



# **AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION**

**OPERATIONS SERIES**

**ADFP 4**

**PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILISATION**

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# AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION

## OPERATIONS SERIES

### PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILISATION

Australian Defence Force Publication 4 (ADFP 4)—*Preparedness and Mobilisation*, is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This edition supersedes ADFP 4, first edition June 1995; all copies of which should be destroyed in accordance with current security instructions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C.A. Barrie'.

C. A. BARRIE  
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05 October 2000



## FOREWORD

1. Australian Defence Force Publication 4 (ADFP 4)—*Preparedness and Mobilisation* outlines the principles and guidelines for preparedness and mobilisation planning in the Australian Defence Force. The content of this edition has been developed from established principles, and lessons learnt during major exercises and operations. An important input has been the constructive feedback provided by the intended users of this publication.
2. ADFP 4 is intended to apply to all levels of conflict and within all joint and Service headquarters. ADFP 4 should be read in conjunction with ADFP 9—*Joint Planning*.
3. It is acknowledged that the concepts and processes described in this edition of ADFP 4 are embryonic, and that Australian doctrine will require review and amendment over ensuing years. Users of this publication are requested to constructively review its content, applicability and currency. If deficiencies are found, amendment action should be taken. Proposals for change should be forwarded to the Current Capability Guidance staff in Australian Defence Headquarters. It is planned that a refined edition be published in 2002/03.
4. ADFP 4 is not to be released to foreign countries without the written approval of Head Capability Systems.







## AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATIONS—OPERATIONS SERIES

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

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# Symbols of Protection



Distinctive Sign of:	Sign	Application/ Explanation
Civilian and Military Medical Units & Religious Personnel  International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949) (Protocols I & II, 1977)		Used as a symbol to protect medical units including field hospitals, transports, medical and religious personnel.  Protective emblem of ICRC delegates in conflicts.  Used to indicate activities of National Societies, such as the Australian Red Cross Society. In times of conflict, a National Society can only use the emblem as a protective sign if they are an official auxiliary to the medical services of the armed forces.
Civil Defence (Protocol I, 1977)		Used as a symbol to protect personnel and equipment engaged in providing assistance to civilian victims of war. The symbol is used by personnel such as firefighters, police and emergency rescue workers.
Cultural Property (The Hague Convention of 1954) (Protocol I, 1977)		Provides general protection to places and object of cultural significance. Special protection for places that are registered with UNESCO e.g. churches, archaeological sites, monuments and museums.
Dangerous Forces (Protocol I, 1977)		Provides specific protection to works or places that may contain dangerous forces e.g. dams or atomic reactors.

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## CHAPTER 1

# PREPAREDNESS CONCEPTS

### INTRODUCTION


**1.1** The Australian Defence Force (ADF) mission is to prevent or defeat the use of armed force against our country and its interests. To achieve this mission Defence develops military capabilities which enable the Government to apply military power when required.

**1.2** Military Capability is achieved by developing a force structure appropriately prepared for operations. Preparedness is therefore of fundamental importance to Defence, and Defence must be able to manage it effectively and communicate its status to Government.

**1.3 Purpose.** The purpose of this chapter is to describe Preparedness concepts.

### MILITARY CAPABILITY


**1.4** Military Capability is the combination of Force Structure and Preparedness which enables the nation to exercise military power ([figure 1-1](#)).



**Figure 1-1: Components of Military Capability**

#### Levels of Military Capability

**1.5** The two levels of Military Capability specified for forces within the ADF are derived from the concept of maintaining forces at an appropriate minimum level of capability during peace, and ensuring that those forces are ready to work-up to an appropriate higher level of capability, within a given time frame, in order to conduct operations effectively. These two levels of capability are respectively the Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC) and the Operational Level of Capability (OLOC). The actual level of capability of a force varies, and is referred to as the Present Level of Capability (PLOC). The relationship between the levels of capability is illustrated in [figure 1-2](#).



**Figure 1-2: Relationship between the levels of capability**

**1.6 OLOC.** OLOC is the task-specific level of capability required by a force to execute its role in an operation at an acceptable level of risk. A force is at OLOC when it has the necessary resources and is sufficiently trained to perform its operational tasks. For a force to **achieve** and **sustain** OLOC:

- a. its workforce entitlement must be sufficiently filled with appropriately trained personnel,
- b. its equipment entitlement must be sufficiently available and serviceable,
- c. its facilities entitlement must be sufficiently available and serviceable,
- d. operational proficiency standards must have been achieved, and
- e. all necessary resources to sustain operations for the defined Sustainability Period must be either available or able to be made available.

**1.7** The maintenance of a force at OLOC for a prolonged period is resource intensive. A clear understanding of the implications is required before a force is raised to OLOC during peace.

**1.8 MLOC.** MLOC is the lowest level of capability (task specific) from which a force element can achieve its OLOC within Readiness Notice. Readiness Notice is the specified amount of time in which a force is to complete its work-up from MLOC to OLOC. MLOC of a force is derived from its OLOC and Readiness Notice, and encompasses the maintenance of core skills, safety and professional standards. For a force to maintain MLOC:


- a. its MLOC workforce entitlement must be sufficiently filled with personnel appropriately trained to commence work-up training;
- b. its MLOC equipment entitlement must be sufficiently available and serviceable for use during work-up training;
- c. its MLOC facilities entitlement must be sufficiently available and serviceable for use during work-up training;
- d. proficiency levels must encompass the full range of military skills that a force is required to perform on operations, and enable minimum role capability and core skills to be maintained;
- e. resources and training support must be available in time to meet work-up training requirements; and
- f. Operational Viability Resources (OVR), which are those resources necessary to sustain the initial period of operations until a complete logistic system is in place, must be available before deployment.

**1.9 PLOC.** PLOC is the actual level of capability of a force at any given time. PLOC will vary above and below MLOC depending on the availability of resources and the proficiency of a force to conduct operations. Preparedness is managed during peace to maintain PLOC as close as possible to MLOC.

**1.10** Achievement of the desired level of Military Capability requires an appropriate balance between Force Structure and Preparedness, which is discussed in succeeding paragraphs. The relationship between the levels of capability and mobilisation is discussed in [chapter 3—‘Mobilisation’](#).

## FORCE STRUCTURE

**1.11** Force structure is the force-in-being that would be required to achieve OLOC in terms of equipment, personnel and facilities. Force Structure planning is based on the OLOC workforce entitlement, the OLOC equipment entitlement, and the facilities, infrastructure and doctrine necessary for the force-in-being to achieve OLOC. The components of Force Structure are illustrated in [figure 1-3](#).




**Figure 1-3: Components of Force Structure**

**1.12** In the medium to long term, Military Capability will vary due to changes in Force Structure generated by the Capability Development Process, which is described in VCDF Minute 199 of 1999 (Practice and Process for Developing Capability) dated 28 Jul 99.

**1.13** In the short term, Force Structure is the more constant component of Military Capability, and the level of capability available for operations is determined by Defence’s management of Preparedness. To enable Defence to manage its Preparedness effectively, Preparedness concepts, described in this chapter, and the Preparedness Management System, described in [chapter 2—‘The Preparedness Management System’](#), have been developed.

## PREPAREDNESS

**1.14** Preparedness is a measurement of how ready and how sustainable the whole or part of the ADF is to undertake military operations. It describes the combined outcomes of Readiness and Sustainability as illustrated in [figure 1-4](#).




**Figure 1-4: Components of Preparedness**

### Readiness

**1.15** Readiness denotes a force's ability to be committed to operations within a specified time. Readiness refers to the availability and proficiency/serviceability of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables as illustrated in [figure 1-4](#).

**1.16 Readiness Lead Time.** Readiness Lead Time is the actual time a force requires to complete its work-up from PLOC to OLOC, as illustrated in [figure 1-5](#). If Preparedness is managed poorly, Readiness Lead Time will exceed Readiness Notice (RN) and a force is unlikely to achieve OLOC within RN.




**Figure 1-5: Readiness Notice compared to Readiness Lead Time**

**1.17 Readiness Resources.** Readiness Resources are those resources required to maintain a force at MLOC, work-up to OLOC, and conduct self-sustaining operations, after deployment, until a logistic system to support the deployment is in place. The period between deployment on operations and the activation of the deployment logistic system is designated the *Operational Viability Period (OVP)*, and the resources required during this period are OVR. Readiness Resources need to cater for a period, or periods, of combat during the OVP.

**1.18 Changes to Readiness.** A change to RN will initiate a change to a force's MLOC, and can be used as a mechanism to prioritise the allocation of resources. Before reducing a force's RN to raise its MLOC, the resources necessary to facilitate the change must be identified and available. When a force is unable to overcome resource deficiencies, RN must be increased to compensate.

### Sustainability

**1.19** Sustainability denotes a force's ability to continue to conduct operations. It is measured in terms of the personnel, equipment, facilities and the consumables necessary for the force to complete its assigned operational tasks. Sustainability resources do not include OVR which, although directly related to the conduct of operations, are accounted for under Readiness Resources. The sustainability period commences at the end of the OVP and finishes when operations cease. The planned period of operations for a force includes at least one period in combat, as illustrated in [figure 1-6](#).



**Figure 1-6: Resource consumption during the Period of Operations**

**1.20** Sustainability requirements are determined by the nature and duration of operations. Planning for sustainability is based on operational assessments of the activity levels and usage rates for planned periods of operations and combat. However, once a force is committed to operations, all aspects of its sustainability will be affected by the unpredictable nature of operations.

#### **Preparedness Resources in retrospect**

**1.21** Resource availability is crucial to the preparation of a force for operations and therefore to the level of a force's preparedness. Forces cannot be considered to be fully prepared for operations until the resource requirements related to both their readiness and sustainability are met.

**1.22** The Period of Operations equates to the Operations Phase of the Mobilisation Continuum described in [paragraph 3.18](#).

## CHAPTER 2

# THE PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

## INTRODUCTION

**2.1** Preparedness planning focuses on the preparation of the force-in-being for operations. It is undertaken to ensure that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is able to:

- a. effectively work-up the force-in-being, or elements of it, to conduct military operations;
- b. sustain forces committed to operations or peacetime tasks;
- c. maintain safety standards and undertake peacetime tasks that may be directed by the Government; and
- d. maintain its regional credibility as a Defence Force.


**2.2** Successful mobilisation is contingent upon well managed preparedness. Mobilisation is described in [chapter 3—‘Mobilisation’](#).

**2.3 Purpose.** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Preparedness Management System.

## PREPAREDNESS AS PART OF MILITARY CAPABILITY

**2.4** The establishment of an effective military capability involves the development of the optimum force structure for the future and the maintenance of appropriate levels of preparedness of the force-in-being. The Capability Development Process develops the force structure for the future, and the Preparedness Management System provides the mechanism to ensure that the force-in-being maintains appropriate current levels of preparedness.

