



# **AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION**

**OPERATIONS SERIES**

**ADFP 9**

**JOINT PLANNING**

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# AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION

## OPERATIONS SERIES

### JOINT PLANNING

Australian Defence Force Publication 9 (ADFP 9)—*Joint Planning*, second edition, is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This publication supersedes ADFP 9, first edition of April 1994. Copies of the superseded publication are to be destroyed in accordance with current security instructions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C.A. Barrie'.

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Admiral, RAN  
Chief of the Defence Force

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23 March 1999



## FOREWORD

1. Australian Defence Force Publication 9 (ADFP 9)—*Joint Planning* details the principles and procedural framework of joint operations planning in the Australian Defence Force. It is suitable for use at all levels of conflict and within all strata of command where joint operations planning is conducted. The contents of this edition were derived from established principles, experience and lessons learnt from major joint exercises and operations. The most important input to the writing of ADFP 9 was the constructive feedback provided by its users.
2. Combined operations planning is also addressed in this publication. Joint planning and operations are largely similar to combined planning and operations, although there may be some differences in terminology and command and planning authorities. Combined operations may entail separate command and status of forces arrangements, as well as some unique planning processes. The Australian Defence Force will be guided by the principles in this publication in agreeing combined arrangements, including combined planning policy, procedures and processes. Joint planning procedures will be used within and between the Australian components of a combined force.
3. ANZUS planning is covered in ADFP 9, Supplement 1—*ANZUS Planning Manual*. ADFP 9, Supplement 2—*Australia's Maritime Jurisdiction*, provides further information for strategic and operational planners. Joint exercise planning is addressed separately in ADFP 17—*Joint Exercises and Training*.
4. Users of this publication should examine its contents, applicability and currency. Amendment action is to be taken if deficiencies or errors are found. Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre invites assistance to improve this publication.
5. **ADFP 9 is not to be released to foreign countries without written approval of the Commandant Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre.**







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ADFP 56	<i>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</i>	7610–66–139–4159



## CONTENTS

	<b>Page</b>
Authorisation	iii
Foreword	v
Amendment Certificate	vii
Australian Defence Force Publications—Operations Series	ix
List of Figures	xv
List of Tables	xvii
Symbols of Protection	xix
	<b>Paragraph</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION TO JOINT PLANNING</b>	
General	1.1
Purpose	1.4
Scope	1.5
Supplement	1.6
Glossary	1.7
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>PLANNING PRINCIPLES</b>	
INTRODUCTION	
JOINT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS	
Other planning considerations	2.6
Criteria	2.7
PLANNING SEQUENCE	
General	2.8
Joint planning phases	2.9
Planning relationship	2.11
Summary	2.13
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	
<b>MILITARY STRATEGIC PLANNING</b>	
INTRODUCTION	
STRATEGIC PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES	
Introduction	3.4
Government strategic guidance	3.7
Defence headquarters	3.12
PLANNING ENVIRONMENT	
Deliberate planning	3.21
Immediate planning	3.23
Campaign planning	3.25
STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS	
General	3.27
Strategic Planning Process—deliberate planning	3.29
Strategic Planning Process—Immediate planning	3.36
COMBINED PLANNING	
<b>Annexes:</b>	
A. Australian Defence Force Strategic Planning Organisation	
B. Roles of Strategic Command Group and Strategic Watch Group	
C. Military strategic planning guidance	
D. Military strategic estimate	
E. Warning Order	
F. Cabinet Submission	
G. Alert Order	
H. Execute Order	

<b>CHAPTER 4</b>	<b>PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL—CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS</b>	
	INTRODUCTION	
	Approaches to the operational level of war	4.10
	Operational art	4.12
	THEATRE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT	
	Deliberate planning	4.14
	Immediate planning	4.15
	Campaign planning	4.16
	PLANNING PROCESS	
	Planning products	4.26
	PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES	
	Liaison	4.39
	<b>Annexes:</b>	
	A. Headquarters Australian Theatre Planning Process	
	B. Operational correspondence	
	C. Australian Defence Force Operational Plan format	
	D. Campaign plan format	
<b>CHAPTER 5</b>	<b>COMBINED AND COALITION PLANNING</b>	
	BACKGROUND	
	Alliances, agreements and arrangements	5.6
	Unilateral or combined/coalition action	5.8
	Structuring combined and coalition forces	5.10
	COMBINED PLANNING	
	Command and control	5.19
	COALITION PLANNING	
	<b>Annexes:</b>	
	A. Australia and New Zealand combined planning process	
	B. Generalised coalition planning model	
<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	<b>PLANNING PEACE OPERATIONS</b>	
	INTRODUCTION	
	SCOPE	
	PEACE OPERATIONS CONTINUUM	
	TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS	
	MILITARY PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS	
	PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS	
	AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION CRITERIA	
	PLANNING PROCESS AND SEQUENCE	
	Sequence	6.27
	Risk assessment	6.29
	Rules of engagement	6.31
	Stages of a peace operation	6.33
	Development stage	6.34
	Conducting and concluding the operation	6.36
	COMMAND AND CONTROL	
	LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS	
	<b>Annex:</b>	
	A. Peace operations terminology	

<b>CHAPTER 7</b>	<b>BASIC APPRECIATION PROCESS</b>	
	APPRECIATION PROCESS	
	Conduct of the appreciation	7.5
	Assessment	7.6
	DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPRECIATION	
	Review of the situation	7.7
	Mission analysis	7.8
	Aim of the operation	7.10
	Assumptions	7.13
	Factors	7.14
	Enemy courses	7.17
	Enemy's most likely course	7.22
	Own courses	7.23
	Selection of the preferred course	7.25
	Outline plan	7.26
	CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS	
	Format	7.31
	Testing the concept	7.32
	Re-appreciation	7.33
	<b>Annexes:</b>	
	A. Basic appreciation format	
	B. List of possible factors	
<b>CHAPTER 8</b>	<b>JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS</b>	
	INTRODUCTION	
	PROCESS	
	Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace	8.9
	Step one—Mission analysis	8.14
	Commander's guidance	8.17
	Step two—Course of action development	8.20
	Step three—Course of action analysis	8.25
	Step four—Decision and execution	8.27
	JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS METHODS	
	Deliberate method	8.32
	Immediate method	8.34
	<b>Annexes:</b>	
	A. Joint military appreciation process—Aide-memoire	
	B. Critical vulnerability analysis	
	C. Mission analysis—Aide-memoire	
	D. Course of action development—Aide-memoire	
	E. Synchronisation matrix	
	F. Course of action analysis—Aide-memoire	
	G. Risk assessment matrix	
	H. Decision and execution—Aide-memoire	
	I. Concept of operation briefing format	

Glossary

Acronyms and Abbreviations



## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Page</b>
3-1	Planning environment	3-6
3-2	Strategic Planning Process—overview	3-7
3-3	Strategic Planning Process—deliberate planning products	3-8
3-4	Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning products	3-9
3-5	Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 1	3-9
3-6	Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 2	3-10
3-7	Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 3	3-11
3-8	Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 4	3-12
4-1	Command levels	4-1
4-2	Planning relationship	4-5
4-3	Operational level planning process	4-7
5-1	National command and liaison	5-4
5-2	Strategic lines of communication	5-5
5-3	Command and control relationships	5-6
6-1	Peace Operations Continuum	6-2
8-1	Joint military appreciation process planning model	8-1
8-2	Joint military appreciation process—showing the linkage with joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace	8-3
8-3	Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace	8-4
8-4	Mission analysis	8-5
8-5	Development of concept for operations	8-6
8-6	Course of action development	8-8
8-7	Course of action analysis	8-9
8-8	Decision and execution	8-10



**LIST OF TABLES**




<b>Table</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Page</b>
3-1	Stages of Strategic Planning Process and phases of ANZUS Crisis Action Management System	3-12
8B-1	Critical vulnerability matrix	8B-1
8B-2	Critical vulnerability matrix	8B-1





# Symbols of Protection



Distinctive Sign of:	Sign	Application/ Explanation
<p>Civilian and Military Medical Units &amp; Religious Personnel</p> <p>International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949) (Protocols I &amp; II, 1977)</p>		<p>Used as a symbol to protect medical units including field hospitals, transports, medical and religious personnel.</p> <p>Protective emblem of ICRC delegates in conflicts.</p> <p>Used to indicate activities of National Societies, such as the Australian Red Cross Society. In times of conflict, a National Society can only use the emblem as a protective sign if they are an official auxiliary to the medical services of the armed forces.</p>
<p>Civil Defence (Protocol I, 1977)</p>		<p>Used as a symbol to protect personnel and equipment engaged in providing assistance to civilian victims of war. The symbol is used by personnel such as firefighters, police and emergency rescue workers.</p>
<p>Cultural Property (The Hague Convention of 1954) (Protocol I, 1977)</p>		<p>Provides general protection to places and object of cultural significance. Special protection for places that are registered with UNESCO e.g. churches, archaeological sites, monuments and museums.</p>
<p>Dangerous Forces (Protocol I, 1977)</p>		<p>Provides specific protection to works or places that may contain dangerous forces e.g. dams or atomic reactors.</p>

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## CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION TO JOINT PLANNING

### General

**1.1** Planning is a function of command at all levels and is a prerequisite for the successful conduct of military operations. Joint planning is also a staff responsibility which embraces all aspects of joint operations and enables logical, timely and coordinated initiation, direction and monitoring of joint operations. Operations, intelligence, logistics and specialist staff officers also contribute to the process and need to be equally adept as planners.

**1.2** Joint planning is inherently more complex than planning for single-Service operations. It is a continuous single process at all levels but with different approaches and outputs which should be concurrent and parallel. Careful consideration of the capability of disparate force elements is an essential ingredient, as is coordination of logistic support. Whenever possible, plans should be developed through early and close consultation with the operational commanders and force elements likely to be involved.

**1.3** Joint planning provides for actions to be taken in response to actual or anticipated events and may be qualified by terms such as 'strategic', 'contingency', 'operational', 'campaign', 'supporting', 'administrative' or 'logistic'. While plans are the main product of the process, other outputs are directives, instructions and orders derived from these documents.

### Purpose

**1.4** Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 9 outlines the agreed Australian Defence Force (ADF) joint procedures for the conduct of planning. These procedures also provide a basis from which to plan ADF aspects of combined operations and are largely compatible with the approaches agreed between Australia and its major allies.

### Scope

**1.5** ADFP 9 describes the principles and sets guidelines and approaches for joint planning at all levels of war. It describes the processes designed to achieve timely, orderly and coordinated development of joint plans, including the manner in which planning is coordinated with agencies outside the ADF. The publication contains planning check lists detailing various factors applicable to certain types of operations and outlines the appreciation process at staff level. Planning for combined and United Nations operations is also outlined to demonstrate the manner in which they reflect and are integrated with the ADF core approach.

### Supplement

**1.6** ADFP 9 Supplement 1—*ANZUS Planning Manual*, complements this ADFP.

### Glossary

**1.7** A glossary of terms as well as a list of acronyms and abbreviations used appear at the back of this publication. Reference should be made to ADFP 101—*Glossary* and ADFP 103—*Abbreviations and Military Symbols*, for other standard abbreviations and definitions.



## CHAPTER 2

# PLANNING PRINCIPLES

### INTRODUCTION

**2.1** Joint planning is a complex process that requires the timely coordination of activities at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. The key to effective planning is ensuring the ADF's decision and planning cycle is faster than any opponent. One method of accelerating the planning process is by anticipating situations that may require a response from the ADF and preparing generic contingency plans that may be modified to suit a specific situation. Contingency planning allows careful consideration of all aspects of an operation and provides a planning framework for situations that require a quick response.

**2.2** Effective contingency planning is dependent on the ability of intelligence staff to provide sufficient warning of developing situations that may require a military response. For this to occur, a baseline database of potential flashpoints should be prepared and constantly updated. Careful analysis of changes to the database may provide the only warning of an impending crisis. Such assessments are essential if warning time is to be maximised.

**2.3** The dynamic nature of international and regional affairs suggests that the ADF may be required to respond to unforeseen crises with little or no warning. History offers many examples, including United Nations requests for urgent peacekeeping assistance, a request to participate in a coalition force or a response to a regional disaster. Common to these examples is the lack of time available for planning and thus the implicit need for a planning process that is responsive and rapid.

### JOINT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

**2.4 Principles of war.** The principles of war are detailed in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 6—*Operations*. They guide joint planning and apply at all levels, and throughout all phases of the planning process.

**2.5 Joint planning principles.** In addition to the principles of war, commanders and planning staff need to consider the following:

- a. **Relevance of the aim.** Operational missions and tasks must be achievable within the allocated resources, and consistent with higher-level political and defence objectives. The aim must be clear and unambiguous with clearly defined and achievable end-states. The mission of a subordinate commander must be consistent with the tasks allotted.
- b. **Passage of information.** Consistent with security requirements, the distribution of information, intelligence and plans must be wide enough to ensure that all assigned and supporting force commanders are aware of their responsibilities and are integrated into the planning process at the earliest practical opportunity.
- c. **Clarity.** Joint plans must be prepared and presented so that there is no misunderstanding by those subject to their direction.
- d. **Timeliness.** Completion and distribution of joint plans must ensure subordinate commanders have adequate time to implement them.
- e. **Flexibility.** Flexibility is enhanced by an approach that allows subordinate commanders to use their initiative while clearly setting out the overall objectives and constraints. In addition, this type of approach allows the adaptation of joint plans to meet changing circumstances.

- f. **Economy of resources.** Joint plans must provide for maximum economy in the use of resources while balancing the need to apply the principle of concentration of force. Over insurance, which causes resources to be unnecessarily assigned, moved, utilised or held in reserve, must be avoided. Control of scarce resources (which may be required to support various elements) must be centralised at the highest level at which their capabilities can be effectively directed and coordinated. The plan should also address the issue of conserving, or being capable of reconstituting, the force for subsequent operations.

### Other planning considerations

**2.6** There is also a number of common considerations which influence the planning process in addition to the specific joint planning principles. In particular, commanders and staffs will need to note the following:

- a. **Concurrent planning.** The maritime, land and air aspects, including logistic requirements, must be developed concurrently and in parallel with the force elements involved in the operation. Close consultation between all levels is mandatory. Appropriate networks to enable the flow of information must be established.
- b. **Planning staff limitations.** Limitations of knowledge and experience among the staff may affect joint plans. This deficiency, most common with ad hoc headquarters (HQ), must be recognised by commanders and additional time taken to solicit expert knowledge and advice.
- c. **Consultation and liaison.** Planning staffs at all levels concerned with the operation should be considered members of the one team. Therefore, consultation and liaison must be established and maintained with higher, lower and lateral commanders and their staffs. If liaison officers are employed, only those who have the necessary knowledge and experience should be selected to exchange information, and more importantly, provide advice on friendly capabilities, intentions and probable outcomes. This is particularly important during combined operations.
- d. **Development time.** The probable complexity of a joint operation may lengthen the time needed to develop plans, perhaps to the extent that planning time will become a planning factor itself. The intensity of the operational planning process dictates that plans be completed quickly, accurately and thoroughly. A planning timetable needs to be agreed early in the process and appropriate deadlines set.
- e. **Intelligence.** An estimate from intelligence staff may provide the initial warning. There will be an ongoing requirement to update the Intelligence Estimate, prepare collection plans, issue orders and requests to collection agencies and review their product.
- f. **Critical assumptions.** Those planning assumptions, derived from the appreciation, which are sensitive to change and may significantly affect the outcome of the plan should be highlighted, the nature of the sensitivity described and the possible range of outcomes stated. Their relevance should be regularly reviewed throughout the process.
- g. **Appropriate scope.** Planners and commanders need to be mindful of the pitfalls involved in 'over planning', ie planning beyond the prerogative of their HQ and compromising the initiative and flexibility of subordinates or other elements. Achieving the correct balance from the outset will develop more effective plans and contribute to trust between components.
- h. **Administrative planning.** Administrative support is central to the raising, training, mobilising, deploying, reconstituting and demobilising of a military force. Administrative planning is the process to coordinate national, civil and military resources to support military operations. Administrative planning results in an assessment of what is administratively possible to support the commander's concept of operations, strategies to overcome problems and identification of limitations.

## Criteria

- 2.7** A joint plan should meet the following criteria:
- a. It must accomplish the specified mission or tasks.
  - b. It must be based on pertinent facts and data.
  - c. Assumptions should be identified and where possible tested for validity and probability.
  - d. Command relationships, control responsibilities and the chain of command should be specified.
  - e. Authority and responsibility should be delegated to the maximum extent consistent with maintenance of control.
  - f. Logistics, personnel, health and financial arrangements should be established for the expected duration of the operation.
  - g. The plan must be expressed clearly.
  - h. The plan must be flexible.
  - i. Adequate measures must be provided to monitor the plan's implementation and ensure accordance with the commander's intent.

## PLANNING SEQUENCE

### General

**2.8** The sequence followed in joint planning is largely the same regardless of the level at which it is undertaken. The process is a logical and sequential problem-solving approach which can be undertaken by small or large planning teams. The major difference between the strategic and operational level is in the composition and authority of the decision making groups and the nature of the agencies providing input. Planning processes at the strategic and operational levels are discussed in [chapter 3—'Military strategic planning'](#) and [chapter 4—'Planning at the operational level—campaigns and operations'](#).

### Joint planning phases

**2.9** The phases required throughout the joint planning process are largely common irrespective of the level of war or the type of joint planning involved. Although joint planning is likely to be a continuous and interactive process and involve a number of concurrent and sequential activities, the process can be reduced to three overlapping phases:

- a. **Initiation and options development.** Recognition and assessment of a situation requiring production of a military appreciation and identification of options, is termed the 'initiation and options development' phase. At the strategic level this phase will be initiated by government or Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) in response to either a developing crisis where the government may consider committing the ADF or a requirement to plan against longer term contingencies. In turn, an intelligence estimate and broad appreciation will be undertaken to provide CDF and government with a series of broad response options.
- b. **Concept and plans development.** This process may involve the development of contingency plans for longer-term contingencies or strategic and operational plans in time of crisis. Plan development is dependent on coordinated and concurrent staff planning at all levels. Effective procedures for liaison and dissemination of planning directions and information are most important.

- c. **Implementation and monitoring.** When a decision is taken to initiate operations, the implementation and monitoring phase occurs. Warning orders and orders to implement the main operational plan are issued. These orders are based on the latest issue of the operational plan, modified where necessary to take account of the most recent information and intelligence. Such orders may be issued in the form of directives and/or operation orders/instructions as appropriate. Operations are then executed as ordered. The monitoring of operations is paramount to ensure that:
- (1) any adjustments can be implemented if necessary,
  - (2) planning for branches and sequels occurs, and
  - (3) essential lessons are recorded for the future.

**2.10 Planning for combined operations.** In combined operations planning, this sequence may be further divided, sometimes with retitled phases. For example the ANZUS Crisis Action Management System, dealt with in ADFP 9, Supplement 1—*ANZUS Planning Manual*, refers to six phases aligning Australia with United States practice, these phases are:

- a. Phase 1—Situation development.
- b. Phase 2—Crisis assessment.
- c. Phase 3—Course of action development.
- d. Phase 4—Course of action selection.
- e. Phase 5—Execution planning.
- f. Phase 6—Execution.

### Planning relationship

**2.11** Successful planning also depends upon effective integration of the staff effort of all levels of command and HQ involved. Early and continuous consultation helps achieve this end. Clear definition of the prerogative of HQ and responsibilities of staff assists development of trust and teamwork as well as the application of appropriate expertise.

**2.12** The linkage between the various levels and planning sequence is detailed in chapter 3, [annex A](#).

### Summary

**2.13** Production of timely and effective plans is one of the major responsibilities of command. The planning of an ADF response to a defence emergency or crisis in peace, and the planning of joint and combined operations in conflict, both call for established and well understood joint processes and procedures. Approaches may differ due to the urgency of the situation and the time available for a response but the common principles of maintenance of the aim, passage of information, clarity, timeliness, flexibility and economy of resources will apply.

## CHAPTER 3

# MILITARY STRATEGIC PLANNING

### INTRODUCTION

**3.1** Military strategic planning is initiated following recognition of a situation that may warrant a response by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). There are two main types of military strategic planning: **deliberate** planning and **immediate** planning. Immediate planning encompasses crisis and contingency planning. One of the characteristics of planning at the strategic level is the need for an effective political/military interface to ensure coordination of the various instruments of national power in pursuit of national objectives. While independent military action may be the chosen option, it is more likely that a combination of the elements of national power will be utilised in any given situation. Hence there is a need for wide consultation at this level to ensure a coordinated approach by all interested government agencies as well as concerned commercial organisations.

**3.2** Planning at this level also involves the integration of resource and preparedness issues from information provided by the Service components and supporting Defence Groups. The need for close consultation with operational level planners and concurrent and parallel planning is paramount if the planning process is to be timely and effective. The two military strategic planning processes are structured towards the development time frame of a situation as follows:

- a. Military strategic deliberate planning deals with circumstances that are not time sensitive. As a general rule, the military strategic deliberate planning process deals with circumstances where at least 12 months warning is anticipated. Military strategic deliberate planning is coordinated by Head Strategic Policy and Plans Division (HSPP).
- b. Military strategic immediate planning is conducted for operations which develop within a 12-month period and include crisis and contingency operations. Military strategic immediate planning is coordinated by Head Strategic Command Division (HSCD) and supported by HSPP, Head International Policy Division (HIP) and the Service headquarters.

**3.3** In all circumstances the relationship between estimated response time and likely warning time determines the approach. Response time, which is the time available between recognition of a requirement for an ADF response and its implementation, is the critical determinant of planning priorities and the planning process to be used. Additionally, the nature, possible outcome of the response and the adequacy of existing plans will determine the detail and level of consultation able to be adopted in the planning process. A diagram of the ADF Strategic Planning Organisation is in [annex A](#).

### STRATEGIC PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

#### Introduction

**3.4** National security is an Australian Government responsibility. The Government identifies Australia's security interests and develops strategies to attain or protect them. These strategies coordinate the political (including diplomatic), economic and military elements of national power to best further Australia's national interests.

**3.5** Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), through the Minister for Defence (MINDEF), is the Government's principal adviser on the use of military power as part of the national strategy and is responsible for developing military strategies to support ongoing national interests and objectives, and responding to crises.

**3.6** This section describes the national and military strategic crisis management mechanisms, and their interrelationships (see [annex A](#)). Discussion of the national level security fora is limited to their participation in crises where the Government might consider using the ADF.

## Government strategic guidance

**3.7** Government provides direction and guidance to CDF, which would include:

- a. a statement of the required national end-state;
- b. definition of national interests which require a military response;
- c. a statement of the circumstances in which the ADF may be committed;
- d. constraints and limitations within which operations are to be conducted;
- e. the extent to which national resources would be devoted to the ADF;
- f. the legal basis for deployment; and
- g. a statement to allow the framing of national policy (NATPOL) and subsequent rules of engagement (ROE).

**3.8 National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC).** This committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and is the premier body for coordinating all aspects of Australia's national security interests. It is the focal point of government decision making on national security matters including crisis management. In addition, the NSCC decides policy relating to intelligence, domestic security and law enforcement matters. Membership comprises the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Minister for Defence, the Attorney-General (AG) and the Treasurer, with other ministers attending as appropriate. During a crisis, the CDF may be invited to attend NSCC meetings which are normally conducted in the Parliament House Crisis Centre.

**3.9 Secretaries' Committee on National Security (SCNS).** This Committee is chaired by the Secretary Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and is the senior interdepartmental committee on national security matters. It provides coordinated advice to the NSCC on options and strategies. Core membership comprises the Secretaries of PM&C, Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), AG and Treasury, together with CDF and the Director-General Office of National Assessments (DGONA); other departmental heads will be involved as appropriate.

**3.10 Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG).** This Group has no executive authority but plays a key role in overseeing the day-to-day coordination of responses to international crises. The SPCG comprises Deputy Secretaries from PM&C, DFAT and Defence (normally Deputy Secretary Strategic and Intelligence (DEPSEC S&I) and Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF)) and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary PM&C. It supports the SCNS by:

- a. setting in place appropriate crisis management arrangements when Australia's interests are involved;
- b. coordinating the development of assessments, policy options and responses to strategies and security;
- c. confirming national objectives and constraints; and
- d. coordinating and facilitating the development of respective departmental policy positions and responses on a day-to-day basis on strategic, security and defence issues affecting Australia's national interests.

**3.11 Interdepartmental Committee (IDC).** To facilitate the functioning of the crisis management machinery, it may be necessary to form a group at a lower level than the SPCG. This group will take the form of an IDC consisting of representatives from PM&C, DFAT and Defence (normally HSCD and First Assistant Secretary International Policy). The function of the IDC is to ensure that the necessary interaction occurs between Defence and relevant government departments. This involves coordinating and facilitating the development of respective departmental policy positions and responses on a day-to-day basis on strategic, security and defence issues affecting Australia's national interests. The IDC provides an ideal medium for confirming or rejecting national objectives and constraints identified during assumption-based planning prior to their consideration by the SPCG.

## Defence headquarters

**3.12** CDF is the principal military adviser to the Minister for Defence. CDF advises the Government on the military implications of strategic developments, strategy and planning, and the conduct of operations. In discharging the command function, CDF issues strategic directives and future intentions. CDF is also required to keep government advised (through the Minister) of strategic developments that may require a military response, the progress of operations, future military plans and resource requirements to achieve national objectives.

**3.13** Consistent with government guidance, CDF approves the requirement for joint or combined planning at the strategic level. After consultation with the Strategic Command Group (SCG), CDF provides appropriate guidance to military strategic planners including the requirement to complete the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE) or issues paper, and prepares written orders. Throughout the planning process, CDF's guidance can be expected to cover the following:

- a. A statement of political constraints.
- b. The national end-state.
- c. Military end-state, objectives and tasks.
- d. A description of command arrangements.
- e. Indicative force element allocation.
- f. Resource restrictions.
- g. Legal basis.
- h. ROE guidance.
- i. Future intentions.
- j. Timings.

**3.14** **SCG.** The function of the SCG is to provide timely military strategic advice to CDF for particular contingencies. The SCG comprises CDF as chairman, VCDF, the Service chiefs, HSCD, the Secretary, DEPSEC S&I and Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation (DDIO). At the invitation of CDF, the SCG may be augmented by Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), Commander Support Australia (COMSPTAS) and Director-General Public Affairs as the situation dictates.

**3.15** In relation to military strategic planning, the SCG advises CDF on:

- a. guidance to government;
- b. military aspects and implications of defence strategy;
- c. approval of military options and concepts of operations and campaign plans, including allocation of forces and supporting assets to designated commanders; and
- d. longer-term mobilisation including aspects relating to the size of the ADF and the balance within it, preparedness, forces disposition, major investments and supporting infrastructure.

**3.16** To assist CDF in the discharge of command functions, as they relate to immediate joint military operations and plans, HSCD has specific responsibility for:

- a. preparing military strategic planning guidance or issues;
- b. development of military strategic plans;
- c. preparing CDF's written orders;
- d. recommending allocation of resources and coordinating strategic logistic arrangements;

- e. providing staff advice to CDF on plans prepared for CDF by COMAST; and
- f. staff activities (submissions etc) and reporting associated with current operational activity.

**3.17 Strategic Watch Group (SWG).** This Group is chaired by HSCD. The SWG monitors indicators and warnings (I&W) to identify potential crises that may require an ADF response, and oversees the military strategic situation and ADF response, to ensure it remains consistent with the developing situation or crisis. If CDF directs military planning for an immediate ADF response, the SWG provides a seamless transition from monitoring to crisis management. During a crisis, the SWG also provides an avenue for coordination between the operational and strategic levels of command.

