readiness condition. Manning additional damage control and Condition III (modified battle station) weapon stations should be considered as a minimum. To facilitate remaining abaft the beam of the COI, the forward weapons systems should provide the threat of main armament, if equipped. Manning of other details, such as flight quarters, boarding/search and rescue boat, and additional high-point gunners (the main deck of a lightly laden merchant will usually be too high to allow an acceptable field of fire from normal small arms positions), may be required. If damage has been sustained by the COI, a rescue and assistance detail should be provided. For safety reasons, all personnel on the deck of the boarding ship should be kept out of sight of the COI. RHIB preparations on the boarding ship should therefore take place on the side away from the target ship, as feasible.

5. Helicopter Support Considerations. During cooperative boardings, helicopters (if available and suitable) are preferred over the RHIB because of reduced sea state restrictions and ability to more quickly embark the boarding team on a vessel with a high freeboard. A helicopter may be used to conduct routine boardings by first inserting a security team (by fast rope/rapid rope procedures if trained) and then the boarding team. If a heliborne assault force (HAF) is to be inserted, the assist ship, if equipped, normally provides the primary support to the HAF helicopter(s). Both ships should maintain a ready deck and manned refueling detail and be prepared for prolonged flight operations. Boarding ship’s helicopter may be used as a sniper platform or a surveillance asset.

0405 Diversion Procedures

1. Following an interrogation, it may become apparent that a ship is carrying illegal cargo and/or is proceeding to a prohibited port. Having this knowledge may present the option of simply diverting the COI to another port, if inbound, or returning to previous port, if outbound, vice conducting a boarding operation. Merchant ships may also have to be diverted to an inspection port or anchorage when weather conditions do not permit boardings, following a boarding when it becomes apparent that the ship may be carrying prohibited cargo, or when its cargo cannot be easily checked by the boarding team.
2. **Diversion and Possible Cargo Seizure.** If the COI is suspected of carrying an illegal cargo, and guidelines have been established for diverting ships to a prearranged port where their cargo will be seized, the following direction should be communicated to the COI’s master:

“Merchant vessel ______________, this is (nation) Navy warship. It is believed that you are carrying cargo that is subject to interception under (the reason for interception), and you will not be allowed to proceed. You may, however, return to your port of origin at this time. If you do not decide to turn back, you will be directed to proceed to (port/anchorage) where this cargo will be taken into custody. (Nation) intends no harm to your ship, your cargo, or your crew. Master and crew will be free to leave as soon as your vessel has reached its new destination. Please do not resist. Cooperate in this action so that we can avoid any damage or injury and ensure the safety of the crew.”

3. **Diversion to Port of Merchant’s Choice.** If no seizure of cargo is planned, it may be possible to allow the COI, if outbound, to return to its previous port or, if inbound, to proceed to a port of its choice other than those that are prohibited. Depending on the situation, either an order or an offer to divert to a port of choice may be extended.

   a. The following is an order to divert:

   “Merchant vessel ______________, this is (nation) Navy warship. You are not authorized to proceed to (intended port) or any other port in (target country). Please provide us with your intentions regarding another port of call.”

   b. The following is an offer to divert:

   “Merchant vessel ______________, this is (nation) Navy warship. You are free to choose to divert now to a port not in (target country). If you choose this option, inspection may be avoided. What is your decision?”

   c. If the merchant selects a suitable port, it will be directed to proceed with the following:

“Merchant vessel ______________, this is (nation) warship. You are released to proceed directly to your destination of (port). Thank you for your cooperation.”

**0406 Stopping Procedures**

1. The measures taken to stop a vessel vary and depend on several factors. ROE and specific instructions from seniors in the chain of command must be taken into account. For the purpose of this manual, it is assumed that the boarding ship is fully aware of the limits to the magnitude and type of force it may employ. Stopping the COI may not mean coming to a stop, but slowing to bare steerageway or “dead slow ahead” (depending on engineering configuration and sea state) to support small boat operations. Ship’s position must be closely monitored to prevent the COI from closing territorial waters if the boarding operation is not conducted while dead in water. In the absence of other guidance, the following should be used to inform the master that his ship is to be boarded:

   “Merchant vessel ______________, this is (nation) Navy warship. At this time, (nation) intends to exercise its right to board and inspect under international law in accordance with its previously published notice to mariners. (Nation) intends no harm to your vessel, its cargo, or your crew. Please stop/slow your vessel and stand by to accept (nation) boarding team.”

2. At this point, a cooperative vessel will comply with the request and stop/slow. (If a vessel refuses to consent to inspection, it must divert (if inbound), return to port of origin (if outbound), or be taken into custody, as appropriate.)

3. **Uncooperative Vessels.** The reply from an uncooperative vessel most likely will be that it must check with his home office, or that it cannot stop/slow because of engineering configuration. It must be noted that some ships need more than an hour to stop. A time limit should then be given to the subject vessel. It should be made clear that, at the end of the given time, if it has not complied, the actions to encourage it to stop will escalate. The following are not the only options available, but suggest a possible sequence of events. These actions may have to be cleared through the chain of command, depending on the specific guidance in effect.
4. **Levels of Force.** The use of force to stop and board a vessel should be predictable, proportional, and if needed, escalative. The uncooperative vessel should be given the opportunity to comply before the level of force is increased. This should be reflected in preplanned levels of force. These levels are:

a. **Nonviolent:**
   
   (1) Warnings by different types of communications.
   
   (2) Aggressive maneuvering.
   
   (3) Turning and aiming of fire-control radars and/or gunmounts.

b. **Deterrence:**
   
   (1) Use of blank pistol or grenades in the water.
   
   (2) Shots across the bow.

c. **Show of Force:** Use of weapon systems/munitions to inflict limited damage with small caliber guns without causing injuries or structural damage.

d. **Disabling Fire (Structural Damage):** Use of weapons systems/munitions to stop the COI (target areas include funnel, steering compartment, or engine room).

e. **Counterbattery:**
   
   (1) Use of proportional violence to prevent the use of violence by the COI.
   
   (2) Use of weapons systems or munitions to neutralize the hostilities posed by the COI.

f. **Full Force:** Use of weapon systems or munitions to sink the COI.

5. **Nonviolent.**

a. Voice communications, flashing lights, flaghoist (in accordance with the International Signal Book), loudhailer, attention signal on the ship's whistle or a horn. The use of simple, clear, and pronounced English is important, as it will depend upon the nationality of the COI whether English is understood. Other commonly used languages at sea may include Spanish, Russian, or Arabic.

b. Aggressive maneuvers by ships, tactical air (TACAIR) support, or helicopters (if available). Maneuvering alongside could be performed, depending on the type of COI, in a "fish-tail" maneuver: approach with an angle of 45° on the COI's course, using 1.5 times the COI's speed. When at 200 yards, slow to match speed and turn to parallel course. Remain slightly astern of the COI to enable early observation of course changes by watching the wake.

6. **Deterrence.** In the sequence of increasing levels of violence, the following methods of deterrence can be used:

a. The following munitions can be used to deter with harmless means:
   
   (1) Firing blank gun rounds towards the bridge of the vessel.
   
   (2) Throwing thunderflashes or concussion grenades overboard.

b. If the above methods fail to have any effect, shots across the bow may produce the intended results. Shots can be fired by ships, TACAIR, or helicopter (if available). Guns should be optically controlled to ensure proper targeting.
   
   (1) Firing of 20 mm or .50 cal. machineguns.
   
   (2) Firing of main battery guns utilizing HE or PD rounds. Rounds should be placed so the effect of the blast does not damage the COI.

7. **Show of Force.** If the actions listed above fail to gain compliance, the vessel is now considered to be opposing the MIF operation. At this point, a decision will have to be made by the cognizant authority as to whether to use small arms fire, disabling fire, or effect a takedown operation.

a. **Nondisabling Fire.** Small arms fire to the bow, the masts, cargo on deck, or other area may be directed to persuade
compliance without seriously damaging the COI. A warning should be issued to the COI so that the area to be taken under fire may be evacuated. In the absence of other guidance, the following warning may be used:

"Merchant vessel ____________, this is (nation) Navy warship. We will now fire on your (area to be fired upon). I am now giving you an opportunity to evacuate your crew from the (area to be fired upon) of your ship. You have one minute to clear your crew from (area to be fired upon)."

b. Disabling Fire (Structural Damage). If the decision is made to use disabling fire, several options are available. Care must be taken to consider not only the effectiveness in stopping the COI, but also the consequences of taking a specific area under fire.

