AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
DOCTRINE PUBLICATION

ADDP–D

FOUNDATIONS OF AUSTRALIAN
MILITARY DOCTRINE
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INTRODUCTION BY
THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

The Australian Defence Force (ADF), like all other quality defence forces, recognises the importance of doctrine. We have over the years produced a range of publications covering both joint and single-service matters. This first edition of ADDP–D represents another evolution in our overall approach. ADDP–D will be frequently reviewed, to ensure that future editions continue to reflect a precise treatment of our strategic doctrine.

It is important for all officers to be clear as to what doctrine is and what it is not. Doctrine provides the glue that builds internal cohesion within our defence force about the way that we intend things should work. It provides an infrastructure around which organisational confidence can be built. We must appreciate that success in war is created by our ability to master ambiguity, deal with uncertainty, and apply our combat power in the best possible way.

Doctrine is not a statement of official Government policy. Strategic guidance is not a substitute for doctrine. Doctrine is a description of how we, within the ADF, think about the application of force in our nation's interests. We do not seek to be prescriptive in stating our doctrine. Rather our doctrine is an attempt to state our philosophy of how to approach a given set of circumstances. It is both a statement of our collective experiences and a cautious judgment about how we might consider future battlefields.

It is the intellectual and professional resources, which we apply to a given set of circumstances, which are defined from time to time by the Government of the day. Doctrine is a dynamic process and based on professional experience and judgment. Its application must be tailored to a given situation or event.

For these reasons, all military commanders need to be familiar with their relevant doctrine. However given the foundational nature of ADDP–D, I expect that all ADF commanders will acquaint themselves with the content of this publication.

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Chief of the Defence Force

Australian Defence Headquarters
CANBERRA ACT 2600

September 2002
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Military Strategy Branch acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of overseas military doctrinal publications, including:

‘British Defence Doctrine’ (JWP 0–01), Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom, 1997.


‘Warfighting’ (MCDP 1), United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., USA, 1997

Readers wishing to comment on this publication, or make suggestions for improvement in future editions, are invited to write to:

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE

- Doctrine as a body of thought on the nature, role and conduct of conflict.
- Hierarchy of doctrine within the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- Organisation of doctrine along the functional staff system.
- Periodic review of doctrine, in line with change within the ADF.

Introduction

1.1 *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* Distribution of Defence Records Management Policy Manual, 3rd Edition outlines the strategic military doctrine of the ADF. It provides strategic guidance for the development and employment of ADF capability, including the development and application of subordinate doctrine. Although written from a strategic perspective, this publication provides professional military guidance to the planning and execution of ADF operations at all levels.

1.2 This publication also describes the relationship between national policy and ADF operations with regard to:

- national security and strategic policy issues applicable to Australia;
- the nature of international conflict, and the application of armed force in international affairs; and
- the constitutional, political, legal, and administrative contexts and arrangements within which, and under which, Australia may use armed force.

Concept and role of military doctrine

1.3 Military doctrine is the body of thought on the nature, role and conduct of armed conflict. This body of thought contains, among other things, the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.

1.4 These principles are not immutable. They are based on experience and reasoned extrapolation to provide guidance for the present and future conduct of operations. Military doctrine is distilled from the history of countless skirmishes, raids, battles, campaigns and wars and, in particular,
from the lessons derived from victories, defeats and stalemates. Doctrine is developed in the context of contemporary and emerging factors that influence the way Australia intends to use military force. These factors include the impact of political, economic and social change and, in particular, the impact of new technology and the likely application of technology to the future conduct of warfare.

1.5 As general principles, they have wide application across time and space, and across different political, cultural, and technological settings. They need, however, to be applied intelligently rather than unthinkingly. While much of doctrine is enduring, it must be periodically reviewed and, where necessary, modified and refined to ensure continuing relevance.

1.6 Military doctrine helps planners and commanders approach stressful, dangerous, chaotic and unfamiliar situations with a clarity of thought based on rigorous analysis, and comprehensive knowledge of hard-won lessons from human history and national military experience. Doctrine also provides an analytical framework and consistent way of thinking about military issues across the whole speciality and rank spectrums, across all components of the ADF, and all levels of conflict.

1.7 Military doctrine at the strategic level of warfare needs to be distinguished from the related concepts of ‘strategic policy’ and ‘military strategy’:

- Strategic policy is a course or principles of action planned or pursued by government to safeguard or promote perceived national security and strategic interests;

- Military strategy is a course of actions resulting from the interplay of strategic policy and the situation at hand. Such strategies are planned or pursued by military and defence professionals, at the direction of government, to give effect to the warfighting aspects of strategic policy; and

- Military doctrine at the strategic level of warfare is a body of thought on the conduct of military operations that contributes to the development of both strategic policy and military strategy.

1.8 *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* is the capstone doctrine publication of the ADF. It is the authoritative source from which all other ADF doctrine is derived. All joint and single-Service doctrine is to be consistent with the doctrine contained in this publication.
Hierarchy of Australian Doctrine Publications

1.9  *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* sits at the apex of two separate sets of doctrinal publications:

- Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP)\(^1\); and
- Single-Service doctrine publications.

1.10 ADDP are developed under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) for use throughout the ADF. The CDF may delegate sponsorship and approval of various ADDP to other commanders or principal staff officers. ADDP cover the conduct of joint operations by the ADF, or otherwise deal with issues from an ADF-wide perspective.

1.11 ADDP are broadly classified along functional lines according to the Common Joint Staff System used by the ADF. They are arranged in a hierarchy based on three tiers:

- capstone doctrine (ADDP D—*Doctrine*);
- keystone doctrine (key doctrine publications within each functional stream); and
- other joint (application) doctrine.

1.12 Further details of the hierarchy of ADDP appear in annex A of this publication.

1.13 Single-Service doctrine publications are developed by and for the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where applicable, these publications cover the strategic, operational and tactical levels of military operations from a single-Service perspective. All single-Service doctrine publications on individual topics relate to the relevant keystone single-Service doctrine publication, and through them to *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*.

1.14 Defence may also publish a body of doctrine work outside of either of these series. Such publications would be aimed at an external (ie non-Defence) readership, and provide treatment of doctrine issues at a philosophical level.

\(^1\) Subordinate to these ADDP, the ADF also has a number of ADFP which are procedural manuals. Although these manuals are not to be considered ‘doctrinal’, they do support the application of doctrine as they detail the tactics, techniques and technical procedures to be followed by commanders and their staffs for specific functions and operations.
Periodic review of *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*

1.15 Strategic doctrine is intended to be robust, and should require only incremental change over time. However, it will be important to review this document periodically given its position as the capstone doctrine publication for the ADF.

1.16 Amendment of this publication may be necessary to:

- take into account changes in military doctrine arising from new experience, new technology, new organisation, or new conceptual thinking, especially as it relates to concepts for future warfare;
- change the level of doctrinal coverage of different issues, in response to changes in strategic policy; and
- update sections dealing with related issues; for example, changes in institutional and administrative arrangements.

1.17 Military Strategy Branch, (Policy, Guidance and Analysis Division) in Australian Defence Headquarters is responsible for reviewing *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* as often as necessary, and normally at least every three years.
CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER

- National Security and scope of potential military and non-military threats.
- Elements of national power.
- The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and strategic policy.
- Military strategy objectives and military response options.

Introduction

2.1 Every nation-state has fundamental and enduring security interests that it seeks to protect and promote. This chapter outlines the main features of Australia’s strategic policy in support of its security interests, and how the ADF contributes to the achievement of Australia’s strategic policy objectives.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
AUSTRALIA’s INVOLVEMENT IN UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY—CAMBODIA

Australian involvement in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) grew out of a decade of intense international diplomatic activity in trying to restore representative government in Cambodia. The Australian proposal to establish a United Nations (UN) transitional authority in Cambodia was a key ingredient in allowing a peace settlement acceptable to all factions to occur.

UNTAC was given a daunting task. This was to verify the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia; to disarm, demobilise and canton Cambodian factional forces; and monitor the agreed ceasefire. UNTAC temporarily also took over many key areas of civil administration, supervised the return and resettlement of refugees, and the conduct of national elections. The military component was commanded by an Australian, Lieutenant General John Sanderson, and comprised command of 16 000 drawn from thirty-four national contingents.
2.2 Australia’s overriding national security interests are to safeguard the physical security of Australia and the Australian people, and to preserve Australia’s capacity for independent decision-making as a sovereign state.

2.3 The protection of Australia’s national security interests is a matter of national policy, not just defence policy, and requires the application of a whole-of-nation and whole-of-government approach to national security.

2.4 A fundamental role of the Australian Government is to ensure the protection of Australia’s:

- territory, airspace, territorial seas, and maritime resource zones;
- citizens; and
- national and international political and economic interests.

2.5 This role requires protection against both military and non-military threats to national security:

- Military threats are those that might be posed by the military forces of other nation-states. These threats may be direct, for example, the threat or use of armed force on Australian shipping, aircraft, territory...

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(contd)

The role of the military component changed during the Mission from the demobilising task to provision of security for the electoral process. As commander of the military component, General Sanderson contended with many problems, including inadequate coordination between the civil and military components of UNTAC, and the widely varying capacities of the various military contingents.

The UNTAC commitment demonstrated the ADF’s ability to play a leading role in UN peacekeeping operations, and demonstrated Australia’s ability to influence regional developments in ways that promote regional peace and stability. The commitment also illustrates how Australia’s military capability and political and diplomatic efforts work together to achieve outcomes that promote and protect Australia’s security interests.
or population centres. Military threats may also be indirect, for example, the commitment of military acts of aggression in other parts of the world that put global security, or Australia’s regional security environment, at risk.

- Non-military threats are those that might be posed by other than the military forces of other nation-states. These threats cover a very broad range of possible occurrences, including deliberate disruption of Australia’s economic activity, especially of its international trade; illegal immigration; influx of refugees; externally-induced environmental degradation. Other threats include pandemics; threats to primary industries from imported animal and plant diseases; illegal fishing; international sabotage of the national information infrastructure; and transnational crime such as narcotics, weapons, and people smuggling.

2.6 The role of the ADF relates primarily to military threats to national security. Australia has a range of non-military agencies and policies to deal with non-military threats. However, non-military threats can also impact the ADF significantly, through the requirement in some cases for the ADF to provide capabilities in support of the civil authorities. The ADF thus has an important role to play in ensuring national security—a role that, in practice, goes well beyond its core requirement to deter or defeat armed attack against Australia or its interests.

Figure 2–1: The submarine capability provides deterrence

2.7 Australia’s security interests and responsibilities are global in scope. Australia is part of an increasingly interconnected international political and economic system, and has a strong interest in ensuring that this system
functions effectively. Australia has a long-standing commitment to international collective security, as evidenced by its involvement many times since Federation in multilateral institutions and measures to promote international security and peace, and to provide humanitarian assistance in times of disaster.

2.8 Notwithstanding the global scope of Australia’s security interests and responsibilities, there is a strong geographical focus to Australia’s security activities. In this regard, Australia’s economic and security interests are closely related. The Government’s *Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, In the National Interest, states that: ‘Australia’s national security and its economic interests are inextricably linked to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region’.

**Elements of national power**

2.9 The essence of national power is for a country to maximise the ability to pursue its national objectives without external constraints, and especially, coercion.

2.10 This ability rests on certain factors, or ‘elements’ of national power. The main such elements are:

- Demographic factors, in particular, size of population.\(^2\)
- Geographic factors, in particular, size, geo-strategic location, and terrain.\(^3\)
- Natural resource base.\(^4\)
- Physical infrastructure.
- Level of industrial and commercial development, including international trade and investment.
- Educational, scientific and technical capacity.
- Societal cohesion and culture.\(^5\)

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2 Demographic factors, other than size, include age distribution, health, and education and employment levels.

3 Other factors include access to the sea, susceptibility to natural disaster, abundance and security of water supplies, and ability of the land to support economic activity.

4 In particular, the scale, diversity, and commercial and strategic value of natural resource endowments, and the level of economic exploitation of the natural resource base.
Chapter 2

- Political leadership and international relations.
- Military capabilities.

2.11 A nation’s overall power is not merely the sum of the individual elements of its power. National power also depends on the particular combination of elements available, and on a nation’s ability to mobilise and integrate these elements within a coherent national strategy to support its national security interests. For example, a country’s military capabilities may be enhanced greatly by the presence of good physical infrastructure, a strong industrial and scientific base to support its armed forces, and by appropriate national policies to realise these inherent advantages.

2.12 Conversely, the absence of some elements may seriously weaken a country overall. History abounds with examples of countries which were well endowed with population, land, and natural resources, but which were weak overall because of a poorly developed economic system and a corrupt or ineffectual government.

2.13 Based on even the most cursory survey of history and contemporary international relations, an effective military capability is an indispensable element of national power.

AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC POLICY

2.14 Australia’s strategic policy is not part of Australia’s military doctrine per se. However, military doctrine influences the development, interpretation and implementation of strategic policy. Moreover, Australia’s strategic policy represents the policy context in which Australia’s military doctrine will be applied. It is therefore useful to survey Australia’s strategic policy in this publication.

Australia’s basic strategic aim and objectives

2.15 Australia’s strategic policy is aimed principally at preventing or terminating coercion or armed attack against Australia and its interests. The policy is not aimed at meeting any particular threat or contingency, but rather at addressing the enduring fundamentals of our strategic situation. The policy focuses on the region of greatest strategic interest to Australia, the Asia-Pacific region.

5 Cohesion does not necessarily imply ethnic homogeneity. A state may be ethnically diverse yet, socially, be strongly cohesive.

6 This section draws heavily on, and includes several direct quotations from, the Government’s Defence White Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000.
2.16 In line with the basic aim of its strategic policy, Australia’s key long-term strategic objectives are:

- first, and most importantly, to ensure the defence of Australia and its direct approaches;
- second, to foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood;
- third, to work with others to promote stability and cooperation in South-East Asia;
- fourth, to contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region; and
- fifth, to contribute to the efforts of the international community, especially the UN, to uphold global security.

**Key factors in Australia’s strategic environment**

2.17 A country’s strategic environment has a powerful influence on that country’s strategic policy. In the case of Australia, some of the key factors in its strategic environment are:

- Globalisation and the strategic primacy of the United States. These two interrelated trends will help strengthen global security and promote economic, social and political developments that align with Australia’s interests and values.
- A more active and effective security role by the UN.
- The critical importance to security of the Asia-Pacific region of the relationships between its major powers—China, Japan, India, Russia and the United States.
- The political and social evolution in South-East Asia that is strengthening the robustness, legitimacy and resilience of the political systems in many countries.
- The large economic and structural challenges faced by countries in our immediate region—Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the island states of the South West Pacific.
- The security that derives from our geography, good relations with neighbours, the low prospects of interstate conflicts within our region, our strong armed forces and a close alliance with the United States.
The development of military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region which, in recent times has seen the fastest growth of military capabilities in the world.

Strategic relationships to support Australia's interests

2.18 As an important part of its strategic policy, Australia seeks opportunities to influence the regional environment in ways that reduce the risks of armed attack on Australia. This influence is achieved through a number of bilateral relationships and multilateral frameworks.

Figure 2–2: Exercises such as Tandem Thrust provide an opportunity to exercise strategic relationships and interoperability issues with allies and regional partners

2.19 Among the more important of these relationships and frameworks are:

- Australia’s strong alliance with the United States. This relationship is a key strategic asset that supports our bilateral, regional and global interests.

- In the wider Asia-Pacific region, bilateral dialogues with key countries in the region and contributing to the development of multilateral security forums.

- In our immediate neighbourhood, working with the Indonesian Government to establish a renewed bilateral defence relationship, and building a defence relationship with East Timor.
• Our close alliance relationship with New Zealand.

• Our defence partnerships with Papua New Guinea and other countries in the South West Pacific region.

• Bilateral defence relationships with selected countries outside the Asia-Pacific region. Australia maintains valuable defence links with a number of NATO member states and Commonwealth countries. These relationships are strategic assets to Australia. In particular, the defence relationships with the United Kingdom and Canada have strong historic links and remain of significant contemporary relevance to Australia.

THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE AND STRATEGIC POLICY

Australian Defence Force as the provider of military power

2.20 Australia pursues its strategic policy objectives by a combination of military and non-military means. The principal non-military means for contributing to strategic policy objectives is international diplomacy. For example, in recent years, Australia has been in the forefront of international diplomatic efforts to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, Australia has actively supported efforts to promote good governance within the region, and in so doing has contributed to regional stability and security.

2.21 The ADF provides the military means by which Australia pursues its strategic policy objectives. The size, disposition, capabilities and activities of the ADF should therefore be consistent with the objectives and priorities of Australia’s strategic policy.

How the Australian Defence Force supports strategic policy

2.22 Defence has a military strategy that sets out the ways the Government can employ the ADF to achieve national security objectives. Australia’s Military Strategy is divided into strategic tasks, which describe the military contribution to dealing with a wide range of threats in peace and war.

7 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
2.23 The basic strategic tasks that the Government could require the ADF to undertake to support national strategic policy, are:

- **Defending Australia and its direct approaches.** Australia’s most important strategic objective is the ability to defend its territory from direct military attack. This task aims to ensure that Australia possesses the military and broader Defence capabilities to prevent or, if necessary, defeat an adversary attacking our nation; or attempting to extract political concessions from the Government through the use, or threatened use, of military force. The ADF’s approach to this task is shaped by the following principles. 8

- **Self reliance.** The ADF needs, if necessary, to be able to defend Australia without relying upon the combat forces of other countries.

- **A maritime strategy.** In the event of an attack, it will be vital for the ADF to control the air and sea approaches to Australia.