**2.5** Government strategic policy defines Defence requirements for the security of Australia and its interests, and provides the basis for the conduct of strategic appreciations and the development of operational plans. Government resource allocation provides Defence with the means to develop ADF capabilities and maintain the preparedness of the force-in-being. A broad outline of the Capability Development Process and the Preparedness Management System, and their relationship to each other, is illustrated in [figure 2–1](#).



**Figure 2–1: Capability Development Process and Preparedness Management System relationship**


**2.6** There is a direct link between the Capability Development Process and the Preparedness Management System. Changes to force structure usually impact on the preparedness of the associated forces. For example, the introduction of a new capability, retirement of an old capability, or capability enhancement will have a direct impact on the resource, training and facility requirements of the forces involved.

**2.7** The remainder of this chapter addresses the Preparedness Management System.

## THE PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN OVERVIEW

**2.8** The Preparedness Management System, illustrated in [figure 2-2](#), involves three distinct phases: the Development of Preparedness Objectives, the Implementation of Preparedness Objectives, and the Evaluation and Reporting of Preparedness. In general terms, the system commences with the conduct of a strategic level appreciation that leads to the development of a strategic preparedness directive. On receipt of the strategic preparedness directive, operational level planners conduct 'scoping' activities that lead to the development of an operational preparedness directive that incorporates detailed operational preparedness *objectives*. On receipt of the operational preparedness directive Service preparedness directives incorporating detailed Service preparedness requirements are produced. Preparedness objectives and requirements are specified to ensure that appropriate capabilities are maintained at appropriate levels of preparedness to meet the requirements of the strategic and operational preparedness directives. Other Executives also produce preparedness directives to ensure that they are appropriately prepared to support the ADF's strategic and operational planning and preparedness requirements.

**2.9** The implementation of preparedness involves the allocation of resources to the force-in-being to ensure that preparedness objectives can be met and properly managed. The evaluation and reporting of preparedness ensure that there is regular feedback in the process, and that preparedness objectives and/or resource allocations are refined as necessary. The management of preparedness is a dynamic process that is continually evolving. The force-in-being is prepared for operations against this planning background.



**Figure 2-2: The Preparedness Management System**

**2.10** Subsequent paragraphs address the phases of the Preparedness Management System.

## DEVELOPMENT OF PREPAREDNESS OBJECTIVES

### Strategic appreciation

**2.11** The Preparedness Management System commences with the conduct of a strategic appreciation by Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) (Strategy staff). The strategic appreciation involves an analysis of the National Security Objectives (NSO) which are specified in Government guidance. The NSO are analysed in the light of current strategic circumstances and Defence policy. The principal product of the strategic appreciation process is the development/refinement of military strategies to achieve the NSO.

**2.12** For preparedness planning, the key outputs of the strategic appreciation process are the Military Strategic Objectives (MSO) and the Military Response Options (MRO) which are derived from the military strategies. The MSO and MRO provide the foundation for the development and conduct of the Preparedness Management System.

### Chief of the Defence Force's Preparedness Directive

**2.13** The development of the Chief of the Defence Force's Preparedness Directive (CPD) involves the compilation of the MSO, MRO and supporting preparedness parameters into Strategic Preparedness Planning Guidance (SPPG). The SPPG, together with a preamble which directs Executive managers to meet specified levels of preparedness, form the basis of the CPD.

**2.14** The CPD is the principal executive document in the Preparedness Management System. It is a strategic level document, the purpose of which is to direct the preparedness requirements of the force-in-being. It also outlines preparedness planning guidance, preparedness reporting requirements and subordinate preparedness directive requirements. The principal recipients of the CPD are Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), the Service chiefs and Commander Joint Logistics (CJL).

### The Operational Preparedness Directive

**2.15** On receipt of the CPD, COMAST 'scopes' the MRO from an operational perspective to determine more-detailed preparedness requirements. These requirements are expressed in the form of Operational Preparedness Objectives (OPO), which define the force elements, roles, associated Readiness Notices (or Notices to Move), and Sustainability Periods that are likely to be required to execute the MRO. The OPO, together with a preamble that directs Component Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders, form the basis of the Operational Preparedness Directive (OPD).

**2.16** The indicative operational sustainability requirements are then further developed with scenario based planning which must be conducted in close consultation with Joint Logistics staff and the Service Headquarters. The OPD is ultimately endorsed by CDF and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

### Executive preparedness directives

**2.17** Executive preparedness directives are developed on receipt of the CPD and draft OPD. The Service chiefs produce Service Preparedness Directives (SPD) to ensure that the CPD and OPD are implemented efficiently and effectively. The OPD and SPD are the principal documents that guide the implementation of preparedness at the operational level. SPD are tailored to Service needs and may not include preparedness objectives. The OPD and SPD will usually be finalised concurrently.

**2.18** Other Executive managers produce preparedness directives to ensure that COMAST's and the Service Chiefs' preparedness requirements can be effectively supported.

## IMPLEMENTATION OF PREPAREDNESS OBJECTIVES

**2.19** All Defence Executives contribute to the Preparedness Management System. Generally, however, one Executive is allocated as the lead Executive for each area of responsibility. Oversight of each area of responsibility is shared with Defence headquarters, which retains responsibility for overall coordination and joint policy. Executive managers retain responsibility for preparedness planning within their respective Executives. [Figure 2-3](#) summarises areas of responsibility and responsible organisations.

Responsibility	Executives														
	ADHQ (including VCDF and CKO)	COMAST	Navy	Army	Air Force	Int	MAT (USM)	JET	DPE	IG	S&T	SMS	PACC	CS	Fin (CFO)
C <sup>2</sup>	L	L	C	C	C	C	P	P	P	C	C	C	C	P	C
Raise, Train, Maintain/Sustain	C	C	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	P	P	P	P	C	C
Capability Development	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	P	C	C	C	C	P	P	C
Infrastructure	L	P	P	P	P	C	C	P	P	P	P	P	P	L	C
Finance	C	P	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	P	P	C	L
Science & Technology	C	P	C	C	C	P	C	P	P	C	L	P	P	P	C

**Key**

- L Denotes organisations that have the *lead* and executive responsibility.  
 C Denotes organisations that actively *contribute*.  
 P Denotes organisations that *participate* routinely but are not actively engaged.

**Figure 2-3: Preparedness planning responsibilities**

**2.20** The Service chiefs are responsible for the implementation of preparedness prior to assignment of forces to COMAST. COMAST is responsible for the implementation of preparedness for forces once they have been assigned. CDF exercises command of operations through COMAST who, in conjunction with the Service chiefs, is responsible for the implementation of the joint aspects of preparedness. CJL is responsible for the implementation of the materiel aspects of both single Service and joint preparedness.

**2.21** The Implementation Process involves:

- ensuring an adequate and appropriately skilled workforce is available;
- ensuring adequate and serviceable equipment is available;
- ensuring adequate and serviceable facilities are available;
- ensuring adequate resources are available to maintain Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC);
- undertaking training activities to ensure MLOC is maintained;
- ensuring resources are available for forces to transition from their Present Level of Capability to their Operational Level of Capability when required; and
- ensuring sustainability resources are planned for and will be available when required.

**EVALUATION AND REPORTING OF PREPAREDNESS**

**2.22** Preparedness is evaluated to determine whether forces are able to achieve the preparedness requirements specified in the relevant preparedness directives. Evaluation may lead to a refinement of preparedness objectives and/or an adjustment of associated resources. Evaluation is based on the measurement of a force's preparedness level. Measurement focuses on the readiness and sustainability aspects of a force's personnel, equipment, facilities, training and consumable resources. *The*

*measurement of a force's preparedness is determined by comparing available resources and present levels of proficiency with those required for the force's specified level of capability.* Commanders will make judgments when assessing their forces' levels of proficiency. Preparedness objectives serve as performance indicators for the evaluation and reporting of preparedness.

**2.23** The CPD and Executive preparedness directives specify preparedness reporting requirements. Preparedness is reported as part of the Capability Assessment Reporting (CAR) process, which requires all Executive managers to report the salient aspects of their Executive's capabilities in terms of force structure, *preparedness*, resources and vision. COMAST submits a separate capability/preparedness report, the Joint Operational Capability Report, which will include a performance statement of the ADF's ability to achieve the MSO/MRO listed in the CPD. Input from the Service chiefs' CAR will be incorporated as appropriate. The Service chiefs' CAR will include an assessment of the preparedness of their forces to undertake assigned OPD tasks, and will be based in part on information provided by other Executives. The Service chiefs will also report on the preparedness of their forces that are not assigned to OPD tasks. The Service chiefs' CAR are paramount in this process because the Services control the majority of forces prior to commitment to operations. Owner Support and Enabling Executive managers will also report the status of their respective Executive's preparedness and the ability of their Executive to support the ADF's preparedness requirements. Defence Headquarters consolidates CAR before presentation to the Defence Committee (DC). The DC's consideration of the consolidated CAR forms the basis of Defence's reporting to Government on ADF preparedness.

**2.24** In addition to the CAR requirement, COMAST and the Service chiefs will report, on occurrence, any significant inability to meet their preparedness responsibilities.

**2.25** **Rectification of preparedness deficiencies.** As a general rule, preparedness deficiencies will be rectified at the lowest possible level. Those deficiencies which cannot be rectified at the operational level will be referred to ADHQ (Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) or Service Headquarters as appropriate) for resolution. DC endorsement (sponsored by VCDF or the relevant Service chief) of proposed solutions may be required to rectify those preparedness deficiencies that are referred to the strategic level.



## CHAPTER 3

# MOBILISATION

### INTRODUCTION

**3.1** The effective implementation of military strategies derived from Australia's security posture will depend on the nation's mobilisation capacity. Australia's ability to rapidly increase the preparedness of part or all of the Defence Force and to surge the capacity of industry to support higher levels of Defence preparedness are critical components of the mobilisation process.

**3.2** The nation's ability to mobilise in response to a contingency is a principal focus for national security planning. Defence's ability to mobilise is the foundation for all Defence planning activity.

**3.3 Purpose.** The purpose of this chapter is to describe mobilisation concepts, principles and processes within the Defence Organisation.

### MOBILISATION CONCEPTS

#### Mobilisation and Force Expansion

**3.4** Mobilisation is the process which generates military capabilities and marshalls national resources to defend the nation and its interests. It encompasses activities associated with preparedness and the conduct of operations, and may involve force expansion. Force Expansion is the process where the force-in-being is increased in size, capability or both, by the acquisition of significant additional personnel, equipment, facilities or other resources.

**3.5** Force Expansion does not automatically accompany mobilisation. Mobilisation and Force Expansion may be undertaken concurrently or as separate processes. Force Elements may be mobilised to meet a threat which does not require them to expand. Conversely, force expansion may occur without a requirement to mobilise.