(1) The following, although not all-inclusive, should be considered when disabling fire is a possible course of action:

(a) Threat of major oil spill from ship’s service tanks or cargo tanks.

(b) Threat of major fire from engineering space or cargo holds.

(c) Maneuverability of ship following disabling fire.

(d) Possibility of casualties.

(e) Damage to cargo.

(f) Ability to insert HAF by fast-roping on the COI or by small boat following the disabling fire.

(g) Proximity of shoals or territorial waters.

(h) Weather forecast.

(i) The number of hours of daylight remaining.

(2) If the decision is made to use disabling fire, targeted areas may include the rudder, stern area, or machinery spaces, if their location is known. Heat-sensing or IR devices may be used to locate the machinery spaces. The ammunition used should be inert blank load and plug, if feasible. Weapons systems should be optically sighted.

(3) Depending on specific guidance, the OSC may need to request instructions from the chain of command. The process of informing the chain of command may take some time, so the position of the COI should be monitored to ensure he will not enter territorial waters while the OSC is awaiting a response.

(4) Prior to commencing disabling fire, a warning, such as the following, should be issued to the COI:

"Merchant vessel ____________, this is (nation) Navy warship. I now intend to fire on your vessel. I am now giving you an opportunity to evacuate your crew from the (stern/engineroom/etc.). You have one minute to clear your crew from (area to be fired upon)."

e. Self-Defense. The use of force in self-defense of personnel engaged in interdiction operations is authorized when it becomes evident that this is the only means by which personnel on board ships or in boarding parties can be protected. Use of force should be as a last resort and proportional to the situation. When using force in self-defense, the following factors should be considered:

(1) Accuracy of the weapons(s) to be used.

(2) Capability of the weapon to penetrate coverage of the enemy.

d. Takedown Considerations. A takedown is the act of inserting a HAF aboard the COI to gain control of key stations and force the COI to submit to search by a boarding party. Shipboard procedures for supporting this type of operation are contained in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 5

Boarding and Searching

0501 Overview

The boarding and search phase is the most important and most hazardous phase of MIF operations. The procedures in this chapter are designed to provide shipboard personnel with the basic guidance required to conduct boarding operations without assistance. Boarding and search procedures, although hazardous in nature, must be conducted in a non-threatening and non-confrontational manner. Members of the boarding party must be adaptive and able to think on their feet. Boarding parties must be relaxed, confident, and cordial while remaining mentally and physically alert to respond quickly, if required.

0502 Discussion

1. The boarding phase is potentially dangerous in two areas: first, during small boat operations, getting the boarding team on and off the COI; second, during the actual boarding and search of the COI.

2. Boarding party members may be required to climb from their boat up a 10- to 20-meter pilot’s ladder at night and in poor weather conditions, so excellent physical conditioning is a must. Ships may have to conduct numerous boardings in a 24-hour period. Boarding party members must be mentally and physically alert at all times. To maximize safety, all boarding party and boat crew members should be removed from the ship’s watch bills to the maximum extent possible, especially if the tactical environment requires frequent boardings.

3. Small arms proficiency and formal training are key elements in the safety of all boarding party members, particularly sweep team members.

0503 Boarding Party Composition

1. The boarding party should be comprised of a minimum of 10 members designated as follows:

   a. Boarding Officer. The BO is usually an officer of at least Lieutenant (LT/O-3) rank. He must be mature, in excellent physical condition, small arms qualified, and have the complete confidence of the ship’s commanding officer.

   Note: Lessons learned from Persian Gulf operations have shown that although executive officers possess maturity and trust, they are often too busy to maintain training and weapons qualification required.

   b. Assistant Boarding Officer. The ABO is usually a commissioned officer (LT/O-3)/Lieutenant junior grade (LTJG/O-2)/Ensign (ENS/O-1), who should be in training or who may be qualified as a BO. He must be in excellent physical condition, small arms qualified, and have the confidence of the ship’s commanding officer.

   c. Security Team Leader. The security team leader should be a senior enlisted member of the boarding ship (Chief Petty Officer preferred). He must be mature, in excellent physical condition, and small arms qualified.

   d. Security Team. The security team is a group of five men (usually enlisted). They must be mature, in excellent physical condition, and small arms qualified.

   e. Sweep Team. The sweep team is a group of two of the most experienced and mature men on the boarding party (senior enlisted preferred). They must be mature, in excellent physical condition, and small arms qualified.

2. The following additional boarding team members may be utilized as desired:

   a. Photographer. The photographer must be mature, in excellent physical condition, and small arms qualified. He should be familiar with low-light still and video photography, if possible.
b. Second Sweep Team (Two Men). The second sweep team has the same qualifications as the first sweep team. This team may augment the security team if services of a second sweep team are not required.

c. Additional Security Team Members. The additional security team members have the same qualifications as the security team members.

0504 Boarding Party Boat Crew Composition

The boat crew should be kept to a minimum of three, if possible, to avoid overcrowding in the boat. Recommended boat crew composition is as follows:

a. Coxswain. The best coxswain is required because many boardings can be at night and in all types of weather and sea conditions. He must be mature and proficient with a hand-held radio.

b. Boat Engineer. The boat engineer should be qualified on a rifle to provide covering fire if boarding party is attacked while attempting to embark/debark from COI.

c. Bow Hook. The bow hook should be the best seaman available because of the demanding nature of boat operations at night and in poor weather conditions.

NOTE

The BO may act as boat officer.

0505 Boarding Party Equipment

1. Annex A contains a detailed list of typical equipment for boarding party members. Annex B contains a detailed list of recommended contents of the boarding kit.

2. Arming of Boarding Party. The boarding party should be armed with the standard service pistol and/or riot shotgun. At least four members, acting as security forces, should carry riot shotguns in addition to the pistol. Total weapon complement consists of 10 pistols, 4 riot shotguns, and 1 semiautomatic rifle in the small boat. Weapons are also required for additional boarding party personnel, if utilized. All members of the boarding party, except those carrying shotguns, may carry the standard baton with speed ring, if qualified. Weapons should be loaded with the chamber empty. All boarding party members are required to be current with their weapons qualifications and have exhibited to the commanding officer sound judgment and maturity. Every boarding party and boat crew member shall wear body armor (if available).

0506 Preboarding Instructions to Contact of Interest

1. Prior to launching a boat with a boarding party, the COI shall have complied with the following instructions:

   a. Slowed to a complete stop and is dead in water (DIW) or dead slow, if required by seas or proximity to shoal waters.

   b. Rigged pilot's or Jacob's ladder (pilot's ladder preferred) on leeward side. Mark it with light shining toward the water, if at night. Once rigged, no one is to be near the ladder.

   c. Energized all interior lights (exterior also if at night) and open all unlocked spaces.

   d. Stated nature and location of any hazardous cargo on board.

   e. Mustered all personnel on board in topside location (not near boarding ladder) visible from boarding ship. Master will probably insist on keeping bridge and engine room manned. He may want to keep the ship's cook in galley near meal hours. These routine exceptions should be allowed.

2. In addition to the above, the COI may be asked if it has weapons aboard and instructed to secure them inside the vessel. This may, however, lead COI crew members to consider armed resistance. The boarding ship commanding officer should make the decision on this matter based on the current tactical situation.
0507 Boarding Party Communications

1. Protected/digitized voice (not necessarily crypto security) secure UHF portable radios are recommended; however, secure VHF/FM radios are a suitable substitute. During prolonged boardings, the use of a backpack or comparable radio may be desired. When plain voice radios are used, code words should be established for key information such as intentions, levels of tension, discrepancies in documentation, and/or cargo and distress. A minimum of six radios is required. Stations, call signs, and type of information sent are shown in Figure 5-1.

2. Standard radiotelephone procedures should be used. All transmissions must be brief in order to allow for urgent transmissions from sweep or security teams. When communicating over nonsecure radios, avoid using the ship’s own name (i.e., “Neversail one, this is Neversail”).

3. The OSC develops and promulgates lost communications and distress visual signals.

NOTE
Do not use ship’s name in boat call sign.

0508 Preboarding Briefs

1. At a minimum, two preboarding (the command and control and boarding team) briefs should be conducted prior to each boarding operation. Additional briefings may be required as the tactical situation dictates.

2. Command and Control Preboarding Briefs. The command and control preboarding brief is a command-level briefing to address critical command and control issues that will vary from boarding to boarding. This briefing is normally conducted over secure voice circuits, but should include face-to-face interface if multinational or takedown operations are planned.

   a. Participation in this briefing should include (as applicable), but is not limited to:

      (1) MIF CDR or MIF COORD.