- **Proactive operations.** The ADF would seek to attack hostile forces as far as possible from Australian shores (including home bases, forward operating bases and in transit).

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Contributing to the security of the immediate neighbourhood. Australia’s security from armed attack largely depends on the security situation in its immediate neighbourhood and in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, Australia would desire to be in a position, if asked, to help our neighbours defend themselves against unprovoked armed aggression, or other challenges to their stability.

Supporting wider interests. Notwithstanding its strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region, Australia also has clear strategic interests at the global level. Foremost among these is Australia’s responsibility to support the UN as the world’s prime mechanism for ensuring global collective security. Australia has a strong interest in being able to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood where our interests are engaged.

Peacetime National Tasks. There is a broad range of peacetime activities that may be directed by government as being in the national interest, including ADF participation in international peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations; evacuation of Australian citizens abroad; counter-terrorist operations; and maritime surveillance and response operations. The military strategy, Peacetime National Tasks, covers these.

The theme of Australia’s Military Strategy may be summarised as ‘shape, deter, respond’. This military strategic approach calls for the Defence Organisation to strike a balance across a range of separate but complementary considerations:

- shaping Australia’s strategic environment to minimise threats to Australia and its interests, and to promote an environment consistent with Australia’s interests;
- deterring through the international recognition of the ADF’s ability competently to defend Australia; and
- responding appropriately to military threats against Australia.

Each of the foregoing military strategies includes a series of military response options (MRO). These MRO are generic joint tasks that the ADF may conceivably perform to achieve associated military strategic objectives (MSO), which are the desired military outcomes. The MSO and MRO together provide the basis for operational planning. The MRO are a critical element of the deliberate planning process at both the strategic and operational levels, and are used to inform the immediate planning process.  

9 The planning process is explained further in chapter 7.
Spectrum of potential military operations

2.26 The Government could call upon the ADF to undertake a wide variety of generic tasks within the foregoing military strategic framework. These tasks, roughly in escalating levels of potential seriousness, conceivably include:

- search and rescue operations;
- natural disaster relief, either in Australia or overseas;
- enforcement of Commonwealth fisheries, immigration, quarantine and customs laws in Australia’s maritime approaches;
- Defence Force aid to the civil power, including restoration of public order or counter-terrorist activities;
- enforcement of economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed by the UN, for example, naval or air blockade;
- evacuation of Australian nationals and nationals of third party countries, from a foreign country, with or without the support and assistance of that foreign country, and perhaps during a civil war or other form of civil disorder;
- participation in and, in some cases, leading multinational peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, especially UN peace operations;
- support to a democratic regional government, at the request of such a government, threatened by anti-democratic forces or widespread breakdown of law and order.
- in extreme circumstances, unilateral intervention for humanitarian purposes;
- participation in coalition operations in regional conflicts;
- defence of Australian sovereignty against direct military threat or attack; and
- participation in general war, especially one involving Australia’s national survival.
Figure 2–4: RAN boarding operations in the Gulf demonstrate a flexible response to global commitments

2.27 The ADF needs to be able to make an effective contribution to all of these potential tasks and in some cases, such as defeating attacks on Australia or its interests, make the decisive contribution.
CHAPTER 3

CONFLICT AND WAR

- Concepts of conflict and war.
- Spectrum and levels of conflict.
- Practical, legal, moral and political limitations to conflict.

Introduction

3.1 Before considering how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) might go about undertaking the various tasks it may be called upon by government to do, it is useful to consider, at least in a general way, the nature of conflict and war.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF CONFLICT

Meaning of ‘conflict’ and ‘war’

3.2 The words ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ relate to similar and overlapping concepts. Both words can describe either a state of affairs or a series of events. The common denominator in both cases is that these words have to do with a struggle—often protracted and usually violent—between two opposing wills.

3.3 There are stages and levels of conflict, and the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ do not adequately reflect the full range of possible stages or activities. The word ‘war’ also has both a formal, legal meaning in international law, and a popular, non-technical meaning. Customary international law recognises a distinction between a legal state of war and a material war. A war in the legal sense is a conflict involving a formal declaration of war by the parties.\(^1\) As the Geneva Conventions in particular note, a war in the material or non-legal

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\(^1\) Since the initial signing of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 no nation-states have formally declared war on each other. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the Charter of the UN recognises the inherent right of a nation-state to self-defence, without a formal declaration of war. Second, formal declarations of war affect the legal and commercial relationships between belligerent states and neutral states, and may also complicate political relations between them. And third, a formal declaration of war may escalate a conflict beyond what either party wants, and may make the ultimate transition from hostilities to peace all the more difficult to achieve.
sense is any armed conflict, even if involving no formal declaration of war, where there is a clash of arms between opposing forces. That is, the existence of war is a question of fact, not of law.

3.4 In this document, the word ‘war’, where it occurs, is used in its non-legal sense unless otherwise indicated. The terms ‘conflict’, ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’ are used interchangeably in common usage, and this document likewise uses them interchangeably. The common element in all three terms is the threat or use of armed hostilities as a means of resolving a dispute.

Spectrum of conflict

3.5 The Spectrum of conflict refers to the variety of actions in which a military force may be engaged, ranging from general war, to some peacetime national tasks. These can be divided into two broad categories, based on the level and types of threat faced.

- Warlike operations are those military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives, and there is an expectation of casualties. Warlike operations can include service in a declared war, service in conventional combat operations against an armed adversary and peace enforcement operations, normally conducted under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

- Non-warlike operations are those military activities that are short of warlike, and where the application of force is limited to self defence. Casualties could occur but are not expected. Non-warlike operations can include hazardous duties such as bomb disposal, mine clearance and peacekeeping duties, normally conducted under chapter VI of the UN Charter.
3.6 Because of the broad range of conflicts throughout history, it is useful to further differentiate some of their main types. These are:

- **General war.** This term is used to cover war between major powers, and involving major clashes of interest. The survival of nations, nation-states, or empires may be at stake. World Wars I and II are the classic examples. General war does not mean universal war, but it does mean widespread war, having implications for combatant nations and non-combatants alike. It is sometimes referred to as ‘total war’ in the sense that combatant nations place themselves on a war footing, and subordinate all other interests to the successful prosecution of the war.

- **Limited conflict.** This term is used to describe a conflict where one or more of the combatants involved are constrained in their employment of force. Such constraints may be strategic, geographical, technological or in the weapons or tactics used, and may stem from legal, political or moral bases. The UN actions in Korea and Iraq-Kuwait are examples.

- **Regional conflict.** This term is used to describe a conflict that is localised to a particular geographic region but is not usually otherwise constrained. The causes of the war usually have to do with regional issues. A regional war may nevertheless have implications beyond the
immediate region, and may involve extra-regional powers, especially by means of political, intelligence, or logistical support, and in some cases by the provision of forces as advisers or to engage in combat. The Indo-Pakistan wars, and the various wars that have been fought in the Middle East since the end of World War II, are examples.

- **Civil war.** A civil war is a conflict between citizens of the same country to resolve some major issue of governance within that country. It usually involves a violent contest for political control of that country, and may involve some participation by other countries assisting one or other of the belligerent parties.

### Phases of conflict

**3.7** The various forms of conflict have an important time dimension, which may be thought of as a continuum extending from:

- A pre-conflict phase, characterised by tension, and perhaps sporadic incidents of violence; to
- A conflict phase, characterised by the application of armed force by the parties in dispute; through to
- A post-conflict phase, being the resolution, or at least the aftermath, of the conflict.

**3.8** At each phase, there are important strategic-level management issues involving:

- the threat of applying armed force and the mobilisation of defence resources, during the pre-conflict phase;
- the application of armed force during the conflict phase; and
- the end-state desired, the cessation of armed force, redeployment of forces and the demobilisation of defence resources, during the post-conflict phase.

### Levels of conflict

**3.9** Armed conflict is generally regarded as being conducted at three different levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.
3.10 **Strategic level of war.** The word ‘strategy’ comes from the Greek word strategia, meaning generalship. The strategic level of war has to do with the overall direction of the war effort, and with the overarching political objective of the conflict. This level of war is sometimes further broken down to ‘national strategic’ and ‘military strategic’.

- The term ‘national strategic’ refers to the political dimension of the conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to support the war effort. The political dimension relates both to the desired political end-state, and to domestic considerations enabling the conduct of hostilities.

- The term ‘military strategic’ refers to the military planning and direction of the conflict at the macro level, that is, setting the desired military end-state and the broad military approach to achieving that end-state.

![Figure 3–2: MAJGEN Cosgrove with INTERFET troops in East Timor](image)

3.11 **Operational level of war.** This level has to do with the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic-level objectives. This level of war is invariably under the command of a joint force commander. Operations could involve the ADF alone, or the ADF and the forces of other countries in allied or coalition operations. The operational level of war is the link between the strategic and tactical levels of war.
3.12 **Tactical level of war.** This has to do with the planning and conduct of battles and engagements that are sub-sets of a military campaign.

3.13 While this categorisation of armed conflict according to the different levels at which it is conducted is a useful analytical and control device, in practice the distinctions may be somewhat blurred. For example:

- a particular battle may be so critical to a campaign, and the campaign so critical to the war aim, that the battle may involve a merging of the different levels of conflict, reflecting the strategic implications of even tactical-level engagements; and

- the impact of pervasive media attention may turn a tactical action into a strategic outcome.

**Limits of conflict**

3.14 Although conflict is a violent clash of wills, its conduct is invariably subject to limits. These limits may be:

- **Practical.** Hostilities may be limited by the equipment and the respective military capabilities of the belligerents, by the cost of war, and by problems of distance, climate, weather, terrain and oceanography in conducting operations.

- **Legal.** In practice, armed conflict is limited by the requirements of international law and of the international conventions on the conduct of armed conflict (see chapter 6—‘Applying Military Power: Legal and Public Policy Aspects’). The principal requirement is that armed conflict should only be in self-defence, or where authorised by the United Nations Security Council as a means necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

- **Moral.** These considerations are now largely absorbed into the international law applicable to armed conflict. Other considerations may be agreement by the belligerents to observe geographic limits of hostilities, and mutual restrictions on targeting.

- **Political.** These could include awareness by the belligerents of their mutual need to conduct political relations beyond the present hostilities. In the case of a coalition arrangement, political considerations are governed by what is mutually acceptable to all coalition partners.
3.15 The foregoing considerations could circumscribe the political aims of a conflict, the intensity of combat operations, the geographic extent of military actions, the duration of hostilities, and the kinds of military operations conducted.

### NATURE OF CONFLICT

**Introduction**

3.16 Modern warfare is continually changing as technological developments transform the ways that wars are fought, and might be fought in future. The changes in technology affect the weapons of war and also the general conditions in society under which a war is fought. These societal conditions include the state of a society’s transport, communications, health, and education systems, and also the role of the mass media. The political environment—whether domestic, regional, or global—in which wars are fought, is also changing continuously over time.

3.17 But some aspects of warfare are constant in that many of the generic causes of war are as old as history itself. Moreover, warfare always requires the application of planning, military skills, organisation, communication, logistic support, leadership and courage. And warfare still invariably involves terror, violence, chaos, suffering, social and economic dislocation, and destruction of life and property.

**Friction**

3.18 Friction in armed conflict is the difficulty that arises in trying to accomplish military tasks. It is a feature of warfare that is both pervasive and serious. Friction is the accumulation of physical and psychological factors that cause operational plans to go awry. No amount of training or planning can eliminate friction entirely. Military operations may be hampered by:

- factors external to a fighting force, for example, enemy resistance, harsh terrain, harsh climatic conditions, unfavourable weather, and excessively restrictive rules of engagement; or by
- factors internal to a fighting force, for example, fear, exhaustion, indecision, misunderstanding, internal rivalries, dilatoriness, incompetence, or poor planning or training.
Since friction is an inevitable, indeed integral, part of warfare, a fighting force must recognise and accommodate it. A fighting force can reduce friction arising from internal sources, especially by the use of simple, flexible, clearly communicated plans; by good discipline, leadership and morale; and by proper attention to administrative and logistic support arrangements. A fighting force must seek to overcome friction arising from external sources by persistence, perseverance and flexibility.

Uncertainty

In armed conflict, uncertainty, disorder and disharmony are pervasive features. The lack of accurate or timely information, or the presence of wrong or contradictory information, creates what has been described as the ‘fog of war’.

A degree of uncertainty is inevitable in warfare. However, a fighting force can reduce the level of uncertainty, or at least accommodate the uncertainty, under which it operates by:

- acknowledging that some of the intelligence required to plan and operate may not exist, may be unobtainable, or may be unobtainable in time;
- using simple and flexible plans, including contingency plans;
having clear command and control arrangements;

• fostering initiative and mutual support at all rank levels; and

• improving surveillance, intelligence, and communications systems.

3.22 A fighting force that is creative, flexible, and decisive can also exploit opportunities that arise from its adversary’s own experience of uncertainty.

Violence and danger

3.23 The nature of armed conflict is such that it inevitably results in fear, trauma, injury and death. Armed conflict also usually results in destruction of physical assets, disruption and distortion of normal economic activity, degradation of the physical environment, dislocation of populations, and severe political and social stresses. These considerations are powerful arguments for the avoidance of armed conflict where possible, and powerful tools for imposing Australia’s will where conflict cannot be avoided.

3.24 However, where armed conflict does occur, these same considerations are also powerful arguments for the importance of fostering and maintaining effective leadership, good discipline, high morale, strong group cohesion, and realistic training. A force that does this will be better equipped to withstand the inevitable dangers and pressures.

Changing nature of conflict

3.25 While the factors listed above are likely to be enduring and universal features of conflict, other aspects are subject to change over time.

3.26 During the 20th Century, the world has experienced the full spectrum of conflict. When the bipolar Cold War ended in the 1990s, the global political situation became more fluid and complex. The threat of nuclear annihilation receded, while the prevalence of regional wars, and especially religious and ethnic wars, increased. Over the same period, the mixed economic performance of many countries, and the ongoing development (but uneven spread, of) technology, complicated the regional and global strategic situations even further.

3.27 Cumulatively, these developments suggest that conflict in the 21st Century will be no less wide-ranging.
3.28 As well as experiencing a continuation of present patterns of armed conflict, the world could witness a tendency towards greater use of asymmetric and indirect forms of warfare. These forms of warfare include:

- **Terrorism.** The methods and objectives may change as terrorists respond to improvements in the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures, but this form of warfare will continue. Some rogue states may continue to employ state-sponsored terrorism as a form of indirect or proxy warfare.

- **Economic warfare.** This could take the form of attacks on key infrastructure systems, to sabotage key industries and disrupt normal life. While economic warfare is not new, the increasing interconnectedness of society and increasing urbanisation make economic warfare a more attractive option for an aggressor.

- **Information warfare.** This might include corrupting or disabling key information databases and systems. Such databases and systems need not have direct military application to be targeted. Again, this is not a new form of warfare. But the high dependence on information technology, particularly in industrialised societies, makes information warfare likely to be a more prominent form of warfare in the future. In a similar way, the increasing presence and availability of the mass media and the Internet make possible a wider array of, and more effective, information and psychological warfare operations. The pervasiveness of these media also facilitates the uncontrolled dissemination of information and disinformation.

- **Environmental warfare.** This relates to the deliberate destruction of, or damage to, eco-systems so as to sabotage economic activity, or degrade the environment. As with economic warfare, increasing industrialisation makes this a more attractive future option for an aggressor.

3.29 These examples all represent something of a shift away from the conventional, force-on-force pattern of warfare, and towards one in which civilian populations are more directly involved or targeted. These emerging forms of warfare are also ones in which traditional distinctions between military and civilian, and between combatant and non-combatant become increasingly blurred. Related to this, the global trend towards greater urbanisation suggests that armed conflict will also increasingly be conducted in urban environments.

3.30 Greater globalisation of political and economic interactions will tend to make future conflict more multi-party and multi-dimensional than in the past, and will also make the notion of a ‘front line’, or linear battlespace, increasingly meaningless. Nevertheless, state-on-state conflict is likely to
continue to be the most common form of international conflict. The continued availability of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological and radiological weapons, will present a fearsome threat to those in danger from them, and a potential danger to military personnel and civilian populations alike.

3.31 With regard to conventional forms of warfare, technological and other factors will continue to transform the means, modes, environmental dimensions and purposes of war in ways that are almost impossible to predict. In particular, technological developments are continually enhancing the speed, range, stealth, precision, lethality and flexibility of weapons of war across the whole spectrum of weapons platforms and systems, and across the whole spectrum of warfare.

3.32 Future warfare will thus become both politically and militarily more complex to manage. Military-related technological developments will also have profound effects on the cost, tempo, duration, and dangers of warfare, on military command and control and on the political-military interface in war. Far from allowing ‘bloodless’ or ‘surgical’ combat, the application of these technologies in war will result in more—rather than less—chaos, destruction, suffering and death.
CHAPTER 4

AUSTRALIA’S PRINCIPLES OF WAR

• Principles of war:
  – Selection and maintenance of the aim.
  – Concentration of force.
  – Cooperation.
  – Offensive action.
  – Security.
  – Surprise.
  – Flexibility.
  – Economy of effort.
  – Sustainment.
  – Morale.

Introduction

4.1 From an understanding of the nature and types of conflict, and humanity’s experience of conflict, it is possible to derive certain basic principles about the conduct of armed conflict.

4.2 The following ten principles have long been established as the Principles of War used by the Australian military. These principles have utility across the spectrum of conflict, and across all levels of conflict. They maintain relevance in spite of dramatic changes over time in the methods, techniques and weapons of war.

