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AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION

OPERATIONS SERIES

ADFP 45

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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ADFP 45, First Edition, 1997

Sponsored by:

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)
Headquarters Australian Defence Force

Developed and Produced by:

Commandant
Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre

Published by:

Director Publishing and Visual Communications
Defence Centre - Canberra

^a Commonwealth of Australia 1997

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**AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
PUBLICATION**

OPERATIONS SERIES

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 45 - *Special Operations*, is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith.



J. S. BAKER
General
Chief of the Defence Force

January 1997

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CANBERRA ACT 2600

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FOREWORD

1. This publication promulgates the agreed joint doctrine and procedural aspects of special operations by the Australian Defence Force. The procedures in this edition have been framed to allow management of special operations through the full spectrum of military operations. ADFP 45 is suitable for use in single Service, joint or combined operations as applicable, at all levels of war and within all strata of command.
2. The Chief of the Defence Force is the approval authority for ADFP 45. Commander Special Forces is the publication sponsor and Commandant Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre is responsible for its continued development, amendment and production. Further information on ADFP is promulgated in Defence Instruction (General) ADMIN 20-1 - *Production and Control of Australian Defence Force Publications*.
3. Every opportunity should be taken by the users of this publication to examine its contents, applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendment action should be taken. Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre welcomes any assistance, from whatever source, to improve this publication.
4. **ADFP 45 is not to be released to foreign countries without the written approval of the Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Strategic Operations and Plans).**

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ACOPS	Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFDIS	Australian Defence Force Distributed Intelligence System
ADFORMS	Australian Defence Force Formatted Message System
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
ADFCC	Australian Defence Force Command Centre
AHQ	Air Headquarters
ASP	Australian Strategic Plan
AO	area of operations
AME	aeromedical evacuation
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
C2W	command and control warfare
C3I	command, control, communications and intelligence
CI	counterintelligence
CIS	communications and information systems
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
COMD SF	Commander Special Forces
COMNORCOM	Commander Northern Command
COMSEC	communications security
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CT	counter-terrorism
DACC	Defence aid to the civil community
DCAS	Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
DFACP	Defence Force Aid to the Civil Power
DGPI	Director-General of Public Information
DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
DJOPS	Director Joint Operations Staff
E&E	evasion and escape
E&RE	escape and re-entry
EW	electronic warfare
FMB	forward mounting base
FOB	forward operating base
HAHO	high altitude high opening
HALO	high altitude low opening
HQADF	Headquarters Australian Defence Force
HQAST	Headquarters Australian Theatre
HQNORCOM	Headquarters Northern Command
HQSO	Headquarters Special Operations
JAPG	joint administrative planning group
JCEB	Joint Communications-Electronics Branch
JFC	joint force commander
JFHQ	joint force headquarters
JFAO	joint force area of operations
JHPG	joint health planning group

LCAUST	Land Commander Australia
LHQ	Land Headquarters Australia
MCAUST	Maritime Commander Australia
MHQ	Maritime Headquarters Australia
MLW	Manual of Land Warfare
NORCOM	Northern Command
OPINST	operational instruction
OPSEC	operational security
POE	point of entry
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RISTA	reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition
SAR	search and rescue
SAS	Special Air Service
SASR	Special Air Service Regiment
SOLO	special operations liaison officer
SF	special forces
SGADF	Surgeon General Australian Defence Force
SHO	senior health officer
SMT	special mission team
SOP	standard operating procedures
SOPT	special operations planning team
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SPCG	strategic policy coordination group
TAOR	tactical area of responsibility

GLOSSARY

C4

Command, control, communications and computers.

centre of gravity

That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may be diffused or surrounded by competing decisive points.

clandestine operations (NATO)

An activity to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence and other similar activities sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (See *also* 'covert operation'.)

close quarter battle

Techniques and procedures using armed force, to engage a target in confined areas, usually at ranges less than five metres.

combat zone (NATO)

1. That area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations.
2. The territory forward of the army group rear boundary. It is divided into:
 - a. the forward combat zone, comprising the territory forward of the corps rear boundary; and
 - b. the rear combat zone, usually comprising the territory between the corps rear boundary and the army group rear boundary.

counterinsurgency (NATO)

Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.

counterintelligence

That aspect of intelligence devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion and installations, equipment, records or material against sabotage.

countersurveillance (NATO)

All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance.

cover

Those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation or installation from the enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information.

covert operations

Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation (ie deniability).

deception (NATO)

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

decisive point

Decisive points are those events, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.

electronic warfare (NATO)

The military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

evasion and escape (NATO)

The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

guerilla warfare (NATO)

Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, indigenous forces.

host nation (NATO)

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations (and/or NATO organisations) to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

intelligence (NATO)

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

insurgency (NATO)

An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

joint (NATO)

Activities, operations, organisations etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate. (When all Services are not involved, the participating Services shall be identified, eg Joint Navy-Army.)

logistics (NATO)

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

- a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel;
- b. movement, evacuation and hospitalisation of personnel;
- c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and
- d. acquisition or furnishing of services.

mounting area

A general locality where assigned forces of an amphibious or airborne operation, with their equipment, are assembled, prepared and loaded in ships and/or aircraft preparatory to an assault.

operational control (NATO)

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

pathfinder team (NATO)

A team inserted onto an objective to establish and operate navigational aids for the purpose of guiding aircraft to drop and landing zones.

psychological operations (NATO)

Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidation psychological operations and battlefield psychological activities.

physical security (NATO)

That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorised access to equipment, installations, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft.

rear area (NATO)

For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions.

search and rescue

The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.

source (NATO)

In intelligence usage, a person from whom or thing from which information can be obtained.

special forces

Specially selected military personnel, trained in a broad range of basic and specialised skills, who are organised, equipped and trained to conduct special operations. Special forces can be employed to achieve strategic, operational or tactical level objectives across the operational continuum.

special operations

Measures and activities outside the scope of conventional forces conducted by specially trained, organised and equipped forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during peacetime, conflict and war, independently or in conjunction with conventional forces.

special reconnaissance

Operations conducted by special forces to obtain or verify by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an enemy. Special reconnaissance may also be used to collect data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment and post strike reconnaissance.

special recovery

Operations undertaken by special forces to rescue personnel or equipment from enemy controlled or otherwise hostile territory and to return them to safe areas.

stay behind force (NATO)

A force which is left in position to conduct a specified mission when the remainder of the force withdraws or retires from the area.

strategic strike operations

Offensive actions designed to effect the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's capability to wage war.

subversion (NATO)

Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens.

tactical control (NATO)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

target acquisition (NATO)

The detection, identification and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

targeting

The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.

terrorism

The use or threatened use of violence for political ends, or any use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of putting any section of the public in fear.

unconventional warfare (NATO)

General term used to describe operations conducted for military, political or economic purposes within an area occupied by the enemy and making use of the local inhabitants and resources.

SYMBOLS OF PROTECTION

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

101. Special operations (SO) are defined as `measures and activities conducted by specially trained, organised and equipped forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives by means outside the scope of conventional forces.

102. These operations may be conducted during peacetime, conflict and war, independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. Special operations fall into four main categories:

- a. special reconnaissance operations,
- b. offensive operations including strike,
- c. recovery operations, and
- d. support operations.

103. SO are inherently joint in nature and rely on specialised training, organisations and equipment to achieve allocated tasks. Special forces (SF) form the major portion of the ADF SO capability and are raised, trained and equipped to conduct special operations. Some components which support the ADF SO capability include submarines, strike aircraft, transport aircraft (with specialist crews) and other government agencies. In addition, certain specialists from both within and outside the ADF may support SF where their skills are necessary for a particular task.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

104. The strategic environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that effect the use of national power. Strategic military commanders make decisions based on an appreciation of this environment. Since politico-military considerations often influence special operations, SF and those who command them, must understand the strategic environment in which they operate.

National Policy

105. National Security Policy. The Australian government decides the nation's security policy. Australia's key enduring national security objective is to maintain a positive security environment in Australia's region. This objective is achieved through the exercise of the interrelated elements of national power: economic strength, diplomacy and military capability. The Australian government also assists achievement of this objective through other policy responses such as: development assistance, non-military threat assistance and the exchange of people and ideas.

106. National Defence Policy. National Defence Policy is articulated in Defence Parliamentary White Papers. In reality, defence policy is an amalgam of political statements such as these, as well as other influences which are evolving constantly. The last formal presentation of defence policy in a White Paper in 1994, reaffirmed the policy of `self-reliance'. The policy gives priority to those capabilities necessary for the Defence of Australia and its direct military interests, with emphasis on Short Warning Conflict.

107. National Military Strategy. National military strategy supports the national security and Defence policies. It is based on the strategy of defence in depth which was first articulated in an Australian context in 1987. The strategy advocates four interlocking defensive zones to prevent

infiltration of Australian territory, along with retention of a limited offensive capability to achieve defensive strategic objectives. Military strategy is decided by CDF. Its formulation is constrained by political, diplomatic, economic and military considerations. Popular will, for example, will have a key influence on strategic plans. National Military Strategy is also articulated in general terms in the Defence White Papers, and more specifically in various documents including the CDF Preparedness Directive, strategic level appreciations, and Australian Strategic Plans.

Operational Continuum

108. The contemporary strategic environment is described as an operational continuum made up of a series of states or conditions ranging in extreme from peace to global war. For illustrative purposes, three general states in the continuum of conflict are peace, conflict and war.

109. Peace. It is not unusual for nations striving to achieve national objectives to be forced into competition with other nations. This may include, for example, nations competing economically for market share or in international fora for influence. The achievement of national objectives during peace may involve the use of all elements of national power, though in the case of military power; this falls short of combat operations. Equally, all elements of national power must strive to prevent peaceful competition leading to conditions conducive to conflict or war.

110. Conflict. The term 'conflict' can be defined as a politico-military struggle short of prolonged conventional armed action between organised parties within a nation or between nations. It is often protracted and usually confined to a geographic region but may have global implications. Conflict between opposing parties may begin with periods of tension characterised by diplomatic or economic sanctions. This may progress to the use of military or paramilitary power in a strategically indirect manner to support or counter subversion, to sabotage, to sponsor acts of terrorism or to support an insurgency. At the high end of the scale, conflict may be characterised by the use of military power directly, in short-duration, limited objective contingency operations by SF or conventional forces.

111. War. The term 'war' declared or undeclared, can be defined as sustained armed conflict between nations or organised parties within a nation. It may range in intensity from 'major conflict' between conventional and unconventional forces, through to 'global war' and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Wars are characterised by armed actions in a series of connected campaigns and battles. War may also include any of the actions described in 'conflict', above. War may be general, involving national survival and the total resources of nations. More commonly, however, war is limited, with restraints on resources and objectives. The same war may be general for one party and limited for another.

NATURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

112. Many of the characteristics and principles which apply to conventional military operations, apply equally to special operations. In other ways, there are significant differences. The distinguishing characteristic of special operations is that they are operations outside the scope of conventional forces.

Distinguishing Characteristics

113. SO differ from conventional operations by the nature of the operating environment. Frequently, they are mounted as a clandestine operation in a hostile environment, are undertaken by numerically lesser forces or are conducted remotely from other friendly combat, combat support and Service support forces. It is in this context that the following distinguishing characteristics must be considered:

- a. **Joint in Nature.** SO operations are inherently joint in nature. They are frequently employed to achieve the objectives of joint commanders at all levels. While the actual task will be performed by SF, the execution of the operation will almost always

require the active involvement of a wide range of elements from all Services and possibly, other government agencies. This may be through, for example, the provision of specialist intelligence advice in the planning phase, the provision of insertion and extraction platforms or the supplementation of the SF task element by ADF and non-military specialists.

- b. **Time Critical.** SO missions, particularly offensive and recovery operations, must seize the appropriate moment for success. Strategic and tactical opportunities are normally limited and of short duration. As they are normally focussed on vulnerabilities SO must be executed successfully the first time.
- c. **Strategic Effect.** SO can be conducted at all levels of war. Nonetheless, their optimum utility is achieved at the operational level. Strategic effect is achieved through the application of essentially tactical level techniques and procedures to achieve national and military strategic objectives. When conducted at the strategic level, virtually all aspects of SO will be directly influenced by the political imperatives which underpin the reasons for the operation.
- d. **Unorthodox Means.** The traditional principles of war apply to SO. However, there may be a different emphasis than in conventional operations. For example, in an SO mission, surprise may be more applicable than firepower or concentration of force.
- e. **Special Training and Equipment.** The rigours of the operating environment require personnel to be specially selected, trained and uniquely equipped. These features give SF capabilities not normally found within conventional forces.
- f. **Need for Specialised Intelligence.** To a greater degree than most operations, SO are intelligence driven and intelligence dependent. This, together with their sensitivity and potential effect, means that SO are usually required to be commanded at the highest level appropriate to the campaign or operation. This ensures timely access to necessary joint intelligence. SO generally rely on extant joint intelligence structures, but for certain sensitive missions, tactical and operational information must be collected using SF assets such as advance or reconnaissance forces. Even when operating at the tactical level, SF may need detailed national and theatre intelligence information, often in near-real-time.

THE ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES

114. The role of SF is to conduct SO. SF are specially selected military personnel, trained in a broad range of basic and specialised skills, who are organised, equipped and trained to conduct SO. SF can be employed to achieve strategic, operational or tactical objectives across the operational continuum.

115. SF are able to perform a range of specific tasks as detailed in chapter 2. These tasks often require the development of unique capabilities, either not possessed elsewhere in the ADF or not developed to the required degree. As a consequence, SF contain skills and capabilities which provide options for unforeseen contingencies. SF, dependant upon the task, frequently provide the ADF with cost efficient and secure options.

War

116. In war, SO may be mounted to achieve national and military strategic objectives. Strategic SO may have an indirect effect on the conduct of operations by conventional military forces at the operational and tactical levels. They may also be used to directly support operational campaign objectives, through the conduct of deep, close and rear operations, either independently or as part of a conventional force.