      (2) OSC.

   b. Issues to be addressed and resolved during this briefing should include, but are not limited to:

      (1) Intelligence brief on COI.

      (2) Possible threats.

      (3) ROE (to deal with each threat identified for every platform involved).

      (4) Code words (not already promulgated).

      (5) Emergency signals and procedures.

3. Boarding Team Brief. The boarding team brief is a working-level briefing that addresses the actual conduct of the boarding about to take place. This briefing is normally held on board the boarding ship. However, portions may be relayed to the assist ship via secure voice, if multiple boarding parties are anticipated.

   a. Participants in this briefing include, but are not limited to:

      (1) OSC (ship’s commanding officer).

      (2) Tactical action officers and senior warfare officers who will be on watch during the boarding.

      (3) Key weapons control personnel for topside gunners.

      (4) Entire boarding party.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Call Signs</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer (CO)</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Controls boarding team via the BO and ship's boat via coxswain, as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding Officer (BO)</td>
<td>Boarding</td>
<td>Controls the sweep team(s) and ship's boat while keeping CO informed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Boarding Officer (ABO)</td>
<td>ABO</td>
<td>Controls security detail. Assists BO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Team Leader</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Informs ABO of security matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweep Team Leader (#)</td>
<td>Sweep (#)</td>
<td>Informs BO of progress and/or problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat Coxswain</td>
<td>Gig, RHTR, or Motor Whale Boat</td>
<td>Receives orders. Reports boat status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1. Boarding Party Communications

(5) Entire boat crew.

(6) Air controller.

b. Issues to be addressed and resolved during this briefing should include, but are not limited to:

(1) Intelligence brief on COI, including vessel characteristics.

(2) Last port of call.

(3) Home port.

(4) Next port.

(5) Type of cargo.

(6) Specific intelligence desired from COI.

(7) Possible threats.

(8) ROE for each threat and each weapon (topside gunners, helicopter sniper/gunner, boarding team members). ROE to be thoroughly briefed prior to each operation.

(9) Code words.

(10) Overall mission plan.

(11) Emergency signals and procedures.

(12) Communication check procedures.

(13) Actions to be taken while on board in the event of an emergency, to include fire, flooding, and casualties.

0509 Cooperative Boarding Procedures

1. A cooperative boarding is defined as a boarding where the master and crew of the COI respond to hailing, the merchant vessel heaves to and accepts the boarding party, and the inspection proceeds without incident.

2. Small Boat Operations.

a. When directed by the OSC, the boarding party will embark in the ship's boat for transfer to the COI. Because of severe speed limitations and exposure of the boarding party, the motor whale boat is the
least desirable choice and should only be
used when neither the gig nor a RHIB is
available. Standard boat fenders are of lit-
tle use and may pose a hazard during along-
side operations. Larger boat fenders, which
may be purchased or made up locally from
three or more standard boat fenders lashed
together, should be used to prevent damage
to boats during boarding operations. The
ship should maneuver to make a lee for the
launch of the small boat. Once clear, the
ship must maneuver to maintain visual ob-
servation of the COI and provide covering
fire, if required. Careful consideration of
winds, seas, navigation hazards, territorial
waters, and possible sudden maneuvers by
the COI are required. When a small boat is
used to transfer the boarding team, it might
be efficient to place an armed protection
team in a second boat.

b. The coxswain must ensure he remains
clear of the COI wake to avoid any obstruc-
tions from the COI. Once the boarding
party is on board the COI, the boat should
be directed to a safe position from which a
rapid response can be made in case of an
emergency. The position should be in-
cluded as a part of the boarding team brief
conducted prior to launching the boat. The
boat engineer should be qualified on a rifle
and prepared to provide covering fire for
the boarding party as they climb aboard the
COI.

3. Boarding the Contact of Interest.
One of the most hazardous phases of boarding
operations is the embarking of the boarding team
from the boat to the COI. Getting off the boat and
climbing a 10- to 20-meter ladder up the side of a
merchant vessel is hazardous in the best of condi-
tions. MIF operations may require this act to be
conducted at night and/or in moderately foul
weather conditions. Security team personnel
should board first and secure the area around the
ladder. Once the area is secure, the remainder of
the boarding party should follow. In the interest of
safety, no more than two boarding party members
should be allowed on the ladder at one time. If the
ship’s first mate or another ship’s officer ap-
proaches to greet the boarding party, the secu-

4. Boarding Officer Procedures. Once
aboard the COI, the BO, the ABO, one security
team member, and the photographer, if assigned,
will proceed to the pilothouse to meet with the
ship’s master. The remainder of the boarding party
will muster the crew and remain with them. Sam-
ple introduction to the master is as follows:

“I am the senior (nation) officer present,
and I intend to inspect your cargo. Please
follow all instructions. Your coopera-
tion will be necessary to conduct this in-
spection. We would like to see your
manifest first, and then we will inspect
the cargo. Please inform your crew of our
intent and for their own safety, direct
them not to interfere with the inspection
team. Please tell them to remain calm and
to help us avoid any misunderstanding or
confrontation. All crewmembers are
safe, and no harm is intended. Thank you
for your cooperation.”

a. Sample safe haven offer (if appropriate)
is as follows:

“If you fear persecution in _______ for
permitting boarding of your vessel in
compliance with (reason for intercep-
tion), (nation) will assist you in finding
safe haven outside _______.”

5. Examination of Documents.

a. The documents examined are only one
of the “tools” available to help reach a con-
clusion regarding the true nature of a ship’s
identity, crew, and cargo.

b. All the documents encountered can be
very easily forged or altered, or details
(cargo) may be deliberately omitted.

c. Based upon training and experience,
accept or reject the documentation
presented.

d. Regardless of whether or not the docu-
mentation is believed to be true, conduct a
search of the vessel.

e. A general plan of the ship can be invalu-
able to the boarding officer when planning
the search and disposition of his team.
The following documents should always be examined:

1. **Certificate of Registry.** The original is required to be aboard. The certificate indicates ship's nationality, and lists owner’s name, address, etc.

2. **Certificate of Charter.** The original is required if ship is chartered. The certificate lists chartering party by name, address, etc., and gives details of the charter’s duration.

3. **Crew and Passenger List.** The original is required to be aboard. The list details passenger and crew names, nationalities, etc.

4. **Ship's Log.** The log is required to be aboard. Some ships have an original and smooth log. Check both for discrepancies.

5. **Cargo Manifest.**
   
   a) The manifest is required to be aboard if the ship is carrying cargo.
   
   b) The master should have the original manifest; however, in some cases, a Xerox and/or telex copy may be acceptable. (Seek guidance from higher authority if unsure what is acceptable.)
   
   c) Check for more than one manifest. Sometimes, they are separated by port of offload, and the master may only offer the papers for cargo bound for the restricted port. Review all cargo manifests, regardless of stated or “intended” destinations.
   
   d) Look for the following:
      
      1) Manifests must be complete. As a minimum, the following should be clearly identifiable:
      
      a) Port of onload.
      
      b) Intended port of offload.
      
      c) Shipper’s name and complete address.
      
      d) Consignee’s name and complete address.
      
      e) Type and amount of cargo(s).
      
      f) Container sizes and ID numbers for container-ized cargo.

   2) Look for obvious signs of omission, forgery, and alterations such as:

   a) Missing information.
   
   b) Poor-quality Xeroxes.
   
   c) Information “whited out” or crossed out.
   
   d) Manifests and bills of lading that do not match.

   e) Make note of manifest items:
      
      1) That are obvious military cargo, regardless of destination.
      
      2) Having any military address, regardless of the cargo item.
      
      3) Having any military value, such as chemicals, metals, or raw rubber.
      
      4) Listed as medical supplies.
5) Destined for any embassy or embassy officials. These are not automatically protected under diplomatic immunity and may generally be searched.

(6) Bills of Lading. These bills are not required to be aboard. When available, they generally contain more detailed information regarding the cargo, its origin, and destination. If available, cross-check these bills against the manifest.

(7) Dangerous Cargo Manifest. This is generally kept separate from the regular manifest and usually must be requested. It should list the IMO classification of the cargo. Careful consideration should be given before boarding vessels carrying chemicals or dangerous substances in order to prevent exposing the boarding team to potential health risks.

(8) Cargo Stowage Plan. For the proper inspection of cargo, especially in locating containers or break-bulk cargo.

(9) Passports/Seaman Books. Should be compared to the presented crew list.