4.3 All of these principles are of fundamental importance to achieving success in war. Most also apply to military support operations. But in applying these principles to specific situations, it may be necessary to balance the application of one principle against the application of another. The principles should not be viewed as merely a ‘check list’ for success.
4.4 The principles are:

- selection and maintenance of the aim,
- concentration of force,
- cooperation,
- offensive action,
- security,
- surprise,
- flexibility,
- economy of effort,
- sustainment, and
- morale.

4.5 The first principle, ‘selection and maintenance of the aim’, is listed first because it is the overriding principle of war. The subsequent principles are presented in no particular order of importance, though they may vary in relative importance from one situation to another.

Selection and maintenance of the aim

4.6 Military action is never an end in itself; it is always a means to an end. It is of fundamental importance that the end always be kept clearly in view. This cardinal principle applies with equal force at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

4.7 The aim of any military action should be selected carefully and articulated clearly. In order to lead to success, the military aim must be clear, simple, achievable, and morally justifiable. The importance of each of these characteristics cannot be overemphasised.

4.8 Selection of the aim is important because it will strongly influence the parameters of military action—the means, and the political, timing, and other constraints. Clear articulation of the aim provides a basis for checking the consistency of military actions at each level of warfare, and of plans for military actions, with the overarching aim. In this way the aim is maintained.

4.9 In a shifting, turbulent and complex political environment, problems can arise from the existence of single and multiple political aims, principal and subsidiary aims, conflicting aims, and changing aims. Complexities and
uncertainties of this type only reinforce the need for a clear articulation of the purpose of any military action. Only by such articulation can military action be directed to best effect.

Concentration of force

4.10 Success in combat depends on the concentration of superior force. Concentration of superior force is the ability to apply military force at the right place, at the right time, and in such a way as to achieve a decisive result.

4.11 Superior force is not merely a matter of numbers and firepower but also of superior combat skills, mobility, timing, selection of objectives, leadership, morale, and the effective employment of advanced technology. Thus, a nation’s total combat power is not just the sum of its individual combat power elements. Combat power also depends critically on a range of qualitative and organisational factors; these factors collectively determine how well the individual power elements are combined and harnessed to achieve the overall level of force.

4.12 Concentration of force, along with the application of other principles of war, can enable a seemingly inferior force to defeat a potentially superior adversary.

Cooperation

4.13 Cooperation—within a Service, between the Services, between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian community, and between the ADF and allies or coalition partners—is vital for success in war. Only in this way can the resources and energies of each be harnessed so as to achieve victory.

4.14 Cooperation entails the coordination of all activities to achieve an optimum combined effort. Cooperation requires goodwill and the desire to cooperate, at all levels within each Service, between Services, with the Government and the community, and with allies and other friendly forces. Increasingly, in a time when more and more combat support arrangements depend on private contractors and on the use of public infrastructure, cooperation between the military and the rest of the community is vital.

4.15 Cooperation is as essential in planning and preparation during peacetime as it is during times of conflict. Within the ADF, and in the ADF’s relations with other defence forces, cooperation is greatly enhanced by the maintenance and further development of joint and combined interoperability. In the broader national sense, comprehensive civil-military relationships, structures and procedures, such as tried and tested crisis management
arrangements, are essential to effective cooperation. Cooperation is an effective means of combining the principles of concentration of force and economy of effort.

**Offensive action**

4.16 Offensive action is action by a military force to gain and retain the initiative. Offensive action is essential in most circumstances to the achievement of victory.

4.17 It is important to maintain a spirit of offensive action even in defensive situation. This is not to be interpreted as licence for rashness that endangers one’s own forces unnecessarily or recklessly. But maintenance of a spirit of boldness and offensive action is vital if forces and commanders are to exploit opportunities to capitalise on enemy weaknesses, and to seize and hold the initiative in combat. Offensive action contributes to the morale of one’s own forces and, if vigorously pursued, can shatter the cohesion of an enemy.

![Figure 4-1: RAAF F111 play an integral part in providing offensive support for campaigns](image)

**Security**

4.18 Security is vital in military operations to:

- allow one’s own forces the freedom of action to operate effectively with minimal interference from the enemy; and
- deny the enemy an advantage.
4.19 Security may be achieved, for example, by such measures as sea denial, defence of vulnerable bases and entry points, protection of vital infrastructure, protection of information and communication systems, holding adequate reserves of forces, gaining air superiority, or guarding flanks to achieve freedom of action.

4.20 Security needs to be held in tension with other principles of war, such as economy of effort and offensive action. Security does not imply undue caution at the expense of bold action. Rather, proper security allows offensive action a greater chance of success. Security is also often closely linked to the achievement of surprise.

**Surprise**

4.21 Surprise is a most powerful influence in operations. Surprise can wrest the initiative from the enemy; help reduce casualties from one’s own offensive actions; sow confusion, dismay and fear in the enemy; paralyse, at least temporarily, the enemy’s decision-making processes; degrade his will; and interrupt the ‘rhythm’ of the enemy’s offensive actions.

4.22 Every effort must be made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being taken by surprise (in this there is a close connection with the principle of security). Surprise can produce results out of all proportion to the effort expended.

4.23 Surprise is becoming both easier and harder to achieve—easier because of the development of stealth technologies and night vision equipment, and harder because of developments in intelligence and surveillance technologies that improve a force’s situational awareness.

4.24 When other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to the success of an operation. Surprise may be achieved through specialised tactics; simplicity, audacity and originality in planning and action; speed of action; the employment of technology; and the skilled use of intelligence.

4.25 The achievement of surprise is further increased through the application of targeted counter-intelligence measures and techniques, including secrecy, counter-surveillance, concealment, deception and other measures to destroy, neutralise or deceive the adversary’s intelligence gathering, surveillance and intelligence dissemination capabilities. These latter aspects are now often referred to as information operations or command and control warfare.

4.26 The use of surprise is positively correlated with other principles of war, such as offensive action, security and morale.
Flexibility

4.27 Flexibility in operations is the capacity to adapt plans to take account of unforeseen circumstances, so as to ensure success in the face of friction, unexpected resistance or setbacks, or to capitalise on unexpected opportunities.

4.28 Flexibility in operations calls for flexibility in:

- planning;
- combat support; and
- decision-making.

4.29 All operational plans should be sufficiently flexible to allow commanders to ‘expect the unexpected’. Plans should always allow commanders some leeway to modify the ways and means of an operation in the face of unexpected developments, so as to allow the end nevertheless to be achieved.

4.30 Combat support capabilities such as communications, transport and other logistic support, should be flexible. In this way, forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at the critical time and in the critical location.

4.31 Importantly, the decision-making process also needs to be flexible. This flexibility comes from a culture of devolution of decision-making. This in turn requires a combination of high-quality training of commanders, and a command culture that rewards sound judgment, initiative, resourcefulness, lateral thinking, and boldness. Commanders at all levels need to have a clear understanding of their superior commanders’ intent, so that their decisions are directed towards achievement of the operational objective.

Economy of effort

4.32 Economy of effort is the prudent allocation and application of Defence and civil resources to achieve the desired results.

4.33 The principle of economy of effort acknowledges the need for a degree of redundancy in wartime to allow for attrition. But it is opposed to a wasteful allocation of resources that does not maximise the contribution of those resources to the achievement or the maintenance of the aim. Wasteful allocation of resources unnecessarily increases the costs of war, and carries with it the danger that it may, in some cases, threaten the achievement of the aim.
4.34 The principle of economy of effort is a corollary of the principle of concentration of force; the more effective a force is in economising its allocation of resources in one place, the more resources are thereby released to permit concentration of force elsewhere.

4.35 Economy of effort needs to be held in tension with other principles of war, notably security and sustainment. For example, the more that resources are allocated to ensuring security, the less are available for offensive action. But since both security and offensive action are important principles of war in their own right, economy of effort is needed as a means of balancing these competing requirements.

Sustainment (formerly administration)

4.36 Sustainment includes all administrative arrangements necessary to implement strategies and operational plans. These arrangements include those logistic and personnel aspects necessary for the efficient support of a force.

Figure 4–2: HMAS JERVIS BAY departing Dili after the deployment of 3 RAR during OP Warden

4.37 Sustainment can be the deciding factor in determining the feasibility of an operation or the practicality of an aim. Force support arrangements are an integral part of an operation. Consequently, planning for sustainment must be included in the operational planning process from the outset.

4.38 This principle is related to the principles of flexibility and also of economy of effort. Sustainment arrangements must allow for unforeseen circumstances, and give all necessary freedom of action to the commander in
carrying out his plan. The art of sustainment lies in making the best use of limited resources, in improvising, in taking calculated risks where necessary, and in overcoming any obstacles that arise. The administrative organisation that provides force sustainment should be as simple as possible.

4.39 All personnel involved in sustainment arrangements need to maintain a bold, offensive spirit no less than those directly involved in engaging the enemy.

4.40 Good sustainment arrangements can be vital to the achievement of an aim, and play an important part in maintaining morale.

**Morale**

4.41 Morale is an essential element of combat power. High morale engenders courage, energy, cohesion, endurance, steadfastness, determination, and a bold, offensive spirit. In any given situation, military success may depend as much on morale as on material advantages. Morale of the fighting force is an embodiment of the national will to resist aggression and coercion.

4.42 The basis of military morale includes primarily a clear understanding of, and belief in, the aim. Those personnel involved must have a conviction about the necessity, legality and morality of a military operation. High morale is built and maintained by effective leadership, good training, appropriate discipline, good sustainment arrangements, and confidence in the popular support of the Australian people.

4.43 With regard to leadership, history abounds with examples demonstrating that effective leadership will sustain high morale even when all other factors are against it.

4.44 Actions taken to destroy the enemy’s morale directly through combat, and indirectly through psychological operations, are important means of reducing the adversary’s combat effectiveness. Conversely, actions taken to sustain Australian popular support for the ADF, through public information and other activities, can also play an important role in maintaining ADF morale.
CHAPTER 5

APPLYING MILITARY POWER: MILITARY STRATEGIC ASPECTS IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

- Australian Defence Force (ADF) warfighting values—manoeuvre, knowledge edge, cooperation, versatility, flexibility and justifiable action.
- Achieving decision superiority.
- Cooperation versus unilateral actions.
- Good leadership and communications critical to effective fighting force.
- Quality personnel and equipment maximising ADF capability.
- ISR maintaining the knowledge edge.
- Interoperability in regional and allied coalitions.

Introduction

5.1 Australia has a distinctive set of strategic circumstances. Australia also has a distinctive national ethos and identity, which are largely a product of our history, and which apply to military matters no less than to other areas of life.¹

5.2 The ADF is alert to the lessons of military history, both generally and, more particularly, through more than a century of Australian involvement in armed conflict, from colonial times as part of the British Empire through to the present. The ADF is also keenly aware of the trends that are shaping the likely future nature of warfare.

5.3 This chapter outlines some of the characteristics of warfare in the Australian context. In doing so, the chapter articulates concepts that guide the ADF as it undertakes the various tasks required of it by government in pursuit of national strategic policy. In particular, these concepts give guidance to the development of warfighting concepts for the conduct of operations by the ADF².

¹ For an elaboration of these points, refer to In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, op cit., page 9.
5.4 This chapter also outlines some of the considerations that are essential to ensuring that the ADF develops and maintains the capabilities needed to enable it to conduct combat and military support operations effectively.

Key warfare concepts in the Australian context

5.5 It is possible to identify common, and perhaps also emerging, Australian warfare concepts at the strategic level, by drawing together an understanding of:

- Australia’s strategic circumstances;
- military doctrine, particularly the principles of war;
- Australia’s national character and military history;
- elements of Australia’s national power; and
- the ADF’s present and emerging military capabilities.

5.6 The concepts covered in this chapter are not ‘Australian’ in the sense of reflecting some unique national trait. But it remains the case that Australia’s geography, population, culture, international political relations and military alliances, along with other factors, strongly influence the way in which—and the constraints under which—the ADF conducts military operations. In that sense, these concepts are distinctively Australian, without being uniquely Australian.

5.7 Some of the factors that influence the ADF’s approach to warfare include Australia’s:

- small population in relation to the size of the Australian land mass, and the uneven geographic distribution of this population;
- small military forces;
- vast land mass and surrounding maritime approaches;
- liberal-democratic political system and national values;
- largely westernised culture, and western orientation in world affairs;
- generally well-educated and technologically adept population; and

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2 For a more complete coverage of this subject, refer to the ADF doctrine publication The Australian Approach to Warfare.
modern, industrialised economy, with strong links to the international economy.

5.8 As a result of these factors, the following concepts have emerged as key ADF warfighting values:

- manoeuvre,
- knowledge edge,
- cooperation in military operations,
- versatility and flexibility in military operations, and
- justifiable action.

Manoeuvre

5.9 Manoeuvre warfare is a key concept influencing the way the ADF conducts operations. The manoeuvrist approach to warfare emphasises the shattering, or at least disruption, of the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than concentrating on destruction of the enemy’s materiel or the holding of enemy territory.

5.10 The manoeuvrist approach also emphasises the need for the ADF to take the initiative, and to apply unacceptable pressure, at times and places, and in ways, the enemy least expects. To apply this approach successfully, the ADF needs to focus on achieving the precise application of decisive effort—incorporating use of surprise where possible—against accurately identified critical vulnerabilities.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MANOEUVRE

The Lae-Salamaua campaign in New Guinea in 1943 is a classic example of manoeuvre at the operational level. Following the successful conclusion of the long and expensive Papuan campaign in January 1943, the Australians and Americans were in firm possession of the north coast of Papua. In February 1943 an Australian brigade repelled a Japanese thrust towards Wau. The Australians were reinforced and began a slow advance overland towards Salamaua.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(contd)

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area, ordered a major manoeuvre-based offensive, Operation Cartwheel, that would make use of his naval and air resources. New Guinea Force under General Sir Thomas Blamey was to seize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area. Airfields were then to be constructed to support further operations. The American New Britain Force was to occupy western New Britain, thus securing both sides of the Vitiatz Strait so as to allow naval movement into the Bismarck Sea.

In June American forces (under New Guinea Force) landed near Salamaua to assist the Australians, but Blamey directed them not to take Salamaua so as to keep the Japanese there. Then, on 4 September the 9th Australian Division conducted an amphibious landing east of Lae. Next day American paratroops seized the Nadzab airstrip northwest of Lae. The 7th Australian Division was flown in and, with the 9th, converged on Lae. Trapped at Salamaua, the Japanese tried to withdraw, and the Australians took the town on 11 September.

With the Japanese off balance, the 7th Division reversed its axis and advanced quickly up the Markham Valley and into the Ramu Valley. An independent company seized Kaiapit in the upper Markham, holding it against a counter-attack until reinforced by an airlifted brigade. On 22 September a brigade of the 9th Division carried out an amphibious assault on Finschhafen, opening the way, after a hard-fought campaign, for the eventual taking of the Huon peninsula coast.

5.11 For the ADF, manoeuvre is generally preferred as a form of warfare and, in many cases, is a matter of necessity. Attrition warfare, while it may be effective, is not usually efficient, particularly above the tactical level, as it is too personnel and resource-intensive a form of warfare for Australia to sustain. Our strategic circumstances generally do not favour an attritional approach.

5.12 Manoeuvre warfare is also preferred for reasons of comparative advantage. Manoeuvre warfare is essentially a fluid form of warfare. It confers advantages to the force that has relative strengths in the areas of:

- speed and flexibility in decision-making;
- devolution of decision-making at the operational and tactical levels;

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reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities;

- mobility;

- innovative training, doctrine and procedures;

- versatility in weapons and personnel;

- adequate and flexible logistic and combat support; and

- familiarity with the terrain, climatic factors, and the battlespace environment generally.

5.13 In the Australian political context, manoeuvre warfare will also generally have other advantages over attrition warfare, namely:

- it will be much more compatible with the limited political objectives of most conflicts, including considerations of restoring and building political relations with other states, in the post-conflict phase; and

- it will be more consistent with the political need to maintain community support for military operations, and to conduct military operations with austerity so as to contain the human, financial and economic costs of the conflict.

- Nevertheless, successful manoeuvre warfare usually involves the use of tactical-level attrition at a critical point or critical points in an operation or campaign. Thus, an intelligent and flexible approach, rather than a doctrinaire application, is required.

Knowledge edge

5.14 Gaining and exploiting a ‘knowledge edge’ is another key concept influencing the way the ADF conducts operations and campaigns, and is thus a high capability development priority for the ADF. This capability has three main elements:

- information,

- knowledge, and

- decision making.
The ‘knowledge edge’ in military doctrine is not just a matter of knowing something about the enemy that the enemy does not know you know. ‘Knowledge edge’ is about having that combination of intelligence information, training, professional mastery, doctrine and insight into the way the enemy acts and reacts that gives a qualitative advantage over the enemy.

By monitoring Japanese radio transmissions, Allied intelligence determined that a Japanese convoy would attempt to reinforce Japanese garrisons at Lae and Salamaua in northern New Guinea. The Allies expected the Japanese convoy to sail around the northern coast of New Britain, in either late February or early March.

Based on this intelligence, the RAAF’s Group Captain Bill Garing urged General George Kenney, commander of the Allied Air Force, to mount a massive, combined air strike against the expected convoy. The mission would involve large numbers of different types of aircraft, striking the convoy from many directions at different altitudes. The operation had to be precisely executed.

The Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight merchant ships left Rabaul just before midnight on 28 February 1943. Allied reconnaissance aircraft detected movement of the convoy on the morning of 2 March, and a RAAF Catalina flying boat tracked the ships’ movements throughout the following night. With precise knowledge of the convoy’s location, ninety allied aircraft struck the next morning as the Japanese ships rounded the Huon Peninsula.