117. Special operations may be conducted at various levels:

- a. **Strategic Level.** SO conducted at the strategic level are directly linked to military strategy and will focus effort against the adversary's centre of gravity or strategic vulnerabilities. SO may attack either directly or indirectly a nation's leadership, command and control capability, economic, military or political vulnerabilities. From this focus, it follows that SO will be frequently conducted in the enemy's rear areas. At this level the CDF may direct a joint commander to conduct SO in pursuit of national or military strategic objectives. For example, SF may be required to undertake the following tasks:
 - (1) collect and report information of national strategic importance,
 - (2) develop and support insurgencies,
 - (3) disrupt the economy,
 - (4) recover personnel or equipment of strategic importance, or
 - (5) conduct other missions with decisive strategic implications but with no apparent near-term effect on conventional military operations.
- b. **Operational Level.** At this level the emphasis for SF will be on the accomplishment of operational objectives, either independently or in concert with actions by conventional forces. SO may be conducted anywhere within the theatre, in specific joint force area of operations (JFAO) or in the Australian support area. At the operational level, SO may be conducted in depth. They may extend into the adversary's homeland or territory, where the theatre allows. These operations may support operations beyond the limits of operational areas of conventional military forces, play an economy of force role on the strategic flanks or edge of the theatre, and involve the long-term support of friendly resistance organisations in the adversary's operational rear areas.
 - (1) **Theatre.** At the theatre level, Commander Australian Theatre may direct SO to support the campaign plan. The campaign commander may, for example, direct SO to collect intelligence in support of campaign planning, or to conduct offensive operations against the enemy. In these circumstances the objective may be to:
 - (a) alter the momentum and tempo of hostile operations,
 - (b) prevent the adversary from conducting continuous theatre operations, and
 - (c) protect Australian sovereignty in remote areas or friendly access to resources.
 - (2) **JFAO.** SO may also be conducted to support operations in a JFAO. By attacking an adversary's operational bases, support and reserve forces, SF disrupt their combined arms operations and degrade their momentum, which creates opportunities for friendly action. SF can identify high value targets and collect other vital information beyond the sensing capabilities of conventional force collection systems. They can attack high value targets and interdict priority target systems which may be beyond the range of conventional forces. If the JFAO is offshore SF elements working with indigenous resistance organisations can enhance their effect by coordinating their activities with those of a conventional military force.

- (3) **Australian Support Area.** During war, SF may conduct operations in friendly rear areas. Friendly rear area security forces may be inadequate, particularly if operations are being conducted over wide areas. SF can undertake crucial rear area tasks including recovery operations, or provide training assistance to conventional forces or police to help them deal with insurgents, enemy SF or terrorist activity.
- c. **Tactical Level.** In order to achieve operational objectives, battles and engagements within a sequence of major activities are planned and executed at the tactical level. This level is concerned with the planning and conduct of battle, and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives. SF are employed at the tactical level where the task is specialised in nature or of a defined duration.

Conflict

118. In the early stages of transition from peace to conflict, the commitment of conventional forces may be premature, inappropriate or unfeasible. It may also increase the risk of escalating the conflict to an unacceptable level. Australia's response to conflict might therefore include options to respond proportionately against the aggressor's interests. In these situations SF provide options for discrete engagement that precludes or limits the need to use conventional forces. The use of SF permits the government to:

- a. demonstrate national resolve and provide a presence where conventional force response options could be construed as escalatory,
- b. demonstrate support for an ally or friendly government by committing what are frequently regarded as a nation's most elite forces,
- c. provide a clandestine response to a threat of national significance,
- d. improve the military capabilities of allied or friendly governments within areas of SF expertise, and
- e. confirm capabilities and intentions of a potential adversary which are outside the sensing capabilities of other intelligence gathering assets.

119. Four types of military operations may be undertaken by the ADF during periods of conflict: insurgency/counterinsurgency, contingency operations, combating terrorism and peace operations. SO may be mounted to support military objectives in each of these scenarios as follows:

- a. **Insurgency/Counterinsurgency.** SF can support a friendly government against an insurgent threat either through special operations against the insurgent forces or through training assistance to the forces of the home government. At the more extreme end of the conflict continuum, SF may be used to support an insurgency if the insurgent forces also seek to oppose the adversary in conflict with Australia.
- b. **Contingency Operations.** These operations are politically sensitive military operations normally characterised by the rapid and short-term projection or use of military forces in conditions short of war. They normally occur in response to crises. Contingency operations by SF may include:
 - (1) recovery operations,
 - (2) evacuation operations,
 - (3) demonstrations of presence and commitment, and

- (4) securing point of entry for conventional follow-on forces.
- c. **Combating Terrorism.** It is possible for a nation to transit rapidly between conditions of 'peace' and 'conflict', albeit with the 'conflict' confined to a small geographic area. A nation can just as quickly return to a condition of peace. The ADF recovery capability has been developed to provide aid to the civil power in the event of a terrorist incident. During periods of short warning conflict, a nationally sponsored terrorist campaign could be expected to be part of any adversary's strategy to threaten Australia. In these circumstances, SO may be mounted in rear areas using extant capabilities. In addition, anti-terrorist operations may be necessary against terrorist infrastructure.
- d. **Peace Support Operations.** SF may be used independently or in conjunction with a conventional force to participate in peace operations. SF involvement may be particularly warranted in situations requiring rapid deployment, independent long-range communications and where economy of force is necessary for either financial, diplomatic or political reasons.

Peace

120. SF can be used in support of operations in the national interest in times of peace. SO may, for example, be mounted to enhance Australia's engagement within the region or to provide humanitarian assistance. SF suitability for operations in peacetime arises from their ability to operate in harsh physical environments; to communicate over long distances; to effectively relate to regional force personnel and to operate with minimal logistics and medical support.

- a. **Engagement with the Region.** SF are ideally suited to enhancing closer cooperation and engagement with nations in Australia's region. Engagement with the region is achieved through the provision of training advisers and teams to regional SF and conventional units and from the exchange of ideas and personnel at higher levels.
- b. **Humanitarian Assistance.** In the case of isolated small incidents, SF can mount humanitarian assistance operations to provide immediate advanced first aid. In the event of a major disaster involving significant loss of life, SF will generally be too small to provide humanitarian assistance of sufficient scale. However their flexibility of insertion means, limited logistic liability and inherent communications and medical capabilities, make them an ideal first response in situations of national disaster where infrastructure may be non-existent. Once deployed within a theatre, they can quickly identify the appropriate focus of effort for follow-on forces and can prepare the entry point for the arrival of large scale medical or evacuation assets. SF can also be used to provide security detachments for conventional force elements carrying out humanitarian assistance.
- c. **Assistance to Other Government Departments.** The same SF individual and collective skills may be of use to other government departments and agencies. Assistance can range for example, from the provision of security advice to overseas missions, to the provision of long-range secure communications for short duration activities.

CHAPTER 2

TYPES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

201. Though their execution is essentially tactical in nature, the range at which special operations (SO) can be mounted gives them the potential to achieve national, military strategic and operational level objectives. For example, the effect required may contribute to national policy objectives such as regional engagement or counter-terrorism in peace; or to military strategic objectives through precision strike or intelligence gathering in conflict or war. Equally however, the same capabilities can be used at the operational and tactical levels. In situations short of war SO can complement conventional capabilities.

202. Types of SO are:

- a. special reconnaissance operations,
- b. offensive operations,
- c. special recovery operations, and
- d. support operations.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

203. Special reconnaissance operations are intelligence gathering operations involving reconnaissance, surveillance and other techniques. Special reconnaissance operations are conducted by special forces (SF) to obtain or verify by visual observation, or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an enemy. Special reconnaissance may also be used to collect data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment and post strike assessment.

204. Special reconnaissance operations normally collect and report information beyond the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems and complement other national and theatre collection systems (eg high altitude imagery or signals intelligence) which may be affected by weather, terrain masking or enemy countermeasures. In addition, special reconnaissance may be used to cue such high technology assets.

205. In order to gain specific, well defined and time sensitive data, special reconnaissance teams may use conventional battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance techniques. Alternatively they may adopt more sophisticated collection methods which utilise language skills and other skills.

Mission Types

206. Typical special reconnaissance missions include:

- a. collection of political, economic, psychological or military intelligence;
- b. collection of critical military order of battle information (eg nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities and intentions, commitment of second echelon forces and location of high level headquarters);

- c. collection of technical military information (missions of this nature could involve escorting non SF specialist technicians charged with obtaining the information);
- d. target acquisition and surveillance of hostile command and control systems, troop concentrations, strike weapons, lines of communications and other military targets of significance to the theatre commander and joint force commanders;
- e. acting as pathfinders for conventional forces;
- f. location and surveillance of hostage and prisoners of war detention facilities;
- g. post strike reconnaissance;
- h. meteorological, geographic, demographic and hydrographic reconnaissance; and
- i. reconnaissance to support SO planned for the future.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

207. Offensive operations conducted by SF are normally limited in scope and duration and usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. They may be conducted unilaterally by SF or in support of conventional forces. Offensive operations by SF are usually designed to achieve specific, well defined results of strategic, operational or critical tactical significance. They frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems or where the strike capabilities of conventional forces might constitute unwarranted escalation. Unlike other ADF strike forces SF may be employed to produce deniable or non escalatory results. SF remain the only ADF strike asset capable of being targeted against individuals regardless of location.

208. Offensive operations involve:

- a. attack on critical capabilities including materiel and personnel;
- b. interdiction of lines of communication, bases or other target systems; and
- c. seizure, destruction or neutralisation of key points in support of conventional forces or in advance of their arrival.

209. Offensive operations can be conducted by individuals and small units from patrol to company/squadron size. Where appropriate assets are available, commandos can also conduct unit sized raids. Although normally thought of in terms of close combat operations, offensive operations can also include stand off attacks by weapon systems either delivered, directed or designated by SF. Offensive operations include:

- a. close combat tactics and techniques such as raids, ambushes and direct assaults employed when the target and mission require precise or discriminate application of force beyond the capability of other forces; and
- b. stand off attacks conducted in support of close combat actions or independently when the target can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close combat forces.

SPECIAL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

210. Special recovery operations are sometimes undertaken to rescue personnel or equipment from enemy controlled or otherwise hostile territory and to return them to safe areas. They also include operations where the personnel or items to be recovered are either held or face imminent capture, and include counter terrorist (CT) operations

211. SF recovery operations are characterised by detailed planning, rehearsal and thorough intelligence analysis. They may utilise an amalgam of special reconnaissance, offensive operations and other SO techniques. They may be conducted independently or with the assistance of conventional force assets and will almost invariably be joint. SF can also contribute to recovery operations conducted by conventional ADF forces in both Services protected and Services assisted evacuations. This support may include: offensive support, pathfinding, special reconnaissance, specialised communications teams, limited medical support and special recovery capabilities for unforeseen emergencies. Greater detail on the role of SF in these types of operations is given in ADFP 43 - *Evacuation Operations*.

212. SF have an inherent capability to conduct search and rescue and combat search and rescue missions. These missions would normally only be undertaken by SF where the recovery of personnel or materiel is beyond the capability of normal SAR assets assigned to the operation.

213. SF have the responsibility for providing specialist assault forces capable of dealing with high risk terrorist incidents which threaten Australian interests and which are beyond the capability of civilian authorities to resolve. In peacetime, CT operations would be conducted in response to 'call out' by the Governor-General in Council. The types of operations undertaken include hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materiel from terrorist organisations and recapture of fixed installations or mobile assets held by terrorists. In addition to conducting CT operations, SF may also provide advice, assistance and training to police, other government agencies and foreign allies on CT prevention and security measures.

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

214. Support operations include all those operations where SF act in support of other conventional or special forces, other government agencies or police forces. Support operations may be conducted in support of either Australian or foreign forces or agencies. Some examples of support operations include regional training assistance and support to contingencies.

Regional Training Assistance

215. The multiskilled nature of SF personnel, coupled with their experience in cross cultural instruction makes them ideal for engagement with other countries through military, paramilitary or humanitarian assistance. Such assistance could include advice and training in:

- a. basic military skills (ie weapons, minor tactics, leadership) to irregular, paramilitary and military forces of the host nation; and
- b. skills to host nation SF units.

Support to Contingencies

216. Contingencies may occur with little warning, requiring a timely and appropriate response by national agencies including the ADF. They may include:

- a. support to regional governments on request,
- b. humanitarian assistance, and

- c. peace operations.

217. SF can provide:

- a. small deployable teams to establish rapid, secure long range communications between forward and rear areas;
- b. language, training and cultural awareness skills which enable them to operate with regional forces and agencies or assist other forces or government agencies;
- c. expertise in security assistance tasks for terrorist threats at the strategic, operational and tactical levels;
- d. extensive training in skills requiring the selective use of force eg close quarter battle;
- e. advanced first aid and area or damage assessment skills to support rescue and disaster relief agencies in remote areas; and
- f. personnel to provide security and protection for non combat ADF elements operating in a hostile environment.

CHAPTER 3

COMMAND, CONTROL AND CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

301. Chapter 2 focussed on how special forces (SF) can be used to achieve strategic and operational objectives. This chapter outlines command and control arrangements and responsibilities for special operations (SO). The assignment of SF in support of operations carries with it a number of responsibilities, including the requirement to provide assigned SF with those resources on which they are dependent for success. The command and control arrangements outlined in this chapter should assist the commander in executing these responsibilities.

COMMANDER SPECIAL FORCES

302. CDF or Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) command SO directly or by utilising the specialist capabilities of Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO). SF elements may also be assigned to a joint force commander (JFC). SF are assigned to Commander Special Forces (COMDSF) who in peace has operational command of all SF units. COMD SF role is to command Army SF and other assigned units, to provide staff advice on their capabilities and employment and to sponsor the development of SF operational capabilities. The responsibilities of COMD SF include:

- a. undertake contingency planning for the employment of SF, as directed;
- b. plan and conduct SO in peace and war, as directed;
- c. provide specialist operational planning advice to HQADF and COMAST as required;
- d. plan and conduct designated, joint and combined exercises;
- e. coordinate the development of the ADF SO capability including joint support capabilities;
- f. when nominated, be the ADF representative for liaison with other government departments and agencies regarding the employment of SF on government directed tasks including the ADF counter-terrorist response; and
- g. conduct liaison with SF of other nations for the planning and conduct of combined SF training.

303. COMD SF is responsible for the conduct of all operations involving SF, other than SF assigned to other commanders. COMD SF is responsible to Chief of the General Staff, for support matters, including the raising, training and equipping of SF for employment on operations and for providing administrative and logistic support to those forces.

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

304. Special operations follow the principles for joint command and control contained in ADFP 1 - *Doctrine*. These principles apply to all SO, with sometimes different emphasis than for command and control of conventional forces.

305. Unity of Command. Forces conducting or supporting SO should be under the operational command of the commander who assigns the SO task. This ensures that operational support for SO is guaranteed and is available for the detailed planning and rehearsals inherent in most SO. Operations are less likely to succeed where command responsibilities are blurred between the forces conducting and supporting SO.

306. Control of Scarce Resources. SO should be commanded at the highest level appropriate to the nature of the SO and the area or theatre of operations to which they are assigned. This control measure ensures that SO components which are scarce assets and hard to replace in the short term, remain available for other tasks. For example, SF, strategic strike aircraft or submarines, are employed on tactical tasks when no higher priority strategic or operational level tasks exist. The assigning authority acknowledges the need to preserve such assets for higher priority tasks through the degree of operational authority assigned to the tactical commander. Assigning appropriate status of command facilitates the employment of SO forces across all levels of operations.