(10) Navigational Charts. Gives confirmation of the voyage so far and the voyage to the next port.

g. Additional documents that may be examined are:

(1) Radio log and/or telex messages, which can help confirm or deny the master’s claims.

(2) Port clearance paper, which can help substantiate claims to last port of call (LPOC).

(3) Bill of health, which may substantiate claims to LPOC.

(4) Consular’s declaration of innocence of cargo. This declaration is rare. If it is found, it means that cargo aboard has been inspected by government officials and has not been found to be in violation for reason of operation. Despite the presence of this document, a search of the ship’s cargo should be conducted.

h. Examples of common documents may be found in Annex C.

6. Decision to Divert.

a. To recommend diversion of a COI, the BO must firmly understand the principles of contraband and free goods. The final decision is normally made further up the chain of command; however, the BO’s recommendation is critical in aiding seniors in making the proper decision.

b. The BO should move to a location where his communications cannot be overheard before discussing this and other sensitive matters. Code words should be developed locally for key information and briefed prior to boarding operations for contingency where nonsecure communications are required.

7. Log Entries. The BO may be required to make log entries in the COI’s deck log.

8. Control of the Boarding Party. In general, the BO will exercise control of the boarding party through the ABO. If required, a separate UHF/VHF protected voice circuit may be utilized between BO, OSC, and small boat. This is normally accomplished by selecting a separate channel on the same portable radios used by other boarding party members. The disadvantage of separate circuits for BO and ABO is the loss of connectivity within the boarding party when BO and ABO are separated. Additional guidance for boarding team is contained in Annex D.
9. **Sweep Team Procedures.**

a. The function of a sweep team is to conduct the actual search of the COI. As critical positions on the boarding party, the importance of selecting the most experienced men cannot be overly emphasized. Specific guidance for sweep team personnel is contained in Annex D.

b. **Initial Sweep.** An initial security sweep will be conducted to determine if there are any unaccounted-for weapons or personnel on board the COI and to look for obvious safety hazards. Results of the security sweep are reported to the BO who will check with the crew list to make sure that the location of crew and passengers is clearly determined. The BO will direct the sweep teams to conduct a search of all or part of the cargo areas based on the cargo documentation presented by the ship's master and other relevant information.

c. **Sweep of Cargo Holds/Tanks (Search Phase).** Extreme caution must be exercised by the sweep team when entering cargo holds or tanks. Lighting is often poor or nonexistent; ladders may be structurally weak or damaged; decks and ladders may be oily; noxious or hazardous vapors may be present (especially in tanks); air may be oxygen deficient; cargo may not be securely stowed; and other hazards exist separate from the threat of armed resistance. It is important that members of the boarding party never open any hatch, door, package, container, etc. This is to avoid injury of the boarding party by badly stowed containers, boxes, or holds.

   (1) Have master or ship's officer open all doors and hatches and enter all spaces first. Ensure a COI officer is present when sealed containers are opened. COI may provide able-bodied seamen to assist in opening containers.

   (2) Sealed containers may not contain the cargo with which they are labeled, so check with the BO before continuing the search. A boresight, which is an inspection device, may assist in determining the contents of a sealed container. Reseal all sealed containers and deliver broken seals to the master while using a form to document the container opened. Identify the general contents and list the seal number issued by the inspector.

   **WARNING**

Do not touch military equipment or anything that appears to be possible explosives, fuses, or detonators and report them immediately to the BO. If in doubt, call for assistance.

**NOTE**

As time progresses during prolonged MIF operations, more creative smuggling techniques will most likely be employed by merchants attempting to get prohibited cargo to/from the targeted nation(s).

(3) Additional safety equipment will be brought aboard in the boarding kit. Safety is paramount and will not be sacrificed for any reason.

10. **Security Team Procedures.**

a. The security team is responsible for containing the COI's crew during the boarding. It has extended personal contact with crewmembers and, as such, should be sensitive to the large variety of cultural and religious backgrounds often found on merchant crews. It is not uncommon for women and children to be among the assembled crew of the COI. Security team members must exercise mature judgment in dealing with the COI's crew. The presence of dogs and free-roaming animals on board poses a physical and health threat to the boarding team and should be avoided. Request that the master lock up all animals for the duration of the boarding.
b. Intelligence Collection. Prolonged contact with crewmembers other than the master should be used to discreetly gather information about the ship's previous activities and schedule. Any discrepancies from the information provided in the pre-boarding brief or unusual activity should be reported to the BO. Care should be taken to prevent the master or other crewmembers from overhearing the report. Previous lessons learned suggest the single code word "clear" may be used to inform the BO that there is sensitive information to pass. Once the BO is ready to receive the report, he will indicate he is clear, and the report may be completed.

c. Dealing With the COI Crew/Passengers. Merchant vessels often have multinational crews. The ship's officers are normally familiar with, if not fluent in, English, and other English speakers may be aboard. Previous records show that during the vast majority of boardings, the crew/passengers are cooperative and only desire the boarding to go smoothly so they can get back to their routine. This does not mean that the security team should assume the crew will not be hostile. Caution, alert observation, and sound judgment are essential. Whenever feasible, at least three men should move together to provide cover for one another. The following lists provide some do's and don'ts developed from lessons learned in previous boarding operations.

(1) Do perform the following:

(a) Be firm, but polite in issuing instructions.

(b) Utilize the COI's chain of command. Have the master or ship's officers give orders to the crew/passengers.

(c) Be sensitive to the religious customs of the crew/passengers, keeping safety of the boarding party in mind.

(d) Be very cautious when dealing with women and children.

(e) Place a security team member in position above the assembled crew/passengers where he can observe the entire group, if possible.

(f) Keep crew/passengers a safe distance from security team members to prevent being overpowered or disarmed.

(g) Plan ahead for restroom use. Boarding operations have lasted in excess of 8 hours in the past.

(h) De-escalate tense situations immediately.

(i) Look for possible "planted" military or intelligence personnel among the crew.

(j) Try to relax the crew/passengers.

(k) Be cordial and polite at all times.

(l) Allow meals and disrupt ship's routine as little as possible.

(m) During extended boardings, consider moving crew or passengers to their cabins, mess decks, or other controllable areas of comfort. If done, direct them to stay in place and maintain security in passageways.

(n) Bring along an interpreter, if possible.

(2) Do not perform the following:

(a) Threaten or provoke the crew or passengers.

(b) Accept food or drinks.

(c) Fail to be on guard. (The situation may change rapidly.)

(d) Allow any crew or passengers to leave the assembly area unescorted.
(e) Give away any information that may be useful to the COI or the embargoed nation.

(f) Discuss boarding party procedures or intentions.

(g) Hesitate to call for assistance if any indications exist that a problem may be developing.

0510 Uncooperative and Opposed Boarding Operations

If a COI is either uncooperative or has been determined to be opposing a boarding, it may be necessary to conduct a takedown operation prior to normal boarding. A takedown is accomplished by placing a heliborne assault force (HAF) on board to force a COI to stop, secure it prior to search by a normal boarding party, or come to the aid of a boarding party that has been confronted by a hostile force. A takedown should not be attempted from a small boat because of the vulnerability of the assault force during boarding. The objective of the takedown will vary according to the mission, but in most cases, it will be utilized to secure the ship control and communication spaces of the COI. The actual procedures for the conduct of takedown operations exceed the scope of this document and will not be addressed herein. Historical data indicates that takedown operations are only required in a very small percentage (less than one percent) of the boardings conducted during normal MIF operations. Command and control of the HAF and the relationship of the assault force to the normal boarding party is addressed below.

0511 Heliborne Assault Force

1. Command, Control and Communications of the Heliborne Assault Force. The HAF may consist of elements from Navy Special Forces teams, Marine Special Operations teams, or a variety of other forces from the armed services. Command and control structures and communications equipment available vary depending on the assault force used. Surface ships must be prepared to support a wide variety of possible options.

   a. Command and Control Structure. Command and control of the HAF by the OSC remains consistent, while command and control within the assault force may vary. The AFC will report to the OSC as soon as feasible after departing the assembly point to coordinate takedown preparations. All supporting aircraft and/or small boats will be under control of the OSC from the time the assault force arrives onscene until it is detached by the OSC. Whenever feasible, a face-to-face pretakedown brief will be held on board the boarding ship. The A/C will control the actual assault teams and will coordinate with the AMC or boat coxswain the use of supporting aircraft and small boats. Supporting fire from a sniper helicopter will be under direct control of the AFC. Supporting fire from surface ships or other aircraft will be directed by the AFC.

   b. Communications. Communication equipment available to the assault force varies, and the surface ship must be flexible and creative in the choice of equipment to be used. Reliable communication between the OSC, AFC, sniper helicopter, small boat(s), support helicopter, surface combat and patrol aircraft, and assist ship(s) is critical to success of the takedown operation. Figure 2-2 displays normal communication circuits required to support takedown operations.