The strike was a stunning success. For the loss of a few aircraft, the Allies sank twelve of the sixteen enemy ships. Almost 3000 enemy troops were killed in the attack. The brilliantly conceived and executed operation smashed Japanese hopes of regaining the initiative in New Guinea. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, General Douglas MacArthur, described the operation as ‘the decisive aerial engagement’ of the war in the South West Pacific.

5.15 The ADF aims for an integrated system that incorporates all three elements of this capability.
5.16 The ADF needs to be able to ‘fight smart’ to compensate for its small size. The three elements of the ‘knowledge edge’ contribute to the development of a ‘qualitative edge’, which the ADF seeks to maintain relative to other Defence forces within the Asia-Pacific region. Having a ‘knowledge edge’ is a potent force multiplier for the ADF; it allows the ADF to maximise its combat power and contain casualties, materiel losses, and costs of operations.

5.17 Having a ‘knowledge edge’ is an important factor in being able to achieve decision superiority over an adversary. Decision superiority is not just about making better decisions than an adversary, it is also about making decisions faster than that adversary. Decision superiority is vital to the successful application of the manoeuvrist approach to warfare. Achieving decision superiority depends on:

- a comprehensive, ADF-wide information systems architecture, so that information is captured, processed and presented in ways that allow timely and accurate assessments and decisions;
- professional mastery in the management, interpretation and application of information; and
- a culture of command and control that emphasises boldness, initiative, delegation of authority, and flexibility in decision making.

5.18 Knowledge is closely tied to many issues involving the operational art of warfare. For example, a knowledge edge will help the ADF identify an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, and help ADF operational commanders to use tempo and leverage to best effect. In this way, commanders can orchestrate the application of the combat power of force elements at their disposal, so as to maximise the opportunities presented.

5.19 An important element of a knowledge-based approach to warfare is having a deep appreciation of the nuances of an adversary’s culture and national values, as well as knowledge of his equipment, force dispositions and military command arrangements. In this way, commanders and staffs will be able to apply the operational arts of warfare intelligently and perceptively to the specific situation at hand. Commanders and staffs similarly need a deep understanding of the culture and values of friendly forces that may be participating in a coalition operation, and also of neutral parties that may be caught up in the conflict.

5.20 Knowledge is also closely linked to Australia’s human geography, particularly the education and training base of the Australian population, which is an important strategic asset for Australia.
Cooperation in military operations

5.21 Historically, operational deployments of the ADF have generally been coalition operations with the Defence forces of other countries, as part of some collective Defence or collective security endeavour. The outlook is for this general practice of ADF operational deployments to continue.

5.22 Thus a key requirement for the ADF in the future is to be able to operate effectively in coalition with the armed forces of other countries and, where appropriate, lead those coalitions. This requirement covers not only operations with allies and traditional Defence partners, but also the more difficult circumstances of ad hoc coalition operations with the armed forces of other nations whose training, doctrine, organisational culture and equipment may be very different from that of the ADF.

5.23 The ADF also needs to cooperate with the Australian civil community. The need for this cooperation is increasing as a result of the trend towards commercial support—rather than organic support—for ADF activities, especially within Australia, and the ADF’s ongoing heavy reliance on Australia’s civil infrastructure in time of conflict. The ADF also needs to cooperate with non-government organisations that are commonly found in modern conflict environments.

5.24 Cooperation versus unilateralism. Notwithstanding Australia’s general preference for cooperation in military operations, Australia retains the right to undertake unilateral military action. Therefore, the ADF needs to develop and maintain a high degree of military capability for undertaking independent combat operations. These will be joint in nature, comprising naval, land, air and special force components.

5.25 One expression of the concept of unilateralism is Australia’s willingness to defend itself without relying on the combat forces of other nations.\(^3\) Self-reliant defence activity might occur:

- As a matter of choice. This might be in situations where there is little or no need from a military point of view for external assistance, and/or where, for diplomatic reasons, government wishes to pursue military action independently.

- As a matter of necessity. Ultimately, Australia must be able to undertake effective, independent military action to defend itself or its interests. It is imperative that the ADF be structured, trained and equipped to perform this role.

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\(^3\) *Defence 2000 Our Future Defence Force*, p. 46.
5.26 Unilateralism is not an absolute concept, even in the conduct of independent combat operations. The interconnectedness of the global economic system, and Australia’s relative dependence on alliances for higher level intelligence and logistic support, will always constrain the level of independent military activity Australia can conduct.

**Versatility and flexibility in military operations**

5.27 As a small force, but with a wide range of potential tasking, the ADF needs to aim to be a versatile force:

- **Training**—at formation, unit, sub-unit and individual levels—needs to reflect the wide range of potential tasks the ADF may be called upon to undertake, and the diverse environments in which operations may take place. The requirement for versatility means that training must develop in ADF members the confidence and experience needed to operate effectively in demanding and ambiguous circumstances.

- **Equipment acquisition** also needs to account fully for the demands of versatility in the ADF. Equipment acquisition needs to optimise the allocation of available resources to strike the best balance between equipment that is superior for a narrow range of purposes, and equipment that is less capable for any given purpose but capable of being used for a wider range of purposes.

- **Operational planning**, particularly deliberate and contingency planning, needs to accommodate the multi-role nature of the ADF.

5.28 Likewise, the ADF needs to aim to be a flexible force in the way that it undertakes any task that may be required of it.

5.29 The requirement for flexibility is mostly a matter of having the kind of command and control culture and arrangements within the ADF that reward initiative, ingenuity, innovation, resourcefulness, and devolution of authority in the way that a commander’s intent is achieved. Flexibility is about fostering an organisational culture that rewards ‘fighting smart’; it is part of the ‘knowledge edge’ that the ADF seeks to cultivate in all its activities.

**Justifiable action**

5.30 The ADF is the provider of armed force on behalf of government to ensure that Australia’s national security interests are preserved, and its objectives achieved. The ADF’s actions have the potential to:

- result in significant loss of life, either to an adversary’s forces, our own forces or the forces of third parties, as well as the incidental loss of life amongst the civilian population, resulting from operations against military objectives;
involve the destruction of military equipment or assets, as well as the incidental destruction of civilian property;

• cause a significant diversion of the energies and resources of the Australian population and its political leadership from other endeavours, to support the ADF’s actions on behalf of government; and

• profoundly affect Australia’s international relations.

5.31 It is therefore imperative that the basis and conduct of the ADF’s operations should be both moral and legal. By using the ADF in ways that are justifiable, the ADF’s (and the nation’s) hard-won stature and credibility in the application of military power be assured.

MAXIMISING AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE CAPABILITY

5.32 In order to perform the tasks required by the Government, the ADF must place a high priority on the development of a level of capability that is appropriate, given Australia’s strategic position, and style of warfighting. While capability development includes the acquisition of equipment, it also entails much broader considerations. The following aspects of capability are of special relevance in the Australian context.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
HMAS AUSTRALIA—THE DETERRENT VALUE OF A CAPABILITY EDGE

In the early years of the 20th Century, Germany maintained a formidable naval presence in the Pacific in support of its imperial interests. At the time, Germany also planned for a major confrontation with the British Empire.

By tying down British naval forces in the Pacific, Germany would undermine British naval supremacy in the Atlantic. Moreover, such a campaign would destroy, or at least damage, the economically and strategically important trade between Australia and Great Britain.
Leadership and communication

5.33 The ADF attaches great importance to the role of leadership and communication in ensuring that the ADF is an effective fighting force.

5.34 Good leadership and communication in the ADF:

• are a key force-multiplier, enabling the ADF to deal effectively with unexpected, ambiguous and complex situations;

• are an important part of the development of an overall ‘knowledge edge’ for the ADF;
are vital for the maintenance of high morale within the ADF; and
help to encourage initiative and professional excellence.

5.35 The ADF aims to achieve good leadership and communication through:

- clear and well understood lines of authority, in the interests of efficiency, clarity, and accountability;
- strong emphasis on joint doctrine, joint training, joint planning, and joint operations to ensure effective integration of its individual component capabilities;
- appropriate technical support throughout the ADF, especially by means of interoperable and integrated communications and information systems;
- encouraging a command culture of delegation of authority, and of flexibility and initiative in the exercise of command authority; and
- strong whole-of-career investment in leadership and professional skills training, from the most junior ranks to the most senior.

Figure 5–1: Future Warfare experiments and projects will enhance the Australian Defence Forces ability to provide a capable and balanced force for the future
Personnel

5.36 The ADF is a small, all-volunteer force. Due to Australia’s comparatively small population, the ADF will always be relatively small, even if bolstered by conscription.

5.37 Given its limited numerical strength, the ADF must concentrate on maximising the quality of its personnel, in order to maximise its combat power. The ADF does this by:

• maintaining high levels of training, including multi-skilling;
• proactive recruitment and retention policies to maintain appropriate overall personnel levels, and to maintain appropriate age, rank, skill, and fitness profiles;
• ensuring a high standard of arrangements for the care and protection of the force, and ensuring the protection of support arrangements for the force;
• investing in reserve forces to ensure that an appropriate peacetime level of capability is sustained that can be drawn upon or surge in time of crisis;
• ensuring personnel have appropriate, high quality, and high-technology equipment; and
• ensuring a high level and standard of commercial support from the civilian infrastructure and workforce to provide support services to the ADF.

5.38 All three Services maintain part-time as well as full-time forces. These reserve forces are a vital component of Australia’s defence capability. The ADF’s reserve forces:

• provide the strategic depth necessary to enable the ADF to counter a major threat to Australia’s national integrity or interests, should such a threat arise;
• provide the ADF with key skills to complement and supplement the skills of its full-time forces;
• lower the economic and social costs of the capabilities that would be required if it were structured only as a full-time force; and
• provide an additional link between the ADF and the wider community.
5.39 The provisions of the *Defence Act 1903* (section 50D) govern the government’s use of reserve forces. The act permits the government to call out the reserve forces, in whole or in part, in the following circumstances:

- war or warlike operations;
- defence emergency;
- defence preparation;
- peacekeeping or peace enforcement;
- assistance to Commonwealth, State, Territory, or foreign government authorities and agencies in matters involving Australia’s national security or affecting Australian defence interests;
- support to community activities of national or international significance; and
- civil aid, humanitarian assistance, medical and civil emergency or disaster relief.

**Equipment**

5.40 The ADF is generally well equipped by regional standards. The ADF also has a continuous program to acquire, maintain, repair, upgrade, and replace its stock of capital equipment.

5.41 For the most part, the ADF’s equipment continues to allow the ADF to enjoy a ‘capability edge’ over that of regional countries. Maintaining a capability edge is more than just a question of holding stocks of certain types of equipment. It also involves having a high standard of training of those who use the equipment, proper maintenance and repair arrangements for the equipment, and ensuring a strong sense of professionalism by those who use and maintain the equipment.

5.42 The high cost of military equipment, especially latest generation equipment, means that the ADF tends to hold its equipment in small ‘packets’. The ADF is thus vulnerable to attrition of materiel in time of war, and is constrained in its ability to conduct concurrent operations. The high cost of equipment also means that the ADF tends to select equipment, which will perform in a range of roles, spreading across the spectrum of conflict. This consideration inevitably requires some trade-offs in the design or selection of particular items or classes of equipment.

5.43 The ADF’s equipment selection program also seeks to ensure that the ADF can maintain and, if possible, increase effective interoperability with key defence partners.
Surveillance and intelligence

5.44 The vastness of the Australian landmass and also of the maritime approaches to Australia, make surveillance and intelligence a particular imperative for the ADF. Surveillance and intelligence play an important role in alerting defence planners to the existence, nature and scale of existing or emerging security threats to Australia and its interests.

5.45 **Surveillance.** The ADF maintains surveillance of air and sea approaches to Australia using a mixture of static and mobile assets. These assets include the over-the-horizon radar network, naval patrol vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, major surface and sub-surface combatants, and ground surveillance units operating in northern Australia. The continued development of surveillance capabilities is a high priority for the ADF; the key product of this surveillance is ADF intelligence.

5.46 **Intelligence.** The Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) depends on its three strategic intelligence agencies, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Defence Signals Directorate, and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation. The defence intelligence capability also depends on the development of the distributed ADF Intelligence System, whereby intelligence elements from the strategic to the tactical levels share common procedures, and are linked by secure communications systems.

5.47 The ADO also derives great value from its international defence intelligence-sharing arrangements with several countries, most notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. Maintaining and improving defence-related intelligence is an integral part of the process of securing a ‘knowledge edge’ within Australia’s immediate region, and is a key consideration and priority for the ADF.

Interoperability

5.48 Interoperability is a critical issue for the ADF. The level of interoperability that the ADF can achieve in any given situation defines the possible extent of force integration and cooperation in that situation. With a comparatively small national force, it is important for the ADF to be able to participate in, and even lead, coalition operations, in support of Australia’s national security objectives. The ability of the ADF to operate alongside the defence force of another country, and to be seen to be operating with that country, may be an important political consideration for ADF operations in certain contingencies.
5.49 The ADF therefore needs to have an appropriate level of interoperability with other Defence forces. The degree of interoperability that is appropriate for the ADF to develop with any given country is a matter of judgment, and will vary from country to country, from Defence force to Defence force, from Service to Service, and from element to element within each Service. ADF interoperability with other Defence forces is achieved through regular interaction by elements of the ADF with appropriate elements of regional Defence forces, and with the application of comprehensive supporting policies, for example, foreign language training of ADF personnel.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—COALITION OPERATIONS

Australia’s commitment to the Vietnam War of units of all three Services demonstrated the complexity of coalition operations. The Commander Australian Force Vietnam (COMAFV), located in Saigon, was the national commander, but his Australian forces came under the operational control of American field commanders. COMAFV dealt directly with the commander of US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and also with the South Vietnamese authorities. The Australian contribution was not large enough to give the country a major say in the overall strategy of the war, and the Australians had little influence over the operational concepts used within South Vietnam.

Headquarters MACV exercise operational control directly over the Australian Army Training Team, and over other Australian units through subordinate headquarters. The American 2nd Field Force (a corps level headquarters) had operational control of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) and, through a subordinate US unit, the RAN helicopter flight. 1 ATF had operational control of No 9 Squadron RAAF (helicopters). No 2 Squadron RAAF (Canberra bombers) and No 35 Squadron (Caribous) were under the 7th US Air Force, while the RAN Diving Team came under the commander of US Naval Forces Vietnam.

The RAN destroyer deployed off the Vietnamese coast to provide gunfire support came directly under the US Seventh Fleet and was not under COMAFV. The US Seventh Fleet did not report to the Commander MACV but to the Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet.

Further complexity was added by the need to cooperate with South Vietnamese authorities. Operations in Phuoc Tuy Province came under a South Vietnamese provincial chief except for those in the designated 1 ATF area, when operations went into the more populated area, they had to be coordinated with the South Vietnamese. While the Australians had to operate in a substantially US command framework, they had under them various New Zealand components that had to operate in an Australian command framework.

The potential complexity of coalition operations generally, underscores the importance to the ADF of developing and testing its interoperability arrangements and procedures with allies and other defence partners in peacetime, so as to allow more effective coalition operations in times of conflict.
5.50 The ADF has a relatively high level of interoperability with Australia’s formal allies, the United States and New Zealand. This results in part from commonality of equipment and, more importantly, from interoperable procedures, common language, familiarity with each other’s modes of operation, and shared values. Australia conducts regular bilateral exercises with the United States, and also with New Zealand, to broaden, deepen, and maintain effective interoperability. Interoperability is an integral requirement of an effective alliance relationship.

5.51 The significance of our relationship with the United States makes interoperability with its armed forces crucially important, setting the benchmark for all other interoperability issues. However as the United States’ military equipment and systems become increasingly sophisticated, the costs to the ADF of keeping pace through its own modernisation programs may make it difficult to maintain effective interoperability with regional partners.

5.52 The ADF has limited interoperability with regional countries; such interoperability as does exist is mostly with ASEAN\(^4\) countries and Papua New Guinea. The ADF pursues various bilateral exercise and training activities with ASEAN countries, but the degree of effective interoperability is limited by a number of economic, cultural, political, linguistic, training, and equipment factors.

5.53 Interoperability is as much an issue for combined or coalition single-Service operations as it is for combined or coalition joint operations, though the particular considerations that are relevant in any given situation may vary from Service to Service. For example, it may be a higher priority for the Army to develop greater interoperability with selected regional countries than for it to develop greater interoperability with the United States Army. But at the same time, and from a ‘whole of defence’ point of view, the ADF may consider the achievement of greater interoperability with the US to be a higher priority than achievement of greater interoperability with regional defence forces.

\(^4\) Association of South-East Asian Nations.
CHAPTER 6

APPLYING MILITARY POWER: LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS

- Domestic law and the exercising of military power.
- Defence force aid to the civil community.
- Defence force aid to the civil power.
- Armed conflict as a political action.

Introduction

6.1 The question of whether or not a nation-state should apply military power in a given situation is not simply a question of whether such application is militarily feasible. The morality, legality, and political efficacy of applying military power in that situation are also important considerations.

6.2 It is vital to the maintenance of high morale and professionalism of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) over the long term, that the ADF enjoys good standing as an institution in Australian society, and enjoys good standing internationally. It is vital to the achievement of this good standing at home and abroad, that the ADF’s combat power is used only in circumstances where such use is morally and legally justified, and only in ways that are so justified. This is ensured within our democratic system through the fundamental principle of civil control of the military under which decisions to deploy the ADF are made by the Government as elected by the Australian people. It is also vital that when Australia applies military power, the ADF is viewed as a professionally competent organisation, and an effective fighting force.