**3.18** The roles and membership of the SCG and SWG in the strategic planning process are shown in [annex B](#).

**3.19 Strategic Planning Group (SPG).** This Group is chaired by Director-General Joint Operations and Plans. The SPG reviews the MSE that is raised by planning staff when a potential crisis is developing. The SPG refers the MSE to the SWG for higher-level consideration when the situation or crisis has developed to a point requiring a potential ADF response.

## PLANNING ENVIRONMENT

**3.20** The planning environment describes the relationships between the planning levels used to optimise the preparation and employment of elements of the ADF, in order to support government direction. Whilst acknowledging that the planning environment is applicable across all levels of conflict and military support operations (MSO), this chapter concentrates on the strategic level and the interaction with the theatre headquarters (HQ). This environment has three planning tiers that are linked by the participation of subordinate level staff in higher planning, policy development and decision-making fora, these are:

- a. **National Strategic.** This tier is represented by the Government acting unilaterally, in a multinational organisation such as the United Nations (UN), or in a coalition with one or more allies. The principal executive forum is the NSCC. Government provides direction for ADF tasks through standing guidance distilled from Strategic Reviews, White Papers and other statements of policy. In time of crisis, the NSCC and subordinate fora, the SCNS, the SPCG and the Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) form the National Crisis Management Machinery (NCMM). The NCMM provides additional specific direction in the form of articulated national aims, objectives and end-states, together with coordination to achieve a national approach to achieve these ends.
- b. **Military Strategic.** Represented by the CDF, the Service chiefs and the Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) staff. DEPSEC S&I, assisted by HSPP and HIP, are primarily responsible for the long range or future planning for employment of the ADF. HSPP, in consultation with the single-Service Headquarters, analyses Strategic Reviews/White Papers and liaises with other government departments to determine Military Strategies and produce Military Strategic Planning Guidance (MSPG) for the theatre HQ to conduct deliberate planning. An example format for MSPG is in [annex C](#). The Military Strategies also guide Capability Development and Preparedness requirements. These aspects are not considered in this chapter. HSCD monitors developing situations that may require an ADF response and provides the mechanism for coordinating strategic level advice to government. HSCD develops MSE based on government and CDF direction, to inform the theatre level immediate planning process. HIP provides the key interface with other government departments to support the immediate planning process. DDIO provides assessments to support the HSCD and HSPP processes. The Service chiefs provide expert advice, generally in the SCG forum, to assist CDF with the decision making and advice to government. Service chiefs also provide guidance to their component commanders, for input at the theatre level.
- c. **Theatre.** This tier is represented by COMAST and the component commanders. At the theatre HQ, MSPG and CDF orders (warning order (WNGO), alert order (ALERTO) and execute order (EXECUTO)) are used as the basis to develop plans for operations and campaigns.

## Deliberate planning

**3.21** Deliberate planning is conducted at all levels of command (strategic, operational and tactical), and at each level the emphasis of the planning and the constraints imposed upon the planning process vary. At the strategic level, military strategic deliberate planning is defined as follows:

The process for the development of considered military strategic guidance for the employment of the ADF, to achieve an end-state, in support of Government national strategy. The process is generally free of time constraints. It relies on a mix of assumption-based planning against current strategic guidance and futures analysis to account for possible future strategic environments.

**3.22** Military strategic deliberate planning deals with circumstances that are not time sensitive. As a general rule, the military strategic deliberate planning process deals with circumstances where at least 12 months warning is anticipated. Military strategic deliberate planning is coordinated by HSPP and supported by the Service Headquarters. Preliminary consultation is also established with the relevant operational level commanders, COMAST and COMSPTAS.

## Immediate planning

**3.23** Immediate planning is defined as follows:

The time-sensitive planning for the employment of assigned forces and resources that occurs in response to a developing situation that may result in military operations. This planning is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds.

**3.24** Immediate planning is coordinated at the military strategic level by HSCD and supported by HSPP, HIP and the Service Headquarters. The process is initiated by the continuous monitoring of I&W provided by Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), and by its nature accounts for situations that could develop over a short time frame, usually less than 12 months. These situations often fall into the military spectrum of MSO. Planning involves the anticipated use of the ADF as part of the whole of government strategy. This planning is guided by the NCMM, in which ADHQ will be represented at various levels to ensure a coordinated approach to the problem.

## Campaign planning

**3.25** Campaign planning is defined as follows:

A process, conducted at the theatre level, that coordinates the sequencing of military operations in order to achieve strategic level objectives.

**3.26** Campaign planning integrates both deliberate and immediate planning processes and seeks to orchestrate the ways for tactical means to achieve strategic ends. The planning environment is summarised in [figure 3–1](#).




Figure 3-1: Planning environment


## STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS

### General

**3.27** The Strategic Planning Process (STRAPP) is a command and staff process to support CDF in command of operations. It combines the cyclic development and review process of deliberate planning with a four-stage immediate planning process. An overview of the STRAPP is shown in figure 3-2.

**3.28** In particular, the process seeks to:

- include the Service chiefs in the planning process, whilst preserving the direct command relationship between CDF and COMAST;
- introduce a simple, structured yet flexible process, that provides for appropriate consultation that is focused on outcomes;
- be responsive to, and integrated with, the NCMM;
- delineate the planning responsibilities of the military strategic and theatre levels;
- consider deliberate and immediate planning as a holistic process; and
- provide the ADF with a process that suits Australian command structures and processes but has the utility to be readily aligned to the agreed combined planning process with the ANZUS Crisis Action Management System (ACAMS).



**Figure 3-2: Strategic Planning Process—overview**

### **Strategic Planning Process—deliberate planning**


**3.29** Deliberate planning is the staff process used to determine military actions which could be undertaken in a contingency or in a specific operation. Its aim is to identify and examine in detail the full range of military options. At the strategic level, the deliberate planning process is founded on guidance from government in the form of white papers and strategic studies. HSPD turn this guidance into military strategies and planning guidance for Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) to formulate campaign plans to suit the needs of the current and future environment. Deliberate plans may be anticipatory or reactive. Anticipatory planning is undertaken as a normal staff process whereas reactive staff planning is likely to be employed during a sustained period of tension or conflict. Deliberate planning is the responsibility of HSPD and is aimed at enabling the ADF to seize the initiative by choosing the time and place to execute the plan.

**3.30** STRAPP—Deliberate planning is designed to enable the timely development of military strategies and associated planning guidance needed to inform:

- a. government of possible military strategic options (including risk analysis, management and implications);
- b. force structure development, preparedness and mobilisation;
- c. doctrine; and
- d. operational level concepts development and planning.

**3.31** The STRAPP—Deliberate planning process involves four iterative components, being:

- a. strategic assessment;
- b. strategy and guidance development;
- c. analysis (including risk assessment); and
- d. review.



**Figure 3–3: Strategic Planning Process—deliberate planning products**

**3.32 Strategic assessment.** Strategic assessment is conducted by HSPP and involves a mix of assumption-based planning and future analysis to position the ADF in a potentially credible circumstance. This methodology is adopted as a means of dealing with strategic uncertainty outside the parameters of existing strategic guidance, predictable developments and changes in the near term.

**3.33 Strategy and guidance development.** Strategy and guidance development is achieved through the Military Strategy Development Process (MSDP)<sup>1</sup>. The product of the MSDP is a credible, relevant and robust military strategy complete with supporting MSPG. In the initial stages of consideration, MSPG could be provided to the operational level on an ‘as available’ basis. As the planning process matures or as circumstances are clarified, MSPG may be provided in a more structured format, as outlined in [annex D](#).


**3.34 Analysis.** Analysis is applied to all components of the deliberate planning process, including the military strategy and the associated MSPG. Analysis is undertaken to prove acceptability, suitability and feasibility, and draws on a combination of expert panels, seminars, national, military strategic and operational level war games and Defence Science and Technology Organisation modelling and assessment. Analysis is used to determine the appropriateness of deliberate planning outcomes against other associated plans, such as readiness, sustainment and mobilisation. The end result of the analysis step in the deliberate planning process is a military strategy, complete with associated guidance, which identifies how the ADF will fight and win and which coordinates the development, deployment and employment of the ADF and other defence capabilities.

**3.35 Review.** STRAPP deliberate planning is an evolutionary process subject to ongoing review and revision during and at the end of each step of the process.

### **Strategic Planning Process—Immediate planning**

**3.36 STRAPP—Immediate planning** is designed to enable the rapid development of military options, government approval of a military plan and its subsequent execution. The process is a flexible system that facilitates parallel planning at the military strategic (HSCD–J3) and theatre levels (COMAST), and is keyed to available response time. The inherent flexibility of the process means the phases can be abbreviated, conducted concurrently or eliminated as required, noting however that the utility of all elements of military strategic planning depends upon the extent of discipline in process that is maintained. The actual sequence of actions and the time spent in each phase is largely determined by the nature of the crisis, the tasks to be accomplished and the time available.

<sup>1</sup> MSDP is a term being developed by Strategic Policy and Plans Division as part of the evolution of the Deliberate planning process.




**Figure 3-4: Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning products**

3.37 An outline of the four stages is as follows:

a. **Stage 1—Situation development**

- (1) **Summary.** Phase 1 is principally a National/Military Strategic level activity and begins when an event highlights possible national security implications. It includes ADHQ military planning and concludes with CDF endorsing the MSE.




**Figure 3-5: Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 1**

- (2) The need to commence military strategic planning will be identified by a variety of stimuli: either by the SWG which monitors changes in I&W, as advised by DIO; or through other channels which may include the UN, allies or a direction from government. In preparing the initial advice to government, CDF will seek advice from the SCG and COMAST, and confirm the need for formal planning. CDF will then advise the MINDEF on his planning intentions.
- (3) MINDEF should seek Cabinet or NSCC endorsement of national objectives and end-states, together with direction on liaison with other agencies and allies. Should the situation warrant, the NCMM will be activated. An IDC or IDETF may be established to provide a coordinating function across disparate areas of responsibility.

- (4) The SPG will complete the MSE, drawing on MSPG and any earlier MSE produced as a result of contingency planning, in order to identify the military strategic objectives. The Strategic Command Division (SCD) subordinate planning groups will subsequently conduct supporting appreciations, coordinate with various government departments through HIP and Defence areas and develop the WNGO. Advice from the Service chiefs and COMAST will be sought during the preparation of the strategic level documents. It may also be appropriate to conduct strategic level reconnaissance, workshops or seminars during this period to facilitate the development of ADF options, as part of the national approach to the situation. The primary responsibility for liaison with allies will lie with CDF and HSCD at this stage of planning. HSCD will normally use the SWG to assist in consideration of the MSE. An example of an MSE is in [annex D](#).
- (5) HSCD will present the MSE to CDF for approval. The WNGO would then be developed. The WNGO is outlined in [annex E](#).
- (6) Concurrent theatre HQ planning will also commence during this stage to ensure that the ADF is able to respond in a timely fashion. Initial theatre level planning will be based on existing military strategic guidance provided in relevant MSPG, recent MSE and direction provided to representatives at SWG or SPG. Alternatively, CDF may issue preliminary planning intentions to HCAST based on available information and assessment of likely military objectives.

**b. Stage 2—Planning development**

- (1) **Summary.** In this stage, the focus of the planning effort shifts to the theatre level. It begins with the WNGO being issued to COMAST, together with supporting MSE documentation. It ends with the issue of an ALERTO to COMAST and the subsequent issue of an operations order/instruction (OPORD/OPINST).




**Figure 3-6: Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 2**

- (2) The WNGO is sent to CDF for approval and release to COMAST. It is the foundation for subsequent planning at the theatre HQ and will include:
  - (a) the endorsed MSE;
  - (b) indicative forces to be assigned, for planning purposes;
  - (c) tasking for the COMAST to produce options/campaign Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to meet the identified military strategic objectives; and
  - (d) additional relevant planning guidance, as required.

- (3) COMAST will develop the campaign CONOPS based on the national and military strategic guidance provided in the MSE and WNGO, together with extant MSPG. The campaign **options** will describe specific military actions covering **who** will execute, **what** type of action is required, **when** it is to begin, **where** it will take place and **how** it will be accomplished. COMAST will develop estimates of resources needed and provide details of costs. COMAST may need to liaise with equivalent allied HQ in the development of the CONOPS, should a combined operation be proposed. The responsibility for detailed liaison for planning with proposed allies transfers to COMAST from CDF, as a result. COMAST will also submit a request for ROE and may issue a WNGO to subordinate commanders.
- (4) The SCG will normally consider the campaign CONOPS and advise CDF who may endorse it or direct COMAST to refine it further. On endorsement, International Policy Division will produce a Cabinet Submission (CABSUB), and SCD will produce an ALERTO. The ALERTO will confirm the approved campaign options in sufficient detail for COMAST to prepare an OPORD/OPINST, assign Force Elements and it may contain appropriate guidance to change or amplify guidance previously provided in the WNGO.
- (5) The CABSUB (see [annex F](#)) will present the CDF agreed CONOPS and factors leading to the selected course of action, for consideration by government. Its approval will provide the legislative cover and financial resources required to conduct the military operation. CDF will issue the ALERTO (see [annex G](#)) to COMAST who will then issue the campaign/operational plan and supporting OPORD/OPINST.
- (6) HSCD and HSPP will conduct branches and sequels planning throughout the planning and conduct of the campaign to consider the strategic factors associated with a resolution of the situation, the need to conduct follow-on campaigns or the possibility of employing the ADF in a second theatre. DDIO will provide input into this planning, particularly with the provision of intelligence estimates.

**c. Stage 3—Execution**

- (1) **Summary.** Stage 3 begins with the issue of the execute order, EXECUTEO, (see [annex H](#)) by CDF and ends with the successful resolution of the crisis.



**Figure 3-7: Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 3**

- (2) MINDEF will be advised of the CDF's intention to issue the EXECUTEO. Throughout the conduct of the campaign/operation, COMAST will provide situation reports to ADHQ. The situation will be monitored by the SWG, who will maintain a watch on branches and sequels opportunities. HSCD will subsequently brief CDF and SCG as appropriate. Should additional guidance or resources be required, these will be sought through the SCG, NCMM or direct liaison with the CDF as appropriate.
- d. **Stage 4—Evaluation.** During this stage, Post Operational Reports are developed at the strategic and theatre HQ to identify lessons learnt. These lessons, together with reviewed government guidance as a result of the participation in the situation, are fed back into the deliberate planning process as inputs to complete the planning environment. The evaluation allows appropriate factors to be considered in generating revised Military Strategies that will in turn inform Capability Development and Preparedness requirements as well as MSPG. Lessons learnt will provide input to all levels of the ADF and cover a range of issues from equipment, standard operating procedures and training. All lessons learnt are entered into the ADF Activity Analysis Database System (ADFAADS). ADFAADS is then used to effect the appropriate staff action to resolve the issues raised by the lessons. This completes the planning to evaluation cycle, where lessons learnt lead to process and doctrinal changes that improve the planning and conduct of operations and exercises.




Figure 3-8: Strategic Planning Process—immediate planning—stage 4

**COMBINED PLANNING**

3.38 STRAPP—Immediate planning is aligned to the ACAMS with consistent written directives (WNGO, ALERTO and EXECUTEO) and corresponding phases as detailed in table 3-1.

STRAPP—Immediate planning	ACAMS
Stage 1—Situation development	Phases 1 and 2
Stage 2—Planning development	Phases 3, 4 and 5
Stage 3—Execution	Phase 6 (part)
Stage 4—Evaluation	Phase 6 (part)

Table 3-1: Stages of Strategic Planning Process and phases of ANZUS Crisis Action Management System

3.39 The STRAPP is easily adapted for combined planning with the United States (US), noting that the development of the USPACOM/ADHQ/HQAST relationship is ongoing. In essence, the primary responsibility for liaison with PACOM rests with CDF until the issue of the WNGO and then transfers to COMAST during the Planning Development and Execution phases of immediate planning. HQAST will then provide the bulk of the Australian component of the Combined Crisis Action Organisation which will be responsive to HSCD and COMAST, as appropriate.

**Annexes:**

- A. Australian Defence Force Strategic Planning Organisation
- B. Roles of Strategic Command Group and Strategic Watch Group
- C. Military strategic planning guidance
- D. Military strategic estimate
- E. Warning Order
- F. Cabinet Submission
- G. Alert Order
- H. Execute Order







## ROLES OF STRATEGIC COMMAND GROUP AND STRATEGIC WATCH GROUP

### Strategic Command Group

#### 1. Membership:

Permanent Members	Invited Members
CDF (Chairperson)	Secretary
VCDF	COMAST
CN	DEPSEC S&I
CA	DDIO
CAF	COMSPTAS
HSCD	DGPA

2. The principle function of the Strategic Command Group (SCG) is to provide advice to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), including professional single-Service advice, to assist the CDF in discharging the responsibility for command of the Australian Defence Force and military advice to government. The roles of the SCG within the Strategic Planning Process (STRAPP) are:

- a. **Deliberate planning:**
  - (1) Approve Military strategies, and
  - (2) approve Military Strategic Planning Guidance.
- b. **Immediate planning:**

Stage 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide advice to CDF on the developing situation and the need for formal planning, in order to provide timely and appropriate advice to government.</li> <li>• Provide military guidance for the development of the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE).</li> <li>• Advise on the suitability of MSE and warning order (WNGO).</li> </ul>
Stage 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider and endorse Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) campaign plans/concept of operations.</li> <li>• Advise on the production of Cabinet Submission and alert order.</li> <li>• Provide force elements to COMAST for the campaign.</li> <li>• Continue to provide advice to CDF.</li> </ul>
Stage 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor conduct of campaign.</li> <li>• Continue to provide advice to CDF.</li> </ul>
Stage 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider and advise on Post Operational Reports.</li> <li>• Provide advice to CDF on requirement to review standing government guidance.</li> <li>• Provide advice to Australian Defence Headquarters on the requirement to review military strategies.</li> </ul>

## Strategic Watch Group

### 3. Membership:

HSCD (Chairperson)	DGIO	DGPA
HIP	DCN	DGJOP
HSPP	DCA	DGMS
HDPE	DCAF	COMAST

4. The principle function of the Strategic Watch Group (SWG) is to monitor changes in indicators and warnings (I&W) as provided by Defence-Intelligence Organisation, to provide advice to the SCG on strategic planning matters and to inform their functional areas of strategic developments. The roles of SWG within the STRAPP are:

- a. **Deliberate planning:** Contribute to the analysis of deliberate planning products.
- b. **Immediate planning:**

Stage 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor I&amp;W to identify the need for military strategic planning or information requirements.</li> <li>• Provide advice to the SCG on developing situations.</li> <li>• Assist in the coordination of the development of MSE WNGO.</li> </ul>
Stage 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to monitor I&amp;W.</li> </ul>
Stage 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to monitor I&amp;W.</li> <li>• Maintain a watch on branches and sequels opportunities.* Monitor Headquarters Australian Theatre situation reports.</li> </ul>
Stage 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to monitor I&amp;W.</li> </ul>

## MILITARY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE

### References:

1. **Situation:**
  - a. Requirement for planning guidance.
2. **Aim of the Military Strategic Planning Guidance.**
3. **The Problem:**
  - a. Statement of the problem.
  - b. Broad assumptions.
4. **Factors:**
  - a. Protagonists
  - b. International issues
  - c. Australian national strategy:
    - (1) National aim.
    - (2) Key elements of national Strategy.
    - (3) National interests and objectives.
    - (4) National end-state.
  - d. Legal issues:
    - (1) Legal basis for deployment.
    - (2) Mandatory aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
5. **National coordination:**
  - a. National strategic level coordination:
    - (1) Identify national players and interests.
    - (2) Responsibilities and representation of committees/planning groups.
    - (3) Interdepartmental coordination.
    - (4) Information operations policy.
  - b. Military strategic considerations:
    - (1) Guidance for Service Headquarters (links with CDF Preparedness Directive).
    - (2) Information requirements.
    - (3) Logistics and national support base.
    - (4) Public information.
  - c. Legal aspects.

**6. Planning guidance for Commander Australian Theatre:**

- a. Chief of the Defence Forces intent.
- b. Military end-state.
- c. Military strategic objectives:
  - (1) Preconditions.
  - (2) Indications or 'triggers' for continued planning and execution.
- d. Planning guidance:
  - (1) Constraints (are must DOs) (including logistics, finance, rules of engagement, information operations).
  - (2) Restrictions (are must **not** DOs).
  - (3) Consultation (approval for).
  - (4) Links with other Military Strategic Planning Guidance.
  - (5) Australian Defence Force Command and Control.

**Note**

1. The content of this annex is to be viewed purely as illustrative. Each situation is different and the guidance, factors and headings will change as required.

## MILITARY STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

for

(of)

### References:

#### 1. **Situation:**

- a. Summary of the current situation.

#### 2. **Aim of the estimate.**

#### 3. **The problem:**

- a. Statement of the problem:

- (1) Short-term.
- (2) Long-term.

#### 4. **Factors:**

- a. Protagonists:

- (1) General.
- (2) National objectives.
- (3) Military capabilities and preparedness.
- (4) Strategic centre of gravity.
- (5) Strategic decisive points and vulnerabilities.
- (6) Key players.
- (7) Scenarios.
- (8) Risk analysis.
- (9) Deductions.

- b. International issues:

- (1) Attitudes and considerations of other nations.
- (2) International organisations.
- (3) Deductions.

- c. Australian national strategy:

- (1) Guidance from government.
  - (a) National aim.
  - (b) Key elements of national strategy.
  - (c) National interests.
  - (d) National objectives.

- (e) National end-state.
  - (f) Australian strategic centre of gravity/decisive points/vulnerabilities.
- (2) Deductions.
- d. Time and space:
  - (1) Timing.
  - (2) Space.
  - (3) Other considerations:
    - (a) Weather.
  - (4) Deductions.

**5. Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) guidance for strategic coordination and operational planning:**

- a. CDF'S intent.
- b. Desired military end-state.
- c. Military strategic objectives:
  - (1) Preconditions.
  - (2) Triggers.
- d. Planning guidance:
  - (1) Constraints.
  - (2) Restrictions.
  - (3) Consultation.
  - (4) Information operation themes.
- e. Legal issues:
  - (1) Legal basis for deployment.
  - (2) Mandatory aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
- f. Command and control.

**Note**

1. The content of this annex is to be viewed purely as illustrative. Each situation is different and the guidance, factors and headings will change as required.

## WARNING ORDER

1. Warning Order (WNGO) is prepared by Australian Defence Force Command Centre, using Australian Defence Formatted Message System (ADFORMS) format. The WNGO will normally be issued using IMMEDIATE precedence. The WNGO initiates planning at the operational level, and should be published as soon as possible. For format and further detail see Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) ADFP 822—*Australian Defence Formatted Message System*. ADFP 822 is now distributed electronically to all commands and will automatically generate the message under 'WNGO'. Content format and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the WNGO are listed below (in this example, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) is assumed to be the originator). Those lines in bold face are mandatory:

**1. SITUATION (Codename for OP):**

**A. GENERAL:**

(Strategic political/military situation).

**B. ENEMY:**

(Enemy forces in the expected area of operations).

**(Capabilities).**

(Intent and probable course of action).

(Strategic centre of gravity).

**C. FRIENDLY:**

(Political, diplomatic, and economic strategies).

(Anticipated attitudes and actions of friendly nations).

(Operations expected of other national, allied or coalition forces).

(Strategic centre of gravity).

**D. CONSTRAINTS.**

**E. ASSUMPTIONS.**

**2. MISSION.**

**3. EXECUTION:**

**A. NATIONAL END-STATE.**

**B. MIL/STRAT END-STATE.**

**C. CDF INTENT (state preferred option).**

**D. COMMAND AND CONTROL:**

**(1) (Nominate COMD).**

**(2) COMMAND RELATIONS:**

(Designate supported and supporting commanders).

(Likely comd status of assigned ADF FE. Forces will be assigned OPCON or TACON by alert or execute order).

(Location (normally the AOR boundary) where the commander will assume control over assigned forces).

(Logistics authority of COMAST).

(Relationships between COMAST and any other allied or coalition forces within AOR).

(Forces assigned to assist with planning upon receipt of this order).

**E. TASKS. COMAST IS TO:**

- (Develop COA).
- (Assess the risk involved with the COA).
- (Recommend adjustments necessary to ADF preparedness).
- (Recommend necessary repositioning of ADF FE).
- (Assess the impact of the COA on other operational-level commitments).
- (Advise the cost and resource implications of COA in consultation with ADFCC, COMSPT and Service HQs).
- (Assess the logistics requirements for COA).
- (Submit requests to me for additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance effort in support of planning).
- (Be prepared to produce detailed plans to contribute to the achievement of the Military Strategic end-state).
- (Be prepared to conduct operations to contribute to the achievement of the Military Strategic end-state).
- (COA is to be submitted through ADFCC (HSCD) to me for clearance no later than ... DTG).

**F. PLANNING GUIDANCE:**

- (General guidance on courses of action as appropriate).
- (FE likely to be assigned).
- (Preparedness. CDF clearance required to utilise ADF FE below OLOC).
- (Callout/Mobilisation. Applicability of Defence Act provisions).
- (Define AOR and DTG effective).
- (OPSEC).**
- (Deception).
- (PSYOPS).
- (Objective).
- (Themes to emphasise).
- (Themes to avoid).
- (Combined intelligence management procedures).
- (The ISP will be issued separately by DDIO).
- (Special collection operations will remain under the control of ADFCC. The focal point for information requirements, requests and tasking for collection is the ASTJIC).
- (CI. The CI plan will be issued separately by DDIO. You are authorised to conduct CI, including special CI operations, in the assigned AO. Technical guidance is available from DDIO).
- (ROE. ROE National policy guidance and NATPOL indicator).**
- (Civil Affairs guidance).
- (What direct liaison is authorised.** Requirements to assign liaison teams).
- (Legal considerations. Legal basis for mission is xxxxxx. SOFAs, notes, letters of exchange and other agreements remain the responsibility of ADFCC (HSCD). As a DJLOP responsibility, it will be tailored to the need from the admin and log appreciation).
- PA. PA aspects of operation xxxxxx will be coordinated by ADFCC (DGPA).

**G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:**

- (Timings).
- (Phases).
- (Anticipated duration of operation).

**4. ADMIN AND LOG:**

(Logistics constraints).  
(Concept of logistic support).  
(Self-sufficiency).  
(LoFC management).  
(Resupply/stockholding policy).  
(FAD).  
(Repair/recovery and disposal/gifting policies).  
(Mov include customs/quarantine/immigration).  
(Health).  
(Service/civilian manpower).  
(Host nation support).  
(UN/foreign military/government guidance).  
(Agreements).  
(Finance/authorisation for expenditure/SLID-SLAC).  
(Legal).  
(Service conditions/OP start dates and zones).  
(Reporting).

**5. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE:**

(Requirements for comm with higher HQ).  
(COMSEC instructions).  
(Procedures for obtaining frequencies, SATCOM access, routing indicators, SICs, etc).  
(Applicability of existing CEOIS).

**ACKNOWLEDGE?/YES****Note**

1. The content of this annex is to be viewed purely as illustrative. Each situation is different and the guidance, factors and headings will change as required.



## CABINET SUBMISSION

1. **General.** International Policy Division will have prime responsibility for raising and staffing the cabinet submission (CABSUB). Australian Defence Force Command Centre input for the CABSUB should include the following:

- a. the concept and duration of operation;
- b. forces involved;
- c. personnel risk;
- d. ROE;
- e. impact on defence of Australia;
- f. legal;
- g. resources;
- h. military threat assessment/declaration of operational zone/conditions of service; and
- i. mobilisation needs.