#### Levels of Mobilisation

**3.6** In response to a contingency the Government is likely to exhaust all political and diplomatic options before resorting to a military response. In responding militarily, the Government is likely to apply military capability incrementally. There are three levels of mobilisation which, in order, embody an increasing commitment by Defence and the Government to respond to a contingency with greater military capability and more-comprehensive national support:


- a. **Selective Mobilisation.** Selective Mobilisation involves raising the level of preparedness of individuals and/or force elements. These individuals and/or force elements will be raised to their Operational Level of Capability to undertake short term, limited operations endorsed by the Government. Some national resources may be required to support selective mobilisation. Selective mobilisation will not normally involve force expansion.
- b. **Defence Mobilisation.** Defence Mobilisation will require the entire force-in-being to be raised to its OLOC. All force elements will be prepared to conduct operations to defend Australia and its interests. All elements of the Defence Organisation will be involved and national resources will be required to support Defence Mobilisation. Some force expansion may be required.
- c. **National Mobilisation.** National Mobilisation will involve Defence Mobilisation and the coordination of the national effort to defend Australia and its interests. The Defence Organisation and the nation will be totally committed to maximising the operational effectiveness of all force elements. Force expansion will be required to prosecute more substantial conflict.

### Mobilisation Continuum

**3.7** Mobilisation is a continuum of interrelated activities which occur during the following four phases:

- a. Preparation.
- b. Work-up.
- c. Operations.
- d. Reconstitution.


**3.8** The Mobilisation Continuum, illustrated in [figure 3-1](#), applies to all levels of mobilisation.



**Figure 3-1: The Mobilisation Continuum**

**3.9** The preparedness of individuals and/or force elements is an integral and fundamental consideration for each phase of the Mobilisation Continuum. At any given time, depending on the level of mobilisation, different individuals and/or force elements will be at different levels of preparedness and different phases of the continuum. High readiness units, for example, which maintain their Present Level of Capability (PLOC) close to their OLOC, will require less time and fewer additional resources to be fully prepared for operations than lower readiness units. These high readiness units will, however, consume significant amounts of resources to maintain higher levels of readiness.

**3.10** The relationship between the Mobilisation Continuum and the levels of capability is illustrated in [figure 3-2](#).



**Figure 3-2: Relationship between the Mobilisation Continuum and the levels of capability**

**3.11** The activities which may occur throughout the Mobilisation Continuum are outlined in the following paragraphs.

### The Preparation Phase

**3.12** The successful conduct of activities throughout the Mobilisation Continuum is founded on effective planning and preparation during the Preparation Phase. The objectives of the Preparation Phase are to ensure that:

- a. the force-in-being has the capabilities stipulated in strategic guidance;
- b. mobilisation plans are developed and resource requirements are identified, including those related to force expansion; and
- c. in response to warning, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable of reviewing and implementing the appropriate mobilisation plans.

**3.13** The Preparation Phase consists of two periods:

- a. **The Planning and Preparation Period.** The Planning and Preparation Period equates to peacetime. During this period the force structure and preparedness of the ADF are developed and maintained to ensure military capability is consistent with strategic policy. Work-up and force expansion requirements are identified and the mechanisms to effect them are established. The Planning and Preparation Period ensures that appropriate personnel, equipment, facilities, consumable resources and training are in place to enable force elements to move efficiently from PLOC/Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC) to OLOC. The outcome of this period is the effective implementation of the embedded plans.
- b. **The Warning Period.** The Warning Period is initiated by the identification of a contingency which may require military action. Plans are reviewed and developed as required. Military options are prepared by Australian Defence Headquarters for endorsement by Government. The individuals and/or force elements to be assigned to operations are identified and formally warned. The level of capability of the individuals and/or force elements involved will be confirmed and liaison between them and supporting agencies will be established. Reservists may be warned for operational duty. Circumstances may preclude a Warning Period.

## The Work-up Phase

**3.14** The Work-up Phase commences with the activation of mobilisation plans refined or developed during the Preparation Phase. Depending on the nature of the contingency and the level of mobilisation, Reservists may be called-out and force expansion may be required. The objective of the Work-up Phase is to raise assigned individuals and/or force elements to OLOC efficiently. The Work-up Phase may involve activities associated with assembly, work-up training and predeployment.

**3.15** Where assembly is required, the objective will be to concentrate assigned individuals and/or force elements as quickly as possible and prepare them to conduct work-up training. Some force elements maintain MLOC very close to OLOC, and will require little time to assemble and conduct work-up training. Assembly activities may involve the identification of equipment and personnel deficiencies and the action required to rectify them (Materiel and Logistic Resource Mobilisation is discussed in [chapter 4—'Materiel and logistic resource mobilisation'](#)). Where necessary, training resources will be assembled and training plans confirmed. Non-qualified individuals may be replaced. Deployment administration will commence and those determined unfit or unable to deploy will be reposted to support the mobilisation effort elsewhere.

**3.16** The objective of work-up training, if required, is to raise individuals and/or force elements to their OLOC. The joint aspects of force elements' work-up training will be paramount during this period. At the conclusion of work-up training, assigned individuals and/or force elements will have their training standards validated to ensure that they have achieved the required level of capability. Additional training may be necessary. Commanders will exercise judgment when committing force elements to operations. While not ideal, a force element may conduct some work-up training on route to or in its area of operations (AO).

**3.17** Predeployment activities, which generally commence after the successful validation of assigned individuals' and force elements' OLOC, will be based on the nature of the contingency as it develops. Force element commanders will focus on their missions and conduct specific mission-oriented training. Training will also be conducted to ensure that OLOC is maintained. Force elements will be administratively prepared for deployment and advance parties will be deployed if required.

## The Operations Phase

**3.18** The Operations Phase generally commences with the arrival of individuals and/or force elements into the AO and concludes with their departure from the AO. Some force elements commence operations outside the defined AO. Operations will be sustained by the provision of personnel, equipment and stocks. A supporting infrastructure will be established to undertake the acquisition, preparation and deployment of replacement personnel and equipment, and the maintenance of sea, land and air lines of communication.

## The Reconstitution Phase

**3.19** Reconstitution is the process by which, at the conclusion of the Operations Phase, individuals and/or force elements adopt the force structure and preparedness required by strategic policy. The Reconstitution Phase commences with the redeployment of forces to the support area and concludes when the forces are returned to the Preparation Phase. Administrative action will involve transition to peacetime procedures. Personnel will be reposted or discharged as required, and unit equipment will be returned to home locations. Support agencies and support units are expected to be the last to complete reconstitution.

# MOBILISATION PRINCIPLES

**3.20** The four principles of successful mobilisation are clear objectives, unity of effort, flexibility and timeliness.

## Clear objectives

**3.21** Operational and mobilisation planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for mobilisation is clearly defined and understood. Supported operational commanders must be advised about the extent of mobilisation activity to be undertaken by supporting commanders and establishments, and the possible impacts on their plans.

**3.22** Operations must be directed towards clearly defined, attainable and decisive objectives. Operational planners must comprehend the mobilisation implications of their plans to ensure that their plans are not compromised and that appropriate resources are acquired. Force expansion requirements must also be clearly identified as early as possible in the planning process.

#### **Unity of effort**

**3.23** Fundamental to effective mobilisation will be an integrated effort between Australia's military and civilian organisations to achieve common objectives established by the Government. Integration will be achieved by the effective application of processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination between the Defence Organisation, other Government departments, State and regional authorities, and the industrial and commercial sectors.

**3.24** Without a unified effort, the operational effectiveness of force elements is unlikely to be optimised.

#### **Flexibility**

**3.25** The application of flexibility will be an essential ingredient of any response to a crisis, to overcome unforeseen problems, and to adapt to uncertainties.

**3.26** Flexibility in mobilisation is achieved by delegating authority, without jeopardising control, to promote freedom of action by subordinate authorities and to ensure that mobilisation activities will continue during uncertainty. Inherent in a flexible mobilisation framework will be a system for monitoring the status and progress of mobilisation and the ability to redirect activities to alleviate choke-points, overcome resource inadequacies and protect the forces, equipment and infrastructure being mobilised.

#### **Timeliness**

**3.27** Timely mobilisation of resources will be critical to seizing and maintaining the initiative, and ensuring that the required military capability is at the right place at the right time.

**3.28** Timely mobilisation will be dependent on the maintenance of appropriate levels of preparedness throughout the Defence Organisation during the Preparation Phase, the efficient implementation of effective, embedded mobilisation plans, and a civilian workforce fully prepared to support mobilisation activities. Timely mobilisation may also depend on Defence obtaining exemption from environmental or other constraints.

## **MOBILISATION PROCESSES**

### **Strategic planning**

**3.29** Australia's military strategy for the defence of Australia is based on a total force of regulars, reservists, Defence civilians, Defence contractors and private enterprise. The successful implementation of the strategy will depend on Defence's ability to coordinate the total force and the resources necessary to defend the nation and its interests.

**3.30** **Strategic Warning.** Central to the strategic planning process is the concept of Strategic Warning. Strategic Warning differs from the Warning Period associated with the Preparation Phase. Strategic Warning is the period commencing when the Government first accepts the existence of a possible threat to when the Government commits military forces to operations in response to the threat. Strategic Warning is a key factor in determining mobilisation requirements. The time available to increase designated force preparedness levels to OLOC is also a critical planning factor. It will be derived from an assessment of the ADF's mobilisation requirements relative to its current preparedness levels. The decision to commence work-up may be taken before the period of Strategic Warning is declared. The range of military response options will depend, in part, on the political implications of decisions to adjust preparedness levels of forces and the associated deterrent or escalatory effect.

**3.31** Depending on the nature of the contingency and the level of mobilisation, coordination between all agencies within the Defence Organisation is likely to be necessary. Coordination between the Defence Organisation, other Government departments, and Federal, State and regional authorities and industry, is also likely to be warranted. These relationships must be developed and nurtured during peace to ensure that the ADF can respond efficiently during a contingency. It is important that the structures and processes employed during peace are those that will be employed during a contingency.

## Strategic level mobilisation management

**3.32** Strategic level mobilisation management involves those national and Defence management structures and processes that enable the Government to respond militarily to protect Australia and its interests. The following paragraphs outline the nation's and Defence's mobilisation management hierarchies, and the linkages between them.

### National mobilisation management hierarchy

**3.33** National responsibility for the provision of strategic direction to Defence and the coordination of all aspects of the protection of Australia's national interests rests with the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC), which is at the head of the National Crisis Management Machinery. Subordinate organisations include the Secretaries' Committee on National Security (SCNS) and the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG).

**3.34** The national management hierarchy is responsible for the strategic coordination of the nation's response to crises, including national and military mobilisation. Coordination of the national effort is undertaken by the SPCG on a day-to-day basis. The key areas of national effort which require coordination are listed in [annex A](#), and the issues which require coordination are detailed in the appended tables. Linkages between the national and Defence mobilisation management processes are achieved by Defence membership of the National Crisis Management Machinery process at SCNS and SPCG levels. National mobilisation structures, membership and outline responsibilities are summarised in [table 3–1](#).