6.3 This chapter considers the moral, legal, and political dimensions to the exercise of military power in support of Australia’s defence and security interests.
DOMESTIC LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Domestic law and the defence power

6.4 Executive power rests with the Government, as elected from time to time. Despite references to the Queen and to the Governor-General and the apparent military command authority provided to the Governor-General, in law the Governor-General is the commander of the ADF in title only. Neither the Queen nor her representative the Governor-General has an Executive role in directing or commanding the ADF. As Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General acts solely on ministerial advice.

6.5 Australia’s exercise of military power is legally based on:

- the Australian Constitution and a number of Westminster system constitutional conventions, known as ‘the express powers’; and
- legislation passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, known as ‘the incidental powers’.

6.6 In times of defence emergency, the Commonwealth’s defence powers increase dramatically but they recede to their core jurisdiction as the relevant external or internal threat recedes.

6.7 The constitutional heads of power for Defence purposes are primarily based on:

- Sections 2 and 61 of the Constitution, which cover Crown (executive) prerogative;
- Sections 51(vi), 51(xxix) and 51(xxxii) covering the Commonwealth’s power to legislate on foreign affairs and defence matters;
- Section 68 which invests command in chief of the ADF in the Governor-General (a power whose exercise is governed by several Westminster conventions—see paragraph 6.4);
- Section 114 which grants the Commonwealth exclusive power to maintain defence forces unless the Commonwealth decides otherwise; and
- Section 119 which covers the Commonwealth responsibility to protect every state against external invasion and, at a state’s request, against violent civil disorder. The states retain residual defence powers but these are strictly limited and mainly relate to the ADF’s potential requirement to abide by state legislation in the absence of relevant Commonwealth laws during a defence emergency.
6.8 Commonwealth authority to pass legislation in respect of defence matters flows from Section 51(vi) of the Constitution. However, the defence power itself, including the power to make or declare war, is not based on legislation but is rather an inherent part of the Executive power under Section 61 of the Constitution. The defence power is exercisable by the Executive Government, and the nature of the power expands and contracts depending on the nature of the emergency or situation to be dealt with.

6.9 Once appropriately authorised, the ADF may be deployed within Australia on tasks other than direct defence against external threats. These tasks fall into three main groups:

- Defence assistance to the civil community (DACC), where force is not involved;
- Defence Force aid to civilian authorities (DFACA), where the use or threat of force is involved in support of civil law enforcement agencies; and
- other domestic law enforcement.

**Defence assistance to the civil community**

6.10 DACC covers the provision of Defence resources for the performance of tasks that are the responsibility of the civil community, but where ADF assistance is either appropriate or necessary. Assistance to the civil community implies little or no likelihood that members of the ADF will be required to use force, for example, by providing emergency aid, assisting with disaster recovery, or participating in events of national or regional significance.
In the early hours of Christmas Day 1974, Tropical Cyclone Tracy devastated Darwin, then a city of nearly 47 000 people. The cyclone was effectively Australia’s greatest natural disaster. Almost the entire population of an Australian capital city had been made homeless, with only approximately four hundred of the city’s estimated 10 000 buildings remaining intact. The city’s water, electricity and sewerage systems were shut down by the cyclone, and all civil communications systems collapsed.

The Commonwealth Government immediately directed that Australia’s full defence resources were to be made available to provide emergency assistance. On 25 December, the Government put the Director-General of the then National Disasters Organisation (at that time part of the Department of Defence), in charge of relief operations, and—temporarily—in control of the city. For public health and safety reasons, General Stretton ordered the evacuation of all non-essential personnel from Darwin and, by 30 December, more than 25 000 people had been evacuated, using both military and chartered civil aircraft. Normal civil administrative arrangements were restored on 3 January 1975.

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) transport aircraft arrived on the scene in Darwin during the evening of 25 December, carrying surgical teams and medical supplies. These aircraft also began evacuation of seriously injured people, and conducted a massive airlift of essential supplies and personnel into Darwin.

Thirteen ships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and nine embarked helicopters were involved in the relief of Darwin. Working alongside others involved in the relief operations, the naval personnel worked to clear debris, repair buildings, and restore essential services. The Army provided 650 personnel (taking over from the Navy) to assist with clearing debris and repairing buildings.

The Defence contribution to the disaster relief operation in Darwin represented one of the largest military air lift and sealift operations by Australia since World War II. The Defence involvement after Cyclone Tracy demonstrated that the capabilities of the ADF, which are developed and maintained primarily for warfighting purposes, also have the potential to be used powerfully in assisting the civil community in times of crisis.
Defence Force aid to civilian authorities

6.11 The Governor-General, acting on the advice of the Commonwealth Executive Council, may call out the ADF to provide aid to civilian authorities. This aid covers the provision of Defence Force capabilities to supplement the civil law enforcement measures or resources of other Commonwealth and/or State/Territory Governments and their agencies.

6.12 The provision of aid to civilian authorities involves the likelihood or possibility of members of the ADF being required to use force. Examples of this aid include riot control, counter-terrorist operations, controlling public movement in emergencies, or picketing and guarding installations and people under terrorist threat or threat of violent civil disorder.

Figure 6–1: Counter-terrorism as an aspect of Defence force aid to civilian authorities is regularly exercised with both state and federal government agencies

6.13 The primary legal bases for the provision of Defence Force capabilities to aid the civil power are:

- the Australian Constitution (sections 51(vi) and 61 for a Commonwealth-initiated call-out, and section 119 for a State-initiated call-out); and

- the ‘call-out’ provisions of the Defence Act 1903 (section 51).

6.14 The general principles the ADF applies in providing aid to the civil power are:

- primacy of the civilian authority;

- necessity for ADF assistance;
ADDP–D

Chapter 6

- ADF only used for situations where its specific skills and capabilities are appropriate;
- use of reasonable and necessary force;
- specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) provided;
- unity of ADF Command;
- accountability;
- appropriate legal protection for ADF members under the law;
- cooperation with civilian authorities; and
- maintenance of public confidence.

Other domestic law enforcement

6.15 Apart from DFACA, the ADF performs other roles related to the enforcement of Commonwealth law and the protection of Commonwealth interests. This primarily involves ‘barrier law enforcement’; examples include the protection of fisheries, or the enforcement of immigration, customs, quarantine and conservation laws. The ADF’s role may involve direct enforcement of the law by its members, for example, by arresting suspected offenders; or it may involve assistance to civil agencies enforcing the law, for example, by providing surveillance services to those agencies.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

6.16 ADF operations are subject to the provisions of international law. International law imposes important restrictions and prohibitions on the use of force, whether for peacetime activities or armed conflict.

6.17 During peacetime, the Law of the Sea, air law, state sovereignty, United Nations Security Council resolutions, and other sources and aspects of international law,¹ may impact upon ADF operations outside of Australia. International law not only significantly affects the conduct of operations overseas for purposes such as peacekeeping, but also routine ADF activities, such as surveillance of Australia’s maritime approaches.

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¹ Australia, for example, is a signatory to Geneva Conventions I–IV and the Additional Protocols of 1977. The Conventions are also incorporated into Australian domestic law by the Geneva Conventions Act, 1957.
6.18  In respect of armed conflict, the body of international law governing the application of armed force consists of two parts:

- The laws governing when force may be used (*jus ad bellum*).
- The laws governing how force may be used (*jus in bello*). These are known as the LOAC.²

**When force may be used**

6.19  The main source of international law concerning when force may be used is the Charter of the UN. Under the Charter, a nation-state may use force, or threaten to do so, in two situations only,³ namely:

- Where force is authorised by the United Nations Security Council ‘... as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’. Examples include the action taken by an international coalition of member states to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in 1990–91, and the international force to restore order in East Timor in 1999; and

- In exercise of the inherent right of a member state to individual or collective self-defence against armed attack. The definition of self-defence can be somewhat fluid and, at times, has been claimed for actions taken to pre-empt attack or to protect a country’s citizens outside that country’s territory, even where either action has involved violation of another country’s territorial sovereignty.

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² For more coverage of this topic, refer to Australian Defence Force Publication 37—*Law of Armed Conflict*.

³ A third principle, intervention for humanitarian purposes, is emerging in international law but is yet to gain universal acceptance.
In all other situations, member states are obliged to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Such means could include direct negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or an arbitrated or judicial settlement.

Australia is a founding member of the UN, and is legally bound by the provisions of the UN Charter.

How force may be used

Like most international law, LOAC is derived principally from international treaties, customary international law, and the jurisprudence of international tribunals. The main tenets of LOAC have now been incorporated into international treaties. The two strands of international treaty law are:

- the Geneva treaty series, which secures the protection of the victims of armed conflict; and
- the Hague treaty series, which governs the means and methods of armed conflict.

Australia is a party to both series of treaties, and is thus legally bound by them.

An important source of LOAC is the jurisprudence of tribunals such as the International Military Tribunals constituted in the aftermath of World War II for the trial of German and Japanese war criminals. Other, more recent,
examples are the UN tribunals set up to try alleged war criminals from the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. A permanent international criminal court is currently being established.

![Image](image.jpg)

Figure 6–3: The commander of the VRS Drina Corps was convicted of murder and genocide and sentenced by the International Court of Justice to 46 years in prison, after the Balkans conflict

6.25 Some of the key principles of LOAC are:

- **Distinction.** The principle of distinction is that methods, tactics and weapons must distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, and between combatants and civilians. Attacks may only be directed at military objectives and combatants. The principle of distinction also prohibits indiscriminate attacks, such as the launching of Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War in the direction of population centres.
Unnecessary suffering. The principle of unnecessary suffering forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction on enemy combatants that exceeds legitimate military requirements. This principle can apply in one of two ways: first, some weapons are prohibited absolutely, and second, the principle can apply so as to prohibit the use of weapons in a certain way.

Proportionality. The principle of proportionality seeks to strike a balance between the requirements of military necessity and the humanitarian interest of sparing civilians and civilian objects. The principle of proportionality requires that incidental casualties amongst the civilian population, and damage to civilian objects, should not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage resulting from an attack.

The LOAC also deal with such issues as protecting the environment, protection of objects of cultural and historical significance, and the humane treatment of prisoners of war.

USE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

Armed conflict as a political act

While, in one sense, the existence of armed conflict represents a breakdown of normal political relations, in another sense it represents the continuation of political relations, but with the added dimension of armed conflict as a means of achieving political objectives.

Some nation-states, and some non-state actors, are more willing than others to use armed conflict as an instrument of policy. The attractiveness of armed conflict as a policy option varies according to many factors. These include:

- cultural or religious influences involving a high tolerance for, even willingness to, employ violence;
- the financial cost of engaging in hostilities, and the ability to meet that financial cost;
- the vigilance and preparedness of the adversary;
- the likelihood of achievement of objectives by non-violent means;
the habitual propensity to use violence as a means of achieving aims; and

the likely impacts on third parties.

6.29 Armed conflict is not an end in itself. It is a means of achieving national objectives. For most states, the damage, destruction and high cost of armed conflict mean that hostilities are usually an option only if the protection or promotion of some vital national security interest is at stake, and cannot be achieved any other way.

6.30 Australia has a liberal-democratic political system. This fact strongly influences Australia’s general attitude against armed conflict as a means of resolving international disputes, and reinforces Australia’s sense of legal obligation to settle any international disputes peacefully unless forced to do otherwise. Australia’s democratic ethos also reinforces its willingness to meet its collective security responsibilities under the Charter of the UN. The mechanisms that make up Australia’s national political system help to ensure accountability of decision-makers, promote transparency of political decisions, and safeguard against military adventurism.

6.31 The nature of the Australian political system, and of Australia’s political culture, also influence the way Australia would engage in armed conflict. For example, Australia would necessarily conduct military operations with an awareness of the role of the media in shaping public opinion, and of the role of public opinion in shaping policy. National values would require that any military action by Australia subscribed to international laws regulating the conduct of military operations, and that the purposes of these operations, and the means of conducting them, enjoy broad community support.

Defence posture

6.32 ‘Defence posture’ is a term that describes a nation-state’s military capability and orientation in relation to other states. Defence posture encompasses both the objective realities of that state’s military capabilities and activities, and also the perceptions by other states of the potential or actual military threat that capability and orientation pose to them.

6.33 Numerous factors have a bearing on a state’s defence posture, and these can be divided into the physical and political dimensions. The physical dimension includes the level of spending on national defence; the size, composition, training and equipment of the force; location of force elements; and the professionalism, readiness and sustainability of the force. Other factors are technology, education, health, public infrastructure, and the scientific and industrial base. The political dimension relates to a nation’s orientation and intent to apply armed force.
6.34 Australia does not have a militaristic culture, or even a martial tradition, and has no territorial ambitions. Australia’s past military experiences have been aimed at:

- ensuring the protection of Australia and its nearer region (for example, the Pacific Campaign in World War II);
- supporting democracy and regional stability by combating external aggression or internal anti-democratic violence (for example, its involvement in various South-East Asian conflicts since the end of World War II);
- supporting collective defence (for example, its involvement in World War I, and the European and Middle Eastern campaigns in World War II); and
- supporting collective security (for example, its involvement in Korea in 1950–56, the 1990–91 Gulf War, and in Somalia in 1993–94).

6.35 Australia’s Defence posture is an expression of its willingness and ability to defend its population and protect its territorial sovereignty. Although the ADF has a suite of offensive capabilities—particularly in the area of strategic strike—the overall posture is essentially defensive, and is designed to be non-threatening to, and supportive of, other countries in the region. In particular, the ADF’s regional activities are largely designed to underscore Australia’s strong commitment to a partnership approach to regional defence and security issues.
CHAPTER 7
APPLYING MILITARY POWER: STRATEGIC LEVEL CONTROL AND PLANNING ASPECTS

- Government and the responsibility for national Defence.
- Principles and processes governing political oversight of Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- Principles of command and control.
- Strategic level planning issues.
- Rules of engagement (ROE).

Introduction

7.1 In the application of military power in pursuit of national security objectives, it is essential that proper oversight and direction be exercised at all times and at all levels within the ADF. This control is necessary to ensure that the ADF’s operational activities remain consistent with the Government’s policy aims and requirements.

7.2 This chapter outlines the principles and processes governing this oversight and direction of the ADF at the strategic level.

HIGHER–LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL PRINCIPLES AND ARRANGEMENTS

Political/military relationship

7.3 Australian sovereignty is based on a self-governing federation of Australian states, incorporating a constitutional monarchy and liberal-democratic structures and processes. Australia’s system of government is a product both of its history and its national values.

7.4 Within this federal political system, national defence is the constitutional responsibility of the Commonwealth Government. All ADF operations are governed by the cardinal principle of control of the ADF by the civil authority. The ADF is accountable to the Government, and the Government, through the Parliament, is accountable to the people of Australia.
7.5 The relationships between the ADF and the civil authority, and the principal mechanisms by which these relationships are conducted are set out in summary form below.

7.6 Within our democratic system of government, ultimately every person in Defence, whether military or civilian, is answerable to the Minister for Defence, who is an elected representative of the Australian people.

7.7 The constitutional authority for setting strategic and defence policy lies unequivocally with the Parliament and the Executive. In practical terms, this power is exercised by:

- the Cabinet;
- the National Security Committee of Cabinet, usually comprising the Prime Minister (Chairman), the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Treasurer and the Attorney-General; and
- the Minister for Defence, noting that the Minister is subject to decisions of the Cabinet and of the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

7.8 The mechanisms of the Cabinet and the National Security Committee of Cabinet ensure that decisions to deploy the ADF on operations are reached from a whole-of-government perspective.

7.9 Under Section 8 of the Defence Act 1903, the Minister for Defence has general control and administration of the ADF.

7.10 Under Section 9 of the Defence Act 1903, the Governor-General may appoint an ADF officer to be the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The CDF commands the ADF.

7.11 Under Section 9A of the Defence Act 1903, the Secretary of the Department of Defence and CDF jointly administer the ADF, except with respect to matters relating to the command of the ADF and any other matters prescribed by the Minister. The CDF and the Secretary are to exercise their authority subject to, and in accordance with, any directions of the Minister.

7.12 Under Sections 2 and 61 of the Australian Constitution, the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen, and is fully exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative.

7.13 By virtue of Section 68 of the Constitution, command-in-chief of the defence forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative. As Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General acts solely on ministerial advice.
7.14 As mentioned in chapter 6—‘Applying Military Power: Legal and Public Policy Aspects’, Executive power rests with the Government, as elected from time to time. Despite references to the Queen and to the Governor-General and the apparent military command authority provided to the Governor-General, in law the Governor-General is only the titular commander of the ADF. Neither the Queen nor her representative the Governor-General has an Executive role in directing or commanding the ADF.

Principles of command and control

7.15 To ensure that all ADF operations and other activities are conducted with military professionalism and in accordance with Government policy, the ADF has a comprehensive system of command and control.

7.16 The command and control arrangements of the ADF reflect the influence of six fundamental principles of command and control recognised by the ADF. These principles are:

- **Unity of Command.** It is imperative that there be a single, recognised command authority at all times. This principle ensures clarity and simplicity in command arrangements, so that command can be exercised effectively.

- **Span of Command.** In any given situation, there is an optimal range and complexity of subordinate elements that can be commanded effectively. While there is no formula for prescribing what such an optimal span might be, the principle to be observed is that commanders should not be overloaded beyond their capacity to operate and command effectively.

- **Clarity.** The military chain of command requires the commander at each level to respond to directions from his or her higher commander, and in turn issue directions to subordinates; upwards reporting follows the same path in reverse. The key principle is that there should be an unambiguous chain of command.