### Note

1. The content of this annex is to be viewed purely as illustrative. Each situation is different and the guidance, factors and headings will change as required.



## ALERT ORDER

1. Alert order (ALERTO) is prepared by Australian Defence Force Command Centre (ADFCC) using Australian Defence Force Formatted Message System format, and will normally be issued using IMMEDIATE precedence. The ALERTO conveys the decision on course of action selection. If a warning order (WNGO) has not previously been issued, the ALERTO initiates operational planning. If the ALERTO has been preceded by a WNGO, reference should be made to this Order rather than restate guidance previously provided. For further detail, see Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) ADFP 822—*Australian Defence Formatted Message System*. ADFP 822 is now distributed electronically to all commands and will automatically generate the message under 'ORDER'. Content and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the ALERTO are below (in this example, Chief of the Defence Force is assumed to be the originator). Those lines in bold face type are mandatory:

**1. SITUATION (Codename for OP)**

**A. GENERAL**

(Strategic political/military situation)

**B. ENEMY**

(Enemy forces in the expected area of operations)

(Capabilities)

(Intent and probable course of action)

(Strategic centre of gravity)

**C. FRIENDLY**

(Political, diplomatic, and economic strategies)

(Anticipated attitudes and actions of friendly nations)

(Operations expected of other national, allied or coalition forces)

(Strategic centre of gravity)

**D. CONSTRAINTS**

**E. ASSUMPTIONS//**

**2. MISSION**

**3. EXECUTION**

**A. NATIONAL END-STATE**

**B. MIL/STRAT END-STATE**

**C. CDF INTENT (The approved COA is ... )**

(The following phases will apply ... )

**(The following forces are assigned for OP ... )**

**D. COMMAND AND CONTROL**

**(1) (Nominate comd)**

**(2) COMMAND RELATIONS**

(Designate supported and supporting commanders)

(COMD status of assigned ADF FE)

(Location (normally the AOR boundary) where the commander will assume control over assigned forces)

(Logistics authority of COMAST)

(Relationships between COMAST and any other allied or coalition forces within AOR)

**E. TASKS**

**(Approved tasks are as follows: ... )**

**F. PLANNING GUIDANCE****(General guidance on courses of action as appropriate)**

(Preparedness. CDF clearance required to utilise ADF FE below OLOC)

(Callout/Mobilisation. Applicability of Defence Act provisions)

(Define AOR and DTG effective)

**(OPSEC)**

(Deception)

(PSYOPS)

(Objective)

(Themes to emphasise)

(Themes to avoid)

(Combined intelligence management procedures)

(The ISP will be issued separately by DDIO)

(Special collection operations will remain under the control of ADFCC. The focal point for information requirements, requests and tasking for collection is the ASTJIC)

(CI. The CI plan will be issued separately by DDIO. You are authorised to conduct CI, including special CI operations, in the assigned AO. Technical guidance is available from DDIO)

**(ROE. National policy guidance and NATPOL indicator)**

(Civil Affairs guidance)

(What direct liaison is authorised. Requirements to assign liaison teams)

(Legal considerations. Legal basis for mission is xxxxxx. SOFAs, notes, letters of exchange and other agreements remain the responsibility of ADFCC (HSCD). As a DJLOP responsibility, it will be tailored to the need from the admin and log appreciation)

(PA. PA aspects of operation xxxxxx will be coordinated by ADFCC (DGPA))

**G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

(Timings)

(Phases)

(Anticipated duration of operation)

**4. ADMIN AND LOG**

(Logistics constraints)

(Concept of logistic support)

(Self sufficiency)

(LofC management)

(Resupply/stockholding policy)

(FAD)

(Repair/recovery and disposal/gifting policies)

(Movt include customs/quarantine/immigration)

(Health)

(Service/civilian manpower)

(Host nation support)

(UN/foreign military/government guidance)

(Agreements)

(Finance/authorisation for expenditure/SLID-SLAC)

(Legal)

(Service conditions/OP start dates and zones)

(Reporting)

**5. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE**

(Requirements for comm with higher HQ)

(COMSEC instructions)

(Procedures for obtaining frequencies, SATCOM access, routing indicators, SICs, etc)

(Applicability of existing CEOIS)

**ACKNOWLEDGE/YES//****Note**

1. The content of this annex is to be viewed purely as illustrative. Each situation is different and the guidance, factors and headings will change as required.

## EXECUTE ORDER

1. **General.** The execute order (EXECUTEO) is prepared by Australian Defence Force Command Centre using Australian Defence Force Formatted Message System format, and will normally be issued using IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence. The EXECUTEO conveys the decision of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to execute a military operation. The EXECUTEO need only contain the authority to execute and the actual date and time the operation is to begin. If necessary, amplifying guidance not previously provided to the supported strategic commander should be included. Format and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the EXECUTEO are below. For further detail see ADFP 822—*Australian Defence Formatted Message System*. Those lines in bold face type are mandatory:

### Immediate

FM: CDF AUSTRALIA

TO: COMAST  
CN CANBERRA  
CA CANBERRA  
CAF CANBERRA  
COMSPT

INFO: ADHQOPS  
DIO CANBERRA  
DSD CANBERRA  
DEFNAV CANBERRA  
OPSPT ARMY  
AFHQ  
DEFENCE CANBERRA  
PRIME MINISTER DEPT AND CABINET CANBERRA  
DFAT  
SGADF CANBERRA  
HQ1JMOVGP  
HADS (IF APPLICABLE)

OPER/(Operation code name)//

**MSGID/ORDER/(ORIGINATOR) //REF/A/ORDER/CDF/(DTG)//**

REF/B/ORDER/CDF/(DTG)//

**ORDTYPE/ EXECUTEO /CDF(NUM) ... (YEAR)//AMPN/ THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. CDF HAS AUTHORISED THE EXECUTION OF OPERATION (Operation code name)//**

TIMEZONE/Z//GENTEXT/SITUATION/1. SITUATION. CDF HAS DIRECTED THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN FOR OPERATION (Operation code name) CONTAINED IN REF ... //GENTEXT/MISSION

/2. MISSION//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION

/3. EXECUTION

A. COURSE OF ACTION. PER REF ...

B. COMMAND AND CONTROL. ASSIGNED FORCES PER REF ... REPORT OPCON TO (COMAST) UPON ENTERING THE (COMAST) AOR//

C. PLANNING GUIDANCE. PER REF

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) PER REF ...

(2) C-DAY AND L-HOUR IS (DTG)

(3) **D-DAY AND H-HOUR IS (DTG)//GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG**

/4. LOG. PER REF ... //

GENTEXT/SIGNAL

/5. SIGNAL

A. PER REF ...

AKNLDG/YES//

DECL/OADR//

**Note**

1. The content of this annex is to viewed purely as illustrative. Each situation is different and the guidance, factors and headings will change as required.

## CHAPTER 4


## PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL—CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

*A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little.*

*On War*  
Major General Carl von Clausewitz

## INTRODUCTION

**4.1** A campaign is a controlled series of simultaneous or sequential military activities designed to achieve a strategic objective, normally within a given time or space. The conduct of campaigns and major operations is the focus of the operational level of war. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations. Planning and conducting campaigns and major operations is based on the operational art which is explained in detail in [chapter 3—'Military strategic planning'](#) of Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 6—*Operations*. It requires broad vision, foresight and a careful understanding of the relationship between the levels of conflict. This relationship can be described in terms of ends, ways and means, as shown in [figure 4–1](#):



**Figure 4–1: Command levels**

**4.2 Ends—Strategic level of conflict.** The strategic level of conflict is concerned with the art and science of employing national power in a synchronised fashion to secure national objectives. The strategic level of conflict includes:

- a. **National strategic level of conflict.** National strategy is the application of national resources to achieve national objectives. This will include diplomatic, information, psychological, economic and military resources.
- b. **Military strategic level of conflict.** Military strategy is the application of military resources to achieve national strategic objectives. The military strategic level encompasses the art and science of employing armed force to achieve a political objective.

**4.3 Ways—Operational level of conflict.** Campaigns and major operations are constructed and directed at the operational level in fulfilment of a strategic directive. It is the operational level that provides the link between military strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre of operations. The focus at this level is on operational art which is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organisation and execution of campaigns and major operations.

**4.4 Means—Tactical level of conflict.** Battles and engagements within a sequence of major operations are planned and executed at the tactical level in order to achieve the operational objectives of a campaign.

**4.5** While the categorisation of war according to the different levels at which it is conducted is a useful analytical device, in practice the distinctions are often blurred. For example:

- a. A particular battle may be so critical to a campaign, and the campaign so critical to the war aim, that the battle may involve a merging of the different levels of war, reflecting the strategic implications of the tactical-level engagement.
- b. The impact of pervasive media attention may turn a tactical action, particularly if conducted unethically, into a strategic outcome.

**4.6** Campaigns and operations are planned and directed at the operational level to achieve strategic objectives. It is the level that links military strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre. Operational planning cannot be accomplished in isolation from the strategic level; the two processes are inextricably linked. Ideally, operational and strategic level planning will be initiated at the same time with each process informing the other.

**4.7** It is at the operational level that military resources are applied to campaign objectives to achieve the end-state. The theatre commander (Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST)) in the Australian context) is responsible for:

- a. designing a campaign plan within the designated theatre;
- b. commanding assigned forces;
- c. directing major operations of the campaign;
- d. determining what operational objectives are necessary to achieve the end-state;
- e. determining in what sequence operational objectives should be achieved;
- f. determining the concept of operations, which is endorsed at the military strategic level;
- g. determining the resources required to achieve the operational objectives and allocating those resources as necessary for subordinate commanders to achieve their tactical missions;
- h. setting priorities for the provision of combat and logistic support to sustain tactical battles;
- i. directing the activities of those formations, ships, aircraft and other units or assets not delegated to subordinate commanders, especially those earmarked as theatre reserves; and
- j. keeping the military strategic commander informed of their actions, problems and future plans, and maintaining awareness of considerations affecting the military strategic commander and the latter's possible future intentions.

**4.8** The link between the strategic and tactical levels must provide the ways of using the tactical means to achieve the required strategic/national ends. To do this, the operational commander and staff develop a concept of operations (CONOPS), draft a campaign plan and conduct major operations. A campaign plan provides:

- a. the anticipated sequence of activities;
- b. the decisive points to be achieved;
- c. a definition of what constitutes success;
- d. guidance to subordinate commanders for taking action in the absence of specific orders, designed to encourage initiative necessary to maintain operational momentum; and
- e. branches and sequels.

**4.9** A campaign does not imply the employment of a particular scale of military assets, intensity of operations, or size of geographic theatre. For example in the Australian context, operations conducted in support of Defeating Attacks on Australia (DAA) might constitute one campaign, whose objective is the maintenance of national sovereignty and security over Australian territory. Another campaign might be simultaneously waged in support of Defending Regional Interests (DRI), which could involve contributing to, and leading a Combined Joint Task Force involved in operations in the region.

### Approaches to the operational level of war

**4.10** A campaign plan can offer a direct or indirect approach, or a combination of both, ie a broad or comprehensive systematic approach. In the direct approach, military force will generally be brought to bear via the quickest and most direct route; and as such, attrition is likely to be high. The direct approach should only be adopted when a marked superiority of force exists and it can be employed effectively to achieve the desired end-state. This superiority can be in either the quantity or quality of the force, particularly where a force possesses a technological advantage. The design, organisation, sequencing and application of those superior forces are intended to grind an enemy down through attrition or deliver overwhelming force at a decisive point.

**4.11** An indirect approach is normally preferred over the direct clash of military forces as it aims to avoid the attrition and risk inherent in the direct approach. The indirect approach will employ more oblique methods to achieve the desired end-state by exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities and the opportunities in the environment. It will carefully coordinate the military dimensions of a campaign with the other elements of national power, including the political, economic, technological and diplomatic elements.

*The expert approaches his objective indirectly. By selection of a devious and distant route he may march a thousand li without opposition and take his enemy unaware. Such a commander prizes above all freedom of action. He abhors a static situation and therefore attacks cities only when there is no alternative. Sieges, wasteful in both lives and time, entail abdication of the initiative.*

Sun Tzu

The reality of warfare is that most campaigns consist of a synchronisation of direct and indirect approaches.

### Operational art

**4.12** In seeking to structure campaigns and major operations in pursuit of strategic objectives, theatre commanders should design their plans around a number of building blocks, which help them to conceptualise how operations will unfold. Their skill at this stage forms the essence of operational art. The key elements of operational art are listed below (and described in greater detail in ADFP 6):

- a. **Operational objectives.** These are the objectives that need to be achieved in the campaign to reach the military strategic end-state. Correct assessment of operational objectives is crucial to success at the operational level.
- b. **End-state.** Will be identified at the national and military levels as follows:
  - (1) The national end-state is the set of desired conditions, incorporating the elements of national power that will achieve the national objectives.
  - (2) The military strategic end-state is the set of desired conditions beyond which the use of military force is no longer required to achieve national objectives.
- c. **Centre of gravity.** That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may consist of a number of key elements.
- d. **Critical vulnerabilities.** A characteristic or key element of a force that if destroyed, captured or neutralised will significantly undermine the fighting capability of the force and its centre of gravity. A critical vulnerability is not necessarily a weakness but any source of strength or power that is capable of being attacked or neutralised. A successful attack on a critical vulnerability should aim to achieve a decisive point in an operation or campaign. A force may have a number of critical vulnerabilities.

- e. **Decisive points.** A major event that is a precondition to the successful disruption or negation of a centre of gravity of either combatant. A decisive point is created normally by successfully attacking or neutralising a critical vulnerability. Operational level planning aims to exploit an enemy's critical vulnerabilities in a sequence or matrix of decisive points known as lines of operation. The key determinant of a decisive point is its effect on the enemy. Identifying decisive points is a fundamental part of campaign planning. During the course of the campaign, opportunities may present themselves—or may need to be created—which require a rapid reappraisal of, and adjustment to, the previously determined decisive points. Disruption of the centre of gravity is achieved by successfully attacking the critical vulnerabilities on which it depends. Decisive points may also relate to the protection of one's own campaign plan.
- f. **Information Operations (IO).** Actions taken to defend and enhance one's own information, information processes and information systems and to affect adversary information, information processes and information systems. It is a fundamental resource that is central to the commander's decision-making processes.
- g. **Manoeuvre.** The concept of manoeuvre fully embraces the indirect approach and its application across maritime, land and air environments. However, due to the higher mobility of air assets and the rapidity with which they can change their tasking or offensive/defensive stance, manoeuvre is normally a tactical action for military air assets. An extract of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation definition is:

Employment of forces ... through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
- h. **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. Tempo is a critical determinant of operational logistics.
- i. **Attrition.** Attrition is the reduction of military effectiveness or capability of either friendly or enemy forces caused by the continued loss of personnel or materiel. Rates of attrition determine the progress and likely outcome of a campaign embracing the direct approach.
- j. **Leverage.** This refers to possessing a marked advantage in a particular capability, and the advantage that can be gained by exploiting that capability.
- k. **Operational pauses.** Operations cannot always be conducted continuously, and there may be a need for periodic pauses to consolidate and to prepare for subsequent activity.
- l. **Culminating points.** A culminating point is the point in time and location where a force will no longer be stronger than the enemy and risk losing the initiative. This may be due to reduced combat power, attrition, logistics, dwindling national will or other factors. To be successful, the operation must achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point.
- m. **Contingency planning.** Contingency plans are designed to provide responses for events that can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility.

## THEATRE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT

**4.13** The planning environment describes the relationships between the planning methods used to optimise the preparation and employment of elements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), this environment is described in detail in [chapter 3](#). The planning relationship between the strategic and operational level is outlined in [figure 4-2](#).



**Figure 4-2: Planning relationship**

### Deliberate planning

**4.14** Deliberate planning is conducted at all levels of command. It is the process for the development of military operational/campaign plans for the employment of the ADF, to achieve an end-state as directed by strategic guidance through the military strategies and relevant military strategic planning guidance (MSPG). The process is generally free of time constraints. It relies on a mix of assumption-based planning against current force structure and capability. The process covers the full range of options to produce plans that are generic in nature. The products of deliberate planning are ADF Campaign Plans (ACP) and ADF Operational Plans (AOP), described in [paragraphs 4.26](#) and [4.27](#).

### Immediate planning

**4.15** Immediate planning is situation specific and based on current events. By its nature, it accounts for situations that can develop over a short time frame. These situations often fall into the spectrum of military support operations. Planning involves the anticipated use of the extant force and current capabilities. This planning is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds. Immediate planning is responsive to the National Crisis Management Machinery (NCMM) and must be flexible enough to incorporate changing circumstances. It is generally time-sensitive and therefore considers only a limited range of options.

### Campaign planning

**4.16** Campaign planning is a process, conducted at the theatre headquarters (HQ), that controls the sequencing of military operations in order to achieve strategic level objectives. Campaign planning integrates both deliberate and immediate-planning processes and seeks to orchestrate the ways in which tactical means can be used to achieve strategic ends. It is informed by both standing government guidance and the NCMM. There are a number of concepts that relate to the operational art that require particular consideration when campaign planning.

**4.17 Sequencing.** Within a purely military line of activity, sequencing is the ordering of military activities into a logical progression. It is unlikely that a commander will be able to achieve success by a single activity. The commander must therefore have a clear conception of the relationship between events in terms of time, space and resources. Without this, the commander cannot establish which events can be conducted simultaneously, which events must be conducted in sequence, and in which order events should be taken. The process of ordering activities is referred to as sequencing. In some types of campaigns, the lines of activity will be political, economic, and humanitarian as well as military. In these circumstances the events in the military line of activity must be sequenced to conform with the requirements of the non-military lines of activity to ensure the success of the military campaign within the strategic framework. It requires particular care to order all other activities on the different lines to ensure that they are complementary and do not contradict or obstruct each other.

**4.18 Parallel operations.** Where possible, the campaign plan must incorporate multiple lines of activity and plan to conduct operations along these lines simultaneously, rather than phasing them sequentially. The aim being to force the enemy commander to react to multiple threats simultaneously thereby overloading the commander's decision-making capabilities and making it more difficult to respond effectively to any specific threat.

**4.19 Branches and sequels.** Planning for branches and sequels gives the commander the flexibility to retain the initiative, or to regain it if lost. The sequence of events leading to the desired end-state is not rigid. Sequencing should possess the inherent flexibility for a commander to adjust the activities of a sequence, to change the order in which they are used, or to create new ones. In managing a sequence of military activities, the commander retains future options through constant planning of potential branches and sequels. Options should be built into the initial plan, enabling the commander to adjust the lines of activity or to vary the policy on offering or declining battle. This enables the imposition on the enemy of the commander's chosen tempo of military activities. This planning must, however, have a logical basis, rather than depending on 'instinctive' assessments of, and responses to, operational developments.

**4.20 Synchronisation.** In conducting the campaign, an operational commander will attempt to synchronise the employment of capabilities to strike the enemy simultaneously throughout the theatre of operations. These strikes should be aimed to exploit an enemy's critical vulnerabilities in a matrix of decisive points to form a line of operation to the enemy's centre of gravity. Therefore, the commander will continuously synchronise all the assets available to support the overall campaign plan. It will be necessary to synchronise campaign activities with other national efforts devoted to the same objective. This may include but not limited to diplomatic and economic lines of activity.


**4.21 Termination.** The commander and staff must remain focused throughout the conduct of the plan on the methodology for bringing the campaign/operation to a close, ensuring a smooth transition to the desired end-states. The resolution of armed conflict will generally be characterised by parallel political, diplomatic and military activity. Military planning must always be conducted against the expectation of the need to fight. Resolution of the conflict may be achieved however at any stage during planning and deployment. The activities may themselves contribute to the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, the conflict may be terminated before the originally envisaged end-state is reached. These uncertainties will bear heavily on the operational commander, who must consider the consequences of unexpected termination. These may include the need for the commander's force to be able to undertake new missions, possibly of a humanitarian or peace support nature. In any event, the operational commander may be the conduit for negotiations with the enemy political and military leaders, as part of the conflict termination process. The force may have an important role in the maintenance of internal stability within the theatre of conflict.

## PLANNING PROCESS

**4.22 Initiating directive.** Planning at the operational level is initiated by either direction from higher authority or internally at the direction of COMAST. The direction from higher authority may take the form of a Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) planning order, or in a crisis, a warning order following recognition of a situation that may require a response from the ADF. In a period of sustained tension or conflict, COMAST may need to initiate planning autonomously within Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQUEST) or may direct an appropriate subordinate HQ to commence planning. In these cases, COMAST would issue an initiating or planning directive, keeping Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) informed.

**4.23 Planning guidance.** Military strategy documents detail the strategies to be employed by the ADF to undertake combat operations. The principal strategies are DAA, DRI and Defending Australia's Global Interests. These strategies form the basis of strategic and operational planning. MSPG is developed within ADHQ to inform deliberate planning. Military Strategic Estimates, are used in immediate planning (see Strategic Planning Process (STRAPP) process in [chapter 3](#)) and provide details of the strategic end-state and the facts to replace the assumptions used in MSPG. A warning order (WNGO) from CDF provides the final detailed information required to develop campaign and other operational plans.

**4.24 Relationship between strategic and theatre level planning.** Theatre HQ's planning is driven by the STRAPP, as detailed in [chapter 3](#). A CDF WNGO or planning order (PLANO) will initiate theatre HQ planning activity. The alert order enables the issue of detailed operation orders and instructions and the execute order authorises the deployment of forces and the execution of the approved plan. This is shown graphically in [figure 4-3](#).



**Figure 4-3: Operational level planning process**

**4.25 Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP).** Military planning in a crisis will never be simple because political and diplomatic activity will proceed in parallel with it. The JMAP facilitates the rapid planning and complex decision making required at the operational level of war in modern conflict. The JMAP provides the basis for planning in HQAST and is described in detail in [chapter 8—'Joint military appreciation process'](#). The application of the JMAP within HQAST is detailed in [annex A](#).

### Planning products

**4.26 Australian Strategic Plans (ASP).** Currently, ASP detail the strategic level guidance, actions and responsibilities to meet standing contingencies. The Theatre Planning Group (TPG) at HQAST is responsible for developing the operational level plans required to support the various ASP as well as reviewing tactical level plans written in response to an ASP. ASP are to be phased out in the near future and replaced with standing MSPG.

**4.27 ADF Campaign Plans (ACP).** COMAST is responsible for the production of Campaign Plans to meet the major military strategic objectives. They are produced using the deliberate planning process and may identify the need for a number of ADF Operational Plans (AOP).

**4.28 ADF Operational Plans (AOP).** COMAST is responsible for the production of AOP to support ASP and ACP. The TPG will develop the required AOP to support the strategic mission and provide sufficient information and direction for the designated Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders. The content of an AOP must be consistent with and include applicable aspects of the ASP/ACP, as well as providing specific operational level information such as COMAST Intent and Planning Guidance. Northern Command (NORCOM), Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ), Commodore Flotilla and the Component Commanders may be tasked with the development of specific AOP by COMAST.

**4.29 CONOPS or Campaign Concept.** The CONOPS describes how and why COMAST intends to employ their forces. It also includes the desired end-state that should exist on termination. The campaign concept, while similar to the CONOPS, also details the synchronisation of operations across the theatre.

## PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

**4.30 COMAST Commander's Planning Group (CPG).** This Group is the senior operational level decision-making group. The CPG will provide planning guidance throughout the planning process. The CPG is used by COMAST to review, guide and endorse the planning products of the TPG. The CPG is convened when required by COMAST. The standing members of the CPG are as follows:

- a. COMAST (chair);
- b. land component commander;
- c. naval component commander;
- d. air component commander;
- e. command staff officer;
- f. Chief of Staff Australian Theatre;
- g. Branch heads from J5, J2, J3, J4; and
- h. other HQAST branch heads, specialist staff and liaison officers may be invited to participate as required.

**4.31 TPG.** This Group is COMAST's principal staff-level working group for the development of campaign and other operational level plans. The group is chaired by HQAST J5 with representatives from the various Australian Theatre (AST) branches and the component HQs. Time permitting, representatives of the subordinate Joint Task Force Headquarters may be invited to attend the TPG, as appropriate, to provide input into HQAST planning and/or enable concurrent planning activity. The role of the TPG is to produce operational level plans using the JMAP as per the HQAST planning process and detailed in [chapter 8](#). The TPG will provide direction to the Theatre Administrative Planning Group (TAPG) and the Theatre Logistics Planning Group (TLPG), and other subordinate planning groups as required. The TPG is responsible for producing operational correspondence including:

- a. COMAST PLANO and WNGO;
- b. CONOPS; and
- c. ACP/AOP.

**4.32 Theatre Intelligence Planning Group (TIPG).** This Group is convened by the HQAST J2 as required. This can be for a range of tasks ranging from the routine oversight, administration and development of the Theatre Intelligence System, to the focused support of the operational planning process. The HQAST J2 will chair the TIPG, which normally includes the following:

- a. J2 staff representatives (as required);
- b. representative from each component HQ;
- c. JTF representatives;
- d. representatives from the Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC);
- e. representative from the Australian Defence Force Intelligence Centre or/and Defence Intelligence Organisation;
- f. representative from Defence Signals Branch (if required);

- g. liaison officers from civil agencies, if invited; and
- h. 1st Intelligence Company (for specific operational support as required).

**4.33 Theatre Administrative Planning Group (TAPG).** This Group is formed to ensure the supportability of the TPG's operational plan. While one representative of the J4 staff will always be part of the TPG, there will also be a requirement to form a TAPG to generate detailed administrative planning for any operation/campaign. The TAPG is to produce an administration instruction for COMAST's approval, detailing the operational support requirements necessary to put into effect COMAST's plan. The TAPG is chaired by the J1/4 and will comprise:

- a. J15 AST;
- b. J05 AST;
- c. J06 AST representative;
- d. J07 AST;
- e. J43/J45 AST;
- f. component logistics representatives;
- g. J3/5 Support Command Australia;
- h. Defence Corporate Support representative;
- i. Defence Estate Organisation representative,
- j. ADHQ (Director Joint Logistics Operations and Plans) representative; and
- k. appropriate JTF logistics representative.

In addition, representatives may be invited from other areas of the Defence Organisation as well as members of foreign militaries as required by the nature of the activity.

**4.34 Theatre Legal Planning Group (TLPG).** This Group will be convened as required during the course of campaign and other operational planning. The J06 AST chairs the TLPG, which comprises legal officers from the component HQs, NORCOM and DJFHQ as required. The TLPG provides support to the CPG, the TPG and the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. The TLPG will produce the Legal Support Plan which deals with the following:

- a. The legal basis for the operation.
- b. The legal regime under which the operation will be conducted.
- c. The application of international law including Laws of Armed Conflict, Law of the Sea, Air Law and any other relevant treaties and conventions.
- d. The status of the forces, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) arrangements and visiting forces legislation) and any other agreements or arrangements required for, or impacting on the operation.
- e. Australian and foreign domestic law including any emergency provisions.
- f. Rules of engagement and government directives/guidance.
- g. The legal framework of civil/military coordination (including civil authorities and non-government organisations).
- h. The legal aspects of command and control.
- i. Any discipline and administrative legal matters.

**4.35 Theatre Health Planning Group (THPG).** This Group will be convened as required during the course of operational planning to develop the health support concept and produce a Health Support Plan as required. The HQAST J07 will chair the THPG which comprises:

- a. Representatives from the four Component HQ (Maritime, Land, Air and Special Operations) and ASTJIC.
- b. Representatives from JTF health branches (as required).
- c. Joint Health Support Agency.
- d. Defence Health Service Branch of Defence Personnel Executive (as required).
- e. SPA medical logistics representative.