307. Recognised Chain of Command. SO are often time sensitive and involve detailed planning and rehearsals. They have the potential to become complex operations and must therefore be controlled by a simple and responsive command system. Unnecessary interpositioning of headquarters decreases responsiveness, has the potential to compromise security and is often unnecessary. In most instances, SF components will be collocated with the supported joint force headquarters or where administrative and logistic support is most effectively achieved. Where this is not possible, SF will provide separate command and liaison elements to effect responsive command arrangements. The SO commander must be directly responsible to the commander who assigns the SO task.

308. Continuity of Command. Detailed preparation and security are characteristics of many SO. Preparation requires tasks to be predicted, where possible, well in advance and security may limit the frequency of contact with deployed elements. Command and control systems reduce this tension by predicting the need for SO and minimising the time required to retask SO elements.

309. Delegation of Authority. SO achieve missions beyond the scope of conventional forces through the amalgam of specialist skills, organisations and equipment. Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of these characteristics and the way in which they enhance the versatility of joint forces requires specialist advice. SO command and liaison elements are integral to effective employment of SO through all levels of operations and forms of conflict. An element of the SO command or liaison component will normally be collocated with the supported commander. These elements may vary in size and structure.

LEVELS OF COMMAND

310. SO will normally be commanded at the strategic and operational levels, as this is where they yield the greatest effect. Command at this level should ensure access to an appropriate level of joint intelligence for planning. Where it is unlikely that a higher priority task will arise, SF may also be employed at the tactical level. There may be a dichotomy between the desire to preserve assets in order to conduct or support possible strategic SO and the benefit of employing these forces to enhance tactical level conventional force operations. The assignment of operational authority is the mechanism by which this dichotomy is controlled. SO are frequently described as tactical operations which yield operational or strategic results.

311. The requirement for and control of SO often depends on the capacity of conventional forces to complete missions in accordance with the commander's intent. SO can meet a requirement where conventional solutions may be inappropriate to achieve military or national objectives. Having determined that a SO is required, the commander assigning the SO mission selects the control

arrangements appropriate to the objectives, considers the conventional support required, the time available, the requirement for security and the effect of SO on the joint force area of operations or theatre of operations. The SO planning process is explained in chapter 4.

Special Operations at the Strategic Level

312. At the strategic level, SF may be commanded directly by CDF, by COMAST, a JFC or COMD SF. The political sensitivity of possible tasks, their contribution to other elements of national power, or their contribution to or need to access high level intelligence will often dictate the method of command or control. Specialist staff provide advice on joint support to SO. HQSO staff provide advice on the conduct of SO. For all operations controlled directly by HQADF in which there is an SF involvement, COMD SF provides an SO planning team as staff supplementation to HQADF.

313. Examples of strategic level SO which may be directly commanded by CDF include:

- a. during peace, military offensive action to counter-terrorism as part of Defence Force Aid to the Civil Power;
- b. during conflict, recovery of personnel or equipment of strategic importance in foreign territory; and
- c. during war, attacks on the enemy's decisive points, so as to unhinge its centre of gravity. An example may be strategic strike operations in the form of direct action or guerilla warfare operations to develop and support insurgencies outside the theatre.

Special Operations at the Operational Level

314. At the operational level, SO may be commanded by COMAST or a JFC. The authority directing the SO and assigning SF should also assign sufficient resources to deploy, sustain and recover the SF in support. An example would be providing resources for special recovery missions, with the range and characteristics required to support the operation. For SO, COMD SF provides an SO planning team as staff supplementation to the supported joint headquarters. It is important to note that under certain circumstances COMD SF can command the joint force when it is predominately SF or where SF have the lead in the operation such as during a recovery operation during peacetime

315. Where the nature of the task borders on the operational level, or HQADF already controls several strategic tasks, CDF may direct the campaign commander to control a strategic level mission. A strategic strike task which is outside an assigned theatre of operations but which is designed to support theatre deep operations is an example of a strategic task which may be controlled at the operational level. Where this occurs, CDF will assign forces with an operational authority appropriate to the number of SO missions required at both the strategic and operational levels.

Special Operations at the Tactical Level

316. SO are not normally assigned to the tactical level. However, SF and forces supporting SO may be assigned to the tactical level to enhance the versatility or effectiveness of a conventional operation. When this occurs, these forces are normally controlled by a formation headquarters. Each SF task component assigned to the formation commander will have an organic command and control element. For tactical support the senior SF commander will normally provide a liaison officer to the supported element.

317. Examples of SF support at the tactical level include:

- a. during peace, security for deployed conventional forces where specialist skills are required;

- b. during conflict, pathfinder operations for conventional follow on forces; and
- c. during war, raids and seizure of amphibious points of entry for conventional follow on forces.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND STRUCTURES AND ORGANISATIONS

318. SO are commanded in a similar manner to other joint operations. COMD SF is also a JFC, particularly where SO are likely to dominate the operational activity within a joint force area of operations (JFAO). In such cases, COMD SF will utilise HQSO as the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) with staff supplementation from supporting joint intelligence and insertion agencies as necessary.

Special Operations Organisations

319. SF units maintain capabilities which enhance the versatility of joint operations. Their organisations provide the flexibility to allocate the most suitable SF element to the operation. SF components for an operation can be drawn from existing organisations or may be designed specifically. Regardless of the size or complexity of the operation the SO structure will normally comprise a command and liaison component, SF task component and supporting ADF assets.

320. The components and their various sub-elements which are described below, are shown in diagrammatic form at annex A.

- a. **Command and Liaison Component.** The command and liaison component consists of a range of command and control elements which are established at all levels involved in an SO. The different elements are described below. Details of their responsibilities are at annex B.
 - (1) **Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).** The conduct of SO as an independent task in a dedicated JFAO, may require a JFHQ to be established. The JFHQ may be based on HQSO or be a separate, purpose designed organisation drawn from regimental SF assets. It has integral communications and is capable of providing liaison officers to supporting units or formations.
 - (2) **Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).** The SOCCE provides command, control and communications for the SO force assigned to a JFC. It will normally be located with the senior tactical or operational level headquarters and will provide detailed advice and planning for the conduct of SO. It will have integral communications and the ability to command or control assigned joint assets. It will possess the capability to provide liaison officers to supporting units or formations if required. The SOCCE may be based on a unit or sub-unit headquarters or be a purpose designed organisation drawn from a combination of SF assets.
 - (3) **Special Operations Planning Team (SOPT).** The SOPT provides SF staff supplementation to a strategic or operational level headquarters. It provides advice to the commander and staff support to the headquarters for the conduct of SO. The SOPT may be drawn from HQSO or be a separate, purpose designed organisation drawn from unit SF assets.
 - (4) **Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO).** A SOLO may be assigned as required to any headquarters or force element that is supporting, supported by or involved with an SO. The SOLO provides advice and liaison for all SO matters. A SOLO provided by a SF formed body will have communications with assigned SF elements, or those operating in a contiguous area of operations (AO) as necessary.

b. **Task Component.** The SO task component allocated to a JFC may include one or more command, combat, combat support and administrative support elements. Their associated characteristics are as follows:

(1) **Command Elements.** The command element is responsible for the allocation of tasks to combat elements, the conduct of battle procedure and the monitoring and control of operations by deployed forces. SF units provide the tactical command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) for other elements of the assigned SO task component. If sufficient notice is given to exchange communications equipment, it is possible for a command element drawn from one SF unit to command elements from another SF unit. The command elements are described below:

(a) **Special Air Service (SAS) HQ.** Where a SF task component is predominantly SAS, it is normal for the tactical command element to be drawn from a SAS HQ, normally at squadron level. These headquarters have the following characteristics:

i. **Employment.** The headquarters provides tactical level C3I to SF combat elements.

ii. **Composition and Capabilities.** Composition includes a commander, operations/intelligence, communications and logistics elements. The composition is dependent on the task and level of support from the supported force. It provides C3I for SF combat elements for a short duration liaison officer capability and personnel to interact with relevant operations, intelligence, administrative and logistics staff.

iii. **Communications.** The headquarters is capable of establishing and maintaining its own lower and higher communications. Strategic, operational and tactical communications capabilities are detailed in chapter 7.

iv. **Administration and Logistics.** The headquarters can be self-sustaining for up to three days. It does not normally deploy with integral transport.

v. **Other Requirements.** If allocated, the headquarters requires an area to establish a command post and communications centre in close proximity to intelligence and movement agency staff. The headquarters is not capable of defending itself in a hostile environment.

(b) **Commando Headquarters.** The command element of a predominantly commando SF task component will normally be based on a commando company headquarters. Its characteristics are:

i. **Employment.** The headquarters is structured to provide tactical C3I to a raid force consisting of up to four platoon sized manoeuvre units and a support weapons platoon. The headquarters has the capacity to control indirect fire support and deploy with its A echelon.

ii. **Composition and Capabilities.** The organisation is composed of command, operations/intelligence, fire support and logistics elements.

- iii. **Communications.** A company headquarters is capable of providing higher and lower communications. Communications are allocated from regiment assets to provide links to unit headquarters and supporting assets.
 - iv. **Administration and Logistics.** A commando company headquarters will normally deploy with its company and with sufficient first line supplies to achieve the immediate task. The company may have integral administrative support prior to its operational deployment.
 - v. **Other Requirements.** Prior to deployment, the headquarters requires an area to establish a command post with ready access to the SOCCE and which is in close proximity to a training area suitable for rehearsals.
- (2) **Combat Elements.** SF task components include combat elements. These elements are the basic building blocks for the conduct of SO. The SF combat elements include the following:
- (a) **SAS Patrol:** The SAS patrol is the basic combat element in Special Air Service Regiment. Key characteristics are:
 - i. **Composition.** The patrol is task oriented and normally consists of five to six personnel and has integral command, communications and level one medical capabilities.
 - ii. **Insertion.** Patrols can insert into an area by parachuting, diving, by use of small craft from submarines or surface vessels, long range vehicles or by fixed or rotary wing aircraft.
 - iii. **Skills.** Other integral skills in a patrol include long range communications, advanced first aid, regional languages, cross cultural training, demolitions and advanced weapons skills.
 - iv. **Mobility.** Patrols employed with a long range vehicle or small craft capability have integral mobility. Other patrols generally lack integral transport and therefore have limited tactical mobility.
 - v. **Administration and Logistics.** In the event that a patrol is deployed independently, it may require administrative assistance from the supported force, particularly resupply platforms.
 - vi. **Communications.** The patrol deploys with communications capabilities suitable to the task. Strategic, operational and tactical communications capabilities are detailed in chapter 7.
 - vii. **Other Requirements.** Additional requirements include a separate area for isolation and briefing, detailed intelligence briefing on arrival, contact with insertion and extraction agencies for planning, areas and resources for independent and joint rehearsals and areas for preparation, maintenance and storage of equipment. Prior to deployment, the requirement for battle procedure generally precludes the use of these personnel for routine security tasks other than in their own sector.

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- (b) **Commando Company.** A commando company is the basic combat element of the Commando Regiment. Key characteristics are shown below:
- i. **Composition.** An operational company has four manoeuvre platoons, each of four sections. Each section consists of eight personnel and has two machine-guns. The company's support weapons platoon is equipped with medium mortars and sustained fire machine-guns. The company also employs shoulder fired anti-armoured weapons.
 - ii. **Insertion.** The company can be inserted by air using static line parachute or by airlanding with fixed and rotary wing aircraft; or may be inserted by sea, using surface vessels and small craft.
 - iii. **Skills.** Other skills resident in a commando company include demolitions, advanced first aid, roping and climbing.
 - iv. **Mobility.** The company has sufficient integral B vehicles to move its combat elements. Normally, however, the nature of the task and restrictions on the capacity of insertion agencies, means that tactical mobility after insertion will be restricted to movement by foot.
 - v. **Administration and Logistics.** The company will usually deploy with sufficient first line holdings to achieve the task. Before retasking, or if unforeseen operational difficulties arise, second or third line resupply will be required.
 - vi. **Communications.** The company's internal communications capacity can be readily augmented by the regimental signals squadron. Strategic, operational and tactical communications capabilities are detailed in chapter 7.
 - vii. **Other Requirements.** Once warned for operations, the company requires sufficient area, resources and assets to conduct joint rehearsals. Additional areas are required for stores, stores preparation, planning and briefing. Extensive intelligence and other agency briefings are essential to mission planning. Liaison officers are required from the supported headquarters and allocated agencies to assist in the detailed tactical level planning and rehearsals.
- (c) **Special Mission Team (SMT).** A SMT is structured to perform a specific task usually associated with the raising, training and commanding of a guerilla force. It will generally range in size from one to 15 personnel and will generally include a command, communications and level one medical element.
- (3) **SF Combat Support Elements.** A SF task component deploys with elements to support the insertion, extraction and execution of tasks. Command, control and administration of these elements occurs in conjunction with other SF elements. Types of support include:
- (a) personnel to support parachute operations (including dispatchers, air dispatchers and parachute riggers);

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- (b) support boat personnel with craft for insertion or extraction tasks (associated craft may range from rigid inflatable craft to craft of opportunity);
 - (c) additional communications capabilities;
 - (d) linguists; and
 - (e) other non-SF technical specialists to support planning or execution of a mission.
- (4) **SF Administrative Support Elements.** A SF task component can deploy with integral administrative support. This reduces its dependency on the supported force by supplementing or interfacing with the supported force's administrative assets. The requirement for these elements must be considered in initial planning by joint force headquarters staff. Associated characteristics include:
- (a) **Types of Support.** The types of administrative support which may be assigned to supplement those of the supported force include catering, clerical, supply, medical, maintenance support (including armourers, fitters, marine and vehicle mechanics and technicians) and transportation.
 - (b) **Location.** Administrative support elements normally operate from an A echelon located with the SF combat element and a B echelon located with the JFC's main administrative force. Both may be collocated for convenience in some circumstances. The duties of personnel are often split between A and B echelon responsibilities.
 - (c) **Protection.** The administrative support elements are small in size and heavily tasked. As a result they have a limited capability to protect themselves. They are usually available for routine local defence tasks when not needed for their primary duties.
 - (d) **Transport.** Administrative support elements usually lack integral transport.

COMBINED OPERATIONS

321. SO may be combined. The various 'building blocks' identified above allow for ease of integration and interoperability as required. Due to the unique nature of special operations procedures at the tactical level, personnel should not be mixed to create ad hoc combined combat elements. If this is unavoidable, lengthy battle procedures and rehearsals will be essential.

BATTLEFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE

322. The infrastructure to support SO will comprise a combination of the following:

- a. **Mounting Base.** A location where concentration and preparation of combat elements occurs prior to deployment. Mounting bases for SF will usually be their permanent barracks. Prior to deployment, routine administrative support of combat elements occurs from this location using normal logistics and administrative assets.

- b. **Forward Mounting Base (FMB).** A FMB is established to concentrate and prepare SF combat elements closer to the AO. This helps to reduce subsequent deployment time and increases operational security. The FMB may also be the location in which SF marry-up with the supported conventional forces.
- c. **Forward Operating Base (FOB).** If deploying over extended distances, a SF task component may move to a FOB. A FOB positions the combat elements closer to the AO and the SF supporting elements closer to the supported force. This may assist command, allow acclimatisation, reduce the tactical insertion phase, improve security and assist administrative support of the component. The FOB may be collocated with the supported force or be in a separate location. The FOB may be in or out of the AO. For amphibious operations the FOB may be aboard amphibious ships.
- d. **Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).** A TAOR is an independent AO assigned to a single SF combat element (if allocated solely for SO). Any two SO TAOR will generally not have a common boundary.

DEPENDENCIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

323. Assigned SF provide the JFC with unique capabilities which, if used effectively, can provide a significant force multiplier, but also impose a number of dependencies such as insertion and extraction, intelligence, logistics and communications.

324. Insertion and Extraction. SO are reliant on all three Services for assets to insert and extract forces. It is imperative that planning involves the supporting insertion or extraction agency as soon as possible. This joint planning leads to the issue of an operation order and subsequent briefings to insertion and extraction agencies. Rehearsals are normally required consistent with the familiarity of the SF element and aircraft or ships crews with procedures. The most common methods of insertion and extraction are detailed in chapter 5. Command and control arrangements must address the responsibilities of commanders during transit, release and recovery of SF combat elements.


325. Intelligence. As with other operations, the successful conduct of SO relies on accurate, relevant and timely intelligence. SF deploy with a limited intelligence capability which relies on interfacing with other agencies. During an operation, information from SF is processed through the joint intelligence system. Details of intelligence requirements and systems are covered in chapter 6.

326. Logistics. SF reliance on platforms for insertion and extraction may place additional burdens on a JFC to ensure the maintenance of logistic support to these maritime, land and air assets. The deployment of SF administrative support elements and an initial self-sustaining capacity may reduce the burden of the force on the JFC's administrative system. However, for SO of long duration, consideration must be given to resupply of deployed elements. This resupply may also involve joint assets which have a direct effect on the JFC's operations. Logistics considerations are detailed in chapter 8.

327. Communications. A SF element will generally deploy with communications and information systems (CIS) to support operations. Supplementation of these assets may be required if tasking requires interface between elements. Interoperability issues, particularly with insertion and extraction agencies, need to be resolved through detailed joint CIS planning and rehearsals. Chapter 7 gives more detail on CIS planning considerations in support of SO.

- Annexes:**
- A. Special Operations Command and Control
 - B. Capabilities of Special Operations Command and Liaison Elements

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL



Notes:

1. Raised for strategic tasks commanded directly by CDF.
2. If SF assets assigned to JFC.
3. If no SF assigned, SOLO may still be required.

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4. If SF operations are commanded directly by COMAST.
5. An integral command element from SASR and/or CDO REGT.
6. May consist of CDO COY(S), SAS PATROL(S) or UWTs.
7. May consist of Parachute Support Personnel, Boat Pens, Communications Specialists, Linguists or Non-SF Technical Specialists.
8. Will usually consist of catering, clerical, supply, medical, maintenance and transport support service personnel.

**CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND LIAISON
ELEMENTS**

ELEMENT	COMMAND AND CONTROL	PLANNING	ADVICE	PROVIDE LIAISON OFFICERS	COMMS
JFHQ	X	X	X	X	X
SOCCE	X	X	X	X	X
SOPT		X	X		X ⁽¹⁾
SFLO			X		X ⁽²⁾

Table 3B-1

This table illustrates the integral capabilities of the various elements of the Special Operations Command and Liaison Component.

Notes:

1. Communications will normally be by fixed communications facilities. A special operations planning team assigned 'In Support' of a combined force may require portable communications equipment.
2. Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO) will have a requirement to communicate with the SF commander whom they represent. In some circumstances the SOLO may not deploy with integral communications equipment, if they have access to fixed communications assets in the supported headquarters. In other circumstances, SOLO assigned to the tactical level may deploy with the necessary equipment to communicate directly with deployed SF task component elements to assist with deconfliction.

CHAPTER 4

PLANNING SPECIAL OPERATIONS CHARACTERISTICS

INTRODUCTION

401. Special operations (SO) are tactical operations which achieve strategic and operational effects. They may be conducted in peace, conflict and war. Consequently, the strategic context affects all aspects of planning and conduct for these operations. Mission planning for SO starts following the recognition that a situation may require an Australian Defence Force response which incorporates SO. It ends with the accomplishment or cancellation of the task.

402. The conduct of a SO has four phases:

- a. planning;
- b. preparation and rehearsal;
- c. execution, incorporating:
 - (1) insertion,
 - (2) conduct,
 - (3) sustainment,
 - (4) extraction, and
- d. post operation procedures.

403. This chapter focuses on the planning phase and briefly addresses the post operational procedure phase. Its aim is to provide guidance to commanders on how to assess whether the mounting of an SO is feasible; and to provide staff planners with the detailed planning factors which should be considered.

404. The CDF, Commander Australian Theatre, a Headquarters Australian Theatre component commander, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) or any subordinate commander empowered to do so, may initiate planning for SO.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING AT THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL

405. ADFP 9 - *Joint Planning*, describes the joint planning processes practiced at the strategic and operational level.

406. Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO) routinely provides input to draft Australian Strategic Plans and combined plans which result from the HQADF deliberate planning process. Commander Special Forces (COMD SF) attends, or is represented on the Strategic Planning Group during HQADF planning through the provision of a special operations planning team (SOPT) from HQSO. As a result, COMD SF is able to provide specialist advice on SO at an early stage of strategic planning. The function and tasks of a SOPT are described in chapter 3.

407. COMD SF provides similar support at the operational level by attending or providing representation at the theatre operations planning group. The provision of an SOPT and/or an SO command and control element to a JFC has the capacity to enhance planning at the operational level. Where COMD SF is appointed a JFC, operational planning will be conducted by personnel in the Joint Force Headquarters drawn from HQSO.

408. The nature of SO advice to planners at the strategic and operational level depends on the tasks envisaged and the amount of planning time and resources available. Special Forces (SF) will seek the earliest possible involvement in planning to enhance the degree to which SO can contribute to achieving military strategic objectives.

409. SO planners provide advice within the relevant planning forum based on a range of options derived from an analysis of the CDF, COMAST or JFC's guidance or planning directive. In developing these options they should seek to involve planners from that SF component likely to execute the operation as early as possible. The method of developing options will otherwise follow the generalised and specific planning processes described in chapter 2 to ADFP 9. A generalised flow chart showing the development of a campaign plan incorporating SO planning and advice is at annex A.

VULNERABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

410. A number of factors may threaten the success of SO. These may arise during insertion and extraction as well as during the operation. The nature of these threats will vary according to the level of conflict and the sophistication and preparedness of the adversary.

Insertion and Extraction Vulnerabilities

411. The threats to each method of insertion and extraction are different. The following paragraphs describe a range of threats which forces engaged in SO may encounter.

412. Air Insertion and Extraction. Airborne forces should avoid extensive and integrated air defence systems with a high degree of redundancy around high priority areas. While these systems have tended to focus on medium to high altitudes, enhanced technology and heightened threat perception and readiness may also result in a substantial low altitude threat. Alternatively, an adversary may not have the capacity to approach this level of technology and the threat could solely arise from chance sightings by casual observers.

413. Sea Insertion and Extraction. Insertion and extraction operations by sea may face an adversary's forces arrayed in overlapping zones. The outer ring may incorporate hostile surface craft and patrol submarines supported by land based maritime aviation. Closer to shore, coastal patrol vessels may protect the coast while fixed structures such as nets and beams may hinder or endanger operations. In addition, fixed and mobile land based coastal security forces may defend high priority coastal installations, littoral and hinterland regions and frontiers. Once again this threat represents one extreme of preparedness; the other is chance sightings by casual observers.

414. Land Insertion and Extraction. SF inserting or extracting by land may have to avoid hostile border security forces. These security forces may employ sensors, minefields and other barriers, patrols and checkpoints and other population control measures.

415. As the array and sophistication of threats to insertion and extraction operations depends on the technological capability of the adversary, planners should conduct a detailed analysis before selecting a particular method of insertion or extraction. Detailed planning considerations for specific insertion and extraction methods are addressed in chapter 5.

Operational Vulnerabilities

416. The variety and sophistication of threats to the conduct of SO will vary according to the adversary's sophistication and preparedness. Planners should conduct a detailed analysis identifying the nature of specific threats in order to allow effective planning to proceed.

417. Tactical Level Threats. Once inserted SF may face an array of threats which will vary according to an adversary's readiness and perception of the level of threat. Some operations will probably have to be conducted in a hostile social environment. The adversary may employ active and passive measures to protect rear areas from disruption. Once there is a perception that a threat to a rear area exists, an adversary may concentrate regular military and security forces as well as local defence elements drawn from the civilian population. Additionally, a variety of aircraft may support the ground forces, posing a significant threat to SF. Hostile police activity and informers, combined with the likelihood that significant portions of the population are likely to report any activity associated with SO, pose a significant threat to these operations.

418. Electronic Warfare. SF communications have a unique electronic signature and their detection compromises the conduct of SO, even if security forces cannot locate them. An adversary's capacity to conduct electronic warfare also varies according to its level of sophistication and readiness. Further detail of electronic warfare aspects of SO is covered in chapter 7.

419. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threat. Though weapons of mass destruction remain absent from Australia's region, the threat of these weapons to SO has increased with their proliferation. The principle nuclear threat would be collateral damage resulting in lost communications as well as the threat of widespread fallout. The use of biological weapons is hard to verify and the defensive warning systems and protective measures available during SO may be rudimentary. Due to their low technology and inexpensive nature, chemical weapons may pose a significant threat.

420. Weather. Weather could also threaten the success of SO. While bad weather may enhance surprise by assisting the concealment of forces it may also be detrimental. Bad weather affects insertion and extraction operations, the reliability of equipment, the endurance of personnel, the amount of equipment carried and the capacity of supporting forces to acquire targets.

ASSIGNING SPECIAL OPERATIONS

421. SO are conducted in support of national military strategic objectives. The SO planning process supports all levels of command.

422. The appropriate employment of SF on SO requires a careful assessment of the expertise and resources needed to conduct specific missions. Specialist planning advice obtained early in the planning process will assist the development of effective plans. SO planning development requires a high rate of effort by staff elements particularly in the areas of intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, policy and plans. Commanders should therefore carry out an initial assessment, by evaluating the potential tasks against the criteria of appropriateness, feasibility and supportability before committing planning resources to the detailed planning required to mount an SO.

423. Appropriateness. Tasks should be especially suited to SF capabilities and be compatible with strategic or operational objectives.

- a. **Suitability for SF Capabilities.** Tasks should be more appropriate for SF and less suited for action by conventional forces. Political constraints, the need for precise and flexible application of force or the avoidance of collateral damage are some factors which might justify the employment of SF.

- b. **Compatibility with National Strategic Objectives.** Commanders should balance the high value and finite SF asset against the risks inherent in the task. Risk assessment should incorporate not only the risk of the loss of SF combat elements, but also the risk of adverse effects should the operation fail.

424. Feasibility. Successful SO require the complete planning of all phases of the operation. SF are not structured for attrition or prolonged exposure to superior enemy forces. Additionally, any assessment of feasibility should incorporate a comparison of the skill levels required to successfully complete the operation and the time required to train and prepare for the task.

425. Supportability. SO require the allocation of significant numbers of resources in comparison to similarly sized conventional operations. Not only are assets required for insertion and extraction but SF components may require considerable support during the planning and preparation phases to aid, protect and sustain them. They require timely insertion, extraction, logistics, intelligence, and command, control and communications system support. Even though a target may be vulnerable to an SO, deficiencies in support may affect and even entirely invalidate the feasibility of conducting the operation.

426. Once a potential SO has been assessed as suitable, feasible and supportable, the detailed development of the plan may start. At the strategic and operational level the detailed planning of SO is integrated with the ADF's planning processes described earlier in this chapter.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING FACTORS

427. SO planning factors do not replace sound professional judgment and common sense. They are a guide to improving the integration of SO into broader campaign plans. SO planning factors include:

- a. understanding the influence of national strategic objectives on SO;
- b. understanding SO functions in the broad operational context;
- c. ensuring adequate intelligence support;
- d. ensuring the legitimacy and credibility of SO;
- e. applying capabilities indirectly;
- f. applying SO discriminately;
- g. developing multiple alternate courses of action;
- h. considering the indirect consequences of SO;
- i. incorporating and where necessary, directly supporting the broader command and control warfare (C2W) campaign objectives;
- j. integrating SO with non-military agency operations;
- k. balancing operational security and coordination;
- l. considering command and control arrangements and the effect of communications and information systems (CIS); and
- m. validating courses of action.

The Influence of National Strategic Objectives on Special Operations

428. SO may support the achievement of national strategic objectives either directly or through the achievement of military strategic objectives. Where relevant planners should advise SF of the specific political objectives of each SO so that when situations occur beyond the scope of the original plan, SF commanders can tailor their actions to accord with the achievement of the objectives. Planners should also note that political objectives also evolve and that they should keep SF task components informed of any changes.

429. Planners should consider the broader strategic objectives when planning SO. It is possible to achieve a tactical success that is detrimental to strategic success. As a result this may require the acceptance of legal and political constraints by SO commanders which are less than optimal from a purely military perspective. In such circumstances it is important that planners make those participating in SO aware of the broader strategic context and the reasons for restraints. This enables SO to be conducted in a manner congruent with national military strategy and national strategic objectives.

Special Operations in the Broad Strategic and Operational Context

430. SO are tactical operations often with strategic and operational results. As such their conduct influences and is influenced by the strategic environment. This environment incorporates political, economic, geo-strategic, military and information elements. Planners should understand the broad strategic and operational context before developing these operations. SO are usually conducted by relatively small force elements which may, at best, only control small areas for short periods. Because of their small size they cannot expect to dominate such an environment, rather, they seek to influence it.

431. Equally, the environment in which SO is conducted is dynamic. Consequently, planners should ensure that these operations retain sufficient flexibility to allow their adaptation to meet changing realities and to grasp fleeting opportunities. Planners should include specialist SF staff in the planning process as early as possible. Planners should ensure that as the operation develops they keep the tasked SF component advised of the developments in the operational environment.