Structure	Membership	Role	Mobilisation responsibilities
National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC)	Prime Minister Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister for Defence Attorney-General Treasurer  ( <b>Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)</b> may be invited in a crisis.)	Management of national security crises as they affect Australia's national interests.	Decisions on major issues affecting Australia's national security interests. Policy issues relating to intelligence and domestic security matters. Law enforcement matters which have implications for Australia's security. Provision of strategic guidance to Defence.
Secretaries' Committee on National Security (SCNS)	Secretaries of Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, <b>Defence</b> , Foreign Affairs and Trade, Attorney-General's and Treasury <b>CDF</b> Director-General of the Office of National Assessment	Provision of coordinated advice to the NSCC on the broad range of factors affecting Australia's security (strategic, defence, economic, trade, intelligence and national security matters).	Provision of advice options and strategies to the NSCC.
Strategic Planning Coordination Group (SPCG)	Deputy Secretaries from Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and senior officers from other appropriate departments, <b>Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF)</b> , <b>Deputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S)</b>	To enhance interaction on strategic and security issues and to come together in a crisis to ensure the necessary arrangements for supporting ministers are in place.	Interdepartmental coordination of mobilisation requirements.

**Table 3–1: National mobilisation management hierarchy**

### Defence mobilisation management hierarchy

**3.35** The Defence Organisation's response to crises is managed by the Strategic Command Group (SCG), which is advised by the Defence Committee (DC), the Strategic Watch Group (SWG) and the Defence Mobilisation Committee (DMC). CDF is responsible for the mobilisation of the ADF for operations, and the Secretary is responsible for providing Defence Department support to mobilisation activities. The Service chiefs are responsible to the CDF for the mobilisation of their Services to support operations. The DMC coordinates Defence's mobilisation planning in accordance with the mobilisation functions and responsibilities outlined in [annex B](#). The Mobilisation Executive Cell (MEC) coordinates some mobilisation activities on behalf of the DMC. The Defence Mobilisation Management Hierarchy may be involved in all Defence mobilisation activities, regardless of the level of mobilisation. Defence mobilisation structures, their membership and responsibilities are summarised in [table 3-2](#).

Structure	Membership	Role	Mobilisation responsibilities
Strategic Command Group (SCG)	CDF (Chair) Secretary Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) Deputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S) Chief of Navy (CN) Chief of Army (CA) Chief of Air Force (CAF) Director Defence Intelligence Organisation (DDIO) Head Strategic Command (HSC) (Secretary, and Chair of Strategic Watch Group)  Augmented as required.	Provide advice to CDF to assist in commanding the ADF and advising the Government on military response options.	Advice to CDF on the management of ADF mobilisation. Establishment of mobilisation coordination framework. Approval of mobilisation plans. Determine longer term military capability (force structure and preparedness) requirements.
Defence Committee (DC)	Secretary (Chair) CDF VCDF CN CA CAF DEPSEC S Deputy Secretary Corporate Services (DEPSEC CS) Chief Finance Officer (CFO) Chairman of the Defence Intelligence Board (CDIB) Under Secretary Materiel (USM) Chief Defence Scientist (CDS)  Augmented as required.	Manage the Department of Defence.	Provide Defence Department support to ADF mobilisation activities.

Structure	Membership	Role	Mobilisation responsibilities
Strategic Watch Group (SWG)	HSC (Chair) Head International Policy (HIP) Head Capability Systems (HCS) (Deputy Chair DMC) Head Defence Personnel Executive (HDPE) Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) Deputy Chief of Navy (DCN) Deputy Chief of Army (DCA) Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF) Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communication (HPACC) Director-General Joint Operations and Plans (DGJOP) Director-General Military Strategy (DGMS)  Augmented as required.	Monitor and assess potential crises that could involve the ADF, and advise CDF and the Secretary on broad military options for responses to contingencies. SWG activity will be triggered by advice and documentation produced by the STRAPP process outlined in Australian Defence Force Publication 9 (ADFP 9)— <i>Joint Planning</i> .	Develop and refine broad military response options to developing contingencies. Examine initial mobilisation needs from the SLPG appreciation. Generate mobilisation planning guidance for the ADF.
Defence Mobilisation Committee (DMC)	VCDF (Chair) HCS (Deputy Chair) Commander Joint Logistics (CJL) Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) DCN DCA DCAF Head Reserve Policy (HRP) First Assistant Secretary Resources and Financial Programs (FASRFP) Head Management and Reporting (HMR) Head Defence Corporate Support (HDCS) HDPE Head Defence Estate (HDE) HIP First Assistant Secretary Capital Equipment Program (FASCEP) HPACC Head Capability Analysis and Options (HCAO) DGJOP Director-General Defence Health Services (DGDHS) Director-General Defence Legal Office (DGDLO) Director-General Emergency Management Australia (DGEMA) Director-General National Support Mobilisation Planning (DGNSMP)	Coordinate strategic level mobilisation planning within the Defence Organisation and, where appropriate, liaise with external organisations to facilitate national and international support for Defence's mobilisation effort.	Coordinate Service and non-Service mobilisation activities, including those summarised in <a href="#">annex B</a> .  Coordinate the Defence aspects of the national defence effort.

Structure	Membership	Role	Mobilisation responsibilities
Mobilisation Executive Cell (MEC)	HSC (Chair) DGNSMP (Deputy Chair) Director-General Personnel Plans (DGPP) Director-General Navy Capability Performance and Plans (DGN CPP) Director-General Preparedness and Plans—Army (DGPP–A) Director-General Preparedness and Plans—Air Force (DGPP–AF) Assistant Secretary Resources Policy and Planning (ASRPP) Director Joint Logistic Operations and Plans (DJLOP) Director Current Capability Guidance (DCCG)	Resolve strategic level mobilisation planning issues to the extent possible, and where not possible, present solutions/options to the DMC for resolution/endorsement.	Coordinate mobilisation planning/ implementation activities on behalf of DMC/VCDF.

**Table 3–2: Defence mobilisation management hierarchy**

### Planning processes

**3.36** The ADF Intelligence System identifies potential threats to Australia’s security. Imminent threats will trigger the preparation of a range of military response options by Defence’s SWG, under CDF direction, for Government consideration.

**3.37** Based on judgments regarding lead times required to effect preferred response options, *mobilisation activities will be initiated by CDF by the issue of directives to the Service chiefs, COMAST and CJL to increase the levels of preparedness of their forces.* Activities in the non-Service Executives of the Defence Organisation in support of mobilisation will be directed by the CDF through the DMC. The Secretary’s primary role will be to authorise and fund the DMC’s plans to mobilise the Defence Organisation. Whether changes to preparedness levels are undertaken overtly or covertly will be a decision taken by the Government based on advice from the CDF, the prevailing strategic circumstances and an understanding of the lead times required to optimise mobilisation efficiency.

**3.38** It is probable that changes to the preparedness levels of particular force elements will be directed by the CDF in anticipation of the strategic warning period to enable particular tasks, such as strategic and operational surveillance, to be undertaken. Mobilisation of those forces may require the implementation of deception plans depending on the Government’s intentions.

**3.39 Mobilisation appreciation.** The mobilisation appreciation is a tool for mobilisation planners to make a systematic appraisal of mobilisation requirements and options in support of operational plans. The purpose of conducting a mobilisation appreciation is to review key planning factors to determine whether an operational plan can be supported and which course of action is best from the supporters’ perspective. Mobilisation appreciations must be conducted as operational plans are developed. Defence’s SWG will analyse and initiate the further development of mobilisation appreciations which are the product of the STRAPP process (described in ADFP 9). Once a strategic military response plan has been endorsed by Government, and operational plans are developed and refined, mobilisation appreciations must be conducted by operational support planners. Mobilisation appreciations will normally be conducted by logistic and personnel staff. Mobilisation appreciations conducted pre-emptively or in concert with the operational plan will inform the development of the operational commander’s military appreciation process. An outline format for mobilisation appreciations is in [annex C](#). The accuracy of information gathered and the quality of analysis made are essential for the development and implementation of effective mobilisation plans.

### Annexes:

- A. [Coordination of the national effort for the defence of Australia](#)
- B. [Defence Mobilisation Committee—mobilisation functions and responsibilities](#)
- C. [Mobilisation appreciation format](#)



# COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL EFFORT FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

## ISSUES FOR COORDINATION

1. A key feature of mobilisation is the need for the Australian Defence Force to be supported as much as practicable by Australia's national industry, infrastructure and community. The management of Australia's national effort during conflict could involve a range of Commonwealth and State agencies and demand high levels of coordination between responsible authorities at all levels of government and the private sector.
2. The key areas for national effort are:
  - a. Australia's security ([appendix 1](#)).
  - b. Activities during a defence emergency ([appendix 2](#)).
  - c. Wider Australian community ([appendix 3](#)).
  - d. Intelligence and surveillance ([appendix 4](#)).
  - e. Industry ([appendix 5](#)).
  - f. Science and technology ([appendix 6](#)).
  - g. Logistics ([appendix 7](#)).
  - h. Management of national coordination ([appendix 8](#)).

### Appendixes:

1. [National Defence effort: Australia's security](#)
2. [National Defence effort: activities during a Defence emergency](#)
3. [National Defence effort: wider Australian community](#)
4. [National Defence effort: intelligence and surveillance](#)
5. [National Defence effort: industry](#)
6. [National Defence effort: science and technology](#)
7. [National Defence effort: logistics](#)
8. [National Defence effort: management of national coordination](#)



**NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY**

<b>ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT</b>	<b>PRINCIPAL ISSUES</b>	<b>COORDINATING DEPARTMENT</b>	<b>DEFENCE LEAD</b>	<b>COMMENTS</b>
National security	Mechanisms to coordinate domestic approach to Australia's security.	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C)	International Policy (IP)	Mechanisms should facilitate a common understanding of national interests, objectives and priorities among agencies at all levels. National interests include preservation of Australia's territorial integrity and economic interests, protection of Australian lives and property, maintaining Australia's international standing, and avoiding unnecessary risk to the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
	Mechanisms to coordinate international approach to Australia's security.	PM&C, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)	IP	
Regional security	Defence participation in the development of Australia's bilateral and multilateral relationships: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• high level contacts between senior officials;</li> <li>• military exercises and activities;</li> <li>• intelligence, information and training exchanges;</li> <li>• industry development; and</li> <li>• science, technology, logistics and resource and financial management cooperation.</li> </ul>	DFAT	IP	
	Manage relations with regional countries.	DFAT	IP	
Global security	Support for United Nations (UN) and other multilateral activities.	DFAT	IP, Strategic Command (SC)	Australia's national interests are served by conflict prevention, management and resolution through UN mechanisms. The UN plays an active role in alleviating international humanitarian suffering caused by natural disasters, political turmoil and war. Support from Australia involves coordination of many Government agencies and non-government organisations.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Alliances	Management of the alliance relationship with the United States (US) to ensure it continues to meet the needs of both parties.	DFAT	IP	The practical benefits to Australia of this relationship include intelligence, access to high technology military systems, industrial and scientific cooperation, military training, and supply and support arrangements.
	Management of the military aspects of the relationship.		SC	
	Shared interests with United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand (NZ) and Canada.	DFAT	IP	
Domestic activities	ADF assistance with major disaster relief and search and rescue.	Emergency Management Australia, Australian Maritime Safety Authority	SC	Major disasters include bushfires, floods, drought and earthquake

## NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: ACTIVITIES DURING A DEFENCE EMERGENCY

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Provide national policy and objectives for handling conflict	Provide government required national strategic 'end-state' to guide Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations.	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C)	International Policy (IP), Strategic Command (SC)	
Response to national disruption	Coordination of Federal/State security policies.	PM&C, Emergency Management Australia (EMA)	SC	State and Territory policies include statutory and administrative responsibilities, resource allocations and use of State and Territory resources. EMA coordinates national policy aspects, and provision of technical advice on civilian shelters and passive protection of specific civilian facilities.
	Maintenance of continuity of government. Associated planning needs to take account of likely effects caused by hostilities in terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• nature of hazards,</li> <li>• level and intensity of activity, and</li> <li>• potential for incidents to endure</li> </ul>	PM&C	IP and EMA	
	Additional funding	Department of Finance and Administration	Resources and Financial Programs	Determination made for additional funding to be made available from existing appropriations or through submission to Government for supplementary funding.
International relationships	Management of changing relationships involving timely and continuing consultations with allies and regional neighbours.	PM&C, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)	IP	Specific reactions by nations would be influenced by their national interests and ambitions and possibly also by Australia's actions.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Protection during a defence emergency	Determination of priorities for the protection of commercial activities and civilian populations.	PM&C, DFAT	IP, SC	Activities in the sea and air approaches that are likely to have a focus for protection in times of a defence emergency include international shipping carrying Australian trade, coastal shipping and resource extraction and production including oil, gas and marine harvesting (fish, prawns, pearls, kelp and salt), and offshore territories. Protection of people and territory might involve a focus on population concentrations, transport or telecommunications infrastructure, economic or industrial assets, or military bases. A document of vital national assets is needed to identify the commercial activities of value to protect.
	Wide ranging interaction between the ADF and the community including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• representation in cooperative mechanisms,</li> <li>• planning and conduct of coordinated activities, and</li> <li>• ADF control of specific activities.</li> </ul>	PM&C, DFAT	SC	
	Passive defence measures.	EMA	SC	Includes provision of advice on measures for civilian assets.
	Coordination of military and non-military aspects of national security involving community protection and protective security.	Attorney-General's Department	SC	ADF activities need to be coordinated with the Protective Services Coordination Centre.

**NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: WIDER AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY**

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Legislation and administration	Development of domestic legislation relevant to the national defence effort, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• freedom of movement,</li> <li>• protective security,</li> <li>• Australian Defence Force (ADF) use of civil infrastructure,</li> <li>• harnessing specific elements of industry for defence purposes,</li> <li>• compensation for the use of private resources, and</li> <li>• industrial awards and workplace conditions for civil personnel.</li> </ul>	Attorney-General's (A-G's) Department	National Support (NS)	
	Arrangements that coordinate administration across adjacent and associated jurisdictions.	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), A-G's	NS	
	Domestic legislation to support the defence powers when invoked.	A-G's	NS	
Ancillary maritime services	Continuity of Australia's maritime trade both in peace and in more demanding circumstances.	A-G's	NS	Coordination mechanisms like the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre and the Australian Shipping Defence Council need close working relationships to provide continuous ancillary maritime services to shipping in peace and in a conflict.
Airspace management	Establishment and development of arrangements to consider the coordination of airspace management during a defence emergency.	Department of Transport and Regional Services, Airservices Australia (ASA)	NS	Further development of Airservices Australia/Defence Air Coordinating Committee, and National Airspace Users Advisory Council needs to bring together ADF, Airservices Australia and industry consultation.
Civilian support to ADF operations	Implications of providing continuous support in times of defence emergency including provision of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commercial services, and</li> <li>• logistics.</li> </ul>	A-G's	NS	

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Civil defence	Interpretation of Australian position on protocols relevant to civil defence.	A-G's	Defence Personnel Executive, Emergency Management Australia (EMA)	
	National coordination of Commonwealth, State/Territory responsibilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• planning,</li> <li>• training development,</li> <li>• broadening awareness,</li> <li>• legislation for implementation when required,</li> <li>• funding,</li> <li>• exercising arrangements in peacetime, and</li> <li>• standardisation.</li> </ul>	EMA	EMA	Civil defence is primarily the responsibility of the States and Territories. Effective coordination must ensure national standardisation of civil defence measures. Organisations and personnel that might undertake civil defence functions could be drawn from public utilities, medical and welfare organisations, emergency response agencies including fire, police, ambulance and State and Territory services and the ADF.
	Combined employment of ADF and civil elements in civil defence.	EMA	SC	
	National Integrated Warning System and Shelter System	EMA	SC	Integration with the National Air Defence Warning System and incorporation of radio and television broadcasting facilities are likely to be necessary. Design and construction of protective shelters (individual and collective) may involve a number of Commonwealth and State agencies, including the Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA).
ADF assistance to civil authorities and organisations	ADF assistance to civil community (DACC).	EMA	SC	
	ADF aid to the civil power (including counter terrorist capability) (DFACP).	A-G's, EMA	SC	

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Law enforcement and counter-terrorism	ADF support to the interception of suspected illegal immigrants, fishing vessels and flora, fauna, drug, arms smugglers, and counter-terrorist and bomb disposal operations.	A-G's	SC	Law enforcement agencies include customs, fisheries, immigration, quarantine and State and Australian Federal Police. The National Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP) of the Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) provides arrangements for counter-terrorism.
	Cooperation between the ADF and local communities on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• availability and efficient use of resources,</li> <li>• exchanges of information and local intelligence, and</li> <li>• advice on specific local issues or problems.</li> </ul>	A-G's	SC	
Infrastructure	Availability of infrastructure in northern Australia.	Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts	NS	
	Availability of information on civil infrastructure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• transport and distribution systems, and</li> <li>• fuel.</li> </ul>	Department of Transport and Regional Services, Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR)	NS	
	Military Geographic Information (MGI)	DISR (Australian Surveying and Land Information Group (AUSLIG)) Department of Transport and Regional Services, Department of Environment and Heritage, Australian Bureau of Statistics Individual State departments and agencies Australian Space Office	SMS staff	Collection and dissemination of Australian MGI is problematic. In the wider community, no single department has carriage. AUSLIG in DISR is the major civilian topographic organisation.
Communications	Allocation of carrier capacity and provision of specific services to meet the needs of the national defence effort: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adapted to the Australian environment,</li> <li>• fully integrated,</li> <li>• secure,</li> <li>• timely,</li> <li>• accurate,</li> <li>• reliable, and</li> <li>• robust.</li> </ul>	DOFA, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts	SC Defence Intelligence Board Defence Corporate Services	This support involves coordination in the activities and operation of wide ranging civilian and military assets and capabilities, including ADF elements operating over widely dispersed areas. It also enables the sustainment and administration of these activities and operations, including logistics and resource and financial management.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Public confidence	Public awareness and acceptance of arrangements for the national defence effort including the implementation of specific responses in times of defence emergency.	PM&C, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts	Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communication (HPACC)	Includes contributing to local communities' perceptions of their security and engendering public confidence in the national defence effort.
	Development of agreed arrangements with the media.		HPACC	
Australia's environment	<p>Consideration of the effects of any national defence activity, both in peace and in times of conflict, on Australia's natural, artificial and social environment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• physical;</li> <li>• biological;</li> <li>• pollution;</li> <li>• noise;</li> <li>• vibration;</li> <li>• socio-economic;</li> <li>• visual;</li> <li>• electromagnetic; and</li> <li>• health and safety.</li> </ul>	Department of Environment and Heritage, PM&C (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission)	Defence Committee	<p>Areas that need particular consideration are heritage sites, buildings and structures and anthropological and archaeological sites, relics, and artefacts.</p> <p>Includes consideration of international agreements, and arrangements for access to native title land and reserves.</p>

## NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Direction on intelligence and surveillance requirements	Clear strategic direction on the demand for intelligence and surveillance in a changing strategic environment.	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) (Office of National Assessments (ONA))	Strategic Command (SC) International Policy (IP) Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)	The essential elements for direction include specification of the subjects for information collection priority, levels of accuracy and detail, what intelligence products are needed and how they are to be formatted and distributed.
Coordination of intelligence and surveillance activities	Establishment of a national surveillance system that focuses on surveillance of the sea-air approaches.	PM&C, Australian Customs Service	SC IP DSD DIO	Include integration of civil and military information from the sea and air approaches and dissemination to military commanders and other authorities. Civil agencies include Coastwatch, Airservices Australia, Australian Customs Service, Fisheries, Immigration, Quarantine, State, Territory and Federal Police, Attorney-General's Department (A-G's) and other government departments.
	Coordination of national intelligence and surveillance in terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• division of responsibilities,</li> <li>• consultative mechanisms,</li> <li>• integration of procedures,</li> <li>• intelligence exchanges, and</li> <li>• clear understanding of individual agency contributions to the national defence effort.</li> </ul>	PM&C	SC IP DSD DIO	Intelligence activities undertaken by domestic agencies including: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ONA, DIO, DSD, Australian Security Intelligence Organization, Coastwatch, Defence Attaches, State/Territory and Australian Federal Police, Australian Customs Service, and intelligence organisations of allied defence forces.
	Coordination of protection of information and intelligence.	A-G's	SC DSD DIO IP	Countermeasures include the protection of knowledge of the decisions supported by intelligence and consequent actions and activities.
	Provision of information on internal threats and coordination of national response.	A-G's	SC DSD DIO IP	

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Collection of information	Collection of information on countries of interest for Australian military planning: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national aims/objectives;</li> <li>• political developments;</li> <li>• economic and social;</li> <li>• military capabilities;</li> <li>• civil support to military capabilities and Strategic Command; and</li> <li>• military geographic information.</li> </ul>	PM&C (ONA), DFAT, A-G's, Department of Environment and Heritage	SC DSD DIO IP	Environmental information ranges from actual and forecasted weather and oceanographic information which changes continuously, to other factors that change less frequently including geography, hydrography, and health.

**NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: INDUSTRY**

<b>ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT</b>	<b>PRINCIPAL ISSUES</b>	<b>COORDINATING DEPARTMENT</b>	<b>DEFENCE LEAD</b>	<b>COMMENTS</b>
Support for the Australian Defence Force	Establish and refine mechanisms for ensuring the availability of essential forms of industrial support during conflict.	Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR)	National Support (NS)	
Focusing Defence policy for industry	Continue to refine and extend statements of Defence priorities for Australian industry based on early and effective consideration of industry capabilities and through-life support issues in the capability development process.	DISR, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts	NS Industry Procurement and Infrastructure (IPI) Capability Systems (CS)	
Coordinate Defence policy for industry	Continue to provide effective dialogue between Defence and industry to encourage a better understanding of mutual demands and capabilities.	DISR, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts	NS IPI CS	
	Consult with industry to coordinate the application of programs and mechanisms for encouraging the cost-effective development and sustainment of high priority industry capabilities.	DISR	NS	
	Negotiate appropriate agreements covering the provision of essential industrial support during conflict.	Attorney-General's Department, Department of Transport and Regional Services, Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts	NS IPI	



**NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Technology development	Technology developments that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enhance important military capabilities such as intelligence collection and electronic warfare,</li> <li>• reduced requirement for large numbers of personnel, and</li> <li>• gives Australia a decisive advantage in combat situations.</li> </ul>	Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR)	Science Policy	Key areas for development of Australian Defence Force capabilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• intelligence collection, evaluation and distribution;</li> <li>• surveillance and reconnaissance;</li> <li>• command and control;</li> <li>• key weapons sensors; and</li> <li>• electronic warfare.</li> </ul>
Research and development (R&D)	A coordinated partnership approach to science and technology that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enhances the selection and direction of R&amp;D efforts to meet specific needs;</li> <li>• enhances assimilation into defence capability;</li> <li>• facilitates the management of technology transfers; and</li> <li>• enhances Australian industry's international competitiveness.</li> </ul>	DISR	Science Policy	Principally as the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, but also the Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation, Cooperative Research Centres, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Institute of Marine Science, Australian industry. International collaboration is an important input multiplier.
Defence science and industry	Technology transfer to and from commercial markets that drive technological advancements, such as communications and information technology.	DISR	Science Policy, Under Secretary Materiel	Agencies include AusIndustry, Telecommunications Industry Development Authority.
	The involvement of industry in the early phase of defence R&D underpinned by agreement on issues concerning: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• technology transfer;</li> <li>• exploitation of R&amp;D; and</li> <li>• industry development.</li> </ul>	DISR	Science Policy	



**NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: LOGISTICS**

<b>ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT</b>	<b>PRINCIPAL ISSUES</b>	<b>COORDINATING DEPARTMENT</b>	<b>DEFENCE LEAD</b>	<b>COMMENTS</b>
Management of logistics	Development of logistic management mechanisms and systems in peacetime with a view to facilitating management in times of defence emergency.	Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR)	National Support (NS)	
Health services	Provision of civilian health services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• trained personnel;</li> <li>• treatment facilities;</li> <li>• evacuation; and</li> <li>• pharmaceuticals, vaccines and blood products.</li> </ul> Preparation of medical teams for war injuries and illnesses.  Timely distribution of medical stores.  Effective systems to regulate the movement of casualties.	Department of Family and Community Services or Department of Health and Aged Care, Department of Veterans' Affairs.	NS Support Command Australia (SCA) Service Headquarters Defence Corporate Support	Defence Personnel Executive involved in the implementation. Includes capacity for treating battle casualties, and maintenance of health services to the community.
Repair and maintenance services	Preservation of equipment and achievement of full serviceable life.  Effective coordination of military and civilian repair and maintenance capabilities.  Flexibility of repair and maintenance arrangements in terms of demands of specific circumstances.	DISR	SCA	Repair and maintenance capacity includes skills, facilities and standards.
Transport and distribution	Review of extant arrangements including memoranda of understanding.  Maximising use of commercial services.  Use of foreign owned carriers.  Payment on occurrence.  Predetermined rates for compensation.  Consultative arrangements between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and carriers.	Department of Transport and Regional Services	SCA	Includes the movement of military personnel on operational service: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• deployments from base areas;</li> <li>• force rotation;</li> <li>• reinforcement;</li> <li>• medical evacuation; and</li> <li>• redeployment to bases.</li> </ul> The transport of materiel includes deployment and redeployment of weapons systems, equipment and stores, and distribution of consumable items such as water, food, ammunition, fuel and repair parts.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
	Development of arrangements that accommodate continued and expanded availability of civilian transport and associated infrastructure in times of a defence emergency when the ADF's demand for volume and frequency of movements between base areas and likely areas of military operations in the sea and air approaches and northern Australian would greatly increase.	Department of Transport and Regional Services, Airservices Australia	NS	
	Resolution of distribution choke-points such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• warehouse capacity;</li> <li>• transport mode restrictions;</li> <li>• regulations (safety, weight limitations, noise curfew); and</li> <li>• materiel handling limitations.</li> </ul>	Department of Transport and Regional Services, Airservices Australia	SCA	Systems include; facilities, equipment, services, and people which perform the functions of processing orders, packaging, warehousing, inventory management and transportation using vessels, vehicles, rail, aircraft and pipelines. Consultation with Australian Customs Service and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry).

## NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT: MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL COORDINATION

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
Management of logistics	Development of logistic management mechanisms and systems in peacetime with a view to facilitating management in times of defence emergency.	Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR)	National Support (NS)	
Health services	Provision of civilian health services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• trained personnel;</li> <li>• treatment facilities;</li> <li>• evacuation; and</li> <li>• pharmaceuticals, vaccines and blood products.</li> </ul> Preparation of medical teams for war injuries and illnesses.  Timely distribution of medical stores.  Effective systems to regulate the movement of casualties.	Department of Health and Aged Care or Department of Family and Community Services, Department of Veterans' Affairs	NS Support Command Australia Service Headquarters Defence Corporate Support	Defence Personnel Executive involved in the implementation. Includes capacity for treating battle casualties, and maintenance of health services to the community.
Repair and maintenance services	Preservation of equipment and achievement of full serviceable life.  Effective coordination of military and civilian repair and maintenance capabilities.  Flexibility of repair and maintenance arrangements in terms of demands of specific circumstances.	DISR	NS	Repair and maintenance capacity includes skills, facilities and standards.
Transport and distribution	Review of extant arrangements including memoranda of understanding.  Maximising use of commercial services.  Use of foreign owned carriers.  Payment on occurrence.  Predetermined rates for compensation.  Consultative arrangements between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and carriers.	Department of Transport and Regional Services	NS	Includes the movement of military personnel on operational service: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• deployments from base areas,</li> <li>• force rotation,</li> <li>• reinforcement,</li> <li>• medical evacuation, and</li> <li>• redeployment to bases.</li> </ul> The transport of materiel includes deployment and redeployment of weapons systems, equipment and stores, and distribution of consumable items such as water, food, ammunition, fuel and repair parts.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORT	PRINCIPAL ISSUES	COORDINATING DEPARTMENT	DEFENCE LEAD	COMMENTS
	Development of arrangements that accommodate continued and expanded availability of civilian transport and associated infrastructure in times of a defence emergency when the ADF's demand for volume and frequency of movements between base areas and likely areas of military operations in the sea and air approaches and northern Australia would greatly increase.	Department of Transport and Regional Services, Airservices Australia	NS	
	Resolution of distribution choke-points such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• warehouse capacity;</li> <li>• transport mode restrictions;</li> <li>• regulations (safety, weight limitations, noise curfew); and</li> <li>• materiel handling limitations.</li> </ul>	Department of Transport and Regional Services, Airservices Australia	NS	Systems include: facilities, equipment, services, and people who perform the functions of processing orders, packaging, warehousing, inventory management and transportation using vessels, vehicles, rail, aircraft and pipelines. Consultation with Australian Customs Service and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry—Australia).
Facilities	Coordination of public and private sector demand for facilities in a defence emergency.		NS	Defence Estate Organisation involved in the implementation. Development of an appropriate coordination mechanism needs to accommodate this principal issue. Its representation should include the Department of Finance and Administration, the Department of Defence, State and Territory Department of Works, and industry.

## DEFENCE MOBILISATION COMMITTEE—MOBILISATION FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

SUBJECT	FUNCTION	DESCRIPTION	PRIME PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY
WORKFORCE AND PERSONNEL	RESERVES	Provide advice to the Chief of the Defence Force on matters affecting the Australian Defence Force (ADF) Reserves. Includes call out, conditions of employment and employer support, and employee protection.	Head Defence Personnel Executive (HDPE)
	CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE	Develop ADF policy on Service pay and conditions and employment.	HDPE
	RECRUITING	Plan and functionally control the recruiting operations of the three Services. Develop recruiting policy.	HDPE
	MEMBER AND FAMILY SUPPORT AND SERVICES	Provide social work, family liaison, and support services/programs for ADF personnel and their families.	HDPE
	MEDICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES	Provision of ADF health services and policy. Coordinate health issues with other agencies.	HDPE
MATERIEL AND LOGISTICS	ACQUISITION	Manage the acquisition and introduction of major and minor capital equipment.	Under Secretary Materiel (USM)
	REQUISITION	Advise on requisition requirements and policy.	USM Director-General Defence Legal Office (DGDLO)
	INDUSTRY	Develop policy and programs for industry support to Defence requirements.	USM Head National Support (HNS)
	AGREEMENTS	Manage international logistics policy and agreements.	HNS
	FUEL MANAGEMENT	Plan and undertake strategic fuel management.	HNS
	AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT	Plan and undertake strategic ammunition management.	USM Commander Joint Logistics HNS
	CONTRACTING	Formulate and implement contracting policies and services to support defence purchasing.	USM HNS

<b>SUBJECT</b>	<b>FUNCTION</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>PRIME PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY</b>
	FACILITIES/ INFRASTRUCTURE	Develop, recommend, implement, and review facilities and property policies, plans and programs.	USM
	STRATEGIC TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION	Develop policy, procedures and doctrine for operational and non-operational movements, and national civil infrastructure support. Maintain Defence movement and transport information and planning systems.	HNS
	REGIONAL SUPPORT	Provide regional administrative and operational support.	Head Defence Corporate Support (HDCS)
FINANCE	BUDGET/FIVE YEAR DEFENCE PROGRAM MINISTERIAL SUBMISSIONS	Prepare/coordinate the preparation of budget and ministerial submissions.	Chief Finance Officer
OTHER	LEGAL	Provide legal advice on international and operational law, the law of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions and Protocols, command and administration of the ADF.	HDCS (DGDLO)
	SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	Provide scientific and technical advice and support for critical short warning conflict requirements.	Chief Defence Scientist
	PUBLIC RELATIONS/ PUBLIC INFORMATION	Reflect in public information activities the maintenance of Defence policy and issues.	Head Public Affairs and Corporate Communication
	EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT	Undertake national coordination for dealing with emergency management across the boundaries of all Emergency Services and States and Territories.	HDCS (Emergency Management Australia (EMA))
	CIVIL DEFENCE	Undertake national coordination for civil defence.	HDCS (EMA)
	LIAISON	Undertake strategic level liaison.	Head International Policy (HIP) USM
COORDINATION OF NATIONAL MOBILISATION ISSUES		Provide advice on the national issues supporting Defence level mobilisation.	Vice Chief of the Defence Force Head Capability Systems HNS

## MOBILISATION APPRECIATION FORMAT

Security classification

Originating organisation

Place of issue

Date-time group

Mobilisation appreciation number

### References:

- A. Maps and charts
- B. Other pertinent documents

1. **Mission.** State the strategic or operational commander's mission.