   Note: AFC and aircraft have limited communications equipment available and will only be up on one or two nets at one time. OSC is net control on all circuits, except supporting fire and assault nets, which are controlled by the AFC.

2. Coordination of Assault Force and Boarding Party. Two scenarios may exist that require use of a takedown force.

   a. The first is one in which the assault force is first to board the COI to secure it. In this scenario, the normal boarding party will embark the COI when directed by the OSC. The AFC remains in charge of the COI until directed by the OSC to turn control over to the BO. In this situation, the boarding party will normally have additional security personnel assigned. The assault force will normally remain on board the COI until search of the vessel is complete. A common voice circuit between the BO, OSC, and AFC is not normally required.
b. The second scenario is one in which the normal boarding party or a portion of it is still on board the COI prior to arrival of the assault force. This situation requires more complex coordination. A pretakedown face-to-face brief is critical and should be conducted if at all feasible. The AFC and assault team leader should be given radios that are compatible with the boarding party's, if not already so equipped, to allow for direct communications during the takedown. Location and identification data on members of the boarding party still on board the COI will be given to the AFC and briefed to all assault force members and snipers. Once the takedown commences, the AFC will assume control of any boarding party members on board the COI. The AFC will remain in control of the COI until directed to transfer control to the BO.
CHAPTER 6

Diversion Procedures

0601 Overview

The BO should ensure the COI’s master is aware that the final decision for diversion is made by higher levels in his chain of command and that he is merely carrying out the directions of higher authority. There are three possible COI diversion scenarios that the BO may encounter after the decision has been made to divert the COI. They are voluntary diversion, involuntary diversion, and opposed diversion.

0602 Voluntary Diversion

A voluntary diversion is one in which a voluntary agreement by the COI’s master to divert is obtained. The diversion usually requires little extra effort on the part of the BO. Having acquired the COI master’s agreement to divert from his intended port of call or to return to last port of call, the BO may request permission from the OSC to depart and return to the parent ship. Tracking and monitoring of the COI should be the responsibility of the boarding ship until this responsibility is passed to another unit. The MIF CDR or MIF COORD determines when tracking and monitoring of the COI is no longer required.

0603 Involuntary Diversion

1. An involuntary diversion is one in which the master or crew of the COI are uncooperative, but force has not been required to gain compliance. Diversion of this COI may require a concerted effort on the part of the BO and the boarding party. The boarding party may be required to take physical control of the COI and man the ship’s navigation and engineering watch stations. If operating in a multiship environment, the MIF CDR or MIF COORD should designate prearranged ship’s control parties utilizing anyone experienced in merchant operations. There have been instances where the COI’s master and crew have retired to their staterooms and left the boarding party in total control of the COI. The master was finally persuaded to come back on the bridge and instruct his crew to aid the boarding party in operating the ship to prevent any damage caused by ignorance of boarding party personnel operating equipment. Whenever an involuntary or opposed diversion is effected, the BO must communicate this transfer of control to the master of the COI. The master should be instructed to relay this word to his crew. Request the master to assist and instruct his crew to do likewise. The BO should then make an entry into the COI deck log to record this course of action.

2. The following is a list of considerations to take into account when communicating how the diversion will be conducted to the master during an involuntary or opposed diversion:

   a. Follow the merchant’s chain of command when issuing orders requiring a response from the merchant’s crew.
   b. Emphasize to the COI’s master that this is not a personal confrontation.
   c. Be firm, but polite when issuing orders.
   d. Never threaten through gestures or by pointing weapons at COI crewmen.
   e. Stay on guard.

0604 Opposed Diversion

1. An opposed diversion is one in which a takedown force was required to gain compliance. Deadly force may have been used prior to the boarding party’s arrival. The COI’s crew should be fairly subdued and may also be in a state of shock. As time elapses, however, and their composure returns, their conduct may become very uncooperative. The ship’s crew may not voluntarily assist the boarding party in accomplishing any task. However, the COI’s master may be convinced to elicit help from the COI crew to ensure no further ship damage is incurred and thereby escape criticism from his home office.
2. **Boarding Party in an Opposed Diversion.** The BO requires an exceptionally large boarding party (20 to 30 men) to establish an underway watch bill that will provide security for all in the boarding party. Two-man watch teams are required to ensure security. The recommended minimum watch stations include:

   a. Bridge and main accesses to the bridge.

   b. Main engineering spaces and accesses.

   c. Boarding party sleeping quarters.

**WARNING**

The important thing to remember during an opposed diversion is to constantly stay on guard.
ANNEX A

Boarding Party Personnel Equipment

A001 Required Equipment

I. Boarding party personnel equipment includes the following:

   a. Life vest:
      (1) Sterns (best option), Mae West (inflatable), or Kapok.
      (2) Chemlite.
      (3) Whistle.
      (4) Strobe (optional).

   b. Body armor: Type IIIA (best option), Kevlar vest, or Flak vest.

   c. Equipment belt:
      (1) Service pistol and holster
      (2) Handcuffs/case
      (3) Baton/holder (if trained)
      (4) Flashlight/holder
      (5) Magazines/pouches
      (6) Canteen/pouch
      (7) Paper/pens
      (8) Leather gloves
      (9) Goggles
      (10) Respirator
      (11) Sunglasses
      (12) Gas mask (if required, all boarding party members)
      (13) Tear gas canisters (if required, sweep and security team members only).
      (14) Individual first-aid kit.

   d. Uniform:
      (1) Coveralls (no rank insignia).
      (2) Ball cap (no rank insignia).
      (3) Steel-toed safety shoes.

   e. Extra weapons:
      (1) Shotgun (minimum of four members of security team).
      (2) Rifle (boat engineer).

II. In addition to the equipment above, the BO and ABO should have the following additional equipment:

   a. Radio/Holder
   b. Checklists.

A002 Radios

1. At least six UHF secure voice portable radios, or VHF FM secure radios if UHF is not feasible.

2. Hand-held radio distribution:

   a. OSC.
   b. BO.
   c. ABO.
   d. One sweep team member from each team.
   e. Security team leader.
   f. Boat coxswain.
ANNEX B

Boarding Kit

B001 Contents of Kit

1. The boarding kit includes the following:
   a. Tape recorder.
   b. Tape measures (25 feet and 100 feet).
   c. Sounding tape.
   d. Extra batteries (radio and flashlight).
   e. Tin snips.
   f. Bolt cutters.
   g. Pry bar.
   h. Flex cuffs (plastic handcuffs).
   i. Inspection mirror.
   j. Bore scope for visual inspection of sealed spaces/containers (not weapons bore scope).
   k. Surgical gloves.
   l. Container seals (boxcar seals).
   m. Clipboard/note pads and pen.
   n. Respirators (type used by spray paint teams).
   o. Goggles.
   p. Evidence tags/tape.
   q. Twenty-meter line with snap hooks (used to hoist kit aboard COI).
   r. Camera (polaroid) and extra film.
   s. Sunscreen.
   t. First-aid kit.
   u. Checklists.
   v. Spare radio and holder.

2. Miscellaneous equipment includes the following:
   a. Emergency egress breathing device (EEBD) for each member.
   b. 35 mm camera for detailed still photographs.
   c. Video camera.
ANNEX C

Sample Merchant Documents

C001 Overview

This annex contains samples of some of the common documents found aboard merchant vessels (Figures C-1 through C-4). This is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather to present a sample of some of the documentation that may be presented by the master of a COI. The BO should carefully examine all documents for discontinuities or evidence of tampering.
### Dangerous Cargo Manifest

**M/V Manning Star**  
**Official Number L927631**  
**Nationality: Korean**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipping Name</th>
<th>I.D. Number</th>
<th>Hazard Class</th>
<th>Number &amp; Description</th>
<th>Gross Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coconut Meal Pellets</td>
<td>UN2113</td>
<td>FLAMMABLE SOLID</td>
<td>100 BAGS</td>
<td>10,000 LBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-CHLOROBENZOYL PEROXIDE</td>
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Figure C-2. Sample Dangerous Cargo Manifest
Figure C-3. Sample Certificate of Inspection
Figure C-4. Sample Certificate of Documentation
MIF boarding operations are potentially hazardous and require attention to detail by all boarding party members.