- **Redundancy.** Alternative commanders and headquarters (as appropriate) must be nominated at all levels of command to provide redundancy in time of war.

- **Delegation of Command.** Underlying this principle is the ADF’s approach of centralised direction and decentralised execution. At all levels of command, subordinate commanders should be given necessary directions and resources to enable them to conduct the...
tasks required of them. Devolution of authority, and cultivation of leadership skills at all levels of the ADF, are vital means of ensuring the future effectiveness of the ADF.

- **Control of Significant Resources.** There are some forces or resources that require special treatment from a command and control point of view because of their wide utility, limited availability, and specialist knowledge requirements (strategic reconnaissance platforms and special forces are examples). Command and control of these designated resources is normally retained at the highest practical level.

- **Obligation to Subordinates.** ADF commanders are obligated to consider the interests of subordinates. This includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

**Strategic-level command and control arrangements**

7.17 The command and control arrangements of the ADF at the strategic level are:

- The CDF commands the ADF and is supported by Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ).

- The Chief of Navy, Chief of Army, and Chief of Air Force command, under CDF, their respective Service elements. (This arrangement is formalised by Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903*).

- The Service Chiefs are responsible to CDF for raising, training, and maintaining their respective Service elements ready for operations, and for advising CDF on defence policy, military strategy, and the employment of their respective Service capabilities and elements.

- CDF may elect to command operations directly, but normally exercises command of ADF operations through the Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST). COMAST is responsible to CDF for the operational-level planning and conduct of ADF campaigns, operations and other activities, unless another operational-level commander is appointed. COMAST is supported by Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST).

- CDF directs the Service Chiefs to assign forces to COMAST for operations as Theatre Commander.

- COMAST may delegate operational authority over forces assigned to him to subordinate commanders.
The Service Chiefs retain administrative authority and responsibility for their respective Service elements, whether or not those elements are assigned for operations.

The Australian Government may direct employment of Australian forces to foreign commanders for combined or coalition operations. The foreign commander is limited to exercising operational control over the assigned Australian forces. These forces remain under national command at all times.

**Chiefs of Service Committee**

**7.18** The Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) is an advisory body to CDF, comprising CDF as chairman, the Secretary, the Service Chiefs and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) as members. CDF may augment COSC by inviting Deputy Secretaries and other appropriate officers for discussion of matters affecting their functional areas of responsibility.

**7.19** COSC advises CDF in discharging his responsibilities to command the ADF and to provide military advice to government. In particular, COSC advises CDF on the approval of strategic-level military strategies and plans, including the assignment of forces and supporting assets to COMAST as Theatre Commander. COSC also advises CDF on a range of longer term issues for the ADF, such as military strategy, capability and force development, mobilisation, and national support arrangements.

**Strategic Command Group**

**7.20** The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is a key advisory group, which provides advice to CDF on strategic-level operational matters. SCG consists of CDF (Chairman); the Secretary; VCDF; Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy (DEPSEC SP); the three single-Service Chiefs: the Head, Strategic Operations Division; the Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation; and other invited guests as appropriate.

**7.21** The role of the SCG is to provide timely military strategic advice to CDF:

- on military response options to present to government in support of national strategic aims and objectives; and
- in directing ADF operations at the strategic level to implement Government direction with regard to military response options.
Strategic Operations Division

7.22 The Strategic Operations Division (SOD) of ADHQ assists CDF in the command and control of the ADF at the strategic level of operations. The Division provides military staff advice to CDF, especially with regard to initial strategic options and the development of strategic military plans. The Division also coordinates the strategic-level command and control of ADF joint and combined operations, and monitors the conduct of, and provides staff advice on, ADF operations from a strategic perspective.

Defence Committee

7.23 The Defence Committee’s role is to make the high-level decisions that assist in achieving the results sought by the Minister and the Government. These decisions embrace the successful joint conduct of military operations (the CDF retaining sole command authority); the provision of capability; timely and responsive defence advice; and proper stewardship of people and resources. The Committee gives direction and monitors performance in delivering those results with a focus on the longer term—five years and beyond.

7.24 The Defence Committee is chaired by the departmental Secretary, and comprises the Secretary, CDF, VCDF, the three Service Chiefs, the Under Secretary Defence Materiel, the DEPSEC SP, the Deputy Secretary Corporate Services, the Chief Finance Officer, the Chief Defence Scientist and the Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security.

STRATEGIC–LEVEL PLANNING

Military planning

7.25 Planning is a function of command at all levels, and is essential for the successful conduct of military operations.

7.26 The essence of planning is the drawing together of ends, ways and means. A good plan will aim to ensure that its desired purpose can be achieved in the optimum way, and with the most efficient use of resources.

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2 The principles and processes involved in strategic-level planning in the ADF are covered in detail in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 9—Joint Planning.
Military planning applies to any given level of conflict and is generally categorised as:

- deliberate planning,
- immediate planning, or
- campaign planning.

Deliberate planning is the process for the development of considered military strategic guidance for the employment of the ADF, to achieve an end-state, in support of Government national strategy. The process is generally free of time constraints. It relies on a mix of assumption-based planning against current strategic guidance and futures analysis to account for possible future strategic environments.

Immediate planning is the time-sensitive planning for the employment of assigned forces and resources that occurs in response to a developing situation that may result in military operations. This planning is informed by the products of deliberate planning, with assumptions and projections replaced with facts as the situation unfolds.

Campaign planning is a process conducted at theatre level that coordinates the sequencing of military operations in order to achieve strategic level objectives.

Good planning requires clear initial guidance, capable planning staff and adequate consultation. Military plans should:

- have a clear, relevant, and achievable aim;
- be disseminated widely enough, and in a timely manner, to ensure that all commanders and their staffs are aware of their responsibilities;
- be clear, so that there is no misunderstanding among those who must execute the plan;
- be flexible, so as to encourage initiative and to allow for unforeseen circumstances; and
- optimise the use of available resources.
Issues in strategic-level planning

7.32 At the military strategic level, the development of military estimates and concepts of operations covers a wide range of considerations—many of them interconnected—including:

- **Military dimension.** This is a central consideration, and the most obvious. It relates to how, in a broad sense, the ADF will apply armed force to achieve the political purpose sought by government.

- **Political dimension.** As emphasised in chapter 2—‘National Security and Military Power’ and chapter 6, the application of military power is a means of protecting national defence and security interests.

- **Legal dimension.** As outlined in chapter 6, the application of military power by the ADF must have a basis in domestic or international law.

- **Financial dimension.** The economic and financial resource costs of applying military force need to be determined as part of the planning process, and may be an important military planning constraint.

- **Sustainment dimension.** The civil/military links and national support arrangements generally, are important in the Australian context as the ADF relies extensively on the services of civilian contractors and on access to community infrastructure. Sustainment is considered in chapter 8—‘Applying Military Power: Preparedness and mobilisation aspects’.

- **Temporal dimension.** In developing strategic plans, the Defence Organisation needs to manage the various dimensions of these plans over an appropriate time scale, covering the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict phases of the application of armed force.

- **International dimension.** The application of military power inevitably affects Australia’s international relations, particularly with Australia’s neighbours and allies. The international dimension requires input not only by Defence, but also other Government Departments, notably the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C).

- **Public affairs dimension.** This is closely related to the political dimension and, to some extent, the sustainment dimension. Community support for military operations is vital and cannot be taken for granted; this aspect is built into the strategic planning process.
7.33 In addressing the military dimension, strategic-level planners need to take into account a wide range of considerations, including the enemy’s:

- perceived objective;
- political, economic and military situation;
- vulnerabilities, especially critical vulnerabilities;
- vital and critical interests; and
- likely courses of action.

7.34 Strategic-level planners likewise need to make assessments of Australia’s own situation and the situation of friendly forces with regard to these considerations. Strategic-level planners need in particular to consider:

- the military objectives;
- the constraints to military operations by the ADF and friendly forces;
- any restrictions imposed upon the use of force; and
- assumptions made and deductions drawn from the analysis of the situation.

**ISSUES IN STRATEGIC–LEVEL CONTROL**

**Accountability and public information**

7.35 Operations involving the ADF will require both the Australian Defence Organisation and the Government to balance the military need for secrecy in the interests of operational security, with the need for openness and accountability in accord with our democratic political system.

7.36 In a liberal-democratic political system, it is essential to maintain an unbreakable link between ADF operations and political control. The latter ultimately must rely on community support.

- Civil political control is essential to provide political and moral legitimacy to ADF operations, to ensure consistency between operations and the political purpose(s) of those operations, and to facilitate the provision of resources needed to carry out the operations successfully.

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3 For more coverage of this topic, refer to ADFP 41—Defence Public Information Policy During Periods of Tension and Conflict.
Community support of ADF operations is crucial because the Government is responsive to the views of the community. Community support is also essential to ensure the maintenance of morale among ADF personnel, and to facilitate national support arrangements to the ADF.

7.37 Accordingly, ADF operations will be carried out with the maximum degree of transparency achievable. However, there will be some restrictions on public reporting to protect the security of ADF operations, the lives of ADF personnel, the confidentiality of associated diplomatic initiatives, and the express requirements of allies and coalition partners.

Rules of Engagement

7.38 ROE are directives that set out the circumstances and limitations within which commanders may apply military force to achieve military objectives in support of government policy. ROE guide the application of force, but in doing so they neither inhibit nor replace the command function. ROE may be used to prohibit or limit certain actions permitted by law. Alternatively, they may be used to authorise actions, to the full extent permissible under international and domestic law.

7.39 The essential point about ROE is that they are a means of ensuring there is appropriate strategic-level control over ADF operations, to ensure consistency with policy objectives and political constraints. At the same time, ROE allow freedom of action to commanders at the operational and tactical levels. Subordinate commanders may impose more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces than those authorised by their ROE, but they may not issue more relaxed ROE. ROE do not limit the inherent rights of unit and individual self-defence.

7.40 ROE are formulated and sought by commanders and staffs at the operational and tactical levels, with further military advice at the military strategic level. ROE are developed around the policy guidance provided by the Australian Government. CDF approves ROE, subject to the general control of the Minister, the National Security Committee of Cabinet, and the Cabinet. In effect, the ROE translate Government policy direction into specific instructions that can be applied by the ADF in the operational environment. ROE must be continually revised to reflect changing military and political circumstances.

4 For more coverage of this topic, refer to ADFP 3—Rules of Engagement.
7.41 ROE for combined and coalition operations are developed in consultation with alliance and coalition partners, as the case may be. Nevertheless, where there is a difference between national and multinational ROE, Australian national ROE always take precedence.

Notes

(a) For example DFAT, PM&C, Attorney-General’s Department, Department of the Treasury.

(b) SCG is an advisory body answering to CDF, and is convened on demand when a security situation is emerging. SCG consists of CDF, Secretary, VCDF, the three service chiefs, DEPSEC SP, Head Strategic Command and Head DIO, plus other invited members as appropriate for the particular situation.

(c) The COSC provides military advice to CDF to assist him in his responsibilities to command the ADF and to provide military advice to
government. It consists of CDF, the Secretary, VCDF and the three service chiefs. Deputy Secretaries and other appropriate officers may be invited to attend meetings as appropriate.

(d) SOD assists CDF in the command and control of the ADF at the strategic level of operations by providing military staff advice, especially with regard to initial strategic options and the development of military strategic plans. SOD also coordinates the strategic-level command and control of ADF joint and combined operations, and monitors the conduct of, and provides staff advice on, ADF operations from a strategic perspective.

(e) Policy, Guidance and Analysis Division

(f) HQAST is commanded by COMAST and comprises a joint staff, three environmental components (Maritime Headquarters, Land Headquarters and Headquarters Air Command) and one specialist component (Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO). Each of the components provides operational advice to COMAST. In certain circumstances, the Commander Special Forces and elements of HQSO may be detached to function independently at the operational level.

(g) Headquarters Northern Command is commanded by Commander Northern Command and normally functions at the regional operational level in northern Australia. It may from time to time also be tasked with tactical-level functions.

(h) The Deployable Joint Force Headquarters is normally a tactical-level headquarters but may be tasked to operate at the operational level, especially if deployed overseas.
CHAPTER 8

APPLYING MILITARY POWER: PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILISATION ASPECTS

• Readiness within the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
• Mobilisation for operations—preparedness, force expansion, conduct of operations and reconstitution of the force.
• Command and control mechanisms for mobilisation within the ADF.
• Sustainment capabilities and use of contractors.
• National infrastructure and industrial base within Australia.

Introduction

8.1 Australia does not maintain a large military force-in-being. In a period of extended peace, the ADF places emphasis on the important long-term task of investing in, and developing, military capabilities to meet significant defence contingencies.

8.2 At any given time, the ADF needs to achieve a given level of readiness, that is, the ability to develop a required level of operational capability within a given time frame. The particular readiness requirement at any time is determined by assessments of the need for the ADF to respond to national defence contingencies, and the expected time frame within which it must deal with these contingencies. Within the ADF, different force elements may have different readiness requirements at any given time.

8.3 High readiness comes at a cost, in particular the cost of investing in and developing future capability. There is thus a trade off between present operational capability and future operational capability; the balance will change according to changes in Australia’s strategic circumstances.

8.4 Readiness refers to the time frame within which the ADF can mount given operations. Sustainability is the ADF’s capacity to continue that operation at the required scale and tempo of activity until the operational objective is achieved. Readiness plus sustainability together provide a measure of the ADF’s preparedness to conduct operations in support of national security objectives.
This chapter outlines some of the considerations involved in harnessing both ADF and non-ADF resources to the task of conducting military operations. These considerations relate especially to the critically important areas of mobilisation of elements of the ADF, or of the whole ADF, to meet readiness requirements, and to conduct operations.

Figure 8–1: There are many aspects to prepaedness all require consideration at the highest levels of government and defence

MOBILISATION FOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONS

Mobilisation is the process of generating military capabilities and marshalling national resources for the conduct of military operations. It is a broad concept, which may encompass activities associated with:

- preparedness of forces to conduct military operations;
- force expansion to conduct operations;
- actual conduct of operations, including sustainment of the force; and
- reconstitution of forces after completing operations.

1 For a more complete coverage, refer to ADFP 4—Preparedness and Mobilisation.

8–2
8.7 In particular, the term ‘mobilisation’ needs to be distinguished from ‘force expansion’, which is the process by which the force-in-being is increased in size, capability, or both, by the acquisition of significant additional personnel, equipment, facilities, or other resources. Mobilisation and force expansion may occur concurrently or as separate processes. For example, force elements may be mobilised to meet a threat that does not require them to expand; conversely, force expansion may occur without a requirement otherwise to mobilise.

8.8 Likewise, the term ‘mobilisation’ needs to be distinguished from notions of work-up. The work-up phase is the time period leading up to the achievement of required readiness levels, where a force or force element moves from its present level of capability (PLOC) to an operational level of capability (OLOC). Work-up is thus a sub-set of the mobilisation continuum.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
NATIONAL SUPPORT—THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II

World War II was the last occasion on which Australian society was placed on a war footing. The extent of the Australian contribution to the international war effort is indicated by the fact that about 550,000 service men and women—one in twelve of the then population of about seven million—served outside Australia in one or other of the forces during World War II. The war imposed extraordinary demands on the Government and people of Australia with regard to the mobilisation of national resources to meet the exigencies of war.

In the late 1930s, when it became increasingly evident that the world was heading towards war, the Australian Government began a program of rearmament to prepare for the coming crisis. Between 1936–37 and 1938–39, the Defence Budget doubled; between 1938–39 and 1939–40, it doubled again. On the eve of the outbreak of war, the Government saw the objective of national planning as having a complete scheme for military, industrial and civil mobilisation in war. Such a scheme would ensure the prompt and controlled use of the nation’s resources when, where and in the manner in which they would be most effective for winning the war.
Command and control mechanisms for mobilisation

8.9 Within the Australian Defence Organisation, the principal lines of authority and responsibility for mobilisation are:

- the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) is responsible for the mobilisation of the ADF for operations;
- the Secretary, Department of Defence, is responsible for providing Department of Defence support to mobilisation activities; and
- the Service Chiefs are responsible to the CDF for the mobilisation of their respective Services to support operations.

8.10 A number of bodies exist in the Defence Organisation to ensure coordination of mobilisation activities, and to provide military strategic options and advice on mobilisation issues. The key bodies are:

- The Strategic Command Group (see chapter 7—‘Applying Military Power: Strategic level control and planning aspects’).
- The Defence Committee (see chapter 7).
- The Strategic Watch Group. This group of senior military officers and Defence officials coordinates the development of mobilisation appreciation’s relevant to Defence contingencies.
- The Defence Mobilisation Committee. The committee is likewise comprised of senior military officers and Defence officials, and provides advice and develops policy on a broad range of mobilisation-related issues, such as reserves and other personnel issues, and logistic, legal and financial considerations.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—(contd)
The complex process of mobilising for war was greatly helped by the existence of comprehensive national planning documents, particularly The War Book of the Commonwealth of Australia. The purpose of the Commonwealth War Book was not to provide a plan for the higher-level conduct of the war, but rather to cover the precautionary measures to be taken when war was imminent, and the measures to be taken immediately after the outbreak of war. The Commonwealth War Book, and other related War Books, ensured the process of mobilisation proceeded in a more orderly, timely and coordinated way than would otherwise have been possible.
8.11 Mobilisation issues are also dealt with, as appropriate, from a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation perspective, using the national security decision-making mechanisms outlined in chapter 7.

AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY AND SUSTAINMENT OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONS

8.12 The enormous distances over which the ADF has to be able to operate, combined with the long lines of resupply both within Australia and also between overseas supply sources and Australia, make sustainment of forces a vital issue for the ADF. Sustainment represents a critical constraint to ADF operations.