In addition, representatives may also be invited from single-Service support commands, the Service HQ and other government or civilian agencies or regional authorities as required.

**4.36** The THPG supports the activities of the TPG by coordinating health support input to the joint operational plan and preparing any separate health support orders or instructions considered necessary. Following the THPG, operational level health support planning is carried out by the HQAST health staff in conjunction with representatives of relevant members of the THPG. Close liaison with the TAPG is to be maintained throughout.

**4.37 Theatre Information Operations Planning Group (TIOPG).** This Group plans, coordinates and advises on IO activities, including deception, psychological operations, operations security, electronic warfare, physical destruction, public information and civil affairs (CA). The group is chaired by the HQ IO officer, with representatives from the intelligence, plans, operations and communications information systems staffs, the public affairs and CA officers, representatives of the components, lower HQ and other organisations as applicable. The TIOPG supports the TPG and liaises closely with the TLPG and the Joint Targeting Cell.

**4.38 Support commands.** Commanders of the Services' support commands may prepare additional supporting plans and issue orders or instructions to their own subordinate units. This is essential when Service dependencies for logistic support are varied or changed to suit a particular operation. Orders or instructions must be distributed to all interested parties including the joint force HQ and other services. General guidance on operational correspondence is in [annex B](#).

## Liaison

**4.39** If concurrency is to be achieved in the overall planning process, there will be an ongoing requirement for effective liaison between all participating HQ. The following principles for establishing liaison should be noted:

- a. Liaison should be reciprocal between higher, lower, lateral HQ and civil authorities.
- b. Liaison must be reciprocal when:
  - (1) force elements are assigned to a combined force commander, and
  - (2) force elements are collocated or adjacent to allied or different nationality forces.

**4.40** When not reciprocal, responsibility for establishing liaison rests with higher HQ for lower HQ, and supporting HQ for supported HQ.

## Annexes:

- A. [Headquarters Australian Theatre Planning Process](#)
- B. [Operational correspondence](#)
- C. [Australian Defence Force Operational Plan format](#)
- D. [Campaign plan format](#)

## HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN THEATRE PLANNING PROCESS

PLANNING STAGE	(1) INITIATION		(2) MISSION ANALYSIS		(3) COA DEV/ANALYSIS			(4) COMAST CONOPS DEV			(5) EXECUTION	
	Trigger	COMAST Guidance	TPG	CPG	TPG	CPG	WGG <sup>(a)</sup>	TPG	CPG	COSC	Instructions	Monitor
Input	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planning guidance</li> <li>CDF's Directive</li> <li>CDF's WNGO</li> <li>COMAST initiative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CDF planning guidance</li> <li>Initial INT advice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theatre Int Estimate (TIE)</li> <li>Planning guidance</li> <li>CDF directive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft Mission Analysis</li> <li>Draft COMAST guidance</li> <li>Draft WNGO</li> <li>Draft CIRs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TIE update</li> <li>Endorsed Mission Analysis</li> <li>Endorsed COMAST guidance</li> <li>Endorsed Warning Order</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COA decision brief</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CPG endorsed COAs</li> <li>CPG war game guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>endorsed COA</li> <li>possible branches and sequels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CONOPs brief to CPG</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CPG endorsed COMAST CONOPS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CDF endorsed CONOPS</li> <li>CDF guidance</li> <li>CDF ALERTO</li> <li>CDF EXECUTO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMAST Directives</li> <li>COMAST OPINST</li> <li>Support Plans</li> </ul>
Output		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMAST initial planning guidance to planning staff</li> <li>Verbal advice to component commanders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft Mission Analysis</li> <li>Draft COMAST guidance</li> <li>Draft WNGO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CPG endorsed Mission Analysis</li> <li>COMAST guidance</li> <li>CPG endorsed WNGO</li> <li>CPG endorsed CIRs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial COAs</li> <li>Preferred COA</li> <li>War game guidance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Endorsed COAs and guidance for war gaming</li> <li>Endorsed COA for development into CONOPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>refined COA</li> <li>Preferred COA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft COMAST CONOPS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CPG endorsed CONOPS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COSC approval issue of CDF ALERTO. EXECUTO will be issued after GOVT approval</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMAST Directives</li> <li>COMAST OPINST and ADMIN INST</li> <li>Support Plans</li> </ul>	
Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planning process is triggered by input from higher or other means of initiation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMAST initial guidance on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>op/admin aspects</li> <li>HQAST planning process</li> <li>Critical timings</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mission Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Process brief</li> <li>TIE</li> <li>Own Forces</li> <li>CDF's Intent</li> <li>End-states</li> <li>Own COG and DPs</li> <li>Tasks</li> <li>COMAST Mission</li> <li>Facts</li> <li>Assumptions</li> <li>Freedom of Action</li> <li>Comd Guidance</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMAST/CPG review, endorsement and advice is sought for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft Mission Analysis</li> <li>Draft COMAST guidance</li> <li>Draft WNGO</li> <li>Draft CIRs</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COA DEV/ANALYSIS as per HQAST SOPs COA DEV/ANALYSIS AIDE MEMOIRE</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMAST/CPG provides guidance on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>endorsed COAs for war game</li> <li>possible branches and sequels</li> <li>war game</li> <li>endorsed COA from war game</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WGG forms teams to war game CPG endorsed COAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft CONOPs as per HQAST CONOPs shell: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CDFs Intent</li> <li>Assumptions</li> <li>Constraints</li> <li>Mil/Strat End-states</li> <li>Threat</li> <li>Mission Intent</li> <li>COMAST Intent</li> <li>Operational Concept</li> <li>Admin Concept</li> <li>C2</li> <li>Key Operational Considerations</li> <li>Preparedness</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Endorsement of CONOPS</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Based on endorsed CONOPs HQAST staff prepare directives and instructions and support plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HQAST implements plan and manages op level aspects. J3 monitors operation. J5 conducts planning for branches and sequels</li> </ul>

PLANNING STAGE	(1) INITIATION		(2) MISSION ANALYSIS		(3) COA DEV/ANALYSIS			(4) COMAST CONOPS DEV			(5) EXECUTION	
	Activity	Trigger	COMAST Guidance	TPG	CPG	TPG	CPG	WGG <sup>(a)</sup>	TPG	CPG	COSC	Instructions
Participants		COMAST (chair) Component COMDs* COS J5 J2	J5 (Chair) Component reps* Agency Reps Branch reps from J1/4, 2, 3 and 6 J5X (Secretary) LOs as required	COMAST (chair) Component COMDs* COS J5 J2 Others as required	J5 (Chair) Component reps Agency Reps Branch reps from J1/4, 2, 3 and 6 J5X (Secretary) LOs as required	COMAST (chair) Component COMDs* COS J5 J2	Teams: • Blue—TPG • Red—J2 • Umpire—COS or J3 • War game to be coordinated by J7	J5 (Chair) Component reps Agency Reps Branch reps from J1/4, 2, 3 and 6 J5X (Secretary) LOs as required	COMAST (chair) Component COMDs COS J5 J2		J3 staff with TPG, TAPG, TIPG, TCPG and THPG support	
Notes	TIPG convenes	Provides start point for Mission Analysis. TPG is the primary planning group in HQAST		J5 is responsible for organising all briefings in the planning process	COMAST briefed by J5 on broad COAs prior to development of COA scheme of manoeuvre and war game. COMAST briefed on outcome of war game and preferred COA. Concurrent planning being conducted by TAPG, THPG and TCPG			Concurrent development of theatre concepts being conducted by TAPG, THPG and TCPG		ALERTO gives authority to issue OPORD and assign forces. EXECUTO gives authority to execute the operation	On endorsement by CDF handover of responsibility from J5 to J3 branch	COS may form a Battle Management Group at this time to coordinate staff effort at the operational level if multiple operations are running

**Note**

(a) War Gaming Group

## OPERATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE

### Directives

1. A directive provides direction in accordance with higher policy decisions, and may be of the following type:

- a. **Command directive.** This directive is often issued to senior commanders on appointment and defines the functional responsibilities of the commander. The contents may include:
  - (1) title of the appointment,
  - (2) identification of the superior commander and any requirement to establish liaison, and
  - (3) assignment of tasks.
- b. **Policy directive.** These directives normally relate to a particularly important aspect of a commander's responsibilities, such as the division of effort between allied forces.
- c. **Planning directive.** These directives are issued by a commander to set subordinate commanders and staff to work on preliminary planning while the final details of the plan for an operation have yet to be agreed. The directive specifies principal plans to be prepared and sets a deadline for completion of each major step in the planning process. Planning directives express the commander's intention and may cover, but not be limited to:
  - (1) situation;
  - (2) mission;
  - (3) assumptions;
  - (4) limitations;
  - (5) military objectives;
  - (6) military end-state;
  - (7) tasks;
  - (8) coordinating instructions;
  - (9) force elements available;
  - (10) timings;
  - (11) planning considerations;
  - (12) administration and logistics;
  - (13) command and control;
  - (14) liaison;
  - (15) security;
  - (16) communications;
  - (17) electronic warfare;
  - (18) rules of engagement;

- (19) reports;
- (20) legal considerations; and
- (21) public information.

### Orders and instructions

2. Orders and instructions are the means by which the intentions of a commander, and the directions for fulfilling them, are conveyed to subordinates. However they are conveyed, they must be:

- a. accurate,
- b. clear and unambiguous,
- c. as brief as is consistent with clarity,
- d. capable of execution, and
- e. timely.

### Difference between orders and instructions

3. **Orders.** The following criteria are used to identify an order:

- a. An order requires definite action to be taken to achieve a certain intention. The mission and the method of fulfilling it must be clearly stated so that the recipient is in no doubt about what action is to be taken.
- b. Orders are normally issued when the commander has some form of immediate control over the situation, and when compliance with the method laid down is necessary for coordination, and unlikely to prejudice the initiative or local knowledge of a subordinate.

4. **Operational instructions.** The following criteria are used to identify an operational instruction (OPINST):

- a. An OPINST indicates the commander's intention and possibly the overall plan, but leaves the detailed course of action to the subordinate commander.
- b. OPINSTs are normally issued instead of an order:
  - (1) to a commander with an independent mission;
  - (2) where the speed of movement or lack of information makes specific orders impossible or undesirable;
  - (3) when a commander wishes to communicate the aim, or future intentions, beyond that which can be defined in a specific and detailed order;
  - (4) to deal with unforeseen emergencies such as civil emergencies or terrorist attacks;  
or
  - (5) to plan for contingencies.

### Operation orders

5. An operation order (OPORD) is the means by which a commander clearly, accurately and concisely directs and coordinates the actions of their forces in preparation for and in the conduct of operations. OPORDS are divided into the following sections:

- a. situation,
- b. mission,
- c. execution,

- d. administration and logistics, and
- e. command and signal.

#### **Administrative order**

**6.** An administrative order (ADMINORD) covers the operational requirements for logistics, health, personnel, finance and movements. Like an OPORD, an ADMINORD should be clear, accurate and concise. The contents of an ADMINORD includes, but is not limited to:

- a. situation—enemy, friendly, assumptions, resource availability and planning factors;
- b. mission;
- c. execution—concept of logistic support, environmental issues and tasks;
- d. administration and logistics—supply and distribution, levels of supply, water winning, class III bulk, salvage, local acquisition of supplies and services, petroleum, oils and lubricants and mortuary affairs;
- e. legal aspects;
- f. medical—preventative medical and health services;
- g. mobility and transportation;
- h. civil engineering support;
- i. security assistance;
- j. administration; and
- k. command and signal.



## AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONAL PLAN FORMAT

1. Once the concept of operations has been endorsed at the strategic level, an Australian Defence Force Operational Plan (AOP) and supporting plans are produced.

2. The contents of the AOP will vary depending upon the nature of possible operations, and as a general rule, should provide adequate guidance to enable staff to develop the operation order (OPORD) or instruction (OPINST). AOP should specify:

- a. mission, intent and end-state (normally a higher headquarters (HQ) will set the tasks to be achieved by the subordinate HQ from which the subordinate HQ will decide its mission);
- b. constraints;
- c. force allocation and grouping;
- d. command and control arrangements (it is the prerogative of the appointed commander to decide on the method to be used to control assigned forces);
- e. information operations (IO);
- f. communications;
- g. operational security (OPSEC);
- h. deception aspects (if applicable);
- i. offensive support priorities;
- j. intelligence aspects;
- k. electronic warfare (EW) aspects (if applicable);
- l. rules of engagement and law of armed conflict aspects;
- m. administration and logistics;
- n. movement priorities;
- o. civil affairs and civil aid (if applicable);
- p. public affairs aspects;
- q. financial arrangements;
- r. legal aspects;
- s. codewords; and
- t. reporting.

3. Requirements for production of supporting plans and the regular review of the plan should also be addressed.

### Supporting plans

4. Supporting plans will be developed by staff branches, in consultation with Service HQs/agencies as appropriate, and those commanders supporting a joint operation. Their timely development is very much dependent on the concurrent involvement of all planning staffs during development of the AOP. Mechanisms establishing liaison between planning staffs from the highest to the lowest levels are essential.

**5.** The commander or the principal staff officers may determine aspects to be included in the AOP, and those aspects to be relegated to supporting plans. There are no firm rules concerning this division, as long as the main plan is coherent and the supporting plans are closely integrated in both timeliness and content. In many circumstances, supporting plans are used to reduce to essentials the scope and detail of the AOP. More complex and specialised aspects likely to be of interest to specific staff branches and elements can be covered in the supporting plans. The subjects covered by supporting plans are flexible and could include, but are not limited to:

- a. intelligence,
- b. IO,
- c. administration,
- d. movement,
- e. communications,
- f. EW,
- g. deception,
- h. surveillance,
- i. reinforcement,
- j. OPSEC,
- k. psychological operations,
- l. public affairs,
- m. legal support, and
- n. fire support.

**6.** Throughout all stages of development, supporting plans must be reviewed and checked against the AOP. When finalised, endorsement of the supporting plan must come from Commander Australian Theatre. Once completed, the plan will be reviewed by the commander planning group before being passed to Australian Defence Headquarters for endorsement by the Strategic Command Group and Chief of the Defence Force. After examination and modification, if required, the plan is issued as a directive, OPORD or OPINST as appropriate.

## CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT

1. The format of the campaign plan is based on extant operational writing doctrine. The plan is designed to be presented as a simple concept with comprehensive coordination of detail. Specifically, the plan will detail the synchronisation of operations and the allocation, coordination and prioritisation of available resources across the theatre. The plan will normally consist of the following sections:

- a. **Situation.** The situation is a brief description of the conditions which resulted in the requirement for the production of a campaign plan. The situation could include the following points:
  - (1) The strategic situation across the theatre and the events that brought about the situation.
  - (2) The Whole of Government appreciation of the situation, including relationship with allies and the actions being undertaken by other departments.
  - (3) Strategic guidance:
    - (a) Chief of the Defence Force intent;
    - (b) strategic objectives;
    - (c) military/strategic end-state (including conflict termination considerations), and
    - (d) strategic limitations and constraints.
  - (4) **Threat.** Briefly describes the threat situation, the threat centre of gravity (COG), critical vulnerabilities and threat courses of action.
  - (5) **Own forces.** Identifies own COG and critical vulnerabilities. States the forces available for operations and any force preparation issues.
- b. **Assumptions.** All assumptions used in the development of the campaign plan are to be listed here. Campaign plans are a combination of deliberate and immediate planning, based on assumptions initially, with facts replacing assumptions in real time. Logistic assumptions are also to be listed.
- c. **Mission.** The campaign mission must be a concise statement focused on achieving the strategic objective and defeating the threat COG.
- d. **Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) intent.** COMAST's intent will include the campaign purpose and end-state. The intent will provide COMAST's vision for the campaign and should be a clear, concise and relatively short statement. The intent will describe the military conditions that subordinate commanders must meet to achieve the campaign's desired end-state.
- e. **Campaign outline.** The campaign outline describes the objectives, tasks and supporting plans required for the success of the campaign. The campaign outline consists of:
  - (1) **General description.** A simple, concise explanation of the campaign by phases. Each phase may, if desired, have a phase name.

- (2) **Phases.** Each phase is described in detail. This is to include any operation which needs to be conducted during each stage. Synchronisation of operations and supporting activities is to be detailed. Any branches identified are also to be listed for each phase. For each branch, a trigger or triggers must be provided to allow activation of branch. Included in the description of each phase are any targeting and information operations requirements for that phase. The phases are described by:
- (a) purpose;
  - (b) method:
    - (i) main and supporting efforts identified, and
    - (ii) reserve designated.
  - (c) end-state; and
  - (d) key operational considerations.
- (3) **Deception measures.**
- (4) **Force assignment.** Brief description of forces required for the campaign is provided for each phase. Detailed assignment of forces is to be attached as an annex to the plan.
- (5) **Tasks.** Tasks are to be allocated to subordinate headquarters (HQ) (including allocation of responsibility for further operational planning). A detailed task matrix is attached as an annex to the plan.
- (6) **Coordination instructions.**
- (7) **Boundaries.** Campaign area of operations and also joint task force area of operations are to be described and included as an annex.
- (8) **Timings.** Broad timings are provided and the mechanisms to allow integration and synchronisation of operations are also provided.
- (9) **Legal.** Includes legal regime applicable to the conduct of the campaign, including required status of forces agreements and memoranda of understanding, as well as guidance on rules of engagement.
- f. **Administration.** The administrative concept as outlined in this section is based on the campaign phases. It should allocate administrative responsibilities and support priorities, and identify special requirements.
- g. **Command, control and communications.** The command and control, relationships are detailed, including combined and joint command arrangements as required. The appointment of joint task force commanders and coordination and liaison requirements are presented with a C2 diagram. The communication information system plan is to be described in brief, with the detail included as an annex.
- h. **Key operational considerations.** This section lists the issues which are critical to the success of the campaign.

2. Once the main body of the campaign plan has been produced and endorsed by COMAST, subordinate HQ and components may be allocated responsibility for the development of supporting plans. Other supporting plans, such as intelligence operations or information operations, will generally be produced within Headquarters Australian Theatre through the Theatre Planning Group.

3. Once completed, the campaign plan will generally be forwarded to the SCG for approval and may be issued as a standing plan or serve a single purpose.

## CHAPTER 5

# COMBINED AND COALITION PLANNING

*Cooperation embodies the coordination of all activities so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Goodwill and the desire to cooperate are necessary at all levels within Services, between the Services and the Government, and between allies. Cooperation is as essential in planning and preparation in peacetime as it is in conflict, and is greatly enhanced through the maintenance of joint and combined interoperability. It is a means of attaining concentration of combat power with prudent expenditure of effort.*

An ADF principle of war, ADFP 1

## BACKGROUND

**5.1** Circumstances may arise in which Australia's interests coincide with those of another nation, culminating in the planning and execution of combined or coalition operations. Moreover, international obligations require the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to be prepared for a range of such contingencies and to be able to perform as a competent and effective combined or coalition partner.

**5.2** A combined operation is defined as:

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**5.3** A coalition operation is defined as:

An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**5.4** There are fundamental differences between coalition and combined operations. The foremost difference lies in the level of interoperability and sharing of intelligence that may exist between alliance nations. Nations linked by an alliance achieve enhanced interoperability through the use of common doctrine, equipment and training. In a combined operation with United States (US) or New Zealand (NZ) forces, for example, ADF units share common operating procedures, doctrine, language and a similar cultural background. In contrast, a coalition operation in support of the United Nations (UN) could see ADF units operating alongside units from non-English speaking nations and from Defence forces structured, equipped and trained differently.

**5.5** Combined and coalition operations may be bi-national or multinational, both however, require a unity of command through the appointment of a single combined force commander (CFC).

### Alliances, agreements and arrangements

**5.6** Long-term alliances are likely to be supported by interoperability arrangements, status of forces agreements (SOFA), common doctrine and procedures, and a degree of familiarity developed through staff level contact in combined training and exercises. Other arrangements are likely to enjoy a lesser degree of familiarity. Australian Defence treaties, agreements, arrangements and interoperability matters are dealt with in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) ADFP 2 Supplement 1—*International Interoperability Arrangements Handbook*<sup>1</sup>. Major Australian treaties and arrangements include:

- a. Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS);
- b. Papua New Guinea Defence Arrangement;
- c. Five Power Defence Arrangements; and
- d. Radford-Collins Agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> The extant edition, is currently being revised.

**5.7** Combined operations are initiated under the terms of a treaty or alliance between the nations concerned. These may be standing or long-term arrangements, such as the ANZUS Treaty. Coalition operations are initiated by an agreement between participating nations and are usually expedient and short-term measures, such as situation specific coalition agreements used in the 1991 Gulf War.

#### **Unilateral or combined/coalition action**

**5.8** Despite the potential difficulties, unilateral action by the ADF or any other single national force may be neither feasible nor desirable for a variety of reasons, these include:

- a. balance of power considerations may cause allied involvement to forestall hostile escalation, particularly hostile third-party involvement;
- b. unilateral action may be seen as excessive and therefore unacceptable internationally;
- c. combined or coalition operations may be initiated in response to a resolution of the UN Security Council;
- d. limitations in both combat power and sustainability may rule out unilateral action; and
- e. no single nation may be prepared, or capable of accepting full potential costs of combat when other national interests are also directly involved.

**5.9** No matter how refined the in-place arrangements are in any given contingency, combined and coalition operations planning will be more complex than national joint operations planning. This is due to the following differences between the partners in:

- a. strategic outlook,
- b. military doctrine and practice,
- c. language and its usage,
- d. national customs, and
- e. equipment and systems.

#### **Structuring combined and coalition forces**

**5.10** The structure of a combined force will be dependent upon the nature of the operation and the contributing forces. There are three force structures that could be applied to operations in which the ADF may be involved:

- a. developed combined structure,
- b. structure with national integrity, and
- c. undeveloped structure.

**5.11 Developed combined structure.** The developed combined structure fully integrates multinational units and headquarters (HQ) staffs to allow optimum employment of all elements of the force. In doing so, this structure simplifies unity of command issues. However, it requires the forces to be of a similar training standard, with similar levels of technology, intelligence-sharing arrangements and a common language.

**5.12 Structure with national integrity.** A structure with national integrity allows national forces to maintain their national integrity under a single combined or coalition force commander. This structure is suited to coalition forces where language barriers, cultural differences and security arrangements are quite different. For these reasons, most UN forces have employed this method, examples of which include United Nations Advance Mission (UNAMIC) in Cambodia and United Nations Aid Mission (UNAMIR) in Rwanda.

**5.13 Undeveloped structure.** The undeveloped structure might be used where there are considerable differences in national interests as well as language barriers, or political and cultural differences. There is no single CFC in an undeveloped structure and the forces are usually assigned distinct geographic responsibilities.

## COMBINED PLANNING

**5.14 Integrated planning.** Alliances and agreements serve to promote mutual interests. Equally, to be effective, the combined operations planning process must serve the interests of all alliance partners. This is best achieved by integrating planning at all levels of command, commencing with agreed strategic guidance from allied governments who will need to reach agreement on strategic objectives, policy and constraints. Disagreements should be resolved quickly through negotiation and a cooperative approach needs to be reflected within the Strategic Commanders Committee (SCC) and throughout the chain of command. Extant arrangements and contingency plans should underpin this process in order to streamline and accelerate combined planning.

**5.15 Standing planning arrangements.** Standing planning arrangements exist between Australia, US and NZ forces. These arrangements are covered in detail in ADFP 9 Supplement 2—*ANZUS Planning Manual* and the Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) combined strategic planning model in [annex A](#).

**5.16 Operational level planning.** The nominated CFC must be closely involved in the planning process from the earliest opportunity. Once strategic guidance is confirmed and a military option selected and approved by governments, the focus of combined planning turns to the Combined Force HQ, its components and subordinate HQs. The operational level planning processes described in [chapter 4—‘Planning at the operational level—campaigns and operations’](#) will apply apart from changes to the composition of approving authorities. Where an Australian contingent is assigned as a force entity (ie a joint task force), ADF joint planning procedures are to be adopted and modified as necessary for interoperability with the combined force.

**5.17 Intelligence.** Integration of allied intelligence is an important and early priority. Intelligence sharing arrangements involve exchanges of liaison officers and agreement on responsibilities, collection priorities and sharing of resources and communications aspects. Whilst the principles applying to intelligence in joint planning are used, effective international coordination is essential to the combined planning process.

**5.18 Key planning decisions.** Aside from the initiating guidance of allied governments, the key decisions to be reached in the combined planning process are:

- a. selection of the combined military option;
- b. assignment of forces;
- c. division of responsibility for support and sustainment of forces;
- d. selection of the CFC;
- e. command and control arrangements;
- f. rules of engagement and law of armed conflict aspects;
- g. selection of the CFC's preferred course of action;
- h. approval of the preferred course;
- i. approval of the combined plan; and
- j. issue of appropriate directives, orders and instructions.

### Command and control

**5.19** [Figure 5-1](#) outlines the normal peacetime relationships between the ANZUS governments, their diplomatic missions, their strategic commanders and defence representatives. Prior to liaison staff being exchanged, Defence Attache (DA) staff should ordinarily be able to provide critical information to assist contingency planning for a combined operation.




Figure 5-1: National command and liaison


**5.20** The US has a unique chain of command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is an adviser to the National Command Authority (NCA). CJCS acts as a conduit for the NCA but is not in the US chain of command. The US military chain of command emanates from the President (the Commander-in-Chief) direct to the theatre strategic level unified commander. For example, in the Pacific region the US Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) is the theatre strategic level unified commander. Consequently, the US Defense Attache to Australia is also the US CINCPAC representative in Australia.

**5.21** The US theatre strategic commanders operate at both the strategic and operational levels of command. For example, there is no direct correlation of responsibilities between all functions of Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) and US CINCPAC, or US CINCPAC and Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST).

**5.22** A CFC will plan and conduct operations in accordance with agreed policies and objectives of allied governments and the combined directives of Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and their allied equivalent. Under ANZUS arrangements, a CFC will exercise command in keeping with the policies of the NCA and the directives of the military representatives (MILREPS). In this case, the NCA are the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers and the President of the United States, advised by appropriate executives. The MILREPS are CDF, NZCDF and CINCPAC.

**5.23 Strategic military coordination.** CDF will be the **supported** strategic commander for any Australian-led combined or coalition operation and will consult with the **supporting** strategic commanders through the Strategic Commanders Committee (SCC). Supporting strategic commanders might include the Defence chiefs of those nations contributing forces and, in the case of the US, a theatre strategic unified commander such as US CINCPAC. Figure 5-2 shows the lines of communications and agencies available for CDF to communicate with the supporting strategic commanders. While local Australian Defence representatives will be an important conduit, ADHQ liaison officers will be critical for successful liaison at the supporting strategic HQ. Members of bilateral operations and strategic military policy fora, such as a AS-US Staff Level Meeting or the ANZ Operations Working Group, are well suited to this role having established relationships with the supporting HQ.





**Figure 5-3: Command and control relationships**

**5.27 National contingent commanders.** National contingent/force commanders will be appointed by their respective strategic commanders and are responsible for the national command (NATCOMD) of their deployed units. NATCOMD is a command state conferred upon a national appointee to safeguard Australian national interests in combined, coalition or UN operations. NATCOMD does not in itself include operational authority; however, in most circumstances NATCOMD would be conferred upon the senior Australian operational commander in the area of operations. The national commander is appointed by a directive from COMAST and is referred to as the Commander of the Australian Contingent (COMASC). COMASC is responsible for representing national issues to the Commander Combined Task Force (CCTF), and for nation-specific administrative and logistics issues.