Intelligence Support

432. SO require detailed, near real time, all-source intelligence. Success in SO may often depend on tactical surprise and cannot rely on the development of sufficient combat power to meet unanticipated hostile reactions. To minimise this possibility, SO planners require access to national and theatre intelligence in near real time. Planners should also take care to realistically prioritise intelligence requirements to avoid overcommitting scarce intelligence support resources. Special operations command and control element and SOPT staff are cleared and briefed to higher than normal levels in order to access high level intelligence.

Legitimacy and Credibility of Special Operations

433. SO may have significant legal and political implications for both commanders and the government. These implications affect perceptions of legitimacy and credibility at the domestic and international level. Planners should consider the broader consequences of proposed SO and address those issues which affect legitimacy and credibility.

Applying Capabilities Indirectly

434. SO may act as a force multiplier by supporting the pursuit of national strategic objectives while minimising national profile and reducing risks and costs. However, SO rarely entail confronting major enemy forces for protracted periods. Planners should seek to apply SO against an enemy's vulnerabilities, centre of gravity and decisive points using an indirect approach.

Applying Special Operations Discriminately

435. SO employ scarce resources in terms of personnel, specialist equipment and insertion platforms. Planners should seek to employ these resources on those missions of the highest priority and importance. Planners should avoid mounting SO against objectives which are tactically attractive but operationally or strategically irrelevant.

Multiple Alternative Courses of Action

436. The retention of operational flexibility through the development of a range of alternative courses of action and contingency responses is an important feature of SO. Planners should seek to ensure the retention of flexibility especially in providing adequate time and resources to plan and execute SO.

Psychological Effects

437. All SO have psychological effects. Some operations may deliberately focus on psychological objectives, others have a consequential effect. Planners should maximise the opportunities SO present, to further psychological warfare effectiveness in pursuit of military strategic objectives.

Command and Control Warfare Operations

438. SO may be mounted to prosecute targets in support of C2W operations. These operations could be either to attack the adversary's vulnerabilities or to help to protect our own.

Integrating Special Operations with Non-military Agency Operations

439. SO may incorporate cooperative activities with other government departments and non-government organisations. In these circumstances planners should anticipate ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and objectives, compartmentalisation of activities and disunity of command. Where possible planners should provide a clear task, and ensure active and continuous coordination with all relevant participants.

Balancing Operations Security and Coordination

440. To achieve surprise requires the effective practice of operational security procedures. Compartmentalisation of SO is important; however planners should balance this against the need to adequately coordinate the numerous and complex support requirements for the successful execution of operations. Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will almost always cause it to fail due to inadequate coordination. Planners should strive to maintain a balance between these two often competing requirements.

Command and Control Arrangements

441. The command and control arrangements and the CIS to support them is a critical factor in SO. Chapter 7 details the factors in determining the optimum CIS solution to support SO.

Validating Courses of Action

442. Prior to execution of an SO, planners should subject possible courses open to detailed critical analysis. Increasingly, computer aided simulation provides a suitable mechanism for assessing weaknesses in operational plans.

TARGETING

443. While the above planning factors apply to all SO, the success of an offensive operation requires the consideration of a number of additional factors pertinent to target selection.

444. The factors which may influence the final selection of any target can be described using the acronym of 'CARVER':

C - Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction or damage will exercise a significant influence upon the enemy's ability to conduct or support operations.

A - Accessibility. This is a measure of the ability to access the target area. In studying a target for accessibility, security around the target area, the location of the target and means available for insertion must be considered.

R - Restoration. This is assessed as the enemy's ability to restore a damaged or destroyed facility to normal operating capacity. It is affected by the enemy capability to repair or replace the damaged or destroyed portions of the target, and should be examined in light of whether the aim was to cause short, medium or long-term disruption. If the target is an individual this factor refers to whether that individual can be readily replaced with someone possessing similar skills or influence.

V - Vulnerability. This is the target's susceptibility to attack by any means available. Vulnerability is influenced by the nature of the target, type, size, composition and location.

E - Effect on Local Population. Target selection always considers possible political, economic and sociological impacts on the local population. If the operation is against an oppressive or occupying power, then consideration to conserving the energy, unity and fighting spirit of the friendly population is necessary.

R - Recognisable. This is the ability to recognise the target, both for the conduct of intelligence gathering to allow mission planning and during the actual execution of the offensive operation.

PROCEDURES ON TERMINATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

445. The planning process for SO should include consideration for the criteria by which the operation is to be terminated. Termination may occur in any of the four phases of an SO resulting from:

- a. cancellation due to changing strategic or operational circumstances or serious breaches to operational security,
- b. failure, or
- c. successful completion of the mission.

446. Cancellation. The commander may terminate an SO because of a wide range of factors. These factors will usually arise due to a change in the strategic or operational circumstances rendering it unnecessary or the risk and consequences of failure unacceptably high. Termination could occur before or during an operation's execution. Such a decision may result in the loss of a window of opportunity resulting in an inability to reinstate the operation when conditions change. This factor will need to be considered by the commander in reaching the decision to cancel.

447. Termination Due to Failure. The commander may need to terminate an operation due to the failure of a critical phase. For SO this is especially the case where a failure has resulted in a breach of operational security. Commanders and their staff should conduct continual risk assessments to ensure that the conditions that encompass acceptable risk remain and may wish to identify possible 'triggers' which would initiate active consideration by the commander to terminate the operation. Planners should avoid the temptation to reinforce failure; this may require the

termination of a partly completed operation. Planners should also incorporate the consequences of terminated SO in their plans. This may require the preparation of a separate contingency plan for emergency extraction procedures and, where appropriate, a public information strategy.

448. Successful Completion. SO do not conclude with the successful extraction of force elements. It is important to exploit the available information and lessons. Effective post-operation procedures ensure that this occurs.


449. Post-operation Procedures. Regardless of the circumstances in which an SO is terminated, commanders and staff must appreciate that SF will not be immediately available for retasking until the post-operational procedure phase is complete. The long-term viability of SF depends on the thoroughness in which the following procedures are practised:

- a. the collective debriefing of the SF task elements on all aspects of mission execution, including lessons available;
- b. the collection of maps, notebooks, logbooks, staff journals, other documents, captured weapons and photography pertinent to the mission;
- c. operational security and counterintelligence debriefing;
- d. the maintenance of personal and unit equipment; and
- e. rest and recuperation.

450. The proper planning and conduct of post-operations procedures is most important. It ensures the effective gathering of operational information that may assist the preparation of future tasks. This particularly applies to special reconnaissance operations conducted in support of other operations. The planned and orderly conduct of these activities also ensures the efficient preparation of the component for its next operation.

Annex: A. Generalised Special Operations Planning Cycle in Conjunction with Planning at all Levels

GENERALISED SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING CYCLE IN CONJUNCTION
WITH PLANNING AT ALL LEVELS



Notes:

1. The form of guidance will vary with the situation. It may take the form of a planning directive, a CDF directive or a warning order.

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2. SO planners involvement in planning at the earliest possible time. This will include participation by the Special Operations Task Component due to the detailed planning required for complex SO.
3. The commander may decide to issue a warning order now. The warning order should be issued as early as practical.
4. The requirement for higher endorsement will be detailed in initial planning guidance but may also become evident during detailed planning.
5. Once the warning order is issued by the commander the SO chain of command and liaison will issue consequential warning orders.
6. SO planners at all levels will develop detailed plans and supporting plans as required. This process will entail considerable liaison. Time is also required for rehearsals and other preparations. The SO planning cycle replicates normal military battle procedure.
7. The plan is placed into effect by means of the initial directive, operation instruction or operation order. The SO plan is a supporting plan. Further operation orders will be issued to subordinate SF units.

CHAPTER 5

INSERTION AND EXTRACTION

INTRODUCTION

501. Insertion and extraction planning is critical to special operations (SO). The sophisticated techniques and equipment available require detailed planning and coordination. This chapter outlines the basic considerations for clandestine insertion and extraction by air, water and land. Although these insertion and extraction techniques are discussed separately, some missions may require a combination of means. In addition, SO resupply techniques, the use of stay behind parties and evasion and escape techniques are also outlined. All these topics are interrelated and need to be considered when planning SO.

502. Planners should not feel constrained by the means detailed in this chapter. Generally, SO teams can insert, extract or be resupplied by any means, no matter how unorthodox, as long as that means offers a reasonable chance of success and training has been conducted in the specific techniques involved.

503. Insertion and extraction should not be confused with tactical mobility. Insertion and extraction refer to the delivery and recovery of SO combat elements between a base area or forward operating base and the joint force area of operations (JFAO). In some circumstances the combat element may use its insertion means for tactical mobility; however, this is the exception rather than the rule. In most instances, the combat element's tactical mobility will be restricted to whatever means can be inserted with them. Generally, tactical mobility will be on foot, by small watercraft or light B vehicle.

504. The execution stage of an SO will generally be conducted in three phases - insertion, conduct and extraction. If an operation is likely to be of a prolonged nature the combat element may need to be sustained in the field. For the deployed combat element, the receipt of externally sourced supplies may be treated by them as an additional phase, while for staff planners it should be treated as a separate SO. In planning SO, it is important to note that the insertion phase does not end when the SO team leaves the aircraft, ship or vehicle. The insertion finishes when the team reports that all are safely in the JFAO. It is, therefore essential that commanders plan emergency actions in case the team is compromised, members are injured or if pre-planned communications are not established immediately after insertion. In addition, it is equally important that resupply and extraction receive the same planning emphasis as insertion.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

505. Insertion and extraction are almost always joint activities. SO combat elements do not generally perform their own air or water insertion and extraction planning. Planners from the agencies providing the delivery or recovery means must be brought into the planning process as early as possible. Planners should note that as a general rule all SO insertions will be into unmarked and unoccupied insertion points. This practice is known as a blind insertion and is used to enhance the immediate security of the insertion personnel on arrival in the JFAO. Successful insertion and extraction requires:

- a. timely, accurate and detailed intelligence;
- b. detailed planning and coordination;
- c. flexible mission planning that addresses the unexpected and includes alternative and emergency actions;

- d. adequate preparation, training and rehearsals;
- e. detailed communications and information systems planning to ensure interoperability (see chapter 7);
- f. operations security; and
- g. precise execution.

506. The special forces (SF) task component commander considers the following factors when determining the most desirable method of insertion or extraction:

- a. the number of personnel, quantity and types of accompanying equipment and supplies;
- b. enemy capabilities;
- c. terrain, weather, hydrography and light data;
- d. distance to the insertion and extraction points;
- e. distance from the insertion and extraction points to the objective area;
- f. time constraints;
- g. SO team capabilities; and
- h. delivery and recovery agency availability and suitability.

Planning Data

507. When planning SO, specific planning data should be used as personnel and agencies are often very highly trained and have access to specialised equipment. Broad planning data on personnel parachuting, cargo parachuting, advanced landing grounds, landing points, airborne rappelling, aircraft ranges, (payloads and endurance), naval and small craft ranges, (payloads and endurance), long range patrol vehicle range, (payload and endurance), foot movement rates, assault swimmer movement rates, night operations lighting requirements and radar horizon planning ranges is held by SF units and headquarters. Additional information is also contained in:

- a. ADFP 10 - *Communications*,
- b. ADFP 12 - *Amphibious Operations*,
- c. ADFP 14 - *Air Transport*,
- d. ADFP 18 - *Maritime Warfare*,
- e. ADFP 24 - *Electronic Warfare*,
- f. ADFP 29 - *Surveillance and Reconnaissance*,
- g. ADFP 39 - *Airborne Operations*,
- h. AFTP 7 - *Patrol Boat Operations*,
- i. AFTP 25 - *Submarine Operations*,
- j. MLW 1.2.9 - *Airmobile Operations*,

- k. MLW 3.2.6 - *Parachute Training*,
- l. MLW 3.2.9 - *Airborne Rappelling*,
- m. SASR SOPs,
- n. 1 Cdo Regt SOPs,
- o. HQ ALG SOPs, and
- p. 5 Avn Regt SOPs.

Operations Security and Intelligence Requirements

508. Detailed attention must be paid to operations security and intelligence requirements during planning. Specific considerations include:

- a. counterintelligence threat,
- b. location and nature of enemy air and/or sea detection and defence assets (including remote sensing and electronic warfare capabilities),
- c. location and make up of enemy ground forces,
- d. location and alignment of local inhabitants,
- e. location and anticipated movements of friendly forces, and
- f. risk of capture of supporting personnel after insertion is complete.

509. When assessing operations security and intelligence requirements, consideration should be given to conducting the mission planning in isolation. Intelligence briefings on planned routes and points for insertion and extraction should be in sufficient time to allow detailed planning to proceed. Personnel assisting with the insertion or extraction should be briefed only on those aspects of the plan which they need to know to accomplish their part of the operation.

Preparation, Training and Rehearsals

510. Prior to the conduct of any SO all personnel involved must be trained and capable of performing their specific task. In addition, adequate time and resources must be allocated to allow for detailed preparation and rehearsals. All agencies and personnel involved in the insertion, task and extraction phases must prepare thoroughly and rehearse all phases of the mission as well as any emergency and alternative plans.

Command and Control

511. Command and control arrangements for insertion, resupply, extraction and evasion and escape need to be considered in the planning process and then stipulated by the SO commander during mission briefings. Principles for joint command and control of SO are covered in chapter 3. Note however, that in order to achieve unity of command during an SO, changes in status of command and/or the designated commander, may be necessary between the various phases of the mission.

Support Operations

512. Operational insertions and extractions may differ considerably from training insertions and extractions due to the absence of safety enhancements normally available in training. During operational insertions most drop zones will be unmanned and unmarked and as a result, the surface wind speed and direction will not necessarily be known or indicated. In the case of amphibious insertions, surf conditions at a beach landing point may be unknown. These factors may be of considerable importance, as they markedly increase the risks to personnel during the insertion phase, particularly at night. If considered critical to mission success, the information normally provided by safety personnel in training may be provided from other SF personnel deployed into the JFAO in order to support operations or retasked in the JFAO to support the insertion.

METHODS OF INSERTION AND EXTRACTION**Air and Combination Air/Water**

513. Air is the most rapid means of clandestine insertion and extraction. Air and combination air/water insertion and extraction techniques include:

- a. static line parachute from very low altitude onto the land, parallel to the beach just beyond the surf zone (beach parallel) or as a marry-up with a parent craft in the sea (marry-up at sea);
- b. static line parachute from medium altitude using high performance parachutes;
- c. high altitude low opening parachute;
- d. high altitude high opening parachute;
- e. parachute load follow with small craft into the ocean;
- f. air land using fixed-wing aircraft;
- g. air land using rotary wing aircraft;
- h. helocast or rotary wing touch down into the sea; and
- i. airborne rappel, fast rope, rope extraction or winch from rotary wing aircraft.