Australian Defence Force sustainment arrangements

8.13 The ADF’s sustainment capability consists of:

- sustainment capability organic to the ADF;
- non-organic support provided from the national civil infrastructure, and also from the private sector overall, and the defence industry sector in particular; and
- support provided from international sources, including that inherent in the supply arrangements for ADF weapon platforms, systems and equipment, and supplementary support through resupply arrangements with Australia’s allies.

8.14 Sustainment capability organic to the Australian Defence Force.
The ADF maintains a limited logistic sustainment capability, as an integral part of the ADF. This capability includes stores of equipment, and of consumables such as ammunition, and the means of moving stores to operational units.

8.15 The ADF is changing its logistic support arrangements. The ADF is shedding more and more of its organic logistic support, and is correspondingly relying more on civilian contract arrangements to provide the logistic support necessary for ADF operations. This change requires a partnership between the ADF and its civilian contractors, to ensure robust logistic support to the ADF under even the most extreme contingencies.
8.16 The ADF’s organic sustainment capability may also be considered from a personnel perspective. The ADF’s organic capability to sustain operations, in terms of personnel requirements, depends on its ability to:

- provide individuals to reinforce units;
- provide additional units or sub-units to ‘round out’ existing formations or units; and
- rotate personnel at predetermined intervals.

8.17 National support base. The ADF is heavily dependent on the national civil infrastructure. In times of conflict, the ADF would rely particularly on the national infrastructure for such things as telecommunications, airlift and sea transport, surface transport, electricity and fuel, storage and distribution, internal transport corridors, and medical support.

8.18 Australia has a generally good national infrastructure by regional standards, although the deficiencies in civil infrastructure that do exist, are more pronounced in northern Australia, where the ADF’s preparations for potential operations in the direct Defence of Australia are concentrated. It is vital to the effectiveness of future ADF operations that the ADF have access to the national infrastructure, especially in the areas of transport, communications and medical support.

8.19 The ADF also relies heavily on Australia’s private commercial sector and particularly the national defence industrial base for the provision of consumable defence goods (for example, food, fuel, ammunition) and for maintenance, repair or replacement of equipment resulting from attrition or high levels of usage.
8.20 The ADF’s reliance on civil contractors and the civil infrastructure requires a whole-of-government approach, particularly at the strategic level, to ensure that there is adequate sustainment of the ADF in operations in support of national security.

8.21 International arrangements. Australia has logistic support arrangements in place with a number of overseas countries to help provide the necessary logistic support to the ADF in times of crisis. These arrangements take some pressure off the high stock holding costs (including storage, administration, quality deterioration, obsolescence, and finance costs) which the ADF would otherwise necessarily incur in the absence of such arrangements.

8.22 Nevertheless, foreign political and practical considerations may interfere with the operation of international logistic support arrangements under future defence contingencies. The ADF has no guarantee of timely resupply of critical items under all contingencies, particularly those which may involve a rapid, unforeseen escalation of military activity, or involve our major suppliers in contemporaneous crises.

8.23 Overall, the strong reliance of the ADF on non-military personnel and resources illustrates how the various elements of national power considered in chapter 2—‘National Security and Military Power’ can be brought to bear on a defence contingency to produce a national effort to support Australia’s security interests.

Development of a national approach to defence support

8.24 The Defence Organisation approaches the question of defence support on the premise that the national support base is integral, and critical, to the nation’s defence capability. Effective support for ADF operations requires:

- a robust and resilient national support base;
- strategic-level mechanisms that ensure the ADF has access to the national support base, to facilitate military responses to national security threats; and
- national and defence-level mobilisation planning mechanisms to ensure that the support capabilities of the civil support base are harmonised with the ADF’s organic and international support capabilities.
8.25 An important area of strategic-level mobilisation is the management of forces to be available for reinforcement, rotation or expansion. These forces may be drawn from the full-time component of the force-in-being or, in some cases, also from the part-time, reserve forces. The extent of the available additional forces that can be drawn upon within the required time scales, including relevant equipment, provides a measure of the ADF’s strategic depth in being able to sustain military operations.

8.26 A further, related consideration is the availability of individual training and base support elements to facilitate and enable the expansion of forces to meet operational requirements. These elements are a critical enabling component for the generation and sustainment of forces. These elements also have an expansion and mobilisation underlay of their own. These elements must have the surge capacity to meet the needs of short-notice increases in demand, as well as having the capacity to expand in times of substantial and ongoing demand.

Phases of logistic support

8.27 The type and scale of logistic support for operations depend on both the nature of the operation and the different phases of an operation:

- In the pre-deployment phase, the logistics requirement is the mobilisation of defence-related resources for possible deployment on operations, for example, by prepositioning and stockpiling supplies, fitting equipment to platforms, and activating necessary transport and other contingency plans. This is to ensure that the force elements reach the required level of operational capability in the required time frame.

- In the deployment and operational phases, the logistics requirement is to ensure sustainment of forces through timely and adequate resupply, for example, as consumables are used up, and as attrition of equipment occurs. The history of warfare shows that logistics is a major constraint—perhaps the greatest single constraint—on the conduct of military operations.

- In the redeployment phase, the logistics requirement is the reconstitution of the force, for example, by replenishment of depleted equipment and consumables, repair of damaged equipment, and the disposal of surplus equipment and stores.

8.28 Particularly at the military strategic level, logistic support is closely connected with the successful integration of military and civilian resources and capabilities. Effective mobilisation arrangements and capabilities are important in allowing national leaders and military commanders flexibility in deciding how to respond to crises that might engage the ADF. Also, effective
mobilisation reduces the size and level of readiness of the force-in-being that would otherwise be required to ensure that appropriate military options are available in times of crisis, thus releasing military and non-military resources for other purposes. Investment in mobilisation thus contributes to a nation’s ability to respond to a defence contingency in a timely, cost-efficient and militarily effective, way.
Introduction

9.1 The regional and global strategic environment within which the doctrine covered in this publication must be put into effect is constantly changing. The fluidity of the external environment puts a premium on the ADF’s ability to be flexible and agile.

9.2 To achieve this, the ADF needs to develop and maintain a high level of professional mastery in a wide range of warfighting skills, and in skills at conducting many kinds of military support operations. The ADF also needs to be alert to domestic and international developments as they unfold, so that it can anticipate and assess the military implications of these developments.

9.3 In carrying out the policies and tasks directed by Government, Defence not only needs to display a high level of internal organisation, but also adeptness in operating, cooperating and liaising with a wide range of military and non-military organisations and sectors. These organisations and sectors include Australian private industry (especially defence industry), State and Territory governments, other Commonwealth Government departments and agencies, the general public, the mass media, the defence forces of other nation-states, and supra-national bodies such as the United Nations.

9.4 A mark of the ADF’s flexibility is its ability to offer to the Government a range of options on possible military responses to defence contingencies. The more the ADF is able to do this, the more the Government will be able to respond to such contingencies with the optimum military option (where a military response is appropriate), and be able to deal with a situation with the optimum mix of military and non-military actions.
9.5 Good doctrine and training are essential parts of the development of a flexible and agile defence force. The purpose of doctrine and training is not to produce personnel who respond to situations in a predictable, unimaginative and doctrinaire way. However, in the absence of good doctrine and training, the ADF would risk responding to situations in an entirely intuitive, uninformed way. The purpose of doctrine and training is educate commanders so that they can make timely, well-informed judgments, and exercise initiative and resourcefulness, against the background of a solid understanding of the art and science of military operations.

9.6 In a turbulent world, no nation-state can ‘fireproof’ itself against the threat of external military coercion or attack. But it can maximise its security from such threat by implementing policies and undertaking activities that foster regional security and global security, and by strengthening the domestic factors that influence national security. In particular, a nation-state needs to maintain professional military forces that have an effective military capability.

9.7 As outlined in chapter 2—‘National Security and Military Power’ of this document, the ADF has an important and, in many respects, unique contribution to make in safeguarding and promoting Australia’s national security. The ADF can best maximise its contribution to national security, within available resources, by focusing on the development of professional mastery, especially with regard to warfighting skills. It can also maximise its contribution by ensuring that its personnel, equipment, organisational arrangements and culture, military-political relationships, military-civil relationships, and doctrine, are all developed to, and maintained at, the highest and most relevant levels.
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE HIERARCHY OF DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

Introduction

1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) are promulgated under the authority of the CDF for use throughout the ADF. The CDF may delegate sponsorship and approval of various ADDP to other commanders or executives. The delegation will be based on the subject of the ADDP and where it sits in the hierarchy of doctrine. Doctrine authority delegations, and Defence’s framework for the management and control of joint doctrine publications are outlined in Defence Instruction (General) ADMIN 20–1—Joint Operations Doctrine.

2. The ADDP series is structured into a logical hierarchy of doctrine based on:

   - the division between strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare; and
   - the Common Joint Staff System (CJSS) or ‘J’ staff system.

Description of hierarchy

3. The hierarchy of doctrine is based on the following tiers:

   - Capstone doctrine—strategic level. The capstone doctrine, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine (ADDP–D), sits at the apex of the doctrine hierarchy and is sponsored by Head, Policy, Guidance and Analysis Division and approved by CDF. This publication is the authoritative source from which all ADF doctrine is derived and is concerned chiefly with the strategic level, describing the relationship between national policy and military operations.

   - Keystone doctrine—strategic/operational level. There are eight prime ADDP streams to provide doctrinal guidance for all ADF functions, based on CJSS categorisations (for example the ‘0’ stream deals with executive issues such as Command and Control; the ‘1’ stream deals with personnel issues, etc). At the top of each of these streams sits a ‘keystone’ publication, which provides a philosophical treatment of the topics covered under that doctrine stream.
Application doctrine—operational level. Each prime stream below the ‘keystone level’ contains a series of doctrinal publications concerned with the application of military capability. These publications describe how the ADF prosecutes specific functions and operations—for example, joint planning, information operations.

Single Service publications

4. The hierarchy of doctrine recognises the important role of single Service doctrine developed by and for the Navy, Army and Air Force. These publications cover both the operational and tactical levels of war, and are classified and arranged along functional lines. All single Service doctrine publications are to be consistent with Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine (ADDP–D).

5. Much of the tactical doctrine of the ADF will be promulgated in single Service publications. These publications will be accredited within the ADF hierarchy of doctrine where they are agreed as representing the ADF practice in the subject matter.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNTAC, 1992–1993

Australian involvement in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) grew out of a decade of intense international diplomatic activity in trying to restore representative government in Cambodia, a process in which Australia played a major role. The Australian proposal to establish a United Nations (UN) transitional authority in Cambodia was a key ingredient in allowing a peace settlement acceptable to all factions to occur. The peace settlement was reached at the Paris Conference in October 1991.

UNTAC was given a daunting task. This was to verify the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia; to disarm, demobilise and canton Cambodian factional forces; and monitor the agreed ceasefire. UNTAC temporarily also took over many key areas of civil administration, supervised the return and resettlement of refugees, and the conduct of national elections.

Planning for UNTAC’s mission and deployment of UNTAC personnel and resources were delayed by the competing demands of the crisis in Yugoslavia. An interim operation, the UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), largely staffed by Australian and French personnel, provided good offices and liaison in Phnom Penh in advance of UNTAC’s deployment. UNTAC’s deployment ran from March 1992 to September 1993. Mr Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, headed UNTAC, and the Mission consisted of seven components. The military component was commanded by an Australian, Lieutenant General John Sanderson, and comprised command of 16 000 troops (as at June 1993) drawn from thirty-four national contingents. It was probably the most significant multinational command ever held by an Australian.

The role of the military component changed during the Mission from the demobilising task to provision of security for the electoral process. As commander of the military component, General Sanderson contended with many problems, including inadequate coordination between the civil and military components of UNTAC, and the widely varying capacities of the various military contingents. He also had problems in achieving satisfactory liaison with the Cambodian factions, especially in the face of strong anti-UNTAC propaganda by one faction, the Khmer Rouge.

Apart from providing the commander and some headquarters staff, Australia’s chief contribution to UNTAC was the Force Communication Unit (FCU). This contingent consisted of about five hundred personnel—mostly communications specialists—drawn from all three Services. Australia also
provided other support troops and, during the elections, Army Blackhawk helicopters, another 115 troops and civilian electoral staff to assist with registering voters, supervising polling booths, and counting votes.

The FCU deployed tactical communications systems, initially to support the military component, but later expanded to support all seven components. The FCU worked closely with the Australian company contracted to install a permanent commercial communications system that was to provide the basis of the Cambodian telecommunications infrastructure.

Although factors such as the Khmer Rouge’s abandonment of the peace accords prevented UNTAC achieving various aspects of its original mandate, the operation was successful in conducting free elections, with extremely high voter registration and turn-out. The operation offered Cambodians the prospect of a secure and peaceful future in a way they had not experienced for several decades.

The UNTAC commitment demonstrated the ADF’s ability to play a leading role in UN peacekeeping operations, and demonstrated Australia’s ability to influence regional developments in ways that promote regional peace and stability. The commitment also illustrates how Australia’s military capability and political and diplomatic efforts work together to achieve outcomes that promote and protect Australia’s security interests.
THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA

The ‘knowledge edge’ in military doctrine is not just a matter of knowing something about the enemy that the enemy does not know you know. ‘Knowledge edge’ is about having that combination of intelligence information, training, professional mastery, doctrine and insight into the way the enemy acts and reacts that gives a qualitative advantage over the enemy.

Australian and other Allied forces dramatically demonstrated the importance of having a knowledge edge, in this sense, in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in early 1943.

By monitoring Japanese radio transmissions, Allied intelligence determined that a Japanese convoy would attempt to reinforce Japanese garrisons at Lae and Salamaua in northern New Guinea. The Allies expected the Japanese convoy to sail around the northern coast of New Britain, in either late February or early March.

Based on this intelligence, the RAAF’s Group Captain Bill Garing urged General George Kenney, commander of the Allied Air Force, to mount a massive, combined air strike against the expected convoy. The mission would involve large numbers of different types of aircraft, striking the convoy from many directions at different altitudes.

Coordination of the attack was vital, so the Allies carefully prepared for the mission with detailed planning and rehearsals. On the basis of these rehearsals, Allied commanders adjusted each phase of the planned attack to achieve the desired concentration of force. The operation had to be precisely executed.

The Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight merchant ships left Rabaul just before midnight on 28 February 1943. The convoy carried some 6000 army troops and 400 marines. Allied reconnaissance aircraft detected movement of the convoy on the morning of 2 March, and a RAAF Catalina flying boat tracked the ships’ movements throughout the following night. With precise knowledge of the convoy’s location, ninety Allied aircraft struck the next morning as the Japanese ships rounded the Huon Peninsula.

The strike was a stunning success. For the loss of a few aircraft, the Allies sank twelve of the sixteen enemy ships. Almost 3000 enemy troops were killed in the attack.

The brilliantly conceived and executed operation smashed Japanese hopes of regaining the initiative in New Guinea. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, General Douglas MacArthur, described the operation as ‘the decisive aerial engagement’ of the war in the South West Pacific.
HMAS AUSTRALIA—THE DETERRENT VALUE OF A CAPABILITY EDGE

In the early years of the 20th Century, Germany maintained a formidable naval presence in the Pacific in support of its imperial interests. At the time, Germany also planned for a major confrontation with the British Empire.

In anticipation of this conflict, Germany planned to conduct what the officer commanding the Australische Station (which covered Australia, New Zealand, New Guinea and several Pacific islands) termed in 1901, ‘ruthless warfare’ against Australian harbours and shipping. German Admiralty Staff planning documents made plain that Australasian trade and shipping were to be comprehensively attacked in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The ultimate target of this campaign was not Australia, but Great Britain. Germany calculated that a campaign of harassment and destruction of Australia’s maritime infrastructure and shipping would incense Australian public opinion, forcing Britain to keep warships in Australian coastal waters. By tying down British naval forces in the Pacific, Germany would undermine British naval supremacy in the Atlantic. Moreover, such a campaign would destroy, or at least damage, the economically and strategically important trade between Australia and Great Britain. The German plan was that ‘wool, foodstuffs ... in short, all the products of Australia’ would come into German hands.

The German Navy had high expectations of success, as their cruisers were superior to the British warships on the Australian station. Also, the Australian ships of the then Commonwealth Naval Force were designed for only coastal defence, and were really relics of the colonial era and generally unfit for service.

In 1909, Australia decided to establish its own fleet. The new fleet sailed into Sydney Harbour in October 1913, led by the—at that time, state of the art—battlecruiser, HMAS Australia. Compared to the German warships, HMAS Australia excelled in armament, seakeeping, endurance and speed. The new ship also symbolised Australia’s resolve to protect its maritime domain.

Virtually overnight, Australia had acquired the naval capability to dominate the region and safeguard its national security, as the world slid towards war. The deterrent effect on Germany was immediate and effective. As the commander of the German Squadron remarked, ‘Australia, by itself, is an adversary so much stronger than our squadron that one would be bound to avoid it’.

Consequently, when World War I broke out in August 1914, the Australian Government had the strategic freedom to act in support of national and imperial objectives. Australia’s presence ensured that the German Squadron
did not interfere with Allied operations, and that all German colonies in the Pacific were rapidly annexed by expeditionary forces from Australia and New Zealand. On each occasion, the Australian fleet commander pointed out to the German Administrator the overwhelming force at his disposal, and in most cases the operation was successfully completed without loss of life.