**5.28 Appointment of the CCTF and Deputy Commander Combined Task Force (DCCTF).** For Australian-led operations the CCTF will be an ADF officer. CDF in consultation with COMAST and the supporting strategic commanders, will appoint the CCTF and the DCCTF. In this example, the DCCTF will most likely be from the non-Australian nation contributing the largest contingent to the Combined Task Force (CTF).

**5.29 Other CTF appointments.** The Chief of Staff (COS) of the CTF HQ should be an ADF officer to provide an interface between the CCTF and the combined staff. The CCTF should also appoint foreign officers as Assistant COS on the basis of one deputy from coalition nations at each level, in accordance with the relative force sizes and sovereignty considerations.

**5.30 Tactical components.** The decision to *integrate* units into combined formations or to establish national components will depend upon mission requirements, assignment authority and degree of interoperability. The CCTF is responsible for appointing their combined component commanders and their deputies. As a general rule, the combined component commanders should come from those nations contributing the largest proportion of respective components.

## COALITION PLANNING

**5.31** Coalition planning normally occurs in circumstances where no standing arrangements exist. Planning procedures should, where possible, follow the planning framework of one of the major contributing nations, rather than developing an approach that is unfamiliar to all the partners. In operations with traditional allies, similarities in doctrine and procedures simplify the problem. Early agreement on, and familiarisation with, terminologies, acronyms and procedures reduces misunderstanding and saves time in planning. A generic coalition planning framework is outlined in [annex B](#).

**5.32** Many of the fundamental planning considerations in combined planning are equally important in a coalition structure, however there is no previously agreed and tested procedure and format. Staff at all levels must be cognisant of the differences between partners outlined in [paragraph 5.8](#). and work to establish procedures that ameliorate potential barriers.

### Annexes:

- A. [Australia and New Zealand combined planning process](#)
- B. [Generalised coalition planning model](#)



# AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND COMBINED PLANNING PROCESS

AUSTRALIAN STRAPP		ANZAC COMBINED		NEW ZEALAND STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS			
AS National		Military		Military		NZ National	
<b>Phase 1—Situation development</b>							
I&W Problem monitored by DIO	I&W identify possible national security implications	DDIS monitors situation	National agencies monitors situation and intelligence requirements				
	I&W problem provided by AS	HQNZDF heightened monitoring and report to CDF					
MSE development: SPCG—SPG/SCD Workshop		Interdepartmental Watch Group (IWG) considers situation response	Senior Executives Group forms (SEG) if required				
	SWG considers I&W Problem, MSE, and strategic intelligence requirements						
	CDF provided with advice on ADO position on the provision of support to national effort to deal with the problem						
CCDC and National agencies monitor and provide assessments		CCDC and National Agencies monitor and provide assessments					
	When appropriate, CCDC consults and may subsequently recommend to respective NCAs that formal consultation commence between AS and NZ defence organisations	COSC					
	Strategic staff level MIL/MIL dialogue commences						

IDC convened to establish the problem to be dealt with by Government and develop national approach and combined arrangements	Strategic Intelligence Assessment
Share respective MSE (or equivalent assessments) to establish planning baseline	JPG
'Way Ahead' papers and critical timelines developed	
'Way Ahead' papers/discussions circulate between ADO and OGO	Discussions between NZDF/MOD and other government departments
SPCG meets to set in place appropriate crisis management arrangements and coordinate the development of assessments, policy options and responses	JPG with other government departments invited to attend
Issue formal SCD SITREP	
AS National position/strategy developed and agreed. National end-state; national/political constraints on freedom of military action. CABSUB submitted	
Political level contact made with counterparts to establish mutual interests and potential for cooperation	
CDF/COSC briefed and determine recommendation to Government on suitability, acceptability and feasibility of military operation and broad combined arrangements	
Cabinet/NSCC meet to approve CABSUB	Exchange LOs (strategic/operational level as required)
Government agrees to combined effort and defines preconditions for involvement (including logistics arrangements, funding, C2, access to intelligence)	Government agrees to combined effort and defines preconditions for involvement (including logistics arrangements, funding, C2, access to intelligence)
NCAAs agree and designate a Lead/Supported Commander (COMAST/NZCDF)	
Exchange strategic planning staff	

<b>Phase 2—Planning development</b>			
		The CCDC 'appreciate' the problem and develop guidance for military action	
		ANZAC WINGO issued to initiate detailed planning (incl ROE NATPOL)	HQNZDF and MFAT draft Cabinet Papers
		The Lead/Supported Commander 'appreciates' the problem and provides advice on possible military action	JPG
		Agreement between countries to establish exchange of notes/SOFA	
		Lead/Supported Commander submits CONOPS to the CCDC (including CROEREQ)	
Finalise strategic level POL/MIL 'Parameters' for military involvement			
	CDF/COSC reviews/clears CONOPS and approves assignment of forces	Combined COSC	CDF/COSC reviews/clears CONOPS and approves assignment of forces
		CONOPS approved by CCDC	
		CDFs each make recommendations or suggest alternative COAs and cost estimates to NCAs	
	Combined military option agreed by NSCC		Combined military option agreed by Cabinet Strategy Committee
		NCAs collectively agree on COA and the ANZAC ALERTO is issued	Combined Military Option approved by Cabinet
	CDF assigns forces to Lead/Supported Commander		
		CDF directs forces to be assigned	
		Implementing Agreement (IA) drafted	
	CDF/COSC advises Government on state of military preparedness		CDF advises Government on state of military preparedness

<b>Phase 3—Execution</b>			
NSCC authorises military action	NCAs collectively decide to execute the military option		Political approval for military action
		ANZAC EXECUTO issued	CDF Directive issued
	ADHQ reporting to appropriate interdepartmental fora and Ministers on issues and progress as reported by HCAST	HQ NZDF reports to appropriate interdepartmental fora and Ministers on issues and progress	
<b>Phase 4—Evaluation</b>			
Execution phase continues until the OP is completed or until the NCAs deem that military end-state is achieved			

### Notes


- (a) Events in approx sequence only, and time taken from one event to the next could range between hours and weeks.
- (b) Combined Planning Process column taken directly from APM.
- (c) In the Combined Process column, CCDC and MILREPS are interchangeable terms dependant on whether NZ or US respectively are involved.
- (d) The Lead/Supported Commander will be either COMAST or NZCDF in the case of AS and NZ conducting bilateral combined operations.
- (e) NCA for each country is that person or group with the authority to direct the employment of the national defence force.


**Acronyms**

CCDC	Combined CDF's Defence Committee
COA	Course of Action
COSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
EXECUTO	Execute Order
I&W	Indications and Warning
IDC	Interdepartmental Committee
JPG	Joint Planning Group
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
NATPOL	National Policy for ROE
NCA	National Command Authority
NSCC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
OGO	other government organisations
SCD	Strategic Command Division (ADHQ)
SCG	Strategic Command Group (new group with role of committee previously referred to as ADF Operational COSC)
SEG	Senior Executives Group
SPA	Strategic Policy Adviser
SPCG	Strategic Policy Coordination Group
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
SWG	Strategic Watch Group
IWG	Interdepartmental Watch Group
WNGO	Warning Order



## GENERALISED COALITION PLANNING MODEL





## CHAPTER 6

# PLANNING PEACE OPERATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

**6.1** Peace operations is a broad term used to encompass all types of military operations designed to assist a diplomatic peace process. Within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrinal framework, peace operations are included as part of military support operations (MSO). As well as the more 'traditional' tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires and reporting breaches of agreements, military capability is called upon to support such activities as:

- a. the provision of security for the delivery of humanitarian aid,
- b. the provision of security for election processes,
- c. the demobilisation of belligerents,
- d. the provision of protection to safe areas, and
- e. the demonstration of international resolve by preventive deployment or enforced separation of belligerents.

**6.2** Increasingly, peace operations involve complex multi-dimensional tasks comprising, among others, political, military and humanitarian lines of operation. Their successful conduct requires an understanding not only of the military role, but also the interrelated roles of the diplomatic, electoral, human rights, civil police, and humanitarian components of a mission.

### SCOPE

**6.3** This chapter defines peace operations terminology and outlines the strategic considerations and planning processes for ADF participation in peace operations. Peace operations are covered in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) ADFP 6—*Operations* chapter 7 and in greater detail in ADFP 35—*Peace Operations*.

### PEACE OPERATIONS CONTINUUM

**6.4** The military component in a peace operation will always be part of a wider political effort to avoid, limit or resolve armed conflict. The range of responses within the Peace Operations Continuum, of which military response is a part, is shown in [figure 6-1](#).




Figure 6-1: Peace Operations Continuum

6.5 Within the Peace Operations Continuum, military capability is primarily used for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

## TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

6.6 **Peacekeeping** is a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate, international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties, in an impartial manner, to implement conflict prevention and/or resolution arrangements.

6.7 **Peace enforcement** is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to prevent armed conflict from starting, escalating or spreading or to restore peace between belligerents, who may not consent to that intervention. Peace enforcement operations differ from war. In war, the ultimate military aim is to defeat a designated enemy force. In peace enforcement operations, the military aim will normally be to coerce the belligerent(s) or potential belligerent(s) into avoiding or ceasing armed conflict and participating in peaceful settlement of disputes.

6.8 The key difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement lies in the level of consent of the parties to the conflict. This distinction can often be complicated by a force gaining consent at the political, strategic and operational levels but, for various reasons, losing it at the local tactical level. Even in peacekeeping operations the force will retain the right of self-defence. This notion can be robustly applied. In some situations, formal guidelines to Force Commanders have defined self defence as including defence of the mandate itself. A key consideration in the use of force, however, will be the capability of the peace operations force when compared to the task and the capabilities of the belligerents or potential belligerents. A force deployed, structured, trained and equipped to undertake peace enforcement would normally be able to operate in a peacekeeping posture. The reverse is not true.

6.9 Peace operations tasks will often overlap with other MSO such as humanitarian operations. In some cases, the primary focus of the military element of a peace operation will be facilitation of emergency humanitarian relief. This will normally relate to provision of security and logistics. In exceptional cases, the military may act as a relief provider. This effort must be coordinated with the wider humanitarian and developmental plan for the mission area.

6.10 Peace operations tasks may also often overlap in a mission area. As shown in figure 6-1, peace building measures, for example, will often continue through all stages of a conflict.

**6.11** Because peace operations are normally conducted in a United Nations (UN) or multinational environment, familiarity with key doctrinal terms of the UN and other nations is essential. Key UN and allied peace operations terminology are shown in [annex A](#).

## MILITARY PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS

**6.12** Within the two broad types of military involvement in peace operations, there are a number of tasks. These include:

- a. participation in fact-finding missions;
- b. liaison, negotiation and provision of good offices;
- c. inspection, investigation, verification and monitoring;
- d. preventive deployment;
- e. observation, including observation of non-UN missions;
- f. interposition;
- g. assistance in the implementation of comprehensive settlements where a military component can be tasked to:
  - (1) canton, disarm and demobilise factions;
  - (2) provide logistics assistance to humanitarian relief operations;
  - (3) provide support to the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons;
  - (4) assist in the conduct of electoral activity;
  - (5) assist in human rights monitoring;
  - (6) assist in peace-building tasks to:
    - (a) train national defence forces;
    - (b) rebuild infrastructure;
    - (c) disposal of explosive ordnance, including mines;
- h. restoration and maintenance of order and stability;
- i. protection for the delivery of humanitarian relief;
- j. protection of human rights;
- k. actions taken to guarantee and deny freedom of movement;
- l. enforcement of diplomatic, economic and military sanctions;
- m. defence of protected zones; and
- n. forcible separation of belligerents.

**6.13** While the focus of the military component will be on tasks for which military capability is most suited, durable solutions to armed conflict are non-military in nature. All elements of the force must be proactive in identifying measures that will strengthen the peace process. This will often see the military component identifying peace-building tasks. To be effective these measures must be coordinated. Coordination of peace building, however, is not a military task.

## PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

**6.14 Command and control (C2) arrangements.** The scope of ADF involvement in the planning of a peace operation will be dictated by the C2 arrangements for the operation. The ADF can be tasked to participate in peace operations under one of four broad C2 arrangements:

- a. Under UN command.
- b. Under command of a lead nation.
- c. Under command of a non-UN multinational organisation or alliance headquarters (HQ).
- d. With Australian (AS) lead.

**6.15** Where AS is not leading the operation, ADF planning is likely to be confined to the deployment phase, policy matters concerned with the status of forces agreement (SOFA), rules of engagement (ROE) and specific AS aspects such as force extraction or rotation. Once deployed, the AS contingent will operate in accordance with the mission's mandate and the appropriate directive.

**6.16** Where AS is leading the operation, ADF planning will be conducted in accordance with existing ADF planning processes and procedures for all MSO and will not be confined to any one operational phase.

**6.17 Level of ADF commitment.** Broadly, there are two levels of ADF commitment, individual and contingents. The planning processes will vary according to the level of commitment by the ADF, but in the most part these differences will be limited to the number of personnel to be committed to the operation only.

**6.18** Formulation of the mandate and planning for the mission may be conducted in very short time frames with political imperatives dictating structures and actions that would not make sound military sense. This is a particular problem with UN-directed peace operations.

**6.19** Operations will normally be multinational in composition. This can involve operations with contingents from nations that are not traditional allies. Standards of training, doctrine, methods of operation and equipment specification and capability can vary dramatically.

**6.20** Distance from a national support base will often dictate lines of logistic support outside national chains, particularly if the national contribution is a small one.

**6.21** The multi-dimensional nature of peace operations will involve interface with organisations and lines of operation with which members of many contingents will have little familiarity. These include political, humanitarian, human rights, electoral and civilian police components. Unless carefully managed through constant consultation, relations can become strained and overall mission effectiveness can be detrimentally effected.

**6.22** The open access accorded the media in many mission areas increases their influence when compared to the control that can be partially exerted over them in more conventional war-fighting theatres. The media will probably be in the mission area before the peace operations force arrives. Planning must take into account the possibility of utilising the media as a resource in achieving the mission goal(s).

## AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION CRITERIA

**6.23 Political consideration.** AS participation in peace operations is decided on a case-by-case basis, with a range of policy considerations influencing the Government's decision. Criteria applied in evaluating AS participation include:

- a. whether the operation has a clear and achievable mandate, clear and achievable goals, and clearly defined termination and review points;
- b. whether there is a prospect for a satisfactory outcome given the UN resource commitment and the political nature of the situation;
- c. what other resources are likely to be available for the operation;

- d. what AS interests are engaged, including regional, alliance and humanitarian interests and community attitudes;
- e. what costs the contribution might incur, including the effect on the ADF's capacity to undertake other tasks, including national defence;
- f. what AS commitment to other operations is at the time;
- g. what training and other benefits will accrue to the ADF; and
- h. what the risks are for personnel involved in such operations.

## PLANNING PROCESS AND SEQUENCE

**6.24 Initial planning.** The possibility of a UN, multinational or AS-led peace operation may arise months before units are required to be deployed. Initially, Head Strategic Command Division (HSCD) and Head International Policy Division will prepare advice for government on possible ADF involvement. Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) and single-Service HQ may be required to develop contingency plans as a basis for such advice. Planning groups in ADHQ will be convened to undertake an initial assessment, conduct military strategic estimates and make appropriate recommendations in accordance with the Strategic Planning Process. The Office of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organisation will be asked to prepare national threat assessments and military threat assessments respectively.

**6.25 Supplementation of planning staffs and deployment of liaison officers.** In many instances, and particularly for a UN or Coalition peacekeeping operation, the ADF is also likely to contribute directly to another strategic and operational level planning HQ. For peace enforcement operations, the planning HQ of the lead nation will normally be an established organisation. Deployment of a Defence Force liaison officer and/or an advisory group may also be necessary to support the AS Defence Attaché (DA) to UN New York or augment the UN HQ planning staff.

**6.26 Public information.** Political sensitivity concerning deployment of an AS contingent or individuals could necessitate security of information before a government announcement. This should not hinder planning. In particular, it does not obviate the need to provide adequate warning to commanders and staffs as well as those to be deployed. Media releases prior to deployment will be controlled by the Director-General of Public Affairs and coordinated with Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). A public relations supporting plan, which draws on ADFP 41—*Defence Public Information Policy during Periods of Tension and Conflict* is likely to be issued.

### Sequence

**6.27** Planners need to be familiar with the key decisions and processes leading to the commitment of an AS contingent or individuals to a peace operation. ADF participation has generally followed this sequence:

- a. an informal request to provide a military force or individuals from the mandating body or lead nation, (normally the UN) or parties to the conflict;
- b. consideration of ADF participation by Defence HQ, primarily SCD and IPD, in consultation with other government departments, principally the DFAT;
- c. approval in principal by government to proceed with detailed planning, and advise the requesting nation, body or organisation that AS would be supportive of a formal request;
- d. commence preparatory planning for ADF participation as necessary, but only to the extent deemed sufficient to continue with this planning;
- e. formal request from the mandating body or lead nation;
- f. deployment of a technical survey team or reconnaissance party (as required and only if time dictates or continued planning necessitates);

- g. government approval of the formal request;
- h. international negotiations on participation such as SOFAs, ROE; and
- i. deployment.

**6.28** When planning for participation in peace operations where the ADF has an existing commitment, the sequence at [paragraph 6.27](#) may be adjusted as necessary. This is most likely to be the case when ADF participation is being reviewed by government and/or Defence, or if a request is received that involves a change in the existing commitment to that peace operation. In particular, approval for the deployment of individuals to an existing peace operation may be delegated to Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) or HSCD.

### **Risk assessment**

**6.29** The mandating body or lead nation should normally determine the broad composition of the force and address issues such as security and emergency extraction. ADHQ will need to review these plans, recommend alterations where necessary, and advise CDF on risks to ADF personnel. Such an assessment will need to examine the threat, contributing nations contingents' capabilities and determine both the likelihood of success and degree of risk entailed. The assessment will need continual review during the warning phase.

**6.30 Reducing risk.** In developing advice on the options for ADF involvement, the following requirements should be addressed:

- a. assured, secure communications between the Commander of the Australian Contingent (COMASC) and AS;
- b. administrative self-reliance during the initial deployment period to the maximum extent;
- c. whether reinforcement of the AS contingent or individuals is a viable option in a deteriorating situation, and what limits are likely to apply; and
- d. preparation of an emergency extraction plan by the mounting authority and approval by government.

### **Rules of engagement**

**6.31** In UN or other organisation controlled operations issue of ROE and orders for opening fire will be the prerogative of the UN, lead nation or organisation. AS input to ROE planning will be through the DA to the UN at the strategic level and through COMASC at the operational level. UN or other organisation ROE do not constrain the AS contingent's inherent right of self-defence.

**6.32** In AS-led peace operations the AS government will take the lead in obtaining input from other troop contributing nations.

### **Stages of a peace operation**

**6.33** There are three distinct stages to the conduct of a peace operation:

- a. deployment,
- b. conduct the operation, and
- c. concluding the operation.

### **Development stage**

**6.34** The deployment stage includes:

- a. **Warning phase.** Once a national commitment to a peace operation has been identified, a planning directive or warning order will be issued to initiate the warning phase.
- b. **Mounting phase.** The mounting phase begins when specific instructions are issued and preparations commence for the conduct of or participation in a peace operation.

- c. **Lodgment phase.** Beginning when the first elements of a contingent or when individuals begin to deploy, the lodgment phase concludes when the last elements are received in the area of operations (AO) lodgment.

**6.35 Intelligence.** Intelligence inputs should be provided to the planning process, and also to the briefing and preparation of the AS contingent. Intelligence requirements are likely to include:

- a. military, political, economical and socio-cultural conditions in the AO;
- b. reason for conflict;
- c. hostile forces engaged in the conflict;
- d. terrain and climate of areas to which deployment is likely, and operational techniques which may be applicable;
- e. military organisation, equipment and capability of other likely contingents;
- f. special health information including hazards and precautions, and effects of climate and terrain;
- g. any particular points of sensitivity in AS interests in or relationship with the parties involved; and
- h. an assessment of the threat to the AS contingent.

### **Conducting and concluding the operation**

**6.36** The complex and wide-range of peace operations requires a flexible approach by the ADF to achieve the mission's end-state. In multi-dimensional peace operations, for example, the restitution of law and order, rather than the unhooking of an adversary's centre of gravity, will require a different approach. Further, the extraction or rotation of a peace operation's contingent may be the conclusion of the operation from a national perspective rather than the end of the mission.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

**6.37** As in any operation, there will ideally be a delineation of powers between the strategic and operational levels. In UN-controlled peace operations the political decision making and strategic executive functions will be vested in the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The UN Secretariat's Department of Peacekeeping Operations will be responsible for strategic level planning and day-to-day management of the operation. In most instances, operational level command of the military component will be vested in the Force Commander. It is the Force Commander who is normally responsible for transforming strategic directions into a military plan.

**6.38** Command of UN operations is usually vested by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General who will appoint the Force Commander. The C2 relationship of the AS contingent to the UN Force Commander will be determined by Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST). In most circumstances the AS contingent will be placed under operational control to the UN Force Commander.

**6.39 National command (NATCOMD).** This is a command state conferred upon a national appointee to safeguard AS national interests in combined, coalition or UN operations. NATCOMD does not in itself include operational authority; however, in most circumstances NATCOMD would be conferred upon the senior AS operational commander in the AO. The national commander is appointed by a directive from COMAST and is referred to as COMASC. NATCOMD provides for the oversight of assigned national forces and includes:

- a. liaison with the combined force commander and the AS chain of command over changes to operational authority, or the employment of AS forces outside the degree of operational authority specified by COMAST; and
- b. maintenance of access to military representatives on national matters involving the employment, administration and conditions of service peculiar to AS forces.

## LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

**6.40** Director-General Defence Force Legal Office will be responsible for monitoring and advising on international legal aspects and may include the following:

- a. SOFA between the UN and the host government as applicable;
- b. the participation agreement between the UN/organisation or parties and AS;
- c. the UN mandate and directives issued by the UN Secretary-General and the Force Commander;
- d. entry requirements, including any restrictions as to the country of origin of AS members;
- e. appropriate bilateral logistic support agreements which might be utilised; and
- f. ROE and law of armed conflict.

A Service legal officer should accompany troops when the AS contingent is to be an ADF-formed body of troops. The officer, in consultation with both the DFAT and the Attorney-General's Department, should participate in legal planning aspects as early as possible.

### **Annex:**

- A. [Peace operations terminology](#)

## PEACE OPERATIONS TERMINOLOGY

### AUSTRALIA

#### Peace operations

1. Peace operations is a broad term used to encompass all types of military operations designed to assist a diplomatic peace process.

#### Peacekeeping

2. Peacekeeping is a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate, international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties, in an impartial manner, to implement conflict prevention and/or resolution arrangements.

#### Peace enforcement

3. Peace enforcement is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to prevent armed conflict from starting, escalating or spreading or to restore peace between belligerents, who may not consent to that intervention.

#### Peace building

4. Peace building is the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among potential, current and former enemies. They encompass longer-term non-military, economic, social and political measures including institution building and specific practical programs such as demining.

#### Preventative diplomacy

5. Preventative diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

#### Peacemaking

6. Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

### UNITED NATIONS

#### Peacekeeping

7. Peacekeeping is a UN presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (ceasefires, separation of forces, etc) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.

#### Peace enforcement

8. Peace enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by chapter VII of the UN Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

#### Peace building

9. Peace building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. Peace building includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**Preventative diplomacy**

10. Preventative diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.

**Peacemaking**

11. Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under chapter VI of the UN Charter.

**UNITED STATES (FM100-23)****Peace operations**

12. An umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace enforcement).

**Peacekeeping**

13. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, etc) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

**Peace enforcement**

14. The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorisation, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

**Peace building**

15. Post conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**Preventative diplomacy**

16. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis and aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs.

**Peacemaking**

17. A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict.

**Preventative deployment**

18. The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties.

## **UNITED STATES (JOINT PUB 3-07)**

### **Peace operations**

19. Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

### **Peacekeeping**

20. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

### **Peace enforcement**

21. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorisation, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

### **Peace building**

22. Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

### **Preventative diplomacy**

23. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.

### **Peacemaking**

24. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.

### **Preventative deployment**

25. The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities.

## **UNITED KINGDOM (JWP 3-50)**

### **Peace support operations**

26. Peace support operations are multifunctional operations involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. They are designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a long-term peace settlement and are conducted impartially in support of a UN or Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandate. These include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.

### **Peacekeeping**

27. Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under chapter VI of the UN Charter with the consent of all the major parties to a conflict, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.

### **Peace enforcement**

28. Peace enforcement operations are coercive in nature and undertaken under chapter VII of the UN Charter when the consent of any of the major parties to the conflict is uncertain. They are designed to maintain and re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.

**Peace building**

**29.** Peace building covers actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures, aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being, and support economic reconstruction.

**Peacemaking**

**30.** Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation and sanctions.

**Conflict prevention**

**31.** Conflict prevention activities are normally conducted under chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventative deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring. Preventative deployment within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to avoid a conflict.

## CHAPTER 7

### BASIC APPRECIATION PROCESS

**7.1** The basic appreciation process (BAP) is the foundation of most military problem-solving techniques employed in the Australian Defence Force. It is the traditional guide for commanders and staffs in planning and conducting operations. It is the foundation of the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) described in [chapter 8—‘Joint military appreciation process’](#) to guide commanders and coordinate joint staffs operating in a complex headquarters (HQ) environment. The BAP is a simple and logical sequence of deductive and inductive reasoning to derive the best course of action (COA) to solve a problem or achieve a mission. The BAP is a very effective technique where the responsibility for planning and conducting an operation is vested in a single commander and a few staff. The BAP is presented in a linear format but it is easily adapted by experienced proponents to solve multi-dimensional problems that involve the iterate assessment of factors.

**7.2** The JMAP employs a similar chain of logic to the BAP and adapts the process to the joint HQ environment where the planning and conduct of operations is dependent on the concurrent and iterative considerations and actions of numerous staff. The JMAP is designed to achieve a unity of staff effort. The contribution of individual staff and support planning groups to the JMAP is based largely on the reasoning inherent in the BAP. Staff must be competent in applying the BAP to achieve workable solutions if they are to contribute competently to the JMAP.

**7.3** The BAP uses deductive and inductive reasoning by analysing factors that relate to the operational situation. It breaks down analysis of the situation into the following stages:

- a. study the existing situation,
- b. decide the aim to be achieved,
- c. consider all pertinent factors and draw deductions,
- d. consider possible ways of attaining the aim, and
- e. decide the preferred COA to achieve the aim.

**7.4** The output of this analysis is a preferred COA which is developed into a concept of operations (CONOPS).

### APPRECIATION PROCESS

#### Conduct of the appreciation

**7.5** The format of the basic appreciation is shown in [annex A](#) and addresses analysis under the following headings:

- a. Review of the situation.
- b. Mission analysis.
- c. Aim and limitations.
- d. Factors.
- e. Enemy courses.
- f. Enemy's most probable course.
- g. Own courses.
- h. Selection of the preferred course.
- i. Outline plan and/or CONOPS.

**Assessment**

**7.6** This can be abbreviated for expedient use to the following:

- a. Mission analysis.
- b. Aim.
- c. Factors.
- d. Enemy courses.
- e. Own courses.
- f. Outline plan.

**DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPRECIATION****Review of the situation**

**7.7** The appreciation requires a review of the background facts of a situation before selecting the aim of the operation. The review refers to any intelligence input, directives, orders or CONOPS from higher authority and assumptions. It provides an accurate picture of the current situation to allow the commencement of planning.