DO02 Embarkation

1. Initial Embarkation. The security team should board first and set up security in the vicinity of the ladder prior to the embarkation of the remainder of the boarding party. The boat engineer (equipped with a rifle) should be positioned to provide cover for the boarding party as it embarks. The COI’s pilot ladder may be in poor condition, so no more than two men should be on the ladder at the same time. Remain clear of the area under the pilot ladder during embarkation to avoid objects that may fall from other members on the ladder. Once the boarding party is on board, use the 20-meter line with snap hook to hoist the boarding kit and any other bulky equipment on board.

2. Security Positioning. The following three principles for establishing security positions must always be considered:

a. Observation. Security positions should be selected that provide unencumbered observation of the entire area. Consider climbing onto a deckhouse or other high point to provide maximum visibility. The security position should be established so that every guard is within the field of view of at least one other guard.

b. Line of Fire. Security positions should provide a clear line of fire in the direction of the threat at all times. Personnel moving within the security area should be careful not to mask the line of fire of established security positions.

c. “Triangulation.” Forming triangularly oriented security positions should provide overlapping fields of view while providing a relatively clear line of fire for all members.

These three principles not only apply to guards, but should be fully employed by all boarding party members as they move throughout the COI.

3. Boarding Party Introduction. The boarding party will normally be greeted by the COI’s first mate or another officer. The BO should introduce himself and ask to speak to the ship’s master. The BO should introduce himself to the COI’s master and clearly state the procedures that will be used to conduct the boarding. Every effort should be made to relay to the master that the boarding team is simply following orders and that no harm to his vessel or crew is intended. The BO must be cordial, yet maintain control of the conversation.

4. Command Presence. Command presence is the psychological process (conduct, speech, and procedure) the BO uses to convince others that he can deal with the situation. The BO’s initial instructions may possibly make all the difference. He should advise the master and crew of his expectations from the outset.

5. Boarding Party Safety. The safety of the boarding party is paramount. It is essential that the presence, if any, of weapons aboard the COI be determined as soon as possible. (The OSC may have inquired about weapons aboard the COI prior to the arrival of the boarding party.) Recommended courses of action for dealing with weapons aboard the COI are as follows:

a. Secure weapons in the boarding bag.

b. Post a guard on the weapons.

c. Lock the weapons in a safe place.

d. Separate weapons and ammunition and secure them on the body (least desirable method).
D003 Crew Control

Every member of the boarding party must display the command presence described above when dealing with the crew of the COI. The following principles for crew control have been established from experience gained during U.S. law enforcement operations and during the Persian Gulf Conflict:

a. Adjust the security response as necessary.

b. Keep the COI's crew together.

c. Observe the COI's crew for signs of anger or resistance.

d. Be aware of and recognize changes in the degree of risk. If the degree of risk becomes unacceptably high, don't hesitate to call for help or depart the vessel and wait for help.

D004 Inspection

Based upon previous intelligence, checking the documentation and identification of the COI will help to determine the type of sweep or search to be conducted.

D005 Completion/Debarkation

1. Upon completion of the boarding, the following options are recommended for the return of weapons:

a. Leave weapons and ammunition separately with the master.

b. Leave them where they were found.

2. The security team is the last to leave the COI. Caution must be exercised by the entire boarding party not to become lax or let its guard down during the debarkation of the COI.

D006 Tactical Sweep Procedures

1. A security and personnel sweep is a function of the operational environment. The sweep should be routinely performed at the onset of every boarding. A sweep is done to locate and neutralize all weapons, search for unaccounted personnel, and detect all obvious safety hazards. The security and personnel sweep should include an inspection of all common spaces and man-sized compartments aboard the vessel.

2. The security and personnel sweep normally should be performed by the sweep team. The master should be informed by the BO of a sweep with a statement similar to "Captain, a couple of men will now make a sweep of your vessel to check for obvious safety hazards, verify the identity of your vessel, and account for all crew members. They will not disturb the personal effects of your crew." The importance of a good sweep cannot be overly emphasized. There have been repeated instances where security sweeps have discovered that the master lied about the number of persons on board and found people hiding in staterooms, bilges, and even in holds. Additionally, unreported weapons and safety hazards are not uncommon and may be discovered with a proper sweep.

3. In any high-risk board, two aspects of tactical competence are tested: the physical mechanics of the movements made and the decision-making or tactical thinking that initiates them. In searching a vessel for unaccounted personnel who may be primed to attack, be competent in both aspects.

4. Tactical sweep procedures include observing proper safety precautions, light and sound discipline, appropriate entry and movement techniques, and a thorough examination of the vessel. The following mental preparations are important for safety:

a. Never feel completely safe in securing any vessel. Complacency tempts fate. Always think and expect an attack, then base actions on tactics that will counter it.

b. Keep in mind that no tactical concept is perfect. (Each involves a tradeoff: sacrificing something to gain something else.) If a procedure does not work favorably, then think of something else. Remember that it is impossible to achieve total immunity from risk. Employ proven techniques that minimize risk.

c. Be flexible. As each new problem on the search is approached, assess the threat potential it presents and select the tactical techniques that buy the greatest safety in that location at that time. Think about each situation before moving into it. Be able to
change plans completely as matters progress and things are encountered.

d. Do not try to search a vessel alone. A sweep team of two is required to search most vessels with any degree of safety. A very large vessel will require additional personnel.

5. When entering a compartment that may be occupied by a hostile suspect, the risk of injury is increased. If there is any other reasonable option, don’t go in.

6. The greatest hazard when boarding is the ability of a person to hide and wait in an almost limitless number of spaces. Within the maze of doorways, passageways, ladders, furnishings, cargo, closets, false compartments, nooks and crannies in a vessel, the natural odds overwhelmingly favor the hunted over the hunter. Yet, despite the infinite variables presented by a vessel at sea, be tactical in approaching any of them. It is true that there is no “standard vessel,” but there are standard movements that can be adapted to the multitude of tactical problems encountered on a vessel.

7. Have the appropriate equipment when searching a vessel. In addition to the items on the belt, consider carrying:

   a. A piece(s) of cord with a loop on the end for tying to doorknobs.
   b. A tactical mirror. (A good mirror (for sweeps) can be made by gluing a convex “fisheye” mirror to a regular inspection mirror with a telescope handle. The mirror can then be used in lieu of the “quick peek” in all tactical sweep situations.)
   c. Extra cuffs (thumb or flex cuffs).
   d. An ear mike for the radio.
   e. A pen light in case the bulb burns out on the primary flashlight or it may be used as a door prop. (Rubber door stops can also be carried for this purpose.)
   f. A small roll of masking tape for marking previously searched compartments.
   g. A small notebook for recording information such as serial numbers, etc.

8. When deciding to enter a vessel on a personnel sweep, enter as tactically sound as any subsequent movement inside. Keep in mind that a hostile suspect can always be waiting just on the other side. Always expect the unexpected and always do the unexpected. If someone is waiting, his territory is being moved into.

9. Approaching and Entering a Compartment. During any search, a key consideration is the proper use of search patterns. While moving up or down stairways or ladders, along hallways, and through rooms, keep the back toward, but slightly away from the bulkhead. Although the hostile suspect may be able to shoot through some bulkheads, this search pattern will generally provide the closest thing to cover available for the backside. Not exposing the back will cause a comfortable feeling and provide the ability to concentrate on advancing. Remember, the potential threat locations are ahead. Be physically constructed to do the best fighting forward. If a team member finds himself in a compartment where he feels as if his back is not covered, chances are that he has failed to do something significant earlier.

   a. The “Fatal Funnel.”

      (1) The “fatal funnel” concept (see Figure D-l) is usually thought of in terms of standing in or through the opening. If a suspect is hiding along the same wall that the door is on, his arc of visibility through the opening may be such that he can see (and shoot) even if someone is standing to the side of the actual doorway. To be truly clear of the “fatal funnel,” stand as far back from the doorway as possible while it is being opened.

      (2) When crossing a doorway, especially if the door is open, consider leaping rather than walking or crawling. It is noisier, but creates a faster moving target. Be sure to start up and end well to the sides of the door frame. Don’t mimic movie police by swinging into the center of the doorway with the weapon pointed into the room, then pivoting to the other side. That slow-motion
Figure D-1. The “Fatal Funnel” Concept
move prolongs exposure to the "fatal funnel." When going to move, move quickly. When going to shoot, shoot quickly. Do not try to accommodate both with the same tactic.