514. Characteristics. Each insertion and extraction technique offers particular advantages and has specific disadvantages. Generally, air and combination air/water insertions and extractions have the following characteristics listed below.

- a. **Advantages:**
 - (1) flexible,
 - (2) fast and accurate (thereby enhancing the element of surprise),
 - (3) short exposure (and possible avoidance in combination air/water insertions) to hostile countermeasures, and
 - (4) enables the delivery of supplies in excess of individual loads.

b. **Disadvantages:**

- (1) vulnerable to enemy air detection and defence systems;
- (2) affected by adverse weather conditions;
- (3) possible injury to personnel especially during night parachute insertions, or insertions in adverse weather or sea conditions;
- (4) possible damage or loss of equipment, especially during parachute insertions;
- (5) need for specially trained aircrews;
- (6) need for sterilisation of land insertion sites;
- (7) combination air/water methods are relatively complex and require detailed planning and synchronisation of air/water platforms; and
- (8) less viable for extraction, particularly after tactical surprise is lost.

Insertions and Extractions by Water

515. Water insertion and extraction are secure and economical means of clandestine movement into and out of a JFAO. Generally, it involves two stages. The first stage is the delivery or recovery stage where the personnel transit from a base area or forward operating base to a drop off or pick up point at sea. Delivery or recovery can be by aircraft, as outlined for parachute load follow, or by surface or subsurface vessel. The second stage is the penetration or withdrawal stage where personnel move from the drop off or pick up point to a beach head or the target area or vice versa. This stage may, in many cases, be classified as tactical mobility rather than strategic or operational insertion or extraction, however, an understanding of the various water mobility techniques is important in the planning of water insertions and extractions. In addition to the combination air/water techniques already outlined, water insertion and extraction techniques can include any combination of the following:

a. **Delivery or Recovery:**

- (1) submarine swimmer release or re-entry;
- (2) submarine multi-swimmer release (delivery technique only);
- (3) submarine launch and recover; and
- (4) surface vessel, both craft of opportunity and naval vessels.

b. **Penetration or Withdrawal.** Following release from the insertion craft, penetration/withdrawal to or from the beach may be by:

- (1) subsurface swimming;
- (2) surface swimming; and
- (3) small watercraft, both motor and paddle powered.

516. Characteristics. Each delivery or recovery and penetration or withdrawal method offers particular advantages and disadvantages. Generally, water insertions and extractions have the following characteristics listed below.

a. **Advantages:**

- (1) long-range delivery and recovery capability;
- (2) subsurface techniques offer excellent security;
- (3) means of tactical mobility and limited extraction capability when using small craft;
- (4) relative freedom from weather considerations during the delivery/recovery stage;
- (5) possibility of enroute operational briefings, rehearsals, and intelligence updates;
- (6) transport or recovery of large quantities of accompanying supplies or captured equipment especially on board surface craft; and
- (7) submarines offer clandestine intelligence gathering and communications support in the area of operations prior to and after insertion.

b. **Disadvantages:**

- (1) need for high levels of watermanship and diver training,
- (2) vulnerability to high winds and sea states during transition from delivery/recovery stage to penetration/withdrawal stage and during the penetration/withdrawal stage,
- (3) possible loss of equipment and stores during transition and penetration/withdrawal,
- (4) relatively long time required for the penetration/withdrawal phase especially if long distances have to be covered, and
- (5) vulnerability of personnel during initial beach landings.

Land Insertions and Extractions

517. Land insertion and extraction is often difficult due to the distances that need to be covered. Land insertion or extraction might occur on foot or by land vehicle when the hostile situation, geographic characteristics or climate conditions allow. Clandestine overland movement in wartime is best done under conditions of limited visibility over difficult terrain. It has the greatest chance of success when enemy lines are overextended, the combat zone is fluid or portions of the enemy's area of influence are inadequately secured. In conditions short of war, land insertion and extraction may offer less risk and greater mission security than air insertion and extraction. The most commonly used land insertion and extraction techniques are:

- a. 'in theatre' conventional ADF soft skinned and armoured vehicles,
- b. use of long range patrol vehicles, and
- c. foot.

RESUPPLY TECHNIQUES

518. Wherever possible, deployed SF combat elements should avoid receiving external resupply due to the operational security risks created. Nonetheless, SO over prolonged periods, or in the event of unforeseen materiel requirements, may make resupply unavoidable. If the need for resupply can be predicted, it should be prepared in detail prior to the deployment of the combat element. This may include the prepacking of supply bundles and rehearsals with delivery agencies. Even in cases where resupply is not expected, general procedures for resupply should be agreed with planning staff prior to deployment. While many resupply techniques can be used, they are generally a mirror of those for insertion and extraction. Similar planning considerations therefore apply. Resupply is an operations staff function and requires similar planning effort as the initial insertion. In planning and conducting resupply missions all personnel and agencies involved must take special care to ensure that the deployed SF combat element is not compromised. Resupply can be by air, water or land.

519. Types. The following four types of resupply need to be considered when planning and executing SO missions:

- a. **Emergency Resupply.** These are pre-planned and packed by the SF combat element prior to their insertion. The supply bundle will generally contain essential equipment and will usually be inserted into the JFAO to a prearranged or on-call location. One example of emergency resupply may be the resupply of communications equipment if no communications are made within a certain time of a prearranged communications schedule.
- b. **Automatic Resupply.** This is pre-planned and packed by the SF combat element prior to insertion and will contain predicted supplies such as food, fuel, water and ammunition. Automatic resupply is inserted into the JFAO to a prearranged or on-call location and alleviates the need for lengthy communications between the SF combat element and its forward operating base (FOB).
- c. **On-call Resupply.** This is packed by administrative support personnel following detailed requests from the deployed SF combat element. On-call resupply is generally inserted into a location selected by the combat element after their insertion into the JFAO.
- d. **Other Resupply.** This includes pre-planned and opportunity resupply. Pre-planned sources may include caches, friendly indigenous forces and known indigenous products. Opportunity sources may include captured enemy and improvised equipment, and any other product that might be acquired.

520. Air. Air is the most rapid and commonly used means of resupply. Aerial resupply techniques include:

- a. fixed-wing and rotary wing airland;
- b. low altitude air drop (by free drop, heli box or parachute); and
- c. high altitude air drop (free fall steerable stores bundle).

521. Aerial resupply techniques generally mirror air insertion techniques and involve similar planning considerations and offer similar advantages and disadvantages.

522. Water/Land. Specific water and land resupply techniques have not been developed. Generally, water and land resupply techniques mirror water and land extraction techniques and involve similar planning considerations.

523. Caching. In some circumstances, caches may be pre-placed within the JFAO and used by SF combat elements. While the placement of caches allows these combat elements to operate over long periods without external resupply, their utility is limited by the difficulty of placing them in most JFAO and the durability of stores. When planning and conducting caching operations, consideration must be given to the following:

- a. expected time that the supplies will be left in the cache;
- b. shelf life of the supplies to be cached;
- c. protection of supplies against environmental factors;
- d. location of the cache, including ease of recognition for recovery and possible recognition by local inhabitants or enemy forces;
- e. time required to lay and recover the cache; and
- f. consequences of discovery by the enemy.

STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS

524. As an alternate method of insertion, SF combat elements can be pre-positioned within the JFAO before hostile forces occupy an area. Such insertions are termed 'stay behind' operations. Prior to being pre-positioned, detailed resupply, evasion and escape, extraction plans and procedures must be formulated and promulgated.

525. Characteristics. Principal characteristics of stay behind operations are shown below:

- a. the chance of success of the insertion is high because the initial insertion is not into a hostile JFAO,
- b. they require less external support during protracted operations because caching is possible and local support is often obtained,
- c. stay behind parties typically disperse over wide areas, and
- d. they generally require support from indigenous elements.

EVASION AND ESCAPE

526. All SO in hostile territory require evasion and escape (E&E) plans. Specific and separate E&E plans will generally be required for each phase of a mission. All plans must enhance the survivability of the SF combat element and insertion and extraction agency personnel. When planning E&E, the focus of the plan should change depending on where the emergency or compromise takes place. If it occurs:

- a. in friendly territory, planning focus is on maintaining operations security;
- b. in hostile territory, planning focus is on returning to friendly control; and
- c. in proximity to the objective area, planning focus is on completing the mission if it has a reasonable chance of success.

527. Planning Considerations. The nature and detail in the plans will vary greatly between phases, missions and areas of operations. Planning considerations will depend on:

- a. availability and nature of combat search and rescue services or friendly indigenous E&E networks;
- b. language skills and ethnic origin of mission personnel in comparison to the local inhabitants of the JFAO;
- c. number and training of mission personnel;
- d. distance from the E&E start point to friendly areas;
- e. nature of the terrain, geography, hydrography and weather; and
- f. E&E stores and equipment available to or able to be carried by mission personnel.

528. Methods. While success will depend greatly on the abilities of personnel, specific E&E methods can be put in place to enhance success. The principal methods used are combat search and rescue, evasion corridors and E&E networks.

529. Combat Search and Rescue. This is the most rapid and effective means of E&E. Generally however, it requires specialised equipment and highly trained personnel on stand by and a means of communicating from the scene of the emergency to the rescue force forward operating base.

530. Evasion Corridors. These provide an effective, albeit rudimentary, means of E&E and are implemented by the establishment of prearranged route corridors and rendezvous points through which individuals are briefed to travel. These corridors are then periodically monitored by friendly forces and individuals are recovered if spotted.

531. E&E Networks. Networks are a complex and often manpower intensive means of E&E. The establishment of E&E networks generally requires specialised support from external agencies, indigenous support, considerable preparation and effective security. When activated, individuals are essentially escorted from the hostile area by local inhabitants. Individuals who have been through an E&E net should not be reinserted into the area of operations while the net they passed through remains active.

CHAPTER 6

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION

601. Intelligence support is a critical planning factor in the conduct of special operations (SO). Access to strategic intelligence,¹ for example, is necessary to place the operation in its correct political and operational perspective whereas combat intelligence² is vital to the operational planning and conduct of the operation.

602. While this chapter describes the nexus between special forces (SF) and intelligence, and lists intelligence considerations in the planning of SO, it is not a definitive statement of the intelligence cycle or of joint intelligence procedures used within the ADF. These are described in ADFP 19 - *Intelligence* which should be read in conjunction with this chapter.

Special Forces - A Source and User of Intelligence

603. SF are both a source and user of intelligence. As a source, SF are able to satisfy specific information requirements about a potential adversary, obtain information in pursuit of security interests affecting the defence of Australian territory and assist in information gathering activities of other force elements. SF may conduct routine intelligence collection activities to satisfy standing intelligence requirements or respond to specific tasking.

604. As a user, SF require detailed, accurate and timely intelligence for the planning and conduct of operations. This begins with the production of intelligence estimates and the development of intelligence requirements. This process also serves to facilitate counterintelligence (CI) planning. The sensitivity of SO will often demand a disproportionate level of intelligence support for the size of the force involved.

605. Despite their contribution to and use of intelligence, SF have only a limited integral intelligence and CI capability. In particular, the intelligence staffs of SF units rely on intelligence agencies and on joint intelligence staffs for much of the detailed processing of information, for the compilation of intelligence and for CI support for SO. SF intelligence staffs interface with these agencies and staffs through the SF Terrorism and Counter-terrorism Cell in the Defence Intelligence Organisation, liaison officers and force elements located with, or assigned to higher formations. The ADF Distributed Intelligence System³ is designed to improve the integral intelligence support available to SF. The joint nature of SO, however, makes it imperative that operational intelligence support of SO be coordinated by the joint intelligence staff at the strategic or operational level headquarters responsible for mounting the operation.

1 Combat Intelligence is that intelligence concerning the enemy, weather and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

2 See footnote 1.

3 ADFDIS aims to develop a distributed intelligence network enabling ADF intelligence staffs at the strategic, operational and specialist level to process and disseminate intelligence from all sources.

INTELLIGENCE

606. Intelligence is defined as 'the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or area of actual or potential operations. the term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations involved in such activity'. As a source, SF might conduct an SO to obtain information (and intelligence) which is unavailable from other sources. Additionally, intelligence will be essential for the planning and conduct of SO.

607. The nature and sensitivity of SO and the role of SF as both a source and user of intelligence have developed a special relationship between SF and the intelligence community. In particular, the following considerations are relevant to the planning and conduct of SO:

- a. **Access to Strategic and Combat Intelligence from All Sources.** The likely success of an SO is enhanced when planning is conducted in the full knowledge of the desired outcome of the operation. This will often require access to the deliberations of those authorising the operation, and to the many sources of strategic and combat intelligence which help establish the complete framework within which the operation is conducted.
- b. **Accurate and Timely Intelligence.** The nature of SO, in particular the range at which they may be mounted and the lack of immediate support, requires detailed planning and knowledge of the operational environment. SO require a level of intelligence support characterised by a close and continuous relationship between the operational planners and intelligence staffs at all levels. It is imperative, therefore, that SF commanders at all levels state their intelligence requirements and refine these as necessary to ensure that the efforts of the intelligence staffs are not wasted and that keystone requirements are met. While SF priority intelligence requirements are routinely promulgated, each operation will have its own peculiar requirements. These might include:
 - (1) biographical and sociological intelligence;
 - (2) political and economic intelligence;
 - (3) scientific and technical intelligence;
 - (4) transport and communications intelligence;
 - (5) military geography and armed forces intelligence;
 - (6) ingress, egress and target specific intelligence; and
 - (7) health intelligence.
- c. **Additional Protective Measures Based on the Principle of 'Need-to-know'.** The significant consequences of the failure of an SO, both in terms of loss of personnel and the strategic and political ramifications of failure or compromise, requires the highest levels of protection of information possible commensurate with the need to adequately plan and conduct the operation. This may require the operation of a compartment system in which all planning, approval and execution of the operation is conducted on a strictly enforced 'need-to-know' basis.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

608. SO rely, in part, on effective security measures for their success. These measures are the product of counterintelligence⁴ planning.

609. Service intelligence staffs are responsible for providing counterintelligence advice and formulating CI plans. SF units have a limited CI capability and while the intelligence staff provide CI advice, they will not normally have the capability to assess the enemy's intelligence collection capabilities or plan, implement and monitor countermeasures. These tasks would normally be undertaken by the intelligence staff on the joint forces headquarters responsible for mounting the SO.