**Mission analysis**

**7.8** Mission analysis focuses the estimate on achievement of the commander's intent. It uses the same steps as for the mission analysis stage of the JMAP and identifies the following:

- a. superior commander's intent;
- b. specified and implied tasks;
- c. constraints on own activities.

**7.9** Once the plan is implemented, commanders must continually analyse their mission. Changes to the situation may result in changes to tasks and priorities. While the aim of the operation will not usually change, the way in which it is achieved may have to be altered.

**Aim of the operation**

**7.10** The aim is the crux of the appreciation and must be clear, definite and concise. The aim indicates the fundamental task, its purpose, and any limitations to its achievement. There must never be more than one aim. Where tasks are concurrent, supportive tasks will be listed as limitations to the aim.

**7.11** The aim must never be conditional. This produces a qualification by condition or method and must be avoided. Constraints or requirements imposed by a superior commander that have been confirmed by an analysis of the superior commander's orders are listed separately as limitations to the aim.

**7.12** During the conduct of the appreciation, the aim must be kept in mind and all reasoning must be directed to its attainment. The aim may have to be reviewed if the appreciation detracts from or changes it.

## Assumptions

**7.13** When analysing a situation, possibilities may emerge which could have a significant effect upon the analysis. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, possibilities cannot be assumed by the analyst to be facts for planning purposes. Until proven, assumptions must be tested against knowledge of relevant circumstances and professional judgment. Assumptions must be constantly verified throughout the analysis and, if not resolved, throughout any subsequent planning. The analysis is amended if the assumption is proved incorrect. Preliminary operations may be needed to test assumptions before a main operation is launched. If the degree of opposition to a COA, is unknown, planning must proceed on the basis of 'worst case'.

## Factors

**7.14** Before considering COA, factors and probabilities must be examined. All available information on own forces and the enemy must be considered. The deductions emerging from this study lead to probable enemy COA and their likely effects. In turn, deductions arising from factors suggest friendly COA that can counter the enemy and support the aim. From this process, the centre of gravity (COG) and decisive points are determined. A list of likely factors for consideration is located in [annex B](#).

**7.15 Assessment of factors.** Factors identified should be considered in order of priority. Factors that affect the outcome, regardless of which course is adopted, are called 'overriding factors' and should be considered first. Facts and deductions that affect several subsequent factors are called 'pervasive factors'. Each factor must be examined in relation to the aim, and should lead logically to one or more deductions, which have a bearing on the aim. A factor that produces no deduction should be discarded unless it has a direct bearing on other factors. Three questions should be applied and reapplied to each factor until no more deductions can be made. The questions are:

- a. How does the factor affect the enemy?
- b. How does the factor affect own forces?
- c. What can the commander do about it?

**7.16 Arrangement of factors.** A well-considered arrangement of factors will help logical argument. Consideration should start with the most important; the discussion of one factor should lead naturally to the discussion of the next.

## Enemy courses

**7.17** Courses contribute to the final decisions or plan and should be considered exhaustively and impartially. The enemy's courses are usually considered first, because they affect the development of own courses.

**7.18 Order of course consideration.** If the enemy has the initiative, or neither side has it, enemy courses should be considered before own courses. If friendly forces have the initiative and a fair measure of freedom of action, own courses may be considered first as this reduces the likelihood of loss of the initiative. Enemy courses should then be considered in the light of likely reactions. Courses open should be derived from these enemy courses.

**7.19 Deductions.** Courses open to the enemy should be considered from the enemy's point of view. The enemy should be credited with acting competently unless previous experience suggests otherwise. Deductions from enemy courses should normally include:

- a. the likelihood of the enemy adopting the course, and
- b. the effect of that course on the attainment of the aim.

**7.20** Consideration of the effect of an enemy course should produce deductions similar to those drawn from other factors and will influence own courses. To consider the two aspects separately under each course simplifies later analysis. At this stage, one course should not be assessed, as more likely than another, comparison is part of the next step.

- 7.21** When considering enemy courses, four useful maxims should be followed:
- a. Enemy courses should conform to what is known of their intent.
  - b. Courses considered should be broad and realistic. Excessive detail should be avoided to minimise confusion.
  - c. Do not attempt to deduce the enemy's action too far ahead.
  - d. Never resort to intuition. All deductions must be based on facts.

### **Enemy's most likely course**

**7.22** This stage summarises all possible courses revealed in the previous step. The most likely course can be derived from this summary and the enemy's COG and decisive points identified.

### **Own courses**

**7.23** The commander will have a number of COA available. Courses that cannot achieve or contribute to the achievement of the aim should be discarded. A course will only be valid if it remains viable after consideration of likely enemy courses.

**7.24** A COA consists of a list of tasks that define the course. If all courses involve a particular task, for example preliminary surveillance operations, a brief general statement at the beginning of the specific 'Own courses' section may avoid repetition.

### **Selection of the preferred course**

**7.25** If the comparison of options is made correctly, the result of the appreciation is the selection of the preferred course, which targets the enemy's COG and decisive points. If at this stage a factor has been overlooked, the analyst must go back to the appropriate step, check all subsequent analysis to determine the effect that the new information could have and amend the appreciation.

### **Outline plan**

**7.26** The outline plan is broad and general, rather than specific, and is not normally disseminated outside the planning group. It is an integral part of the appreciation as it outlines the preferred course, based on deductions from the 'factors' section, and forms the basis for further detailed main or supporting plans.

**7.27** **Mission statement.** This describes the mission or predominant task derived from the preferred course and outlines the action required to achieve the aim.

**7.28** **Content.** The outline plan should include:

- a. mission statement;
- b. at the strategic and operational levels, a CONOPS including the commander's intent;
- c. at the tactical level, a general outline and any supporting tasks to be achieved;
- d. grouping of assets assigned and tasks to be conducted by those groups;
- e. resources required;
- f. administration, including logistics and movement;
- g. command and liaison arrangements;
- h. communications and operational security policy; and
- i. any special arrangements.

## CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

**7.29** A CONOPS is developed from the outline plan. The commander's final CONOPS ties together their assessment of what the enemy will do and their plan to achieve the mission. By definition, it is a verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of their intent in regard to an operation or a series of operations. The CONOPS is frequently embodied in a campaign plan and operation plan, particularly when the plan covers a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

**7.30** After deciding on their COA, the commander provides the guidance for the development of the CONOPS. Subordinate commanders may be briefed at this stage. The CONOPS facilitates the briefing of the preferred COA. It must have sufficient detail to allow staff officers and subordinate commanders to commence detailed planning at their levels.

### Format

**7.31** Although there is not a specified format for a CONOPS, the most commonly used format is:

- a. **Assumptions.** The commander states any assumptions that they have made. An assumption for a military appreciation is a statement of a fundamental consideration whose factual basis is uncertain. The statement must be necessary for planning to continue and must affect the plan and should be verified throughout the intelligence cycle.
- b. **Superior commander intention.** The commander outlines the superior commander's intention and indicates any applicable limitations or constraints on their actions.
- c. **Assessment of likely enemy operations.** The commander describes the course that they believe the enemy will adopt. This description enables staff and subordinate commanders to anticipate the changes to meet unexpected developments. It is logical to assume that an enemy will be guided in their choice of courses by the need to achieve their objectives, together with their assessment of our own COG. Both these factors are very useful in determining the degree of likelihood of a particular enemy COA.
- d. **Mission.** The commander states the mission applicable to their selected plan. The definition of a mission in joint operations is: 'the task together with its purpose, thereby clearly indicating the action to be taken and the reason therefore'. The mission is a succinct statement of what must be done to achieve the aim.
- e. **Operational concept.** The commander describes their outline plan, which is a course (or combination of courses) selected from their appreciation, designed to achieve objectives and end states through action which targets the enemy's COG and/or decisive points. The commander may also include the probable responses to anticipated moves by the enemy. The operational concept should generally consist of the following:
  - (1) A broad indication of how the mission is to be achieved.
  - (2) The general grouping of forces.
  - (3) The effect(s) to be produced on the enemy.
  - (4) The general posture to be adopted, including style of warfare, such as for example the avoidance of attrition and cumulative styles, and the use of manoeuvre, precision strike, the indirect approach, and/or the tenets of command and control warfare.
  - (5) The axis of main and auxiliary efforts.

- (6) An indication of any phases and their objectives. The use of phases is a powerful tool for the effective use of the operational art subset termed sequencing. Phases may be operations in their own right, and they may be, among other things, interdependent, independent, synchronised, simultaneous or sequential. Their characteristics include at least some of the following:
- (a) points (1) to (4) above;
  - (b) a phase objective, guided by focus on the COG or decisive points, if applicable;
  - (c) phase boundaries, whether time or event governed, taking into account critical timings, the need for operational pauses and the anticipated occurrence of culminating points;
  - (d) alternative COA in the event of contingencies, with their main thrust identified. For example, should the main line of operation be regained, or an alternate be adopted; and
  - (e) changes in command and control (C2), which should not just include mandated changes and their circumstances, such as changes in the course of an amphibious operation, but overall responsibility for conduct of a phase.
- f. **Concept of offensive support.** The commander allocates, by phases, their priority for support by offensive support capable units, that might otherwise be retained for exclusive use by subordinate commanders. The commander should also state in broad outline the assets available for each phase, eg phase 1—naval gunfire support (NGS) and close air support to the Maritime Component Commander, phase 2—artillery and NGS to Land Component Commander.
- g. **Deception.** Deception aims to mislead the enemy into a predictable COA or inaction that can be exploited. The deception objectives must be stated and deception measures described. It is critical to match deception measures with the achievement of campaign objectives. Measures must deceive the enemy into doing something that you need them to do. Details of intentions to implement deception may be promulgated in a supporting plan. The considerations for deception are:
- (1) centralised control and coordination;
  - (2) sound and thorough preparation;
  - (3) congruous and logical;
  - (4) promulgated by the maximum number of routes to the enemy's mind;
  - (5) critical timing; and
  - (6) security.
- Some of the techniques for deception are the encouragement of the belief that the most likely option will be adopted; the 'lure'; the 'repetitive process'; the 'double bluff'; the 'unintentional mistake'; the 'piece of bad luck'; 'substitution'; and disguise. It is not unusual for large elements of a force to be committed to the deception plan.
- h. **Key timings.** The commander summarises the key timings applicable to the operation. Key timings include all timing influences on a campaign or operation, including externally dictated deadlines, such as political and environmental ones. Within the campaign or operation they must include the equivalent of a critical path analysis, taking into account in the planning of sequencing such time dependent activities as preparation, mounting, and transit; and time-intensive operations.

- i. **Key administrative aspects.** The commander states those administrative aspects that are essential for their plan to work; for example, the availability of guided munitions, the availability of key health personnel to activate required facilities, the requirement for guaranteed resupply at a specific rate, the stockholding policy within the area of operations or the location of the main support area.
- j. **C2 arrangements.** The commander must outline the C2 arrangements for the operation by phases. Ideally, the main C2 arrangement should remain intact for all phases. In formulating C2 structures, the following points should be considered:
  - (1) Are the levels of command (strategic, operational, tactical) clear?
  - (2) What method of command, direct or component, is to be used at the various levels? If component, what types (environmental, functional, phased, geographic, hybrid), and what will be the various staff arrangements and responsibilities?
  - (3) Does the C2 organisation comply with the fundamentals of command, particularly with regard to unity, span and control of scarce assets?
  - (4) What degrees of authority need to be assigned?
  - (5) Are the necessary changes in the course of the campaign or operation reflected?
- k. **Sensitive parameters.** The commander should state those doubtful factors or facts that might significantly affect the plan. An example factor could be the timeliness of any intelligence which reconnaissance elements will give the commander.

### Testing the concept

**7.32** Once the concept is established, indeed during its development, it can and should be tested for effectiveness by subjecting it to a range of pertinent questions, such as:

- a. Are all the objectives, both specified and implied, targeted by the plan?
- b. Does the plan focus on the enemy's COG, by targeting it directly, and/or through decisive points?
- c. Is the associated risk acceptable?
- d. Does the plan prevent the enemy from achieving their objectives?
- e. Does the plan protect our own COG and decisive points?
- f. Does the plan take advantage of our strengths and the enemy's weaknesses?
- g. Is the plan logistically achievable and sustainable? Does it take advantage of any logistic strengths or opportunities?
- h. Does the plan cope with contingencies, particularly those affecting our sensitive parameters?
- i. Does the plan comply with the applicable law (domestic law, law of armed conflict, and other international law)?

### Re-appreciation

**7.33** Accurately determining future events is difficult and is usually a matter of assessing when new information is likely to be received, or when the situation will have changed sufficiently to warrant a new appreciation. Therefore, a statement should be included to indicate the conditions under which the plan should be re-appreciated. The continuous process of mission analysis will alert the commander to the need to re-appreciate.

### Annexes:

- A. [Basic appreciation format](#)
- B. [List of possible factors](#)



## BASIC APPRECIATION FORMAT

### Notes on the format of a basic appreciation

1. **Layout.** In general, the format conforms to the normal conventions of Service writing and the guidance provided in Australian Defence Force Publication 102—*Defence Writing Standards*. These notes set out differences likely to be required in higher level appreciations, particularly at the strategic and operational level. The following should be noted:
  - a. **Title.** The subject or existing situation should be specified as clearly as possible in the title but not prejudice the aim or any possible course of action (COA). It must be definite in respect to the subject yet non-committal as far as the nature of any specific Australian Defence Force operation eg, 'AN APPRECIATION ON THE LAW AND ORDER CRISIS IN UMBARGO'.
  - b. **Review of the situation.** Prepared by operations staff. Possible headings include:
    - (1) background,
    - (2) strategic aspects,
    - (3) national policy, and
    - (4) media aspects.
  - c. **Mission analysis.** This procedure will lead to the aim of the appreciation and should identify:
    - (1) the superior commander's concept;
    - (2) specified and implied tasks; and
    - (3) changes in the situation since task assignment and conclusions drawn from those changes.
  - d. **Aim.** The following should be considered:
    - (1) Selected by the commander, the aim is the crux of the appreciation, as the relevance of all future considerations in the appreciation will be related to it.
    - (2) The aim should state the fundamental task to be undertaken, and be clear, definite and concise. A poorly worded aim may be misunderstood, therefore correct military tasking verbs must be used.
    - (3) Constraints on military action imposed by higher commanders or government or by law may be included as limitations to the aim and could include:
      - (a) time;
      - (b) rules of engagement (ROE);
      - (c) third-nation sensitivities;
      - (d) world/public opinion; or
      - (e) other political constraints.
  - e. **Factors.** The next step in the appreciation process is the drawing of deductions from relevant factors. Proper consideration of deductions forms the basis for establishing options and courses open to both the enemy and own forces. The following three questions should be applied to each factor in order to discern particular actions to be taken. How does the factor affect the enemy? How does that factor affect us? What can be done about it? [Annex B](#) lists possible factors for consideration. [Chapter 8—'Joint military appreciation process'](#) provides check lists of possible factors pertinent to specific types of joint operations.

- f. **Enemy courses.** The COA are examined to determine their likely impact upon achievement of the aim. The effect upon the enemy's campaign of each particular COA should also be considered. For each enemy course a determination of its likelihood of adoption and, if adopted, its effect on us, is needed. The likelihood of particular courses may need to be assessed in terms of short-, middle- and long-term options. This section is normally prepared by intelligence staff.
- g. **Enemy's most probably course.** The COA is determined by considering the advantages and disadvantages to them of each possible course. The COA which would most assist the enemy to achieve their aim is likely to be the course adopted, although lack of political will may sometimes preclude this.
- h. **Own courses.** The next task is to examine courses available, some of which could include a combination of options. Each is examined to determine its advantages and disadvantages and the following should be noted:
  - (1) Tenable own courses become 'military options' for government consideration at the strategic level.
  - (2) A separate logistic appreciation may be required to support each of the courses selected. Alternatively, the logistic feasibility of courses may be determined by an assessment of assets and liabilities.
- i. **Selection of the best course.** A comparison of possible own courses should now be made to determine best achievement of the selected aim. Factors affecting the selection of the best course include:
  - (1) assets required for the COA,
  - (2) expected time taken by that course to achieve the aim,
  - (3) losses which may result from that course,
  - (4) constraints imposed upon the aim, and
  - (5) likelihood of success and expected costs.
- j. **Concept of operations (CONOPS).** Rather than an outline plan, a CONOPS which expands upon the preferred course may be required at the strategic level. Along with proposed ROE the concept will form the basis of the Cabinet Submission.

**Appendix:**

1. [Layout of the basic appreciation](#)

**LAYOUT OF THE BASIC APPRECIATION**Page 1 of ....<sup>1</sup>File reference<sup>2</sup>

Copy No .... of ....

**AN APPRECIATION ON** ..... For: .....

By: .....

Loc: .....

At: ..... (Time Zone) On: ..... (Day, month and year) <sup>1</sup>**References:****A.** Chart ..... (No, title and, if required, date of ed, etc)<sup>2</sup>**B.** Map ..... (Map series, sheet No, ed and scale)<sup>2</sup>**C.** Intelligence summary/country brief .....

Time zone used throughout the appreciation .....

**REVIEW OF THE SITUATION**

1. Background.
2. Current readiness.
3. Superior commander's intentions.
4. Tasks.
5. Constraints.
6. Changes to the situation.

**AIM**Selected by commander.<sup>2</sup>

7. To ..... with the following limitations.

- a. **Limitation.**

**FACTORS****DEDUCTIONS****Factor heading**

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>8. Each aspect of a factor should be stated completely as the stem of a paragraph. One or more subparagraphs will list associated deductions. This 'factor' has two deductions identified as 'a.' and 'b.'</p> | <p>a. A deduction drawn from the stem of the paragraph should be listed as a subparagraph. This deduction is drawn from paragraph 8.</p> <p>b. Further deductions drawn from the stem and perhaps earlier deductions in the same paragraph may also be listed.</p> |
| <p>9. Another aspect of the same factor.</p>  | <p>a. Deduction.</p>   |

**Another factor heading****10., 11. etc.****ENEMY COURSES**

12. **Course A:** The enemy could .....
- a. **Likelihood.**
- b. **Effect.**
- a. **Likelihood.**

13. **Course B:** The enemy could .....

b. **Effect.**

etc.

#### ENEMY'S MOST PROBABLE COURSE

14., 15. etc.

#### OWN COURSES

16. **Course 1.** To .....

a. **Advantages.**

b. **Disadvantages.**

17. **Course 2.** To .....

a. **Advantages.**

b. **Disadvantages.**

etc.

#### SELECTION OF THE PREFERRED COURSE

18. Comparison of courses.

19. The proposal is to adopt course ..... because .....

At the strategic level, courses open, commencing with the preferred course, are presented to government in the form of a cabinet submission (see paragraph 3.37b(4), and [annex F](#), chapter 3).

#### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(If required)

#### OUTLINE PLAN<sup>3</sup>

20. **Mission:**

21. **Execution:**

a. **General outline.**

(1) **Commander's intent.** It is my intention that ... .

b.

c.

d. Units, grouping and tasks.

e.

etc.

f. **Coordinating instructions.** Including essential elements of coordination, particularly ...

22. **Administration and logistics.**<sup>4</sup>

**23. Command and signal.<sup>4</sup>**

Signature )  
Name )  
Rank )  
Appointment )<sup>1</sup>

**Annex:**

A. ....<sup>1</sup>

Distribution	Copy No
.....	.....
.....	.....

**Notes**

1. As appropriate.
2. These words are not included.
3. This should include sufficient detail to enable a staff officer to draft a detailed plan.
4. May not be required in a tactical appreciation.



## LIST OF POSSIBLE FACTORS

1. The following is a list of possible factors to be considered. The list, while comprehensive, is not exhaustive. Any relevant factor should be considered.

2. **Comparison of forces:**

a. **Enemy:**

- (1) Aim.
- (2) Intentions.
- (3) Capabilities.
- (4) Deficiencies.

b. **Own forces:**

- (1) Present disposition of forces.
- (2) Order of battle available.
- (3) Additional assets required.
- (4) Enhancements required.

- c. Relative strengths and weaknesses.
- d. Potential third-nation involvement.
- e. Information warfare and command and control warfare.

3. **Environment:**

- a. Area of operations (including requirement for exclusion zone, total exclusion zone, air defence identification zone, air defence operations area and tactical area of responsibility).
- b. Point of entry.
- c. Terrain.
- d. Vital points.
- e. Bases (mounting bases, forward operating base).
- f. Landing zone, drop zone and air landing ground.
- g. Infrastructure (ports, road, rail and airfields).
- h. Local resources.

4. **Information collection:**

- a. Intelligence agencies.
- b. Reconnaissance.
- c. Surveillance.

5. **Meteorology/oceanography:**

- a. Weather.
- b. Seasonal conditions.

- c. Tides.
- d. Moon phases.
- e. Sunrise/sunset.
- f. Sonar conditions.

**6. Endurance:**

- a. Logistics.
- b. Maintenance.
- c. Resupply.
- d. Reinforcement.
- e. Relief.
- f. Radius of action:
  - (1) Surface ships.
  - (2) Submarines.
  - (3) Aircraft.

**7. Time and space:**

- a. Key timings.
- b. Distances.
- c. Assembly and preparation period.
- d. Movement times.
- e. Duration.

**8. Political considerations:**

- a. Aim.
- b. End-state.
- c. Constraints.
- d. Rules of engagement.
- e. Public information.
- f. Media.

**9. Legal considerations:**

- a. Domestic law.
- b. International law.

**10. Assessment of tasks:**

- a. Functional organisation.
- b. Command and control.
- c. Degrees of operational authority.

- d. Priorities.
- e. Phases (related to time and space).
- f. Additional assets required.

**11. Civilians:**

- a. Liaison with government.
- b. Refugees.
- c. Civil affairs.
- d. Liaison with police and other civil agencies.
- e. Facilities and infrastructure.
- f. Legal authority.

**12. Other factors:** (These factors should be considered throughout the process.)

- a. Security.
- b. Surprise.
- c. Deception.
- d. Electronic warfare.




## CHAPTER 8

# JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS

## INTRODUCTION

**8.1** Successful military operations depend on commanders making sound decisions that are developed into workable plans and executed by subordinates in a timely and appropriate manner. Staff assist the commander's decision making, develop plans and ensure orders are communicated and executed effectively. Mastery in decision making and planning is achieved by the commander and staff understanding and employing a common doctrine. The joint military appreciation process (JMAP) is a logical decision-making process that analyses all the relevant factors in a situation and coordinates all staff functions towards the development of the most appropriate plan of action. The JMAP facilitates the rapid planning and complex decision making required at the operational level of war in modern conflict. Its introduction was motivated by the need to formally introduce a common staff-planning process across the three Services. The JMAP recognises the different factors and their application that are important at the joint task force and theatre level. The JMAP provides a decision-making model for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) that preserves the logic of the basic appreciation process, while adapting it for ADF operations in contemporary warfare. As such, it incorporates the planning issues associated with the ADF's recently developed warfighting concept, *Decisive Manoeuvre*.

**8.2** Effective decision making must take account of all aspects of operational planning. This includes deliberate planning prior to operations (contingency planning), immediate planning (responsive and quick planning during operations) and the concurrent planning of future operations. The JMAP facilitates dynamic planning that addresses changes to the situation and post H hour analysis. The effectiveness of the process is reliant on the provision of timely and informed commander's guidance, and regular consultation between the commander and staff. The JMAP addresses planning before and after the start of operations. It provides clear methods for concurrent and responsive planning for ongoing and future operations, and for crisis situations. The process enables the commander to select courses of action (COA) with an understanding of the associated risks. [Figure 8-1](#) shows the JMAP planning mode.



**Figure 8-1: Joint military appreciation process planning model**

**8.3** This publication provides an outline of the JMAP to assist commanders and staff in joint planning at all three levels of conflict, with the focus being on the operational level.

**8.4 JMAP and the commander.** The commander is an integral part of the JMAP process. The format outlined below is in no way designed to diminish the significant role a commander must play throughout the process. The commander maintains overall control of the process and, together with the Chief of Staff, provides cohesion to the overall effort of the headquarters (HQ). Depending on the level of the HQ and the style of the commander, the briefings that occur during the process are the vehicle by which the commander's intent and direction, together with the situation and plan updates, are communicated across the entire HQ. The degree of command direction will vary markedly from the immediate to the deliberate planning model. Clearly if time is not restricted, the commander will wish to see the full range of options developed prior to imposing their experience and intuition. This is illustrated in [figure 8-1](#).

**8.5 JMAP and risk.** The JMAP itself is a tool that allows for the management of risk within the battlespace. No matter at what level of command, a commander and their staff must be clear on the degree of risk that their superior is prepared to accept. Risk management is the systematic application of procedures and practises to the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, controlling and monitoring risk and is applied throughout the JMAP. Rather than limiting activities through restrictive safety concerns, risk management allows the full operational potential to be achieved through managing rather than avoiding risk. The identification of various COA and the way in which a force manoeuvres allows the commander to manage and at times ameliorate the risk associated with the prosecution of a course. At the theatre HQ it allows a commander to detail the cost of their planned military options. This cost can be measured in different ways depending on the circumstances and direction from the strategic level. Risk management is concerned with balancing identified threats against the harm those threats may inflict to various mission outcomes. There are a number of risk management procedures within each step of the JMAP and they are included within the text below. A risk management/JMAP integration check list is included as [appendix 2](#) to annex A.

## PROCESS

**8.6** The JMAP is initiated by either direction from higher authority or internally at the direction of the commander. The direction from higher authority may take the form of a directive, or in a crisis, a warning order following recognition of a situation that may require a response from the ADF. In a period of tension or conflict, the operational level commander may need to initiate planning autonomously within their HQ or they may direct an appropriate subordinate HQ to commence planning. In these cases, an initiating or planning directive would be issued, keeping the superior HQ informed. In practice, informal advice by way of inter-staff liaison and consultation are also likely to be the initial stimuli.

**8.7 Preliminary scoping.** Prior to the formal initiation of the JMAP, an operational level HQ will normally conduct some form of preliminary scoping. The format and detail covered during this activity will differ in each HQ as per their standard operating procedure (SOP). Preliminary scoping is not designed to situate or limit the JMAP, and will normally cover the following areas:

- a. situation update;
- b. strategic/higher direction;
- c. commander's initial guidance;
- d. planning timeline;
- e. division of responsibilities; and
- f. essential re-positioning and alterations to readiness levels to meet timeline.

**8.8** The JMAP consists of four consecutive steps with an integral and continuous part known as the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB). The four steps of the JMAP and their relationship with the JIPB process are shown in [figure 8-2](#). An overview of the JMAP is in the aide-memoire in [annex A](#).




Figure 8-2: Joint military appreciation process—showing the linkage with joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace


#### Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace

**8.9** JIPB is a continuous process which is integral to the JMAP. Its purpose is to maintain the situational awareness of the commander and staff. It is essentially an intelligence function, however commanders and all staff must have an understanding of the process.

**8.10** The process requires a thorough study of the total operating environment, including political, legal and social influences and their cumulative effects on possible threat COA and friendly forces. It requires a detailed analysis of the full range of possible threat COA, including the most likely and most dangerous. The JIPB process recognises the uncertainty of conflict and allows assumptions to be made to keep the planning process active. It focuses information-gathering sources on validating those assumptions and possible threat COA as early as possible.

**8.11** JIPB assists the commander and staff to identify critical vulnerabilities and potential decisive points from the perspective of both the adversary and friendly forces. It identifies also the intelligence requirements to support the analysis, exploitation and targeting of the enemy centre of gravity (COG) and critical vulnerabilities, and in turn, identifies the tasks for the appropriate reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition assets. Its products can be presented in many forms, such as a series of graphic overlays and matrices that depict the combined effect of the environment, threat capability and the range of threat COA. An example of a critical vulnerability matrix is in [annex B](#) which, when applied by a joint staff, will enable a range of direct and indirect, military and non-military factors to be exploited in lines or matrices of operations. The format of JIPB products is dependent on the nature of the problem, the capabilities of the intelligence staff and above all, the commander and the HQ SOP.