3) Be certain to avoid doing a tactical sweep alone, whenever possible. However, if it becomes necessary to go alone, keep the following in mind:

(a) If a compartment whose door opens inward is in the path, approach the door on the side opposite the hinges.

(b) Take cover behind the bulkhead and quietly, but forcefully shove the door open. If possible, look through the crack between the door and the bulkhead to see if anyone is behind the door. Inspect as much of the compartment as possible from the covered position.

(c) Inspect the remaining area of the compartment by rapidly extending the head just far enough to see, then quickly ducking back. This is referred to as a "quick peek." When doing a "quick peek," do so at a higher or lower than normal level by stooping or standing on the tiptoes.

(d) When approaching a compartment whose door opens outward, approach the door on the side opposite the hinges. Take cover behind the bulkhead and quietly pull the door open. Inspect as much of the compartment as possible from the covered position.

(e) Inspect the remaining area of the compartment by doing a "quick peek." If the door is already open, approach on the hinged side.

4) When operating as a two-man team, remember the following:

(a) Team members should take up positions on opposite sides of the door.

(b) The man opposite the hinges should open and inspect behind the door.

(c) Both team members should inspect the area visible using "quick peeks" as necessary to ensure thorough coverage of the compartment.

(d) Team members should enter the compartment using one of the techniques described on the following pages.

(e) If the door opens out, the man on the knob side should loop a cord around the knob and throw the end to his partner, staying back along the wall as far as possible from the doorway, reaching out full arms length, and unlatching the door.

(f) After having pulled back and readied his weapon, the other man should pull the door open.

(g) If the door opens in, the person on the knob side should try to unlatch the door. First, he should open the door an inch, back away, and listen for a moment. Next, he should shove the door open with enough force to strike the wall or a person hiding behind it.

(h) When entering the door, the following should be performed:

1) Strive for speed, surprise, and safety.

2) "Quick peek" before moving, then get in and get low, protect the back, and get the area of responsibility under control as quickly as possible.
3) Don’t “dally” in the doorway.

4) For speed, move in high with nothing lower than a slight crouch. (Going in low with the knees radically bent will be too slow.) Move in high, then get low.

5) Once across the threshold, get away from the door.

6) In essence, use a pattern, a tactical way of entering in minimum time with minimum exposure. Patterns are not absolutes, and getting in fast is more important than executing a perfect entry movement. Some of the more common methods are described below.

b. The “Buttonhook.” The “buttonhook” can be used when working alone or in a two-man team. After visual inspection from outside the door, quickly enter the compartment, hooking away from the door and keeping back to the bulkhead while entering. In a two-man team, normally enter together on signal. If the doorway is too narrow to enter together, decide by signal who will go first, and then quickly enter one after the other. In cases where furniture or other objects obstruct the view of the entire room, after entering, slowly move further into the room keeping the back towards the bulkhead until the compartment seems to be safe. Two-man teams usually work down opposite bulkheads. Commonly on vessels, doorways are located at the ends of passageways, thereby preventing both men from getting on either side of the door. In this instance, wrap around the door to the other side of the wall (one at a time, from the same side of the door and keeping the backs close to the frame).

c. The “Crisscross.” The “crisscross” (see Figure D-2) is the entry of choice for a dynamic entry. With the door closed, take up positions on opposite sides of the door. On signal, the man opposite the hinges opens the door and using the door as a shield during the initial 70° of the arc, quickly enters the compartment, assuming a position to the side of the doorway. Once clear of the doorway, the second man enters to the opposite side of the room. When the doorway is too narrow to enter simultaneously, the “crisscross” is an effective nondynamic room entry because, unlike the “buttonhook,” it is possible to see the destination before getting there.

d. The “S.A.S.” The S.A.S (see Figure D-3) can be used as a non-dynamic room entry when it is impossible to stand on both sides of the door. It is a technique where two or more men position themselves “heel to toe” on one side of the door, and one man holds onto the belt of the man in front of him. On signal, both men simultaneously rush into the room. As each man in line enters the compartment, he lets go of the belt and positions himself at a predetermined location inside the room.

e. The “Israeli.” Many sweep teams do an “Israeli” move (see Figure D-4) before they enter a compartment. The position for a “quick peek” into a compartment is the same position as for an “Israeli” move. On signal, immediately follow a “quick peek” with another “quick peek” with handgun being the “third eye.” In other words, swing only the gun hand into the compartment from the barricade position, sweeping the area of responsibility, then move back outside to set up for a standard entry.

f. For all entry techniques, if the right hand is the stronger hand and the right side of the doorway is being entered, switch weapon to the left hand. This minimizes exposure of the body in case it becomes necessary to engage a suspect hiding against the wall. The same holds true for a left-handed person on the left side of a doorway.

g. All entry tactics, while infinitely better than impulsively rushing the room, are tricky to perform and require practice.

10. Tactical Movement. Nothing is more important to surviving vessel sweeps than the
Figure D-2. The "Crisscross"
Figure D-3. The "S.A.S."
Figure D-4. The "Israeli" Move
principle of concealment that can minimize the risk. This can help in constructing a systematic plan rather than relying on random movement. Yet, ironically, when conducting tactical sweeps, often many of these tactical principles cannot be applied because of constraints in manpower, the impulses of human nature, or the realities of vessel design. Adhere to these principles as if they were the moral principles of life and appreciate their value. Try to adhere to them as often as possible and understand that there will be times when they will have to be compromised because of uncontrollable elements. At the very least, be aware when they are violated and why. The following are some specific tactical movement strategies:

a. **Clearing the Room.** After entering a room and establishing the areas of responsibility, clear the room with the same amount of safety used to enter it. Threat locations typically include under beds, behind large pieces of furniture, in closets, or around corners within the room. Look especially for doors that are open and doorways that lead to adjoining rooms. The primary area of interest will be that spot which, if a hostile person were hiding there, would give him the greatest opportunity to attack.

b. **The Most Immediate Threat.** Always take care of the most immediate threat first, even if it is not the greatest threat. The “rules of the room” says one ought to always move around the perimeters of rooms with back to the wall. In reality, furnishings or other obstacles often prevent this, especially on vessels. In large holds, mess decks, or other large spaces, it is tactically sound for decreasing the chance of exposing the back to a suspect. Stay low to reduce the possibility of being a target.

c. **Stationary/Moving Man.** No matter which partner chooses to negotiate the same side of the room or along opposite sides, only one should move at a time. The other should provide security. Usually, the stationary man performs most of the searching. The moving man will be able to open closet doors or lift void covers so the stationary officer can see into them.

d. **Weapon Preparation.** While moving, ready weapon to meet force with force. Forcefully challenge noises or movement not identifiable from the nearest cover by saying (for example), “You in the closet! Come out! Hands first!” Command the crewman to come. Do not approach what may turn out to be an armed crewman waiting.

e. **Adversary’s Field of View.** While moving, think constantly about the cover and the adversary’s field of view. Could a crewman be hidden in a spot from which he could see (or shoot)? As a tactical minimum, never enter a field of view that a partner cannot cover.

f. **Positioning.** Remain aware of own position relative to where a crewman may be and the position relative to that of the partner. Partners getting into each other’s crossfire is a major risk, especially in the close quarters of a vessel and where high stress tends to keep them engrossed in the search process.

g. **“Bunching Effect.”** Avoid the “bunching effect,” the tendency to cluster together in the illusion of safety in preparation to move, enter, or search. The closer partners are, the easier it is for an adversary to shoot both of them. Tactical separation buys time for proper reaction. However, partners should not distance themselves apart to a point where they cannot keep in visual contact. They should be able to see each other at all times, except in extreme circumstances.

h. **“Triangulation.”** Strive for the principle of “triangulation” (see Figure D-5), which promotes tactical separation, minimizes crossfire and bunching, and maximizes the impact of defensive fire by directing it to a central point. To understand “triangulation,” think of the potential hiding places in the field of view as being at the apex of a triangle. Ideally, both partners should be positioned so as to form the other corners of the triangle relative to each of these hiding places. If a threat presents itself, it is then possible to direct fire at it from different angles, while the adversary will be forced to separate his fire power in
Figure D-5. The "Triangulation" Concept
order to hit both partners. While moving to clear areas of responsibility, one partner shifts his position to maintain triangulation on new potential threat locations.

(1) Two movement techniques that accommodate this principle of "triangulation" are "follow the leader" and "leapfrog." They are described as follows:

(a) "Follow the leader" is a technique where one man moves, then stops, then the second man moves to his position (maintaining tactical separation). The second man also has rear guard responsibilities.

(b) "Leapfrog" is a technique where one man searches an area, then signals when it has been secured. The second man then moves past him into a new area and secures it.