Thereafter, Australian and Allied warships hunted down the German warships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, destroying them or forcing them to flee. With the threat to shipping removed, the way was clear for the unhindered Allied use of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Consequently, between 1915 and 1917, troopships carrying First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) reinforcements to Europe and the Middle East required no naval escorts, a risk that would have been considered unthinkable in 1914.
CYCLONE TRACY—ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

In the early hours of Christmas Day 1974, Tropical Cyclone Tracy devastated Darwin, then a city of nearly 47,000 people.

The cyclone was effectively Australia’s greatest natural disaster. Almost the entire population of an Australian capital city had been made homeless, quite literally overnight. Only about four hundred of the city’s estimated 10,000 buildings remained intact. As well, the city’s water, electricity and sewerage systems were shut down by the cyclone, and all civil communications systems collapsed.

The people of Darwin were at serious physical risk, not only from exposure in the hot, humid conditions, but also from shock, and public health hazards posed by the unsanitary conditions and massive debris. More than sixty people were killed in the cyclone and hundreds were seriously injured; for the survivors there was the threat of further cyclonic activity.

The Commonwealth Government immediately directed that Australia’s full defence resources were to be made available to provide emergency assistance. On 25 December, the Government put the Director-General of the then National Disasters Organisation (at that time part of the Department of Defence), Major-General Alan Stretton, in charge of relief operations, and—temporarily—in control of the city.

For public health and safety reasons, General Stretton ordered the evacuation of all non-essential personnel from Darwin and, by 30 December, more than 25,000 people had been evacuated, using both military and chartered civil aircraft. Normal civil administrative arrangements were restored on 3 January 1975.

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) transport aircraft arrived on the scene in Darwin during the evening of 25 December, carrying surgical teams and medical supplies. These aircraft also began evacuation of seriously injured people, and conducted a massive airlift of essential supplies and personnel into Darwin. On 26 December, Hercules aircraft of Nos. 36 and 37 Squadrons evacuated nearly seven hundred people from Darwin, and on 27 December evacuated more than twelve hundred people. By the end of January 1975, RAAF Hercules aircraft had transported over 8000 people in support of the relief effort. The RAAF used eleven different aircraft types in the Cyclone Tracy relief operation, totalling over 1600 flying hours. The air forces of the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand also provided transport aircraft to assist with the airlift.
Thirteen ships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and nine embarked helicopters were involved in the relief of Darwin. The first group of ships sailed from Sydney on 26 December. The ships carried hundreds of tons of building materials, and electrical and relief stores. All ships reached Darwin by 3 January. Able to operate independently of local support, and hence having no detrimental impact on scarce resources, the ships provided a workforce of some 1200 personnel with a range of specialist skills. Working alongside others involved in the relief operations, the naval personnel worked to clear debris, repair buildings, and restore essential services. The last RAN ships sailed from Darwin on 31 January.

The Army likewise made a significant contribution to the relief operation. In the immediate aftermath of the cyclone, the Army provided important logistic and engineering support, and provided accommodation and rations for the civilian police who were flown to Darwin to augment the local police presence. The Army also provided nearly 19 000 days of accommodation around Australia for Darwin residents who had been evacuated. From late January until early May, the Army provided 650 personnel (taking over from the Navy) to assist with clearing debris and repairing buildings.

Australian Defence personnel and resources from all three Services thus played a valuable role in the overall national response to this natural disaster, and—given the scale and speed of the Defence response—played a critical role in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone.

The Defence contribution to the disaster relief operation in Darwin represented one of the largest military air lift and sea lift operations by Australia since World War II. The Defence involvement after Cyclone Tracy demonstrated that the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force, which are developed and maintained primarily for warfighting purposes, also have the potential to be used powerfully in assisting the civil community in times of crisis.
MANOEUVRE

The Lae-Salamaua campaign in New Guinea in 1943 is a classic example of manoeuvre at the operational level. Following the successful conclusion of the long and expensive Papuan campaign in January 1943, the Australians and Americans were in firm possession of the north coast of Papua. The Japanese, however, still held Salamaua, Lae and the Huon Peninsula further to the west. In February 1943 an Australian brigade repelled a Japanese thrust towards Wau. The Australians were reinforced and began a slow advance overland towards Salamaua. The prospect was for another slow, grinding campaign.

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific Area, ordered a major manoeuvre-based offensive, Operation Cartwheel, that would make use of his naval and air resources. New Guinea Force (mainly Australians) under General Sir Thomas Blamey was to seize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area. Airfields were then to be constructed to support further operations. The American New Britain Force was to occupy western New Britain, thus securing both sides of the Vitiaz Strait so as to allow naval movement into the Bismarck Sea.

In June American forces (under New Guinea Force) landed near Salamaua to assist the Australians, but Blamey directed them not to take Salamaua so as to keep the Japanese there. Then, on 4 September the 9th Australian Division conducted an amphibious landing east of Lae. Next day American paratroops seized the Nadzab airstrip north-west of Lae. The 7th Australian Division was flown in and, with the 9th, converged on Lae. Trapped at Salamaua, the Japanese tried to withdraw, and the Australians took the town on 11 September. Meanwhile, attacked from both sides, the Japanese withdrew from Lae.

With the Japanese off balance, the 7th Division reversed its axis and advanced quickly up the Markham Valley and into the Ramu Valley. An independent company seized Kaiapit in the upper Markham, holding it against a counter-attack until reinforced by an airlifted brigade. On 22 September a brigade of the 9th Division carried out an amphibious assault on Finschhafen, opening the way, after a hard-fought campaign, for the eventual taking of the Huon peninsula coast.

The whole campaign, which ended with the seizure of Madang in April 1944, was a brilliant orchestration of land, sea and air forces. It involved the use of five Australian infantry divisions, two major amphibious landings, an air assault by a US parachute regiment and a further airborne advance by Australians. The campaign was supported directly by air and naval forces, coordinated by Blamey, and was also assisted by a separate major air bombardment campaign.
COALITION OPERATIONS

Australia’s commitment to the Vietnam War of units of all three Services demonstrated the complexity of coalition operations.

The Commander Australian Force Vietnam (COMAFV), located in Saigon, was the national commander, but his Australian forces came under the operational control of American field commanders. COMAFV dealt directly with the commander of US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and also with the South Vietnamese authorities. The Australian contribution was not large enough to give the country a major say in the overall strategy of the war, and the Australians had little influence over the operational concepts used within South Vietnam.

Headquarters MACV exercise operational control directly over the Australian Army Training Team, and over other Australian units through subordinate headquarters. The American 2nd Field Force (a corps level headquarters) had operational control of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) and, through a subordinate US unit, the RAN helicopter flight. 1 ATF had operational control of No 9 Squadron RAAF (helicopters). No 2 Squadron RAAF (Canberra bombers) and No 35 Squadron (Caribous) were under the 7th US Air Force, while the RAN Diving Team came under the commander of US Naval Forces Vietnam. COMAFV continued to exercise operational control of the Australian logistic elements, including the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group and the RAAF contingent at Vung Tau.

The RAN destroyer deployed off the Vietnamese coast to provide gun-fire support came directly under the US Seventh Fleet and was not under COMAFV. The US Seventh Fleet did not report to the Commander MACV but to the Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet.

Further complexity was added by the need to cooperate with South Vietnamese authorities. Operations in Phuoc Tuy Province came under a South Vietnamese provincial chief except for those in the designated 1 ATF area, which were directed by the Commander Second Field Force. The Australians had advisers and liaison officers with the South Vietnamese in the province and, when operations went into the more populated area, they had to be coordinated with the South Vietnamese.

The operations of the Canberra bombers were made more complex because they were not permitted by the Australian Government to operate across South Vietnam’s borders. Individual RAAF officers also served as forward air controllers and with US Phantom squadrons, but faced similar restrictions to those applying to the Canberra bomber operations.
While the Australians had to operate in a substantially US command framework, they had under them various New Zealand components that had to operate in an Australian command framework. For example, at its peak 1 ATF included three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, an SAS squadron, an APC squadron and a tank squadron. There was usually a New Zealand infantry company (sometimes two) in one of the Australian infantry battalions which then became an ANZAC battalion. Within the SAS squadron there was a New Zealand troop, while a New Zealand artillery battery operated as part of an Australian field regiment.

Operations with the Americans demanded an understanding of US procedures and ability to communicate with them. By operating in Phuoc Tuy Province the Australians were able to use their own tactics and concepts. When they worked with the Americans they generally had to adopt American operational concepts, if not necessarily American tactics. The problems of interoperability were assisted by the fact that the Australian and Americans spoke (almost) the same language. The Americans were able to provide certain classes of ammunition and supplies (on payment), thereby reducing the Australian logistic burden.

These command and control arrangements, while necessary in a coalition setting, added a further layer of complexity to an already challenging operational environment. The potential complexity of coalition operations generally, underscores the importance to the ADF of developing and testing its interoperability arrangements and procedures with allies and other defence partners in peacetime, so as to allow more effective coalition operations in times of conflict.
NATIONAL SUPPORT—THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II

World War II was the last occasion on which Australian society was placed on a war footing. The extent of the Australian contribution to the international war effort is indicated by the fact that about 550,000 service men and women—one in twelve of the then population of about seven million—served outside Australia in one or other of the forces during World War II. The war imposed extraordinary demands on the Government and people of Australia with regard to the mobilisation of national resources to meet the exigencies of war.

In the late 1930s, when it became increasingly evident that the world was heading towards war, the Australian Government began a program of rearmament to prepare for the coming crisis. Between 1936–37 and 1938–39, the Defence Budget doubled; between 1938–39 and 1939–40, it doubled again. On the eve of the outbreak of war, the Government saw the objective of national planning as having a complete scheme for military, industrial and civil mobilisation in war. Such a scheme would ensure the prompt and controlled use of the nation’s resources when, where and in the manner in which they would be most effective for winning the war.

The complex process of mobilising for war was greatly helped by the existence of comprehensive national planning documents, particularly The War Book of the Commonwealth of Australia. The purpose of the Commonwealth War Book was not to provide a plan for the higher-level conduct of the war, but rather to cover the precautionary measures to be taken when war was imminent, and the measures to be taken immediately after the outbreak of war. The Commonwealth War Book, and other related War Books, ensured the process of mobilisation proceeded in a more orderly, timely and coordinated way than would otherwise have been possible.

As the war progressed and the strategic situation gradually improved, the Government had to make adjustments to keep the war effort within the Commonwealth’s physical capacity. For example, in the latter part of 1943, the War Cabinet decided to divert labour resources from the production of surpluses to the production of items in short supply. Thus, for example, the Army demobilised 20,000 personnel over a period of months, and the munitions and aircraft industries also released 20,000 people, for redeployment to rural industries and food processing. In the closing stages of the war, Australia became a major supplier, especially of food, for the Allied war effort, and national management decisions increasingly focused on the needs of Australia’s post-war economy.
GLOSSARY

The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are source documents. The source documents used are:

- ADFP 101—Australian Defence Force Publication 101—Glossary
- BMD—British Military Doctrine
- US NDP 1—United States Naval Doctrine Publication 1
- MS—Australian Defence Force Military Strategy Glossary of Terms

Administration

1. The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management.
2. Internal management of units (ADFP 101).

Armed Conflict

Conflict between States in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims. It may also embrace conflict between a State and organised, disciplined and uniformed groups within the State, such as organised resistance movements (ADFP 101).

Assigned Forces

Forces in being which have been placed under the operational command or operational control of a commander (ADFP 101).

Attrition

The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel (ADFP 101).

Attrition Warfare

The application of overwhelming combat power that reduces the effectiveness of an enemy’s ability to fight through his loss of personnel and materiel (US NDP 1).

Battlespace

All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of influence and area of interest (US NDP 1).

Campaign

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space (ADFP 101).
Capstone Doctrine
The single, foundational doctrine publication which sits at the apex of the doctrine hierarchy, and from which all other doctrine is derived.

Coalition Operation
Military operations conducted in conjunction with, or in support of, the military forces of one or more other nations, which may include formal alliance partners (MS).

Coercion
The use of force, or the threat of force to persuade an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour, against his wishes (BMD).

Collateral Damage
Incidental damage to persons, objects or locations arising out of combat action against a legitimate military objective (ADFP 101).

Collective Defence
Where two or more sovereign states form a system of international organisation directed against threats to a specified area from an outside source, and intended as a system of self-defence, not as a system to keep the peace anywhere it happens to be threatened.

Collective Security
Where a group of sovereign states form a general system of organisation designed to deal with peace as an indivisible entity, and therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire group of states, which must agree in advance both to react to such a threat and how to react against it.

Combat Power
The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time (ADFP 101).

Combat Service Support
The support supplied to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics (ADFP 101).

Combined Operation
An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission (ADFP 101).
Command
The authority which a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel (ADFP 101).

Common Security
Where two or more sovereign states form a system of international organisation designed to preserve peace by reducing international tension, assisting transparency and providing a forum where common security issues can be aired and discussed openly.

Conflict
See Armed Conflict.

Control
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated (ADFP 101).

Deterrence
The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction (ADFP 101).

Doctrine
Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application (ADFP 101).

End-state
The set of desired conditions which will achieve the strategic objectives (ADFP 101).

Formation
1. An ordered arrangement of troops and/or vehicles for a specific purpose.
2. An ordered arrangement of two or more ships, units or aircraft proceeding together (ADFP 101).
**General War**
A conflict between major powers in which their large and vital interests, perhaps even survival are at stake (BMD).

**Insurgency**
An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (ADFP 101).

**Intelligence**
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity (ADFP 101).

**Interoperability**
The ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together (ADFP 101).

**Joint**
Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate (ADFP 101).

**Keystone Doctrine**
The principal doctrine publication in each doctrine series. Keystone publications support the capstone doctrine, and provide a framework for all subordinate doctrine publications in that series.

**Logistics**
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel;
b. movement, evacuation and hospitalisation of personnel;
c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and
d. acquisition or furnishing of services (ADFP 101).
Manoeuvre
1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
2. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (ADFP 101).

Manoeuvre Warfare
A philosophy that seeks to collapse the enemy’s cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation, with which he cannot cope (US NDP 1).

Military Doctrine
See Doctrine.

Military Strategy
That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations (ADFP 101).

Mission
1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task (ADFP 101).

Mobilisation
1. The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources.
2. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organising personnel, supplies and materiel for active military service (ADFP 101).

Mobility
A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission (ADFP 101).

National Security
The ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders (ADFP 101).
Offensive Operations
Military operations conducted for the purpose of seizing or retaining the initiative (MS).

Operational Authority
1. The authority granted to a commander to use the operational capability of a unit to undertake his mission. This authority is granted without qualification and is described as either operational command or operational control (q.v.).
2. In naval usage, a flag officer or senior officer exercising operational control over one or more ships (ADFP 101).

Operational Command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander (ADFP 101).

Operational Control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control (ADFP 101).

Operational Level of Conflict
The operational level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations (ADFP 101).

Operation
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign (ADFP 101).

Peace Enforcement
A coercive instrument of international order whereby the United Nations (UN) sanctions military force in accordance with chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
Peacekeeping
A non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate, international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties, in an impartial, non-combatant manner, to implement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid operations (ADFP 1).

Regional Conflict
A conflict where the fighting is contained within a particular geographic area. Its political and economic effects, however, may reverberate further afield and there may be involvement from beyond the region, such as the supply of military equipment, advisers and/or volunteers by third parties (BMD).

Reserve Forces
Personnel, units or formations earmarked for future use on mobilisation or against an operational requirement, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement (ADFP 101).

Security
1. Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, annoyance or surprise.
2. A condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition which deters unauthorised persons from attempting to gain access to official matter affecting national security (ADFP 101).

Spectrum of Conflict
The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war (BMD).

Staff
The body of military professionals who support a commander in his or her estimation of a situation, and in formulating and executing subsequent plans, orders and activities.

Strategic Level of Conflict
The strategic level of conflict is that level of war which is concerned with the art and science of employing national power (ADFP 101).

Strike
An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective (ADFP 101).
Surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means (ADFP 101).

Tactical Level of Conflict
The tactical level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of battle and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives (ADFP 101).

Tempo
The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations (BMD).

Terrorism
The use or threatened use of violence for political ends, or any use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear (ADFP 101).

Theatre
A designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operation (ADFP 101).

Unit
Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organisation and equipment; specifically, part of an organisation (ADFP 101).
**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADHQ</td>
<td>Australian Defence Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Australia's Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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<td>CJSS</td>
<td>Common Joint Staff System</td>
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<td>COMAST</td>
<td>Commander, Australian Theatre</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMNORCOM</td>
<td>Commander, Northern Command</td>
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<td>COSC</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>CSIN</td>
<td>Contributing to the Security of the Immediate Neighbourhood</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Defending Australia</td>
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<td>DACC</td>
<td>Defence Assistance to the Civil Community</td>
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<td>DFACA</td>
<td>Defence Force Aid to Civilian Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>DJFHQ</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>HQAC</td>
<td>Headquarters, Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQAST</td>
<td>Headquarters, Australian Theatre</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQNORCOM</td>
<td>Headquarters, Northern Command</td>
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<td>HQSO</td>
<td>Headquarters, Special Operations</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>LHQ</td>
<td>Land Headquarters</td>
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<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>MHQ</td>
<td>Maritime Headquarters</td>
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<td>MRO</td>
<td>Military Response Option</td>
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<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategic Objective</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLOC</td>
<td>Operational level of capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGA</td>
<td>Policy, Guidance and Analysis Division (In ADHQ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLOC</td>
<td>Present level of capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM&amp;C</td>
<td>Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNT</td>
<td>Peacetime National Tasks</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SOD</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Command Group</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCDF</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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