**8.12** The planning time available and the size of the HQ will limit the detail of the JIPB products. Determining which products are required and their relative priority depends upon the commander's guidance, time available, information requirements and the demands of the situation. JIPB is described in detail in Australian Defence Force Publication 19—*Intelligence* and its steps are outlined in [figure 8-3](#). It is stressed that the four JIPB steps shown in [figure 8-3](#) are not linked in any way to the four JMAP steps.



**Figure 8-3: Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace**


**8.13** Time available for collection and analysis of information combined with the amount of staff available will dictate the quality of the intelligence product and amount of assumptions made. That said, the JIPB will provide the following inputs to JMAP:

- a. **An analysis of the operational environment.** This will include comment on the area of operations (AO), the area of interest (AI) and the area of intelligence responsibility (AIR) and include an interpretation of how the environment will affect friendly, adversary and neutral operations. In written form this analysis is termed the analysis of the operational environment (AOE).
- b. **An analysis of adversary capability and intent.** In written form this is provided as an intelligence estimate. The estimate will include:
  - (1) Assumptions and gaps in knowledge.
  - (2) **Adversary capability.** To include adversary intelligence capability.
  - (3) **Adversary mission analysis.** This includes the level of adversary command faced and the intent of that command and its higher command in terms of purpose, method and end-state.
  - (4) Adversary COG (strategic and operational) and critical vulnerabilities provided as strengths and weaknesses in warfighting capability.
  - (5) **Adversary COA.** These may be presented verbally, as overlays or in matrix form similar to friendly matrixes shown in [annex G](#). COA will include rationale, likely objectives, what friendly elements will be targeted and by what means. (This aspect is fundamental to operations plans staff 'reverse engineering' adversary options for potential friendly activity noted below in COA development.) Strengths and weaknesses of adversary COA will also be provided.
  - (6) **Indicators and warnings.** JIPB will also provide an intelligence-collection architecture designed to test assumptions, fill gaps and to cue potential decisions by the commander in an effort to maintain decision superiority.
  - (7) Advice on the threat from adversary intelligence collection and implications for deception, operations security and countering covert attack threats.

### Step one—Mission analysis

**8.14** Mission analysis ensures that commanders and staff clearly understand the intent of their superior commanders up to two levels above. This focuses planning within the boundaries of that intent. It assists commanders and their staff to identify the mission and tasks that are essential to the successful outcome of their superior's plan. Mission analysis results in a clear statement of the commander's mission and intent, and through clear commander's guidance, provides the basis for all subsequent decision making and planning.

**8.15** Mission analysis requires input from all supporting staff processes to provide the 'situational awareness' required to continue the JMAP. For example, operations staff provide an awareness of current operational capability, dispositions and intent. Logistics staff will provide advice on logistics restrictions and freedoms of action affecting operations. Legal staff will indicate what legal constraints exist. JIPB provides the commander and staff with a clear picture of the battlespace through a detailed situation review. In identifying critical vulnerabilities and potential decisive points, JIPB enables the staff, through mission analysis, to consider the factors of own forces and time and space. It emphasises logistic and personnel support issues and helps identify our own critical vulnerabilities and COG. It provides the solid platform on which viable courses can be developed. It focuses planning on identifying and striking at the threat COG and critical vulnerabilities, whilst identifying and protecting our own. A mission analysis aide-memoire, including the briefing format, is in [annex C](#) and its steps are outlined in [figure 8-4](#).




**Figure 8-4: Mission analysis**

**8.16 Risk management.** Mission analysis places threat and environmental detail in context with the higher commander's intent and denies any restrictions on the friendly commander in terms of limits in acceptable costs. In commander's guidance, the commander should detail the relative risk they are willing to accept. Major events which are expected to occur during the operation should be determined. A framework should be applied and the hazards associated with all specified and implied tasks identified. The steps followed are the same as the six mission analysis steps outlined in [annex C](#), except the emphasis is on identifying and analysing the associated risk in each step. For example, when reviewing the situation, the hazards within the joint force area of operations (JFAO) (environmental, enemy threat, equipment, external pressures and uncertainty) should be identified, analysed and prioritised and control measures to address these hazards established.

### Commander's guidance

**8.17** The commander is an integral part in the JMAP. Mission analysis clarifies commander's guidance early in the process. This is critical as it focuses the staff on the commander's intent and the timely and effective development of own COA and the threat COA to be developed. The commander will specify in planning guidance the critical vulnerabilities to be exploited, deception objectives, the commander's priorities (intelligence reviews, morale, logistics etc), the acceptable degree of risk and the objectives to be achieved in arriving at the desired end-state. The components of operational art and the warfighting concept provide the framework for crafting how these objectives will be achieved.

**8.18** Commander's guidance should form the basis of the commander's concept of operations (CONOPS) and should flow from the inputs shown in figure 8-5. CONOPS guides the coordinated application of force to achieve the desired military objectives by combining operational art, the warfighting concept, the forces and capabilities available, and the prevailing time and space conditions applicable to the specific theatre or JFAO. A theatre concept will shape how a joint task force commander applies the forces within a JFAO.



**Figure 8-5: Development of concept for operations**

**8.19** The components of commander's guidance are:

- a. threat COA to be developed;
- b. commander's intent (purpose, method, end-state) and mission;
- c. outline theatre or JFAO CONOPS (core and supporting concepts with deep, close and rear);
- d. deception objective (consistent with superior commander's deception objectives);
- e. commander's priorities;
- f. acceptable degree of risk;
- g. time plan (when order is to be issued); and
- h. type of order to be prepared.

### Step two—Course of action development

**8.20** COA development involves identifying a range of COA that will best achieve the mission and intent of the commander. COA are developed by applying the components of operational art and the planning considerations associated with the warfighting concept *Decisive Manoeuvre*.


**8.21** Each COA must target the threat COG by either a direct line of attack or indirect approach, sequencing through a number of critical vulnerabilities to create decisive points in a line or matrix of operations. Planning staff must be able to visualise the environment they wish to create as a result of their actions. This picture is directly influenced by the commander's vision of the end-state and their concept to achieve it. The staff must develop detailed options to support the commander's concept. This development must be balanced carefully by the consideration of the following:

- a. the requirement to counter adversary objectives and manoeuvre, as identified in the JIPB;
- b. the potential to target adversary critical vulnerabilities leading to an assessed COG;
- c. the need to meet specified, implied and essential tasks derived from mission analysis;
- d. the requirement to protect own vulnerabilities, such as key installations, vital assets, and mission essential units etc; and
- e. the requirement to shape the environment and impose the commander's will over the adversary.

**8.22** This consideration will lead to the determination of a number of effects that need to be achieved in order to defeat the adversary. These effects will lead to the determination of a number of decisive points on the line or matrix of operation. Decisive points are achieved by careful allocation of capabilities to exploit critical vulnerabilities and achieve objectives. Planners must consider all possible options to achieve these decisive points, these may include:

- a. strategic influences, such as trade sanctions and other forms of economic pressure;
- b. defensive information operations (IO);
- c. offensive IO;
- d. targeting;
- e. operational manoeuvre, which includes:
  - (1) orchestration of tactical manoeuvre,
  - (2) synchronisation of strategic influences, and
  - (3) sustainment of capabilities.
- f. Tactical manoeuvre, the command and control of force element groups.

**8.23** The COA process leads to the development of various schemes of manoeuvre. Differences in COA are developed by emphasising distinctions in three areas; the focus of the main effort (ME), the time associated with prosecution and the management and acceptance of risk. The products of COA development are a number of friendly COA that meet the commander's intent, focused on gaining or retaining the initiative, and analysing the risk associated with its prosecution. This step involves a COA development brief to the commander, which results in further commander's guidance being given. The number of COA developed depends on the time made available in the commander's guidance. A COA development aide-memoire, including the briefing format, is in [annex D](#) and its steps are outlined in [figure 8-6](#).




**Figure 8-6: Course of action development**

**8.24 Risk management.** The focus of risk management is force preservation through the identification, control and monitoring of threats relative to the impact or harm to the commander's mission and plan. Risk management should allow the commander to maximise operational potential through daring, cunning, deception and speed, based on an objective cost-benefit analysis balanced by intuition based on experience. Throughout COA development the staff must consider the 'cost-benefit' that results in apportioning capabilities and rates of effort to achieve objectives and tasks. By assessing hazards and evaluating battlespace synchronisation, the level of risk for each COA can be determined and control measures identified to protect the force. For example, in the step, 'test COA criteria' when reviewing COA acceptability, identify and analyse the consequences of potential risks and how they may impact on own and higher missions.

### **Step three—Course of action analysis**

**8.25** COA analysis involves war gaming each friendly COA through to its intended end-state in an attempt to predict what may happen during the execution of a COA. It highlights the degree of risk associated with each COA and enables a commander to make subsequent decisions based on a judgment of acceptable risk. The methods for war gaming vary depending on the level of analysis required and time available. War gaming identifies potentially critical points where the commander must make a decision to exploit or respond to developments. The identification of decision points (DPT) assists the commander to synchronise the potential of all capabilities of the force. During the analysis the staff identify these decision points and position appropriate capabilities to support the decision process by identifying named areas of interest (NAI) and target areas of interest (TAI) in the battlespace. Synchronisation promotes forward planning across the entire force and focuses effort on the threat COG and critical vulnerabilities. An example of a synchronisation matrix is in [annex E](#). The products of COA analysis are workable and synchronised COA which meet the commander's theatre or CONOPS, with clear advantages and disadvantages. This step includes a COA analysis brief and the provision of further commander's guidance. A COA analysis aide-memoire, including the briefing format, is in [annex F](#) and its steps are outlined in [figure 8-7](#). The responsibilities of staff during the war game are detailed in [appendix 1](#) to annex F.



**Figure 8–7: Course of action analysis**


**8.26 Risk assessment.** During war gaming, key events are identified which incorporate risk to the success of the plan. Staff plan requirements to counteract risk by developing control options to synchronise the operation and eliminating or reducing risk. This may take the form of planning branches or sequels within their plans and designating DPT required to initiate action. Associated with these DPTs are commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) which are those pieces of information required by the commander to make a sound decision and provide a clear insight into the risk involved in taking or not taking one of a variety of options.

#### **Step four—Decision and execution**

**8.27** In this step, the commander compares the strengths and weaknesses of each modified COA, and decides which COA is to be developed into a plan and executed. During the execution of the plan the commander and staff constantly review the situation, undertake decision making, adjust plans as required, and plan future operations. Products from this step are the plan of action, contingency plans, supporting plans and orders.

**8.28** The purpose of COA comparison is to determine which COA has the highest probability of success against the threat COA that most concerns the commander. This comparison can be assisted by analysing each COA against the principles of war and the supporting concepts of *Decisive Manoeuvre*. In addition, the commander assesses the risk associated with each COA, the elements of risk and their relative importance, will be determined by the situation and the superior HQ intent. An example of this risk assessment matrix is in [annex G](#). The commander directs which COA, with attendant modifications, is to be developed into a plan, and which unused COA are to be developed into contingency plans for sequels and branches in the campaign or used as possible deception plans.

**8.29** The commander and staff constantly monitor the execution of a plan and review the situation. A decision and execution aide-memoire, including the decision briefing format, is in [annex H](#), and its steps are outlined in [figure 8–8](#). The plan is developed into a CONOPS, which is briefed in the format shown in [annex I](#).



**Figure 8-8: Decision and execution**

**8.30 Termination.** The commander and staff must remain focused throughout the conduct of the plan on the methodology for bringing the campaign/operation to a close, ensuring that the desired end-states are achieved and can be maintained.

## JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS METHODS

**8.31** The JMAP recognises that the nature of conflict includes constant change, uncertainty and time constraints. It ensures that prior to operations, thorough analysis leads to developing the best plan and range of alternative (contingency) plans. During operations, however, development of the best plan is often not feasible. In most conflict situations there are usually a range of workable options available to a commander. The JMAP can be used in two ways to accommodate differing staff levels, time periods and resources. These are as follows:

- a. the deliberate method which employs the full JMAP prior to operations, or during significant pauses in operations, and
- b. the immediate method that is used during operations for immediate decision making.

### Deliberate method

**8.32** The deliberate method is ideal for use before operations begin or during significant pauses in ongoing operations. It is characterised by long planning times, greater freedom for staff to explore a full range of threat and own force options, detailed analysis, thorough deductive reasoning, and maximum staff involvement. It aims to identify the best possible COA and a full range of viable contingency plans. The deliberate method results in a detailed plan that can be used as an effective start point for future operations. The detailed plan provides a thorough framework, which best prepares commanders and staff to make timely and effective decisions during the conduct of operations.

**8.33** The deliberate method relies on close interaction between the commander and staff, and draws all elements of the staff together to plan in accordance with the commander's intent. It may be inappropriate, however, due to the associated staff effort and time requirements. The deliberate method is shown in the aide-memoire in [annex A](#).

### Immediate method

**8.34** The immediate method is designed for use during operations when planning occurs within tight time constraints, is subject to constant change and used to make quick or immediate decisions. It is designed for crisis decision making in any time-constrained situation. The immediate method gains its speed of decision by using a streamlined version of the deliberate method and maximises concurrent activity and quick action. The immediate method relies on a detailed understanding of the original plan (from the deliberate method) and enhanced situational awareness by commanders and staff. This enhanced situational awareness better prepares commanders and staff to adapt as operations develop.

**8.35** The immediate method is characterised by reduced staff involvement and a shorter time for planning. It focuses staff attention on the priority concerns of the commander in accordance with the commander's intent and the demands of the situation. This method deals with fewer friendly and threat COA than the deliberate method with the commander relying principally on intuitive judgment and enhanced situational awareness, to produce a quick but workable plan which addresses an immediate problem. The streamlined steps of the immediate method are included in the JMAP aide-memoire in [appendix 1](#) to annex A.

**Annexes:**

- A. [Joint military appreciation process—Aide-memoire](#)
- B. [Critical vulnerability analysis](#)
- C. [Mission analysis—Aide-memoire](#)
- D. [Course of action development—Aide-memoire](#)
- E. [Synchronisation matrix](#)
- F. [Course of action analysis—Aide-memoire](#)
- G. [Risk assessment matrix](#)
- H. [Decision and execution—Aide-memoire](#)
- I. [Concept of operation briefing format](#)



## JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS—AIDE—MEMOIRE

INPUTS	STEPS AND ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
JIPB update.	<b>1. Mission analysis:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Review the situation.</li> <li>b. Identify and analyse the superior commander's intent and our mission.</li> <li>c. Identify and analyse tasks.</li> <li>d. Identify and analyse freedom of action.</li> <li>e. Identify and analyse critical facts and assumptions.</li> <li>f. Draft commander's (comd's) guidance.</li> </ol>	Mission analysis brief. Comd's guidance. Warning order.
Comd's guidance. IPB update.	<b>2. COA development:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Confirm centre of gravity.</li> <li>b. Conduct critical vulnerability analysis.</li> <li>c. Develop lines of operation and decisive points.</li> <li>d. Develop COA scheme of manoeuvre.</li> <li>e. Test COA criteria.</li> </ol>	Viable COAs. COA brief. Comd's guidance.
Viable COAs. IPB update. IPB event overlay. Comd's guidance.	<b>3. COA analysis:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Determine the war game start states.</li> <li>b. Select war game method.</li> <li>c. Select war game record.</li> <li>d. Conduct the war game.</li> </ol>	Modified COAs. COA analysis brief. Comd's guidance.
Workable/modified. COAs. IPB update. Comd's guidance.	<b>4. Decision and execution:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Compare COAs.</li> <li>b. Select the COA.</li> <li>c. Develop and issue the plan.</li> <li>d. Execute and monitor the plan.</li> </ol>	Synchronised plan. Orders.

### Note

(a) In case of Commander Australian Theatre, this will include the theatre concept.

### Appendixes:

1. [Joint military appreciation process—Aide—memoire—immediate method](#)
2. [Risk management/joint military appreciation process integration check list](#)




## JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS—AIDE—MEMOIRE—IMMEDIATE METHOD

JMAP STEPS	IMMEDIATE METHOD
<p><b>1. Mission analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Review the situation.</li> <li>b. Identify and analyse the superior commander's (comd's) intent and our mission.</li> <li>c. Identify and analyse tasks.</li> <li>d. Identify and analyse freedom of action.</li> <li>e. Identify and analyse critical facts and assumptions.</li> <li>f. Draft comd's guidance.</li> </ul>	<p><b>1. Mission analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Identify if the situation or mission has changed? If not, continue with plan.</li> <li>b. If situation has changed, decide if it affects the mission or execution of the plan? If not, continue with plan.</li> <li>c. If the mission or plan is affected, then redo mission analysis and identify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) If major adjustment needed, then: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) conduct quick mission analysis;</li> <li>(b) assess most dangerous course of action (COA);</li> <li>(c) use contingency plan if applicable; and</li> <li>(d) design a new plan, depending on time available.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>d. Comd gives guidance for development of friendly COAs, lays down time frames and confirms the most dangerous threat and most likely COAs.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. COA development:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Confirm centre of gravity.</li> <li>b. Conduct critical vulnerability analysis.</li> <li>c. Develop decisive points and lines of operation.</li> <li>d. Develop COA scheme of manoeuvre. Test COA criteria.</li> </ul>	<p><b>2. COA development:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Create COA concepts (three minimum).</li> <li>b. Comd tests COA criteria.</li> <li>c. Develop COA scheme of manoeuvre.</li> <li>d. Test COA criteria (to save time proceed with first three COAs that meet criteria).</li> <li>e. To save time an informal COA brief is conducted for the Chief of Staff (CofS) or comd as available.</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. COA analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Determine the war game start states.</li> <li>b. Select war game method.</li> <li>c. Select war game record.</li> <li>d. Conduct the war game.</li> </ul>	<p><b>3. COA analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Create COA concepts (three minimum).</li> <li>b. Comd conducts quick war game of three COA against most dangerous threat COA.</li> <li>c. Select war game record (onto matrix to save time).</li> <li>d. Modify COA progressively until workable COA reached.</li> <li>e. To save time, an informal COA analysis brief is conducted for the CofS or comd as available.</li> </ul>

<b>JMAP STEPS</b>	<b>IMMEDIATE METHOD</b>
<b>4. Decision and execution:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Compare COAs.</li><li>b. Comd selects the COA.</li><li>c. Develop and issue the plan.</li><li>d. Execute and monitor the plan.</li></ul>	<b>4. Decision and execution:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Compare COAs (conduct decision brief).</li><li>b. Comd confirms the COA.</li><li>c. Develop and issue the plan (by quickest means).</li><li>d. Execute and monitor the plan.</li></ul>

## RISK MANAGEMENT/JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS INTEGRATION CHECK LIST





## CRITICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

1. In developing viable course of action (COA) options, the commander and staff, as part of their Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, need to identify critical vulnerabilities and potential decisive points from the perspective of both the adversary and friendly forces. A critical vulnerability matrix enables staff to identify a range of direct and indirect, military and non-military factors that can be exploited in lines or matrices of operations which can be developed into friendly COA.
2. While there are a number of approaches to producing a critical vulnerability matrix (table 8B–1), the end product should identify:
  - a. the enemy's centre of gravity (COG);
  - b. a number of alternate approaches to the neutralisation of that COG;
  - c. the decisive points for each of these alternate approaches; and
  - d. the critical vulnerabilities contributing to each decisive point.

<b>Threat COG</b>	<i>That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict.</i>					
<b>Decisive points/critical vulnerabilities</b>	<b>Line of operation 1</b>		<b>Line of operation 2</b>		<b>Line of operation 3</b>	
	<b>DP1</b>	CV1 CV2	<b>DP1</b>	CV1	<b>DP1</b>	CV1 CV2
	<b>DP2</b>	CV1 CV2 CV3	<b>DP2</b>	CV1 CV2 CV3	<b>DP2</b>	CV1 CV2
	<b>DP3</b>	CV1	<b>DP3</b>	CV1 CV2	<b>DP3</b>	CV1 CV2
<i>In this section the J5 staff with advice from the J2 analyse ways of exploiting critical vulnerabilities on a line of operation through a series of decisive points in order to attack the COG.</i>						

**Table 8B–1: Critical vulnerability matrix**

<b>Critical Vulnerability analysis—systems approach</b>				
<b>Leadership</b>	<b>System essentials</b>	<b>Infrastructure</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Fielded forces</b>
Pres	Electrical	Rail bridges	People	Strategic def
Ministry of Defence	Petroleum	Highway bridges	Elite	Strategic off
Political parties	WMD Comms	Ports	Military	Aircraft missiles
Internal security govt agencies			Indigenous groups	Bases

**Table 8B–2: Critical vulnerability matrix**



## MISSION ANALYSIS—AIDE—MEMOIRE

## Step one—mission analysis

INPUTS	STEPS AND ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
<p>Intelligence (int) updates:</p> <p>Operational environment analysis.</p>	<p><b>1. Review the situation:</b></p> <p>a. Environment and threat update. (Factors and deductions) threat COAs, COG.</p> <p>b. Own forces review:</p> <p>(1) Own COG and critical vulnerabilities.</p> <p>(2) State of manoeuvre.</p> <p>(3) Logistic capabilities.</p> <p>(4) State of morale.</p> <p>c. Time analysis (1/3 plan, 2/3 preparation).</p> <p>(1) Key timings.</p> <p>(2) Distances.</p> <p>(3) Assembly/preparation timings.</p> <p>(4) Duration.</p> <p>(5) Planning time.</p>	<p>Most likely threat COA. Most dangerous threat.</p> <p>Own COG, critical vulnerabilities.</p> <p>Counterintelligence requirements.</p> <p>Own force capability.</p> <p>Initial time plan.</p>
<p>Superior comd's intent.</p>	<p><b>2. Identify and analyse superior comd's intent and our mission.</b></p> <p><b>3. Identify and analyse tasks:</b></p> <p>a. Specified tasks.</p> <p>b. Implied tasks.</p> <p>c. Essential tasks.</p> <p><b>4. Identify and analyse freedom of action:</b></p> <p>a. Limitations:</p> <p>(1) Constraints (affect our conduct of operations (ops)).</p> <p>(2) Restrictions (prohibit certain activities).</p> <p>b. Acceptable degree of risk (cost vs gain).</p> <p><b>5. Identify and analyse critical facts and assumptions:</b></p> <p>a. Facts (known/measurable data, identify shortcomings).</p> <p>b. Assumptions (must be a viable substitute for facts).</p>	<p>Superior's intent. Confirmed mission.</p> <p>Priority of tasks.</p> <p>Limitations.</p> <p>ROE.</p> <p>Key issues.</p>

INPUTS	STEPS AND ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
Comd drafts guidance.	6. Draft comd's guidance:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Mission analysis brief.</b></li> <li>2. <b>Confirm comd's guidance.</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Threat COAs (to be developed).</li> <li>b. Our comd's intent (purpose, method, end-state) and mission.</li> <li>c. Outline theatre or JFAO concept for operations (core and supporting concepts with deep, close and rear).</li> <li>d. Deception objective (consistent with superior comd's deception objectives).</li> <li>e. Comd's priorities (periodic intelligence reviews, morale, logistics, etc).</li> <li>f. Acceptable degree of risk.</li> <li>g. Time plan (when order is to be issued).</li> <li>h. Type of order to be prepared.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. <b>WNGOs issued.</b></li> </ol>

**Mission analysis briefing format**

<b>BRIEFER</b>	<b>SUBJECT</b>
<b>CofS/J3</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Purpose of the briefing.</li> <li>2. Condition of own force (COG, task orbat, morale).</li> <li>3. Time analysis.</li> </ol>
<b>J2</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Initial int estimate: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Brief on initially important factors.</li> <li>b. Brief on situation overlay (threat COG, critical vulnerabilities and potential decisive points).</li> <li>c. Threat COAs (each COA must include a scheme of manoeuvre—close, deep and rear—target our own critical vulnerabilities and COG).</li> <li>d. Recommend most likely and dangerous threat COAs.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Intent and mission of higher and next higher comd.</li> <li>6. Critical facts and assumptions.</li> <li>7. Limitations on the op.</li> <li>8. Specified, implied and essential tasks.</li> <li>9. Ops conclusions; capability shortfalls and war stoppers.</li> </ol>
<b>J1</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Personnel assumptions (replacements, host nation support, other).</li> <li>11. Pers conclusions; projected pers and shortfalls and war stoppers.</li> </ol>
<b>J4</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12. Logistics (log) facts (log requirement shortages, infrastructure and force capabilities).</li> <li>13. Log assumptions (infrastructure capabilities, memorandum of understanding validity).</li> <li>14. Log conclusions; potential logistics shortfalls and war stoppers.</li> <li>15. Health factors (capability shortfalls, force health requirements).</li> </ol>
<b>J6</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>16. Communications information systems (CIS) facts.</li> <li>17. CIS assumptions.</li> <li>18. CIS conclusions—capability shortfalls and war stoppers.</li> </ol>
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>19. CofS recommends confirmed comd's guidance (optional): <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Threat COAs to be developed.</li> <li>b. Confirmed comd's mission and intent.</li> <li>c. Theatre or JFAO concept for operations.</li> <li>d. Deception objective.</li> <li>e. Priorities.</li> <li>f. Time plan.</li> <li>g. Type of order to be issued.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>Comd</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>20. Comd confirms comd's guidance (modifies/changes as required).</li> </ol>



**COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT—AIDE—MEMOIRE****Step Two—Course of action development**

INPUTS	STEPS AND ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
Comd's guidance. JIPB update.	<b>1. Confirm centre of gravity (COG):</b> a. Enemy. b. Own COG. c. Relate to comd's Intent.	Own and enemy COG.
	<b>2. Conduct critical vulnerability analysis:</b> a. Visualise action. b. End-state c. Identify critical vulnerabilities to exploit leading to enemy (en) COG.	Critical vulnerabilities.
	<b>3. Develop decisive points and lines of operation:</b> a. Conceptualise direct/indirect approaches. b. Identify and analyse doctrinal options. c. Use warfighting concept of decisive manoeuvre to identify options to exploit en critical vulnerabilities.	Range of developed COAs.  Decisive points.
	<b>4. Develop the COA scheme of manoeuvre:</b> a. Close, deep and rear by phase. b. Objectives, main effort (ME). c. Supporting efforts. d. Command and control, tasks and logistic concepts.	
	<b>5. Test COA criteria:</b> a. Suitability. (Comd's intent?) b. Feasibility. (Time, space and means?) c. Acceptability. (Cost/risk?) d. Distinguishability. (Is COA different?)	COA brief.  ROE.