(2) These two methods are used at various times during a vessel search. If one partner insists on moving about in a careless manner, the other partner should cover and not be lured into joining him in untactical movements.

11. Movement Strategies During a Search. Employ the following during a search:

a. Make sure that only one man moves at a time. (One covers while one moves.) This principle ensures that someone is always maintaining control and is prepared to provide reliable defense.

b. Look before leaping. Spot a covered or concealed position and plan the route to it prior to moving. Move by short bounds from one covered or concealed location to another. Keep low and don’t hesitate to creep or crawl.

c. Take full advantage of shadows and dark areas after making certain that no one is hiding in a potential moving spot.

d. Shift slowly while moving. Don’t wave the arms or rapidly turn the head.

e. Be conscious of self-made noises. The crewman will probably know of the team’s presence, especially once the team enters the compartment where he’s hiding. Breathing alone may be enough to alert him. It is amazing how acute the senses can be when someone is hiding and waiting for someone. Don’t help him by jangling keys, jingling coins in the pocket, carrying squawky radios, or wearing watches with alarms.

f. Minimize noise by using the sides of the feet to lightly feel the floor, rolling forward with the whole length of the outer edge of the foot before putting any weight on it.

g. Consider eliminating “visual noise,” such as ball caps with protruding bills. At least turn it around backward if it is worn at all. Besides announcing the team’s presence in maneuvers like the “quick peek,” a hat bill will restrict the peripheral vision and may discourage the team from looking up, an important and often neglected part of searching.

h. Get rid of the “loudness” of unnecessary odors, too. The scent of cologne can give locations away as easily as being heard.

i. Search with a gun on hand. It is disadvantageous enough to encounter a threat without being slow to respond by having to draw a weapon. Keep the following in mind:

(1) When standing or moving, avoid the “Movie cop” syndrome by holding the gun beside the head. There is a risk of shooting off a partner’s head.

(2) Move with the gun pulled back snugly in a two-hand hold against the waist, at the belt buckle, and with the muzzle pointed slightly downward. Having the gun in this position provides good stability, even to release
one hand to open doors or balance against a rocking ship. Then, if a threat comes unexpectedly from either side, the team member(s) will be on target (referred to as the “third eye” concept).

(3) Employ the “third eye” concept because as the body turns toward a threat, the gun (lined up in the center) turns, too. This turning is the essence of instinct shooting: what the gun sees as a “third eye,” it can hit.

j. When searching for a suspect:

(1) Avoid passing any potential hiding place without first checking and securing it. Do not dismiss any space for being too small or too unlikely. Motivated by the fear of being caught, humans can squeeze into amazingly small spaces.

(2) When searching an area of a vessel without having found someone, keep the senses sharp by thinking “I didn’t find anyone” and not “There is no one in there.”

(3) While searching, pause frequently and just listen. Remember, the crewman is excited and under stress, too. He may make a noise because his throat is dry, or he may get a muscle cramp.

(4) Do not rush the search. Because the mind may be accelerating under stress does not mean the movements have to accelerate to match.

(5) If a person is found, perform the following:

(a) Move him to a secure area.

(b) Handcuff and search him for weapons (one team member only, while the other provides cover).

(c) Move the suspect topside via a path that has been cleared or call for another sweep team to get him.

(d) Remember that if both team members leave the area, they will have to search their way to their previous location. Finding one unaccounted-for crewman should be a flag to search for more.

k. After clearing a room, be sure that all doors and accesses behind have been closed and locked, if possible, before moving on. Place pieces of masking tape across the top of the door and collect them when passing these places on the way out. Also, make sure that none of the tape has been disturbed.

1. If a barricaded crewman is encountered and cannot be talked out, or try to wait him out, smoke him out, or starve him out. Do not try to go in and get him. Leave that to the professionals. Lock him in, if possible, or post a guard and leave him.

12. Tactical Communications.

a. Most communications with other sweep team members during the conduct of a sweep should be accomplished by using nonverbal signals. See Figure D-6 for a few of the standard signals and their meanings.

b. Decisions dealing with who will go first, who will be high, who will be low, etc., are made simply by pointing and directing with the hands. Normally, the person in charge of a sweep team initiates the communication.

c. The sounds partners make while communicating should be soft, also. Instead of speaking out loud (a “hard” sound that can easily be pinpointed), whisper (a “soft” sound whose precise location cannot be so easily placed). Obviously, if a threat is imminent, shout out loud so there is no doubt that the warning is heard. While moving through the interior of the vessel, keep in mind that everyone may not always hear or see the same things, even though it may seem impossible that they wouldn’t.

d. In addition to the above, employ the following:
Figure D-6. Nonverbal Signals
(1) Be sure that communication does not require either partner to look away from his area of responsibility. Hand and head signals should be used only when they can be seen in direct or peripheral vision while attention is kept on the potential threat location. Normally, the man in front uses hand signals, while the man at the rear whispers, because his whisper will project forward. If in front, resist the impulse to look back to see if the other person got the message. When either partner receives a message, whisper or signal back to the other person that the message was received. Signals need to be very simple so they won’t be forgotten or confused under stress.

(2) Do not rub against walls while moving from one spot to another due to possible exposure and ricochet fire. To avoid being ambushed or surprised by someone on a different level, take care to check openings above and below while moving. In a situation where close attention must be given to the level above, cover the area into which the team is moving (see Figure D-7) while one partner, walking backwards and guided by the other partner, covers the higher level away from the area into which the team is moving. If a possible threat is detected, the team should take cover and confront the threat.

(3) Enter the passageways cautiously because they are ready-made for an ambush. Due to the possibility of an ambush, employ the following:

(a) Take a “quick peek” to clear the passageway before entering it. Instead of pecking around a corner, move to the opposite wall and peek out. (If someone is just around the corner, this will maximize the distance between them and the team member(s).)

(b) Utilize the “slicing the pie” option (see Figure D-8) while entering passageways or a corner and a threat may be on the other side. When near the corner, move away from the wall as far as possible, face the corner, and, while shuffling to the side, gradually increase the arc of visibility around it. Once the decision has been made to enter the passageway, only one man should enter at a time. Again, one man should move and one should cover. While moving around, always try to keep some cover in sight: a place to retreat if trouble explodes.

(c) When traversing narrow passageways and spaces, one team member should go first (crouching low) while the other covers him. When the first man gets to his destination, the other may advance.

(d) While moving up a ladder (see Figure D-9), one team member should slide up the ladder on his back, using his heels to push himself. The second team member should provide cover to the front. When moving down the ladder, take one or two steps down, exposing only the feet, then do a “quick peek” before proceeding. Use a mirror to look into a compartment to prevent being exposed.

(e) Remember that there are two objectives when approaching a search: To move through the passageway to reach a more distant area that was intended to be entered and searched, or to position one’s self in the passageway to enter a room that opens off the passageway.


(1) One method of expanding the field of view is through the manipulation of light in darkened locations. Where there is controllable lighting, move from dark areas into lighted ones and never the reverse, if possible. If, prior to entering a compartment, it is impossible to turn on its lights, turn the lights out in the occupied room. Do not form a silhouette by moving with bright
Figure D-7. The "Cover" Concept

Figure D-8. "Slicing the Pie"
light behind. Light switches in most compartments are opposite the hinge side of the door about chest height off the floor. Don't linger around the switch too long, though; the other guy probably knows where it is, too.

(2) Use the following procedures prior to entering compartments in which the lights cannot be turned on:

(a) Take cover together on the same side of the doorway with the partner standing and facing the wall as far back from the doorway as possible and holding his flashlight pointing into the compartment near the top of the doorway.

(b) Lay on the deck and peek into the compartment with weapon ready. On signal from one partner, the other partner should turn the light on.

(c) Send signals to the partner by pulling either up, down, left, or right on his pants leg. The partner should then correspond by slowly moving the flashlight in the direction of the pull.

(3) When performed properly, a person inside the compartment can only see a bright light near the top of the door. Use of this technique and "slicing the pie" should provide a look at most of the compartment.

(4) When moving about a dark compartment, consider using the "harries" flashlight technique. The flashlight is held with the back-of-flashlight hand meeting the back-of-gun hand. The two press together to create dynamic tension that stabilizes the pistol. Depending on hand and flashlight shape, the light button may be controlled by the little finger, index finger, or thumb. The idea is to flash momentarily, change position, and do it again, leaving the light out while moving. Regardless of the illumination created, before passing any corner or entering any doorway, see what may be waiting on the other side.
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