2. **Situation and considerations:**

a. **Assumptions.**

b. **Mobilisation factors:**

- (1) Workforce availability.
- (2) Transportation.
- (3) Equipment/materiel.
- (4) Health service support.
- (5) Facilities.
- (6) Industrial base and surpluses.
- (7) Training base.
- (8) Communications.
- (9) Host-nation support.
- (10) Environment.
- (11) Legal authorities.
- (12) Funding.
- (13) Distribution choke-points.
- (14) Concurrency training and resource requirements.

3. **Mobilisation analysis of courses of action:**

- a. Make an orderly examination of factors, including their impact on each other, to assess the affect on the proposed courses of action. The objectives are to determine whether the mobilisation requirements can be met and to isolate the implications that should be considered by the operational commander in the military appreciation process:
  - (1) For example, if a course of action requires training base expansion, the analysis process should establish that there are sufficient qualified instructors, facilities, equipment and medical support for an expanded training establishment. A shortage in one or more areas may render a course of action unfeasible.
- b. Analyse the factors in subparagraph 2.b. for each course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically for time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect the mobilisation course of action.

- c. Throughout the analysis, keep mobilisation considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicable mobilisation factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisons in [paragraph 4](#).

**4. Comparison of courses of action:**

- a. List the effect that workforce mobilisation has on the other resource areas from an operational support point of view.
- b. Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resource areas based on the mobilisation decision.

**5. Conclusions:**

- a. State whether the mission can be supported from a mobilisation perspective.
- b. State which mobilisation course of action can best be supported from an overall perspective.
- c. Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention of the operational commander. Provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

## CHAPTER 4

# MATERIEL AND LOGISTIC RESOURCE MOBILISATION

## INTRODUCTION

**4.1** Associated with each phase of mobilisation are logistic resources, services and agreements which must be mobilised for the movement and sustainment of forces. Preparedness planning should ensure a capability exists to mobilise all elements of logistics including:

- a. the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, repair, evacuation and disposition of material;
- b. movement, rationing and accommodation of personnel;
- c. funding for operations;
- d. provision of conditions of service, health and legal support;
- e. provision of facilities through access to hospitals, reception centres, ports, airfields and fuel installations;
- f. provision of air, road and sea lines of communication; and
- g. support of other government agencies such as customs, quarantine and immigration.

**4.2** Economic considerations dictate that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will not own all of the logistics capability required for forces to achieve their Operational Level of Capability (OLOC). Because of lead time and cost constraints mobilisation of materiel and facilities will often need to occur before mobilisation of personnel. There is little point in mobilisation of personnel without the equipment and infrastructure needed to make them combat effective. Accordingly, strategic arrangements and alliances with sources beyond the control of the ADF should be in place to guarantee logistics availability when and where required.

**4.3** The relationship between mobilisation phases, levels of capability and consequent resource implications are shown diagrammatically in chapter 3, [figure 3–2](#). In summary, the phases and their respective resource requirements are:

- a. preparation, during which ‘minimum resources’ are needed to ensure force elements attain and remain at their Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC);
- b. work up, during which resources are required to bring force elements from MLOC to OLOC and to sustain forces at OLOC for the Operational Viability Period (OVP);
- c. operations, during which sustainability resources are required; and
- d. reconstitution, during which resources are required to reconstitute force elements and/or transition them to MLOC from OLOC.

**4.4** Materiel resources are considered to be prime equipment and systems acquired through major or minor equipment programs. Logistic resources concern the equipment, infrastructure, consumables and services required to support the operational force elements. Included in logistics is the capability to access resources, services and infrastructure not held on the inventory of the force-in-being under the Chief of the Defence Force’s (CDF’s) control. Unless otherwise specified, for the ease of subsequent use during this chapter, materiel and logistic resources will be referred to generically as ‘resources’. Those resources associated with preparation, work up and an initial OVP are termed ‘readiness resources’. Readiness resources and sustainability resources together are termed ‘preparedness resources’.

**4.5** A decision to work up all or part of the ADF will cause an increase in activities, and create greater demand on the current stockholdings of the ADF supply system and external supply sources. It will also impact on our ability to maintain a supply of trained and ready forces and on the performance

of other resource elements integral to preparedness and mobilisation. To ensure that an adequate flow of resources is available to meet preparedness demands, supply sources need to be identified and mechanisms need to be in place to optimise their responsiveness in time of contingency.

**4.6 Purpose.** The purpose of this chapter is to identify the resource elements of mobilisation and describe the framework required during peace to ensure essential resources can be acquired in time to support contingency operations.

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

**4.7** Effective and efficient resource management during operations will always be a considered and informed judgment of the balance between the time frame, activity levels, usage rates, priority for allocation of resources and the ability of resource systems to surge to meet the needs of a particular contingency. These aspects combine to form a resource management framework for testing and determining the resource needs of a force element's operational requirements. Materiel resources are managed by application of Force Activity Designators (FAD) against the Australian Standard Materiel Issue and Movement System (AUSMIMPS) outlined in Australian Defence Force Publication 20 (ADFP 20)—*Logistics in Support of Joint Operations*, chapter 3. FAD are allocated by CDF or delegate, and their use ensures that the allocation of logistic resources is aligned with operational objectives.

### Period of contingency

**4.8** Effective preparedness and mobilisation planning is contingent upon effective and consistent assessment of operational resource requirements in addition to those required for work up. The Period of Contingency (POC) is the term given to the planning time frame which should be used to assess and determine the period for which operational resource requirements will be required.

**4.9** The POC encompasses three time periods: the Work Up Period, the OVP and the Sustainability Period (SP):

- a. **Work Up Period.** The Work Up Period is the period in which force elements are required to raise their levels of capability from MLOC to OLOC within readiness notice. The resources used in this period are termed Work Up Resources.
- b. **OVP.** The OVP is the period immediately following deployment on operations during which forces must maximise self-sufficiency until the logistic resupply system is in place to replenish expenditure. The OVP is set by operational and logistics needs and considerations and will include a short-term degree of self-sufficiency for each force element. The subsequent requirement for Operational Viability Resources will be set in accordance with the length of the OVP and the anticipated resource usage rates for the level of conflict envisaged.
- c. **SP.** The SP is the period for which force elements are to be sustained on operations after the OVP. In order for Defence to plan for the long-term sustainment of forces during operations a sustainability period needs to be set. The sustainability period is determined in accordance with strategic guidance. It enables stockholding, procurement and maintenance strategies to be developed and the required level of resource usage and support to be determined.

### Activity levels and usage rates

**4.10** Activity levels refer to the tempo and intensity of likely contingency operations. There are planning assumptions used to calculate resource usage rates. Usage rates are the levels of resource consumption for defined activity levels over time. Usage rates should relate to the nature of the forces to be committed to a particular operation and its duration.

**4.11** Preparedness planning provides guidance on the nature of the forces to be committed in a given operation. Forecasting the likely tempo and intensity of operations and the rates of consumption of resources is made on the basis of strategic guidance, preparedness planning scenarios, historical data, objective assessment and professional judgment. The levels of activity to maintain MLOC of the force-in-being, for work-up, maintenance of OLOC and for sustainability, are all used to determine the associated usage rates.

**4.12** The CDF's Preparedness Directive/Operational Preparedness Directive establish the order of priority for activity levels and their associated usage rates. The first priority are those activity levels relevant to peacetime tasks and operations associated with contingencies considered credible in the shorter term. Lower priority is given to activity levels and usage rates for higher levels of conflict. Regardless of priority, planning of total activity levels and usage rates is necessary to enable logistic policies for total preparedness to be developed.

#### **Resource allocation priority**

**4.13** The priority for allocation of available resources is determined by the requirements of readiness and sustainability. All force elements require a base level of resources to maintain MLOC from which their OLOC can be achieved within readiness notice. The base level of resources will vary due to the effect of differing readiness notice and OLOC. Force elements on longer readiness notice will normally require a lower level of resources.

**4.14** Work-up resource requirements are based on readiness notice, the plan for achievement of the specified OLOC and contingency supply arrangements. Force elements on longer readiness notice will normally have a greater demand for work-up resources.

**4.15** Contingency supply arrangements, stockholding plans, operational viability and sustainability requirements are based on assessed contingency activity levels and usage rates.

**4.16** The allocation of resources to force elements for minimum resources, work-up, operational viability and sustainability essentially reflect a cost/risk trade-off. As readiness notice reflects strategic guidance, those force elements assigned shorter readiness will attract priority for resources over force elements with longer notice in accordance with AUSMIMPS.

#### **Stockholding**

**4.17** Preparedness and mobilisation plans may require that stocks are physically held, or that plans are developed for their timely provision. Stockholding policy guides this process. The general stockholding principles are:

- a. Stocks forming part of minimum resources should be held at optimum levels which reflect a cost/risk trade-off between inventory procurement and holding costs, and the cost and operational impact of stock shortages.
- b. Reserve stocks are required to support both work-up training and operations. Reserve stocks for operations need to be held only if they cannot be obtained in a timely manner by procurement initiated within readiness notice. However, reserve stocks for use during work-up training will also need to be held to the extent that they are not available for timely delivery prior to planned usage. In applying these principles, consideration should be given to:
  - (1) international cooperative logistics support arrangements, such as Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) and the use of Foreign Military Sales arrangements;
  - (2) industry capacity and expansion capability; and
  - (3) prepacking and pre-positioning needs.
- c. The continuing availability of operating stocks from the peacetime supply pipeline also needs to be considered. Reserve stocks are needed to provide only the increased demand over and above normal peacetime levels, not the total usage during contingencies.

**4.18** In applying these principles particular attention needs to be given to critical and long lead time items, and items with a potential for supply interruption. The ability of transport resources to provide the required logistics mobility is also important.

**4.19** Reserve stock requirements need to be based on endorsed activity levels and usage rates expected in the work-up to OLOC, and during the period of operations. Additionally, assessment of the duration and geographical spread over which operations may extend is necessary for the determination of total stockholding requirements and to ascertain where, when and which elements of the ADF logistics system must be in place to support operations.

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS

### Equipment and facilities

**4.20** The system for identifying and planning for defence equipment and facilities (capabilities) used by the Defence Organisation is described in VCDF Minute 199 of 1999 (Practice and Process for Developing Capability) dated 28 Jul 99. Defence mobilisation planning documents are regularly updated and provide guidance for the Capability Development process. The system of Higher Defence Committees is the mechanism by which these plans are approved. As changes to strategic or financial guidance occur, priorities are reassessed and approval is sought to re-engineer budgets against revised objectives for acquisition of new capability and adjustment of financial expenditure across the Five Year Defence Program/Ten Year Development Plan.