610. The joint CI staff will normally produce a CI estimate⁵ to support the planning and conduct of the operation. In particular, the CI estimate will provide the basis for a range of operations security (OPSEC) measures planned by the operations staff and intended to deny information about the operation and influence an enemy's interpretation of friendly activity. OPSEC measures which might be contemplated include:

- a. **Physical Security.** Enhanced physical security precautions may need to be implemented as part of a broader range of OPSEC measures. Consideration should be given to isolating task elements to further ensure security.
- b. **Information Security.** Information security may require the operation of a compartment system in which all planning, approval and execution of the operation is conducted on a strictly enforced 'need-to-know' basis. While such a system will often limit staff effort in support of operational planning, it is nevertheless vital to protect the detail and security of the operation.
- c. **Communications Security.** Communications security monitoring may be used to detect breaches of transmission security by task elements. It is important that intelligence staffs assess all breaches in communications security for their effect on the security of the operation.
- d. **Countersurveillance.** This includes all those active measures intended to make surveillance of friendly activity more difficult. These will need to be included in the CI plan. Isolation of force elements and compartmentalisation of information will assist in this regard.
- e. **Deception.** Deception may also be used to mislead the enemy, however, deception measures must be planned and managed at the highest level and will require careful coordination between the operations, communications and intelligence staffs. When planning deception measures, sufficient time should be allowed for the enemy to process the information which has been passed.
- f. **Cover Stories.** The level of joint Service support required to successfully mount an SO may make it extremely difficult to compartmentalise knowledge of an impending operation. Plausible cover stories may be required to prevent the true nature of preparations from becoming widespread knowledge. As a precaution separate cover stories may also be required by those undertaking an SO in the event of capture by the adversary.

4 Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion and installations, equipment, records or materials against sabotage.

5 Counterintelligence estimates examine an enemy's intelligence gathering capability as a basis for assessing the threat to an operation, provides information requirements and identifies vulnerabilities in the enemy's intelligence collection capability that may be exploited.

611. Determination of the operations security plan is an operations staff function. The operations security plan is the application of those active and passive countermeasures determined in accordance with the security countermeasure detection process at figure 6.1. The plan is normally attached as an annex to the operation order. The effectiveness of operations security measures must be continually monitored and may require the deployment of specialist intelligence staff.




Figure 6.1 - Security Countermeasure Detection Process

- Q1 Can indicators be detected by the enemy?
- Q2 Is the activity causing the indicators essential to the SO's success?
- Q3 Would the activity, if detected by enemy, be useful in a deception plan?

Q4 Can indications be protected from enemy detection by use of countermeasures?

Q5 Will enemy's detection of indicators jeopardise the SO's success?

Q6 Should the concept of the SO be changed?

CHAPTER 7

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS**INTRODUCTION**

701. This chapter describes the concepts and procedures for communications and information systems (CIS) support to special operations (SO). SO CIS essentially follow the chain of command and provide commanders at each level with the CIS support necessary for them to command their forces to their maximum potential. SO CIS must also provide support to each level including all elements of special forces (SF) task components to enable the sharing of information on demand with minimal manual intervention. SO CIS should enable the transfer of information, commands and intentions both in barracks and in the field. The transition from barracks to the field should be achieved with minimal reduction in capability and functionality.

702. SO are joint in nature and can encompass the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. They usually require RAN, Army, RAAF and/or allied assets to provide the means of insertion and extraction for SF. SO may also be required for logistics resupply in the case of protracted operations. In many instances SF will operate at strategic depth or within an operational theatre.

703. SO nearly always require joint communications plans which are developed by applying the concepts and general procedures detailed in a number of ADFP including:

- a. ADFP 9 - *Joint Planning*,
- b. ADFP 10 - *Communications*,
- c. ADFP 12 - *Amphibious Operations* (chapter 12),
- d. ADFP 24 - *Electronic Warfare*,
- e. ADFP 29 - *Surveillance and Reconnaissance* (chapter 6),
- f. ADFP 39 - *Airborne Operations* (chapter 9),
- g. ADFP 18 - Joint Maritime Operations, and
- h. ADFP 500 Series (listed at annex A).

704. These concepts and procedures are suitable for use in most SO, although adaptation may be necessary to suit the command structure which may be tailored for a specific operation. Unique CIS standard operating procedures (SOP) are used by SF units as the basic building block from which CIS plans are developed in support of each SO as it is planned.

705. A glossary of joint communications electronics terms, acronyms and abbreviations is contained in ADFP 10.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS NODES

706. Command and Control Nodes. SO command and control nodes are provided for the command and control of SO and are located with the elements of the SF command and liaison component and SF task component. These components may be regarded as building blocks for making up an overall command structure and are described in more detail in chapter 3.

707. Additional SO CIS Nodes. Additional SO CIS nodes can be established with mounting bases, forward mounting bases and forward operating bases to support intelligence, liaison, training, development and administrative functions.

708. SO CIS nodes may require the following capabilities:

- a. voice;
- b. data (includes E-mail, file transfers, still and video image transfer and multimedia);
- c. facsimile;
- d. formal messaging (ACP 127/128); and
- e. hand carriage of information (paper, magnetic media and optical media).

709. The capabilities listed above are the ideal, but they may not always be available. All these facilities are normally on a secure system, although there may also be a requirement for some insecure facilities such as telephone and facsimile to allow communications with external agencies.

710. SO liaison officers will normally deploy with CIS support. However, the nature of SO and the resultant distances over which SF liaison may need to be established, may preclude them deploying with CIS support in some cases. In these instances they may require access to host unit CIS facilities. A special operations planning team will not normally deploy with integral CIS but will rely on the CIS facilities of the headquarters being supported. Exceptions to this rule might be where some specialised equipment is not normally available, which is essential to achieve SF communications interoperability, or where a SOPT assigned in support of an allied or United Nations combined headquarters has a requirement to maintain independent communications with the higher ADF headquarters.

PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

711. Planning and management of SO CIS support is undertaken using standard ADF procedures for formal message handling and cryptographic management as detailed in other ADFP. There are, however, many aspects of SO CIS support that are unique. This arises from the following factors:

- a. SF combat elements may require communications over strategic distances of several thousand kilometres;
- b. the combat element may need to communicate in a high electronic warfare (EW) threat environment and may be subjected to immediate physical threat if detected;
- c. the nature of the mission may require seamless high capacity connectivity between SF combat elements and military strategic decision makers;
- d. the combat element may need to communicate to supporting maritime, air and intelligence assets; and

- e. collectively, the above requirements must be satisfied through rugged, lightweight, manportable equipment which can guarantee communications for extended periods, with minimal maintenance and power usage.

712. It is particularly important that CIS representatives of the supported joint/combined staffs are consulted in the planning process as early as possible. Detailed liaison, planning and coordination is required at all levels to ensure maximum functionality is achieved with minimal personnel and equipment requirements.

Tactical Special Operations Communications and Information Systems Support Factors

713. The links between SF combat elements and their parent command elements are considered to be tactical CIS. The most difficult links to establish in SO CIS are from the SF combat element back to its parent command element. Commanders at all levels must balance the importance of CIS in achieving a mission against the impact that CIS requirements may have in the conduct of that mission. In planning tactical SO CIS support, the following factors should be considered:

- a. CIS requirements have an impact on the conduct of a mission including:
 - (1) The ability for a combat element to achieve connectivity with its parent command and control element in the shortest possible time. This will be important to ensure the maintenance of physical and CIS security by minimising set-up, time-on-air and pull-down times.
 - (2) Enhancing CIS security by achieving the lowest probability of intercept, given the enemy electronic warfare capability. This applies to the enemy's ability to detect or find a deployed SF combat element.
 - (3) Minimising the physical payload of an SF combat element. This applies to both bulk and weight of the total CIS equipment required for a particular mission. This is particularly important when considering tasks such as pathfinder operations when a number of alternative means and modes of communication are required. In these cases a compromise may be necessary between the wishes of the supported commander (eg continuous secure voice) and the ability of the combat element to carry the equipment to achieve the commander's requirements.
- b. Communications with insertion and extraction agencies and other friendly forces/agencies that may have an impact on the conduct of a mission is essential. Consideration should include the means and mode of communications and cryptographic requirements. Interoperability within the ADF is addressed in ADFP 10.
- c. The need to ensure the survivability of tactical CIS is critical, including:
 - (1) The provision of multiple paths for SF combat elements. These paths could include diversity in modes of transmission, frequency and locations of receivers.
 - (2) The reliability and availability of CIS equipment and ancillaries.
 - (3) Measures required to minimise system degradation through EW action, damage or overload.
 - (4) CIS sending information to deployed SF combat elements being considered separately to efforts in receiving information from deployed SF combat elements.

- d. The location of each command and control element is a major factor in achieving the best possible communications with deployed SF combat elements. Commanders at all levels need to assess operational requirements against the need to communicate and determine their deployment locations after consultation with their CIS advisers.
- e. Use of standard message formats (SOP and Australian Defence Force Formatted Message System (ADFORMS)). SF unit SOP use message formats that are abbreviated as much as possible to ensure minimum transmission times. These message formats have yet to be included as an approved ADFORMS set.

Operational Special Operations Communications and Information Systems Support Factors

714. When SO are conducted at an operational level, dedicated SO CIS support is normally provided both down from the strategic level and down to the tactical level. The following are factors to consider in planning operational level SO CIS support:

- a. command and control arrangements for a task;
- b. interoperability with other joint and combined headquarters; single Service units, ships and aircraft; and external agencies;
- c. availability of CIS personnel and equipment for a command and control element of an SO component;
 - (1) overall system survivability;
- d. elements of the SF command and liaison component are normally collocated with a joint headquarters at higher levels and additional CIS support will be required if this is not the case. (If an element of the SF command and liaison component is collocated with the supported formation HQ, it is desirable for a link to be established to enable the electronic exchange of information between the two command posts.);
- e. the requirement to maintain CIS support for ADF contingency plans (some ADF assets, such as some counter-terrorist CIS equipment, are permanently assigned to SF units for specific contingency plans and these assets cannot be deployed on other tasks without Headquarters Special Operations and HQADF approval);
- f. the requirement for suitable power sources in forward deployment areas. Consideration should be given to the use of generators, power filters, transformers, plugs/connectors, batteries and battery charging;
- g. use of standard message formats (SOP and ADFORMS);
- h. use of hand carriage - signals dispatch service/air dispatch service;
- i. use of airborne command and control platforms (command and control aircraft fits);
- j. use of maritime platforms;
- k. administrative communications requirements; and
- l. non-military communications (including civil CIS networks, diplomatic, local government authorities, police and media).

Strategic Communications and Information Systems Support to Special Operations

715. Strategic CIS support to SO are those links provided from HQADF down to the operational level headquarters conducting SO. This support is normally coordinated through HQADF. Detailed planning and liaison is required to ensure the necessary strategic CIS support is provided, particularly when SO are mounted at short notice.

TRAINING

716. Regular CIS training is necessary for continuous preparedness for SO. Such training is carried out within each SF unit to develop high standards in individual SF CIS skills, operating procedures, communications security and achieving interoperability with units of each Service, ally and civilian CIS.

717. It is important to ensure that training is realistic and applicable to SO. This is particularly the case with long range communications training for the combat elements. Every effort should be made to ensure long range communications are practised over realistic distances and under realistic conditions.

718. SF units actively participate in both the standard Joint Communications Exercises, and communications exercises for testing high command links for Australian Joint Service Plans as outlined in ADFP 571 - *Standard Joint Communications Exercises*.

Annex: A. Australian Defence Force Publication 500 Series Manuals

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION 500 SERIES MANUALS

FORMALLY JSP(AS) 500

Ser.	ADFP No.	Title	Security Classification	Status
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	JSP(AS) 501 (A)	<i>Plans and Policies</i>	RESTRICTED	Edn 3
2.	ADFP 502	<i>National Distribution and Status of Non-Cryptographic Communications-Electronic Publications</i>	RESTRICTED	Nov 93
3.	JSP(AS) 520	<i>Australian Joint Circuit Register</i>	CONFIDENTIAL	AL9
4.	JSP(AS) 521	<i>Fixed Service Communications Systems Control Manual</i>	RESTRICTED	Edn 3
5.	JSP(AS) 522	<i>Joint Services Communications Instructions - Traffic Procedures</i>	RESTRICTED	AL1
6.	JSP(AS) 523	<i>Defence Communications System Network Standing Instructions</i>	RESTRICTED	Edn 1
7.	ADFP 524	<i>DISCON Users Companion</i>	UNCLASSIFIED	AL1
8.	JSP(AS) 525	<i>DISCON System Network Standing Instructions</i>	RESTRICTED	Draft
9.	ADFP 528	<i>DISCON Traffic Procedures</i>	RESTRICTED	Draft
10.	ADFP 529	<i>Australian Defence Force Communication Security Accounting Instructions</i>	RESTRICTED	AL3
11.	ADFP 530	<i>Australian National STU-11/11B Telephone Directory</i>	RESTRICTED	Dec 93
12.	JSP(AS) 540	<i>Joint Tactical Communications Systems Engineering</i>	RESTRICTED	AL1
13.	JSP(AS) 541	<i>Joint Force Communications Centre Procedures</i>	RESTRICTED	Mar 81
14.	JSP(AS) 550	<i>Joint Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre Procedures</i>	CONFIDENTIAL	Draft
15.	JSP(AS) 553	<i>Joint Services Catalogue of Ground Based Radars</i>	SECRET	Edn 2
16.	JSP(AS) 561 (A)	<i>Radio Frequency Spectrum Management</i>	UNCLASSIFIED	Edn 3
17.	JSP(AS) 570 (A)	<i>Communications Security Monitoring</i>	RESTRICTED	AL2
18.	ADFP 571	<i>Standard Joint Communications Exercises</i>	RESTRICTED	AL1
19.	JSP(AS) 572	<i>VINSON Keying Concept</i>	RESTRICTED	Edn 1

CHAPTER 8

LOGISTICS

INTRODUCTION

801. The logistics challenge when planning special operations (SO) is to coordinate the civilian and military resources located within the joint force area of operations (JFAO) and the Australian support area (ASA), to ensure the provision of timely and economic support. This may require the implementation of non-standard procedures to ensure the economic provision of resources which still allow special forces (SF) elements maximum flexibility in achieving their mission. For example, logistics support procedures may have to follow the peacetime arrangements in place at the time. This may be due to SO being conducted either during periods of peace, as pre-emptive operations where a developed JFAO logistics support structure is not fully established or where the SO is conducted on the periphery of a developed JFAO.

802. While SO may vary considerably in type and duration, the same logistics support principles that are relevant to the provision of logistics support to conventional forces remain applicable. Adherence to these principles is the key to effective support regardless of the SO being conducted.