**Joint military appreciation process—Course of action development briefing format**

<b>BRIEFER</b>	<b>SUBJECT</b>
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Intent of own and higher comd.</li> <li>2. Mission.</li> <li>3. Reconfirm own COG.</li> </ol>
<b>J2</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Updated intelligence estimate:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Changes to threat situation.</li> <li>b. Event overlay if available (each developed threat COA).</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Brief on each COA:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. COA statement and sketch:                   <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Scheme of manoeuvre:                       <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) close, deep, rear;</li> <li>(b) ME; and</li> <li>(c) risk accepted.</li> </ol> </li> <li>(2) Sketch (force positions and control measures).</li> </ol> </li> <li>b. COA rationale:                   <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Threat COAs countered or exploited.</li> <li>(2) Deductions from relative capability analysis.</li> <li>(3) Reasons for force positions selected.</li> <li>(4) Reasons for control measures selected.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>J1</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Updated facts, assumptions and conclusions.</li> </ol>
<b>J4</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Updated facts, assumptions and conclusions.</li> </ol>
<b>J6</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Updated facts, assumptions and conclusions.</li> </ol>
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Recommended COAs for war gaming in JMAP step three—COA analysis.</li> </ol>

## SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX

<b>BLUE</b>	Phase	
	Main effort	
<b>Red Action</b>	DP	
	CVs	
<b>Time</b>		
B A T T	Deep	
L E S	Close	
P A C E	Rear	
<b>Deductions</b>		

## SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX SAMPLE

<b>BLUE</b>	Phase	Shape
	Main effort	Strike/surveillance/early warning
<b>Red Action</b>	DP	Shape
	CVs	Sub to choke pt, depth through SF on AS and AI Defence
<b>Time</b>		
B A T T	Deep	Strike Kamaria TAI1, SF insertion NAI1, AEW radar NAI2
L E S	Close	SF insertion AI NAI 2, PNG Is NAI3 subs LOC NAI4
P A C E	Rear	VAP and ATLS prep (mainland AS)
<b>Deductions</b>		Air superiority, EZ



## COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS—AIDE—MEMOIRE

### Step three—Course of action analysis

INPUTS	STEPS AND ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
Viable COAs. Event Overlay. Int update.	<p><b>1. Determine the war game start state:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Friendly forces (two levels down at start positions).</li> <li>b. Critical assumptions.</li> <li>c. Known critical events and decision points (DPT).</li> <li>d. Significant factors.</li> </ul>	COA set up for war game.
	<p><b>2. Select a war game method:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Include all relevant staff.</li> <li>b. Method dependent on time and required analysis.</li> </ul>	War game area identified.
	<p><b>3. Select a war game record:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. War game matrix (information recorded straight on to initial synchronisation matrix).</li> <li>b. Narrative (detailed notes).</li> <li>c. Sketch note (graphic and simple notes).</li> </ul>	Record selected.
	<p><b>4. Conduct the war game:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Conduct war game drill until a decisive outcome is reached for each critical event: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Friendly action (conducts initial COA).</li> <li>(2) Threat reaction (threat responds to friendly COA).</li> <li>(3) Friendly counteraction (responds to threat action).</li> </ul> </li> <li>b. War game from COA start until end-state is reached.</li> <li>c. Modify COAs as needed.</li> <li>d. Discard unworkable COAs if they cannot be modified.</li> <li>e. Ensure war game record confirms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Named areas of interest (NAI) and Targeted areas of interest (TAI).</li> <li>(2) DPT.</li> <li>(3) Decisive points.</li> <li>(4) Counterintelligence requirements.</li> <li>(5) Branches and sequels (contingency plans).</li> <li>(6) Relevant supporting plans.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Workable and modified.</p> <p>COAs with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Clear advantage and disadvantages.</li> <li>b. Risk assessment.</li> <li>c. Contingency plan.</li> <li>d. Supporting plans.</li> </ul> <p>COA analysis brief.</p>

**Course of action analysis briefing format**

<b>BRIEFER</b>	<b>SUBJECT</b>
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Intent of own and higher command.</li> <li>2. Mission.</li> <li>3. Own force status (position, condition).</li> <li>4. Reconfirm own COG.</li> </ol>
<b>J2</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Threat situation update.</li> <li>6. Enemy COA war gamed.</li> </ol>
<b>J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Brief on each COA war gamed: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Operation assumptions.</li> <li>b. War game technique used.</li> <li>c. COA friendly force actions: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Critical events.</li> <li>(2) Action one-level down at each critical event.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>J2</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Possible threat actions/reactions considered during the war game.</li> </ol>
<b>J3</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Results of the war game for each COA: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Modifications to COA.</li> <li>b. Proposed task organised.</li> <li>c. Event overlay.</li> <li>d. Priority for combat and service spt.</li> <li>e. Estimated (est) time for op.</li> <li>f. Est threat losses.</li> <li>g. Est friendly losses.</li> <li>h. Advantage of COA.</li> <li>i. Disadvantage of COA.</li> <li>j. Degree of risk of COA.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Recommended COAs for comparison in step four.</li> </ol>

**Appendix:**

1. [Staff responsibilities for war gaming](#)

## STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR WAR GAMING

1. Key staff responsibilities for war gaming are:
  - a. Chief of Staff coordinates all staff responsibilities and leads the war game effort in the absence of the command.
  - b. J1:
    - (1) Analyses the course of action (COA) being war gamed to determine the casualty liability.
    - (2) Analyses the risk for each COA and determines measures for reducing risk.
  - c. J2:
    - (1) Develops the threat decision support overlay and synchronisation matrix for each friendly COA.
    - (2) Identifies information requirements to support decision point (DPT).
    - (3) Identifies named area of interest (NAI) that support target area of interest (TAI) and DPT.
    - (4) Refines the situation overlays.
    - (5) Assists J3/J5.
    - (6) Identifies reactions, projects enemy losses and verifies NAI and TAI determined by intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).
    - (7) Identifies counterintelligence requirements.
  - d. J3/J5:
    - (1) Manoeuvres friendly forces allocated for the COA in accordance with the theatre concept and scheme of manoeuvre.
    - (2) Develops the synchronisation matrix for the COA being war gamed.
    - (3) Identifies NAI that support TAI and DPT.
    - (4) Identifies information requirements to support DPT.
    - (5) Identifies any shortfalls in rules of engagement.
  - e. J4:
    - (1) Analyses each COA during the war game to determine potential logistics problems and shortfalls.
    - (2) Identifies potential shortfalls and options to overcome them or reduce detrimental effects.
  - f. J6 analyses each COA to identify potential weaknesses in communications information systems (CIS) and probable solutions.
  - g. J06 analyses COA to determine compliance with applicable law.



**RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX**

	COA 1	COA 2	COMMENTS
Loss of capability			
Sustainability			
Loss of personnel			
Effect on the environment			
Humanitarian and social implications			

**STAFF DECISION MATRIX**

	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3	COMMENTS
<b>J1</b>				
<b>J2</b>				
<b>J3</b>				
<b>J4</b>				
<b>J5</b>				
<b>J6</b>				
<b>J06</b>				
<b>Components</b>				



**DECISION AND EXECUTION—AIDE—MEMOIRE****Step four—Decision and execution**

INPUTS	STEPS AND ACTIVITIES	OUTPUTS
Decision support matrix. Modified COAs. IPB update.	<b>1. Compare course of action (COAs):</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Individual key staff comparisons and recommendations.</li> <li>b. Combined staff comparison applying core and supporting concepts (led by Chief of Staff (CofS)).</li> <li>c. Select staff recommended COA.</li> </ol>	Staff recommended COA.
	<b>2. Select the COA:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Staff recommend COA.</li> <li>b. Commander selects a COA as the plan.</li> <li>c. Comd selects other COAs as contingency plans.</li> </ol>	Decision brief. Outline plan.
	<b>3. Develop and issue the plan:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Prepare and issue confirmatory warning order (WNGO).</li> <li>b. Develop decision support and synchronisation matrix:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Develop synchronisation matrix and confirm:                   <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Named area of interest.</li> <li>(b) Decision point.</li> <li>(c) Target area of interest.</li> <li>(d) Branches and sequels (contingency plans).</li> <li>(e) Logistic supporting plans.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> </li> <li>c. Develop the plan and supporting plans.</li> <li>d. Prepare and issue orders.</li> </ol>	Confirmatory WNGO. Decision support matrix. Synchronisation matrix. Developed plan. Supporting plans. Orders.
	<b>4. Execute the plan:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Combat method of JMAP used to monitor execution of the plan:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Ops staff monitor the current battle.</li> <li>(2) Plans staff plan the next battle.</li> <li>(3) Comd and staff coordinate capabilities and assist the comd's decision making.</li> <li>(4) Mission analysis constantly reviewed.</li> <li>(5) Quick method is used for quick decision making as required.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	Coordination of battle. Contingency plans. Monitoring of change. Modifications to plan.

## Decision briefing format

BRIEFER	SUBJECT
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	1. Intent of own and higher comd. 2. Mission. 3. Own force status (position, condition). 4. Confirm own centre of gravity.
<b>J2</b>	5. Threat situation update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Modified event overlay (after war game).</li> <li>b. Recommended Comd critical information requirements.</li> </ul>
<b>J3/J5</b>	6. Brief on each COA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Ops assumptions.</li> <li>b. Results of ops staff estimate (est).</li> <li>c. COA advantages and disadvantages.</li> <li>d. COA degree of risk.</li> </ul> 7. Recommended ops COA. 8. Recommended COA from selected advisers (major capabilities). 9. J06 endorsement of COA.
<b>J1</b>	10. Brief on each COA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Personnel (pers) assumptions.</li> <li>b. Results of pers staff est.</li> <li>c. COA advantages and disadvantages.</li> <li>d. COA degree of risk.</li> </ul> 11. Recommended pers COA.
<b>J4</b>	12. Brief on each COA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Log assumptions.</li> <li>b. Results of log staff est.</li> <li>c. COA advantages and disadvantages.</li> <li>d. COA degree of risk.</li> </ul> 13. Recommended logistics COA.
<b>J6</b>	14. Brief on each COA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Communications information systems (CIS) assumptions.</li> <li>b. Results of CIS staff est.</li> <li>c. COA advantages and disadvantages.</li> <li>d. COA degree of risk.</li> </ul> 15. Recommended CIS COA.
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	16. Combined staff recommended COA.
<b>Comd</b>	17. Comd selects COA as plan.

## CONCEPT OF OPERATION BRIEFING FORMAT

### Concept of operations

*The general concept of operations is to improve all presently occupied forward air bases; occupy and implement air bases which can be secured without committing large forces; employ air forces from these bases to soften up and to gain air superiority over the initial attack objectives along the two axes; neutralise with appropriate aviation supporting hostile air bases and destroy hostile naval forces and shipping within range; move land forces forward covered by air and naval forces to obtain first objectives (existing and potential hostile air bases) and consolidate same; displace aviation forward onto captured aerodromes. This process is repeated to successive objectives, neutralising by air action, or by air, land and sea action, intermediate hostile installations which are not objectives of immediate attack. The entire movement will be covered by air attack on Japanese air and sea bases along the perimeter Buka, Rabaul, Kavieng and Wewak with the objective of interrupting and denying sea supply and/or support or reinforcement of objectives under attack.*

Colonel E.G. Keogh

1. The commander's concept of operations (CONOPS) is a verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of their intent in regard to an operation (OP) or a series of OPS. The CONOPS is frequently embodied in a campaign plan and OP plan, particularly when the plan covers a series of connected OPS to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the OP. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

2. Once the CONOPS has been approved, the Australian Defence Force Operations Plan can be developed. A CONOPS may be oral, written and/or graphic.

### Operation order/plan briefing format

BRIEFER	SUBJECT	EXPLANATION
Comd/CofS	I. <b>Intent of higher and next higher comd, including intended end-state.</b>	I. Conveys the military end-state. Intent should reflect the vision and convey the thinking of the comd.
	II. <b>Critical assumptions.</b>	II. These are listed and checked before forces are committed. Thus a need to vary the plan can be identified quickly.
J2	III. <b>Updated intelligence estimate:</b> Environment. Situation.	III. This will be drawn from the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace, based on the listed likely enemy (en) ops. This list allows identification of the need for changes due to unexpected developments. It should also include an assessment of the en COG and critical vulnerabilities which provides a focus for all planning.
	IV. <b>Threat situation:</b> Updated threat course of action planned against. Assessed enemy centre of gravity (COG) and associated decisions points.	
Comd/CofS	V. <b>Comd's intent (purpose, method (theatre concept<sup>(a)</sup>) and end-state)</b>	IV. This describes the comd's mission. It allows subordinates to analyse their allocated tasks in context of the overall operation.
	VI. <b>Outline concept of ops:</b> A broad indication of how the mission is to be achieved and an outline of the line of OP chosen highlighting the decisive points and objectives.  The general grouping of forces.	V. Tasks are linked with specific units and described. Responses to alternative en actions are stated. The comd's intent for the mission is included.

BRIEFER	SUBJECT	EXPLANATION
	<p>VII. <b>The effect(s) to be produced on the en:</b></p> <p><b>The style of warfighting</b>, ie how decisive manoeuvre will be applied, such as for example the avoidance of attrition and cumulative styles, and the use of manoeuvre, precision strike, the indirect approach, and/or the tenets of information operations.</p> <p>The line or matrix of OP for main and auxiliary efforts. An outline of phases and their objectives.</p>	
J3/5	<p>VIII. <b>Detailed concept of ops.</b> Scheme of manoeuvre (close, deep, rear) by phase.</p> <p>IX. <b>Main effort for each phase.</b></p> <p><b>Phase boundaries</b>, whether time or trigger governed, taking into account critical timings, the need for operational pauses and the anticipated occurrence of culminating points.</p> <p><b>Specified tasks and groupings of forces</b>, possibly zone oriented (close, deep, rear etc), and scheme of execution, including use of deception.</p> <p><b>Key timings.</b></p> <p><b>Phase command and control</b>, based on responsibility for tasks, and delineating degrees of authority.</p> <p><b>Rules of engagement</b> for each phase.</p> <p><b>Critical cross domain considerations</b>, including: Offensive support (spt). Targeting. Command and control warfare (including deception). Employment of special forces. Pre-planned contingency/ alternate lines of action.</p>	

BRIEFER	SUBJECT	EXPLANATION
<b>J1/4</b>	X. <b>Concepts of personnel (pers), logistics (log) and health spt.</b> Spt mission. Outline concept of spt to zones of OP. Outline spt phase, matched to ops phases. Key locations. Next highest comd's spt priorities. Our spt priorities. Higher spt provided. Summarise spt issues (significant, critical, unusual functions, internal and external priorities): Before ops. During ops (matched to ops phases). After ops. Significant pers/log/health risks.	
<b>J6</b>	XI. <b>Communications information systems details.</b>	
<b>CofS/J3/J5</b>	XII. <b>Comd and signal.</b>	
<b>Comd/CofS</b>	XIII. <b>Vulnerabilities (state how they are to be minimised).</b>	

**Note**

- (a) For a joint task force commander, the theatre concept will be included as part of the next highest comd's intent.



## GLOSSARY

**administration**

The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy, primarily in the field of logistics and personnel management.

**administrative order**

An order covering traffic, supply, maintenance, evacuation, personnel and other administrative details.

**assigned forces**

Forces-in-being which have been placed under the operational command or operational control of a commander.

**battlespace**

The battlespace includes all aspects of the environment that are encompassed by the area of influence and the area of interest. This includes the operational environment (oceanic, continental, littoral and electronic) and those relevant aspects of society, politics, culture, religion and economy.

**campaign**

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space.

**campaign planning**

Campaign planning integrates both deliberate and immediate planning processes and seeks to orchestrate the ways for tactical means to achieve strategic ends.

**centre of gravity**

That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may consist of a number of key elements.

**coalition operation**

An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**combined operation**

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**commander's critical information requirements**

The critical information that the commander needs to make a decision. Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) will normally be identified during the war gaming process and they relate to decision points, target area of interest and named area of interest. Timely answers to CCIR assist the commander to enter the decision cycle ahead of the adversary commander, thus improving the probability of gaining or retaining the initiative.

**commander's intent**

A formal statement, usually in the concept of operations or general outline of orders, given to provide clear direction of the commander's intentions.

**concept of operations**

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish the mission.

**contingency plan**

A plan for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility.

**counterintelligence**

That aspect of intelligence devoted to identifying, assessing and counteracting the threats to security posed by hostile intelligence activities and organisations or individuals engaged in covert activity such as espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

**critical vulnerabilities**

A characteristic or key element of a force that if destroyed, captured or neutralised will significantly undermine the fighting capability of the force and its centre of gravity. A critical vulnerability is not necessarily a weakness but any source of strength or power that is capable of being attacked or neutralised. A successful attack on a critical vulnerability should aim to achieve a decisive point in an operation or campaign. A force may have a number of critical vulnerabilities.

**culminating point**

A culminating point is the point in time and location where a force will no longer be stronger than the enemy and risk losing the initiative. This may be due to reduced combat power, attrition, logistics, dwindling national will or other factors. To be successful, the operations must achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point.

**decision point**

Decision points (DPT) are points in time and space at which a commander must make a decision in order to influence the operation in a particular target area of interest (TAI). DPTs must be offset from the point where the action has to take place, in order to allow sufficient lead-time for action to be initiated.

**decision support overlay**

A graphic and tabulated display depicting named area of interest (NAI), TAIs and DPTs associated with the plan. It also displays, in tabulated format, the proposed synchronising of friendly combat power.

**decisive points**

A major event that is a precondition to the successful disruption or negation of a centre of gravity of either combatant. A decisive point is created normally by successfully attacking or neutralising a critical vulnerability. Operational level planning aims to exploit an enemy's critical vulnerabilities in a sequence or matrix of decisive points known as lines of operation.

**deliberate planning**

The start of a process for the development of considered military strategic guidance for the employment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), to achieve an end-state, in support of Government national strategy. The process is generally free of time constraints. It relies on a mix of assumption-based planning against current strategic guidance and future analysis to account for possible future strategic environments.

**directive**

- a. A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered;
- b. a plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises; or
- c. broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or procedure.

**directive control**

A philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by the superior on their intentions—that is the result required, a task, the resources and any constraints. It includes the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

**direct support**

The support provided by a unit not attached or under command of the supporting unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

**end-state**

End-state is identified at the national and military levels as follows:

- a. The national end-state is the set of desired conditions, incorporating the elements of national power that will achieve the national objectives.
- b. The military end-state is the set of desired conditions beyond which the use of military force is no longer required to achieve national objectives.

**engagement area**

A target area of interest, where action has been planned to reduce the effect of an adversary's combat power.

**essential elements of friendly information**

Those elements of friendly information which, if known by an adversary, would compromise friendly plans or operations through indicators of dispositions, capabilities and intentions.

**high value target**

High value target are those assets, which are likely to be required for the completion of the enemy commander's mission.

**immediate planning**

The time-sensitive planning for the employment of assigned forces and resources that occurs in response to a developing situation that may result in military operations. This planning is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds.

**information operations**

Actions taken to defend and enhance one's own information and information systems and to affect adversary information, including the information itself.

**joint**

Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate (when all Services are not involved, the participating Services shall be identified, eg Joint Army–Navy).

**joint exercise**

A joint exercise is an exercise, which is planned and conducted by elements of two or more Australian Services.

**joint force**

A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of Navy, Army and Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander who is in turn directly responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force.

**joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace**

Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) is a systematic, dynamic process for analysing the threat and the environment, considered in the dimensions of space and time. It is designed to support staff planning and prepare the foundations for informed military decision making. JIPB is a processing medium with which intelligence staff provide an assessment of environmental effects on operations and an estimate of adversary capability and intent.

**lines of operation**

Lines of operation describe how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the enemy's centre of gravity.

**mandate**

The terms of a United Nations Security Council or United Nations General Assembly authorisation.

**military support operations**

The use of military forces for purposes other than combat operations usually associated with war.

**named area of interest**

A NAI is an aspect which will confirm or deny enemy intentions. It serves to focus attention on areas where the enemy must appear for a particular course of action. NAIs provide an objective basis for the employment of intelligence gathering assets.

**national contingent**

National forces of one or more Services including civilian personnel, under the command of a single national commander, which are committed to United Nations or other internationally organised operations.

**notice to executive (x)**

1. A term used at the strategic level to advise the time from the issue of an authorisation to deploy outside Australia to when allocated ADF elements can be expected to conduct operations at (x), a specified geographic location. Notice to Execute (x) is used for:
  - a. strategic planning—to advise Government when the ADF can be expected to commence operations; and
  - b. to provide strategic guidance for Commander Australian Theatre to make the necessary operational preparations.
  - c. If an operation involves more than one task, a specific Notice to Execute may be directed for each task. Notice to Execute (x) will be based on the prevailing strategic objectives, and may be adjusted as a contingency develops. Notice to Execute is not used at the operational or tactical levels.

**observer mission**

A group of military and/or civilian personnel with supporting elements established by a United Nations mandate to supervise and/or observe and report on the observance of a truce or other agreement.

**operation**

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

**operational command**

This is the highest degree of authority which can be assigned to the commander of a joint force operation and is usually retained for the duration of the operation or campaign. It would be normal for the national military strategic authority to place assigned forces under operational command of a national commander who will then have the requisite authority to assign, deploy or reassign forces. For ADF operations, operational command may be delegated to a subordinate commander and will normally include responsibility for administration and logistics.

**operational control**

This degree of command gives a nominated commander the authority to direct forces assigned to achieve a specific mission within agreed limitations, usually related to function, time or location. The commander may delegate operational and tactical control to another commander but does not have the authority to assign separate employment to components of the formation or units concerned. It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics.

**operational instruction**

An operation instruction indicates the commander's intention and possibly the overall plan but leaves the detailed course of action to the subordinate commander.

**operational level of conflict**

The operational level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

**operational objectives**

These are the objectives that need to be achieved in the campaign to reach the military strategic end-state. Correct assessment of operational objectives is crucial to success at the operational level.

**operation order**

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

**operation plan**

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

**peace enforcement**

Peace enforcement is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security actions by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents, at least one of whom does not consent to that intervention.

**peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping is a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy where a legitimate force, which may comprise civil and military elements, is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties in an impartial, non-combatant manner, to implement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid operations.

**peacemaking**

Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under chapter VI of the UN Charter.

**peace operations**

Peace operations encompass all types of operations designed to assist a diplomatic peace process.

**supporting plan**

A plan, complementing the main plan, which provides detailed information concerning specialised and discrete aspects of an operation. Supporting plans may cover areas such as communications, electronic warfare, movement, administration, public information, intelligence collection, etc. Subordinate formation or unit plans may also be incorporated as supporting plans.

**tactical command**

This degree of command allows a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. The commander may delegate tactical control of the asset.

**tactical control**

A force assigned to a commander under tactical control allows local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplished missions or tasks as directed by the assigning higher commander.

**target area of interest**

A TAI is an area where a commander can influence the battle by destroying, delaying or disrupting the enemy.

**warning order**

A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow.



## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABCA	American, British, Canadian and Australian (Armies)
ACAMS	ANZUS Crisis Action Management System
ACP	Australian Contingency Plan
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFCC	Australian Defence Force Command Centre
ADFCPMG	Australian Defence Force Collection Planning Management Group
ADHQ	Australian Defence Headquarters
admininst	administrative instruction
adminord	administrative order
A-G	Attorney-General's Department
ALERTO	alert order
AME	aeromedical evacuation
AMPD	ANZUS Military Policy Document
ANZCP	Australia–New Zealand Combined Plan
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
AO	area of operations
AOP	Australian Defence Force Operational Plan
APM	ANZUS Planning Manual
AS	Australia
ASA	Australian Support Area
ASC	Australian Contingent (used in a United Nations context)
ASCC	Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee
ASCRP	Australian Contingent Reconnaissance Party
ASLEG	Assistant Secretary Legal (Department of Defence)
ASP	Australian Strategic Plan
ASSPP	Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy Planning (Department of Defence)
AUSMIMPS	Australian Standard Materiel Issue and Movement Priority System
C2	command and control
CABSUB	Cabinet Submission
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirements
C3	command, control and communications
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CEOI	Communications Electronic Operating Instructions
CFC	combined forces commander
CFHQ	combined force headquarters
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
COMASC	Commander Australian Contingent (used in a United Nations context)
COMASCRP	Commander Australian Contingent Reconnaissance Party
COMNORCOM	Commander Northern Command
COSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
COMDSF	Commander Special Forces
CPG	commander's planning group
DA	Defence Attache/Defence Adviser
DDIO	Director Defence Intelligence Organisation
DEFCOMNET	Defence Communications Network
DEPSEC S&I	Deputy Secretary Strategic and Intelligence
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFLO	Defence Force liaison officer
DGDFLS	Director-General Defence Force Legal Services
DGIO	Director-General Intelligence Operations
DGJOP	Director-General Joint Operations and Plans
DGMS	Director-General Military Strategy
DGPI	Director-General Public Information
DGSC	Director-General Service Conditions
DIO	Defence-Intelligence Organisation
DJLOP	Director Joint Logistics Operations and Plans
DJOPS	Director Joint Operations

DJP	Director Joint Plans
DPT	decision point
DOD	Department of Defence
DSO	decision support overlay
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
EA	engagement areas
EAA	evacuee assembly area
EHC	evacuee handling centre
EMA	Emergency Management Australia
EW	electronic warfare
EXECUTEO	execute order
FEG	force element group
FMB	forward mounting base
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
HIP	Head, International Policy Division
HRFP	Head Resource and Financial Programs
HDPE	Head Defence Personnel Executive
HOM	Head of Mission
HQ1JMOVGP	Headquarters 1 Joint Movements Group
HQASC	Headquarters Australian Contingent
HSCD	Head Strategic Command Division
HSPP	Head Strategic Policy and Plans Division
HQNORCOM	Headquarters Northern Command
HQSO	Headquarters Special Operations
IDC	Interdepartmental Committee
IDETF	Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force
IO	Information Operations
IPDIV	International Policy Division
ISP	intelligence support plan
J	When prefixed to an abbreviation generally indicates 'joint'
JEPG	Joint Exercise Planning Group
JEWCC	joint electronic warfare coordination centre
JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
JF	joint force
JFAO	joint force area of operations
JFC	joint force commander(s)
JFHQ	joint force headquarters
JHPG	joint health planning group
JIS	joint intelligence staff
JMAP	joint military appreciation process
JMCC	joint movement coordination centre
JOC	joint operations centre
JSLPC	joint services local planning committee
LO	liaison officer
LOAC	Law of armed conflict
LofC	lines of communication
MGI	Military Geographic Information
mil	military
MILREPS	ANZUS military representatives
MINDEF	Minister for Defence
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
MSO	military support operations
MSPG	Military Strategic Planning Guidance
NAI	named area of interest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATPOL	national policy

NCA	national command authority(ies)
NCMM	National Crisis Management Machinery
NGS	naval gunfire support
NSCC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
NTM	notice to move
ONA	Office of National Assessments
OPCOMD	operational command
OPCON	operational control
opconcepts	operational concepts
OPSDIV	Operations Division
OPINST	operation instruction
OPPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
ORBAT	order of battle
PI	public information
PM&C	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
POE	point of entry
PR	public relations
RFPDIV	Resources and Financial Programs Division
ROE	rules of engagement
SAE	Services assisted evacuation
SASR	Special Air Service Regiment
SCG	Strategic Command Group
SCNS	Secretaries Committee on National Security
SF	special forces
SG	Secretary General (United Nations)
SHO	senior health officer
SIPG	Strategic Intelligence Planning Group
SLPG	Strategic Logistics Planning Group
SME	Strategic Military Estimate
SOFA	status of forces agreement
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
SOP	standing operating procedures
SPCG	Strategic Policy Coordination Group
SPE	Services protected evacuation
STRAPP	Strategic Planning Process
SWG	Strategic Watch Group
TACOMD	tactical command
TAI	target area of interest
TACON	tactical control
TLPG	Theatre Logistics Planning Group
TIPG	Theatre Intelligence Planning Group
TPG	Theatre Planning Group
UN	United Nations
UNF	United Nations Force
UNFC	United Nations Force Commander
UNFCE	United Nations Force Communications Element
UNFOS	United Nations Field Operations Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNMOG	United Nations Military Observer Group
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
VCDF	Vice Chief of the Defence Force
WNGO	warning order