Strategic Level

803. The planning process for logistics support to SO follows closely that developed for conventional operations. Once HQADF is directed to commence planning for an operational contingency, administrative/logistics planning staffs should become involved in the process. At the strategic level, Director Joint Logistics Operations and Plans is responsible, through the Strategic Logistic Planning Group (SLPG), for development of logistics input to the joint planning process. The SLPG will coordinate logistics input to the development of strategic level orders, directives and instructions. Although the composition of the SLPG is flexible and normally dictated by the situation, Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO) should always be represented when considering support to SO.

804. Where an Australian Strategic Plan (ASP) exists, planning follows the normal sequence. The ASP is developed by the operations staff within HQADF while the joint supporting operational plan is developed by Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) to produce an Australian Campaign Plan (ACP). HQADF monitors development of the supporting plan and provides strategic direction. The Joint Administrative Supporting Plan for an SO will be endorsed by Commander Special Forces (COMD SF) and approved by Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Strategic Operations and Plans) or Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) on behalf of CDF.

805. When issuing any orders, directives and instructions to support an SO, HQADF or HQAST should ensure that:

- a. single Service directives are issued to ensure that support is provided to SF elements where required; and
- b. arrangements are made for provision of support from, or assignment of, any existing military infrastructure located within the boundaries of a JFAO.

806. When a joint force is established, single Service chiefs of staff may be required to issue directives to ensure that:

- a. logistic support is provided to single Service elements of the joint force including establishment of lines of communication into the JFAO, coordination of which is determined by HQAST in conjunction with HQADF;

- b. appropriate arrangements are made for technical maintenance and support of assets assigned to the operation; and
- c. responsibilities of single Service commanders of non-assigned logistic units located within the boundaries of the JFAO are specified.

Movements Planning

807. Development of a movement concept to support an SO incorporates the strategic deployment to the JFAO, movement aspects of the maintenance of the force and subsequent redeployment. The movement plan will normally include:

- a. identification of transport assets required to move the force;
- b. sources of available transport assets (ADF, civil, commercial or allied);
- c. broad costings for provision of movement resources; and
- d. organisations responsible for control of movement along the lines of communication.

808. Subject to acceptance of the movements plan, HQAST movements staff, may issue a movement warning order. For deployment of a joint force, HQ 1 JMOV Gp will issue either an Australian Theatre movement instruction or a movements annex to CDF's operational instruction.

Operational Level

809. At the operational level, the Theatre Administrative Planning Group (TAPG) will coordinate logistics input to the joint operational plan and prepare any necessary orders or instructions. The TAPG is normally chaired by the senior administrative officer from the joint headquarters (JHQ) conducting the SO, and membership may include representatives from administrative staffs from the component headquarters, Service Support/Logistics Commands and appropriate regional authorities. Where COMD SF is appointed as the joint force commander (JFC), the Administrative Planning Group could be chaired by (personnel/logistic) staff within Headquarters Special Force if required. Where the SO is to be controlled by a conventional force JHQ, the SF component will normally be represented on the appropriate administrative planning group by an SO liaison officer, normally drawn from HQSO.

810. The component commanders may issue a separate administrative order depending on the complexity of the arrangements necessary to support the SO. Whenever possible, logistics arrangements are included in the administration and logistics paragraphs of an operation order or issued with it as an administration and logistics annex.

CAPABILITIES

Logistics Capabilities

811. HQSO lacks any additional logistics support assets able to be assigned to supplement that held at unit level. SF elements deployed on SO will therefore depend on external logistics support for a range of requirements. SF elements may deploy with some organic logistics capability, although this will normally be to support relatively large SF deployments of company or squadron level and above. SF elements of less than company or squadron size will normally rely on external logistic support for most requirements for periods beyond sustainability levels directed in the CDF Preparedness Directive and COMAST's Operational Readiness Directive and confirmed during the planning process.

812. When fully augmented by unit support elements, a Special Air Service (SAS) squadron group or commando company has the following logistics capabilities:

- a. requisition, receipt and limited storage of the following supply classes:
 - (1) I - (foodstuffs);
 - (2) II - (general stores);
 - (3) III - (petrol, oils and lubricants limited storage only);
 - (4) V - (ammunition - limited storage);
 - (5) VI - (limited personnel demand items only); and
 - (6) IX - (limited repair parts);
- b. procurement of materiel using Australian Government Credit Card;
- c. once deployed, SF task components generally lack the ability to conduct more than basic servicing of equipment; the nature of their operations means that in many instances, damaged equipment may need to be destroyed and abandoned;
- d. prior to deployment the following repair capabilities may be available from the forward operational base:
 - (1) field level repair for unit vehicles, marine equipment and power generation equipment; for a commando company even field level repair is extremely limited;
 - (2) unit level repair for refrigeration equipment for SAS squadron only;
 - (3) unit level repair of communications equipment and limited field level repair when authorised; and
 - (4) unit level repair for small arms;
- e. first line transport support;
- f. medical capability to provide routine and emergency Level One medical support;
- g. unit level personnel support; and
- h. limited parachute packing for SAS Regt only airlift coordination.

REQUIREMENTS

Logistics Requirements

813. As SF normally has no additional logistic support assets, support requirements are likely to include:

- a. transport, to include:
 - (1) strategic movement of personnel and equipment from mounting base (MB) to forward mounting base (FMB) or forward operating base (FOB);

- (2) movement control; and
- (3) augmentation of first line transport and provision of second line transport support;
- b. administrative support to FMB and limited support to FOB;
- c. logistics engineering support to include:
 - (1) construction, repair and maintenance of living and working accommodation if existing facilities are not available and conditions preclude the use of tentage;
 - (2) provision of essential services such as water supply if required; and
 - (3) construction of expedient field firing ranges and rehearsal areas if required;
- d. aeromedical evacuation plus the provision of Level Two support when required; specialist advice and the provision of a field intelligence resuscitation and surgical team may be required for specific activities (detailed requirements are contained in chapter 9);
- e. distribution from support area to FOB;
- f. backload and repair and the ability to supervise trade repair;
- g. local purchase assistance;
- h. parachute supply, packing and rigging; and
- i. refrigeration.

Strategic Level

814. A number of options exist for the provision of logistic support to SO. Depending on the nature of the SO a combination of these options may provide the most timely and economic logistic support to the force. These may include:

- a. **Joint Facility.** HQADF may make arrangements for the provision of support from any existing military infrastructure located within the JFAO. In some circumstances, HQADF or HQAST may assign units located within the JFAO to the JFC for the duration of the SO.
- b. **Civil Infrastructure.** SF elements will normally make optimum use of the existing civil infrastructure to reduce the requirement for extensive military support. Support likely to be available includes the use of established transport routes and nodes, fuel storage capacity in population centres, utilities and services such as food supply and refrigeration and the existing telecommunications network.
- c. **Host Nation.** Depending on the nature of the SO, it may be appropriate for the host nation to provide logistic support. HQADF will negotiate necessary agreements or arrangements with other nations for support and assist with the implementation of agreements and arrangements.
- d. **Formation Support Area.** It may be appropriate, particularly at the operational and tactical level, to provide support to SF elements from an administrative area.

- e. **Mounting Base.** Some support may be provided to the JFAO directly from the MB which is normally the SF unit base. This could be the case for the provision of specialist personnel or equipment.
- f. **Australian Support Area.** SO may be supported directly from the ASA. For example, most SO will have a significant dependency on strategic aeromedical evacuation which will normally be launched from the ASA.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOURCES OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT




Figure 8.1 - Sources of Logistics Support

CHAPTER 9

HEALTH SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Introduction

901. General requirements for planning and providing health support to ADF operations are detailed in ADFP 53 - *Health Support*. Specific health support considerations for amphibious, airborne and evacuation operations which may be relevant to special operations (SO) are detailed in ADFP 12 - *Amphibious Operations*, ADFP 39 - *Airborne Operations* and ADFP 43 - *Evacuation Operations* respectively.

902. SO involve certain unique factors that will affect health support, including:

- a. the clandestine nature and location of many SO may reduce the scope for timely evacuation and access to medical treatment beyond the limited support available within special forces (SF) combat elements;
- b. the hazardous nature of SO including insertion by water and air;
- c. country-specific health threats, including tropical diseases not encountered in Australia;
- d. a health support dependency that may include civilian and military evacuees, as well as SF; and
- e. a broader range of medical conditions than may be encountered in other operations, including stress reaction and the effects of riot control agents and other non-lethal weapons.

Responsibilities

903. Capabilities. Health support to SO will be joint in nature. Depending on the operational plan, the Services could be tasked to provide the following health support capabilities:

- a. **RAN.** Afloat medical support and evacuation of casualties by sea.
- b. **Army.** Land-based health support to SF and other Army dependencies and surface and forward aeromedical evacuation (AME) within a joint force area of operations (JFAO).
- c. **RAAF.** Health support at airheads used as forward mounting base (FMB), point of entry (POE) and forward operating base (FOB); tactical AME within a JFAO or theatre; strategic AME from a JFAO or operational theatre; and AME staging support at airfields in the strategic AME chain.

904. Coordination. Health support to SO will be coordinated as follows:

- a. **Strategic Level.** By Surgeon General Australian Defence Force (SGADF) in conjunction with Headquarters Special Operations and Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Strategic Operations and Plans) (ACOPS).
- b. **Operational Level.** By the senior health officer (SHO) of Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST), in conjunction with the Joint Health Planning Group (JHPG) and Commander Special Forces.

- c. **Tactical Level.** By the SHO, appointed by the joint force commander to exercise technical control over health support and to act as the principal health adviser for the operation, in conjunction with the special operations command and control element assigned to the commander.

Health Support Planning

905. Health support planning for SO will be conducted as part of the broader operational and administrative planning process at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This will involve close cooperation with operational and administrative planning staffs. The health support plan must complement the operational plan.

906. Health Intelligence. Health intelligence, particularly information on country-specific disease threats, civilian and host nation health infrastructure and the health status of any civilian or military evacuees will be critical to effective health planning. The primary source of health intelligence is the SGADF Health Intelligence Cell. Health intelligence will be used to prepare environmental threat assessments and determine medical countermeasures for the operation.

907. Strategic Level Planning. Strategic level health planning will involve SGADF, ACOPS and Headquarters Special Forces staff. For advice these staffs may draw on national and international health authorities. The outcome will be a strategic health support concept which provides the basis for the health content of the CDF operations instruction (OPINST). The CDF OPINST will assign broad responsibilities for health support to the operation.

908. Operational Level Planning. Operational level health planning will involve health, operational and administrative staffs of HQAST or the joint force headquarters, as well as health staffs of joint or single Service headquarters tasked with assigning health assets to the joint force or in support of the SO. The JHPG provides a forum for coordinating health support planning at the operational level. The outcome will be a health support plan which details:

- a. health preparations for the operation, including the time frame for administration of health counter measures;
- b. casualty treatment at FMB, POE and FOB;
- c. casualty treatment during insertion and extraction of SF;
- d. casualty treatment for SF combat elements during the operation;
- e. medical screening and treatment of civilian or military evacuees;
- f. casualty evacuation and medical regulation within the theatre and JFAO;
- g. casualty evacuation and regulation from the JFAO and theatre to the Australian support area; and
- h. post-operations health screening.

909. Tactical Level Planning. Tactical level health planning will involve the SHO and operational and administrative staffs of the tactical headquarters, SF command and liaison components as well as SF task components. It may also involve civilian and/or host nation health authorities. The outcome will be a health support plan which amplifies relevant information contained in the operational level plan and details arrangements for casualty treatment and evacuation within SF combat element tactical area of responsibilities (TAOR), including use of civilian or host nation health infrastructure.

Health Support Concept

910. The potential range of SO in which the ADF may be involved is broad. The quantity and scope of health support to be provided will depend on the nature of the operation and in particular the requirement for operational security in the location and dispersion of SF task components, methods of insertion and extraction, the distance between TAOR and ADF administrative support areas, the location and suitability of civilian or host nation health infrastructure, the location of FMB and FOB relative to SF combat element TAOR, the enemy threat and the prospect of SF battle casualties, and the involvement and health status of military and civilian evacuees. Health support plans for specific contingencies are detailed in relevant Australian Joint Service Plans.

911. Level One Medical Support. SF task components will be self-sufficient for level one medical support. SAS patrols and commando sections include patrol medics. These medics are trained in resuscitation and can provide limited medical and nursing care. The 'A' echelon administrative support located with SF combat elements may include a SF medical officer who will be trained in and equipped for emergency management of severe trauma. The evacuation and subsequent treatment of casualties at level two or three medical facilities in joint force administrative support areas or elsewhere may be delayed through the requirement to maintain operational security and/or the distances involved. In addition to providing immediate medical care to casualties, level one medical personnel may therefore be required to provide sustained medical care and stabilisation, including resuscitation and pain relief.

912. Level Two and Three Medical Support. Level two and level three medical support will be required for all SO. The location of level three (initial wound surgery support) will be critical to casualty survival, but will also be influenced by operational considerations. Deployed ADF level three medical support will be the minimum consistent with the requirement to save life and limb. Depending on the nature of the operation, level three support could be provided by:

- a. ADF hospitals or surgical teams already located within the JFAO,
- b. ADF health facilities at the FMB or FOB deployed specifically for the operation,
- c. civilian or host nation hospitals,
- d. afloat medical support (training and helicopter support ship medical facility or surgical team aboard other major fleet unit), and
- e. fly-in fly-out surgical teams which could conduct surgery at the extraction site where operational circumstances permit before casualties are evacuated.

913. Casualty Evacuation. Surface evacuation is unlikely to be available within SF combat element TAOR. Casualty evacuation from TAOR will normally involve mounting an extraction operation by air or water. Wherever practicable, in-transit medical care should be available to casualties during extraction and evacuation. Casualties should be evacuated to medical facilities detailed in paragraph 912.

Other Health Support Considerations

914. Prevention. Casualties in SO will be minimised by ensuring that all personnel are medically, dentally, physically and psychologically fit prior to deployment. Provision must be made for effective acclimatisation. Preparation for deployment must include appropriate health briefings and initiation of specified medical countermeasures.

915. Operational Stress Management. Personnel involved in SO will require stress debriefing. This may require the deployment of stress management teams to the JFAO, FMB or FOB.

916. Survival Medicine. SF personnel should be trained in survival medicine appropriate to the area in which they will be operating. Caching of medical supplies should be considered as part of administrative support within SF TAOR if established.

917. Health Aspects of Diving/Submarine Operations. The specialised nature of diving and submarine operations will require support by health personnel trained in undersea medicine who have access to recompression facilities. Provision should be made in health support plans for SO which involve diving and/or submarine egress or ingress.

918. Health Aspects of Paratroop Operations. Similarly, paratroop operations will require support by health personnel trained in aviation medicine who have access to recompression facilities. These aspects should also be addressed in health support plans.

919. Medical Care of Evacuees. SF recovery operations may involve the requirement to provide medical care to evacuees. Relevant information is provided in ADFP 43 chapter 13.

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