### Impressment powers

**4.21** From time to time the ADF will need to have recourse to assets and resources that exist in the community such as vehicles, equipment, fuel and facilities. In scenarios short of a declared defence emergency the Commonwealth will contract, lease, buy or charter the services or items it requires. During a defence emergency the *Defence Act 1903* confers the power to requisition materiel for defence purposes provided that provision has been made to appropriately recompense the owner of the materiel requisitioned. These regulations are necessary, as the Constitution requires that acquisition of property be on 'just terms'.

### Infrastructure

**4.22** Infrastructure is the framework of interdependent tangible and intangible networks and systems comprising industries, institutions and distribution capabilities that provide a continuous flow of goods and services essential to the defence of Australia. The ADF has always been reliant on national and international infrastructure for a wide range of goods, service and facilities. The trend to outsource support instigated by the Commercial Support Program and accelerated under the Defence Reform Program has increased the ADF's reliance on the national support base during peacetime and during lower levels of conflict. The success of ADF operations across the full spectrum of conflict will depend upon the capability of the national support base to respond and adjust to increased Defence demands.

**4.23** Mobilisation planning and management must ensure the needs of all force elements of the ADF and, if necessary, the foreign elements of a combined force are met through a holistic approach. An overarching framework of arrangements and agreements is required to harness national and international resources in a concentrated, efficient and effective fashion. These arrangements and agreements must provide for the need to surge to higher levels of support, and to sustain these levels, or to adapt to changed tasks and priorities during Defence mobilisation.

**4.24** The National Support Division is responsible for the development of policies, strategies and arrangements that facilitate ADF access to the national support base to support Defence mobilisation and sustainment. This includes:

- a. the development of strategic level plans for the mobilisation of national resources to support and sustain the defence effort;
- b. the development of a strategic level understanding of Defence's support needs and the national support base's potential to meet those needs;
- c. the development and maintenance of relationships with those who control, shape and influence the national support base including governments, industry, infrastructure owners and the general community;
- d. the development of strategies for better engaging industry in support of operations thereby broadening the options for Defence planners at all levels;
- e. the development of arrangements, agreements and understandings with those elements of the civil infrastructure relevant to support of ADF operations; and
- f. the development of international government-to-government and military-to-military arrangements, agreements and understandings enabling support to ADF operations in Australia and overseas.

**4.25** Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements with foreign governments, MOU with civil airlines and shipping companies currently exist. These are reviewed periodically and new arrangements negotiated to facilitate ADF access to requisite goods and services during Defence mobilisation.

### **Production/adaptation**

**4.26** Defence industry is that part of industry which provides, or is capable of providing, goods and services which are strategically important to Defence. This dynamic definition enables the focus for industry to be altered in accordance with changing strategic guidance. The focus for industry, however, is likely to remain in areas of key technologies which act as force multipliers and where retaining the technological edge is important.

**4.27** There are three levels of priority for industry in relation to preparedness and mobilisation planning. They are:

- a. **First Order Priorities**—are those essential to the development of Australia's self-reliant defence posture. In particular, they are concerned with information technology, communications and electronics, which are crucial to the development of intelligence, surveillance, command and control, combat performance and consumables.
- b. **Second Order Priorities**—are those considered to be generally strategically important but cannot be justified on economic grounds. That is, there is no strategic justification for paying a significant premium to maintain them. They include the ability to build end items, such as naval platforms. It should be noted that important capabilities are developed for through-life support of this equipment which fall into the first order category.
- c. **Third Order Priorities**—those capabilities which are of lower strategic importance or are less urgent in the context of our foreseeable strategic circumstances. That is, they relate mainly to industry support of those elements of the force maintained at lesser degrees of readiness. Consequently, international competition (normal commercial practice) is used to determine the level of Australian industry involvement.

**4.28** Defence preparedness and mobilisation planning provides a statement of strategic priorities for local industry support to the ADF. It also identifies longer term development needs for key defence-related technologies, which assist Australian industry to meet Defence needs competitively.

### **Movement and distribution**

**4.29** Distribution involves access to, and management of facilities, equipment, services and people to achieve an efficient and cost effective flow of raw materials or finished products from point of origin to point of utilisation.

**4.30** Movement involves the transportation of personnel and materiel from their origin to a destination within a stated period of time and in a designated order of march. It requires coordination of movements through dedicated movement agencies utilising all necessary transport resources in accordance with the doctrine and procedures outlined in ADFP 21—*Movements in Support of Operations*. Transport resources are those organic to the ADF and those accessed through national and international agreements, from commercial and foreign military sources. Mobilisation planning should ensure agreements with these sources are in place to provide the framework for accessing extra air, land and sea transport capability for contingencies as required.

**4.31** Distribution management involves both distribution planning and distribution operations, each with different infrastructure implications. Distribution planning is facilitated by trained personnel and good information systems support. Distribution operations include functions such as order processing, packaging, warehousing, inventory management and transportation. They will be facilitated by structures such as warehouses, roads, railways, ports and airfields.

**4.32** The essence of distribution management is to provide an unhindered flow of products to the customer. The speed of that flow is governed by operational and economic factors. Operational factors include such elements as priority, availability targets and critical items which are influenced by Defence preparedness plans. Economic factors are governed by the endeavour to achieve the most cost effective means of potential distribution. To meet operational needs in the most cost effective manner it is necessary to identify and resolve distribution chokepoints such as warehousing capacity, transport mode restrictions, government regulations (safety, weight limitations, noise curfews) and material handling

limitations. Defence mobilisation planning provides the mechanism to identify chokepoints and develop solutions through changes in distribution patterns, defence investment or changes to logistic concepts of operations.

## Maintenance

**4.33** The maintenance of military equipment is necessary to ensure that equipment is available for operational use. It also ensures that planned life of type (LOT) is achieved in peacetime. Equipment availability is influenced by the availability of spare parts and consumables and by its maintenance schedule. The maintenance schedule is in turn dictated by the inherent reliability and maintainability aspects of the equipment's design.

**4.34** Maintenance consists of three elements: application of skills, specialist facilities and standards. The determination of the type and frequency of maintenance processes and the prediction of usage rates of parts and consumables is a part of maintenance planning.

- a. **Application of skills.** Preparedness and mobilisation planning needs to ensure that the skill base to support the ADF is relevant, appropriately trained and adequate for mobilisation. As technologies change new skills and levels of proficiency may be needed. The development of new skills may necessitate changes in training, which may lead to a reassessment of the 'core' functions, workforce and lead times appropriate to preparedness. Formal arrangements like MOU and contingency contract clauses are effective planning tools for the provision of skills and capacity from the civil sector.
- b. **Specialist maintenance facilities.** Specialist maintenance facilities are generally provided as part of the capital investment in defence capabilities (eg shipyards). Preparedness and mobilisation planning should quantify the need for maintenance facilities, whether part of industry or Defence, and ensure they are of the right size and in the appropriate place to provide efficient maintenance support during mobilisation.
- c. **Maintenance standards.** Maintenance standards are specified for general and specific classes of equipment. They are determined by the individual Services in accordance with civil standards for similar equipment, international military standards, and past experience with the equipment. In a non-operational environment, emphasis is placed on conservation of the equipment and achievement of LOT. In times of contingency operations, serviceability criteria may be relaxed and the focus altered from long-term asset preservation and cost minimisation to maximising operational availability and mission generation. Unusual unserviceability will arise because of the changed environmental conditions, increased rates of usage and battle damage. Maintenance standards and practices must take account of the need to improvise, use innovative repair techniques to offset shortages of consumables and repair parts, and cannibalisation of unserviceable equipment to make other equipment serviceable.

## Information management (strategic communications)

**4.35** Defence routinely uses the civil communications infrastructure. In the more populated areas of the continent, where the communications infrastructure is sophisticated and robust, that use could be expanded rapidly to meet mobilisation needs. In sparsely populated areas where the communications infrastructure is more austere, Defence mobilisation planning needs to identify any potential increases in use of the civil communication infrastructure by Defence and the lead times involved for upgrading communication infrastructure to meet such increases. Civil communication carriers need to be constantly apprised of Defence communication planning intentions.

**4.36** Defence mobilisation planning for strategic communications involves development of infrastructure under the following headings:

- a. **Defence communications network.** This consists of the Defence network and a range of civilian controlled or operated communications capabilities. They are limited to what is considered necessary to sustain communication support to existing force capabilities during operations. This network should provide Defence with the ability to assess ADF surge capability by utilising the national and international civil infrastructure, and any constraints on it.

- b. **Civil communication carriers.** The national carriers provide a range of services to Defence. These services range from the provision of point-to-point bandwidth which Defence manages and uses, through to the provision of specific services to end users. Formal structures, including a range of management and working level committees, are in place between national communications carriers and Defence to ensure cooperative communications infrastructure planning. A major outcome of this cooperative planning is the enhancement of the civil communications infrastructure for Defence use which is now capable of expansion during mobilisation.

## Health

**4.37** Health support to Defence is heavily reliant on the national infrastructure. The need to provide health support to deployed forces competes with the maintenance of effective services in the civil community. The national health infrastructure is designed to support existing civilian dependancies with a small surge capacity for short periods to meet civil emergencies. The capacity of the national health infrastructure to provide higher levels of medical care to Defence is limited.

**4.38** The elements of national health infrastructure on which Defence is reliant are:

- a. trained health services personnel;
- b. civilian treatment facilities;
- c. casualty carrying transport, including commercial vessels suitable for conversion to hospital ships, civil aircraft for medical evacuation and national road and rail infrastructure for surface evacuation; and
- d. health materiel including national contingency stocks of drugs, vaccines, blood and blood products.

**4.39** Australia has a limited health materiel base and is reliant on overseas sourcing for a range of pharmaceuticals, advanced medical equipment and technology, and items required for treatment of nuclear, biological and chemical casualties. Health care is a critical and limited resource that must be thoroughly planned, well before it is required. Preparedness and mobilisation planning involves the determination of the size of this requirement and the planning of options.

**4.40** Defence mobilisation planning on health matters is coordinated by the Defence Health Consultative Group (DHCG). The DHCG is chaired by the Surgeon General Australian Defence Force and includes State and Federal representatives.

**4.41** MOU provide the basis for accessing the civil infrastructure to meet the health support needs of the ADF during a defence emergency. The development of these MOU is coordinated by the Australian Support Area Health Planning Group. International agreements provide the basis for securing access to the civilian and military health support capabilities of other nations in combined operations. These arrangements are supported by measures designed to develop health support inter-operability.

## Liaison

**4.42** Information is required from a variety of sources to inform judgments and decisions relating to defence mobilisation. For preparedness and mobilisation planning to be effective, liaison at all levels within Defence is necessary. Liaison is undertaken through formal and informal arrangements. The Department of Defence has well developed processes within Intelligence to facilitate international and inter-departmental liaison. Constant liaison is essential to ensure matters are reviewed as they unfold and the best possible advice is provided to Government. The process may necessitate the establishment of liaison staffs at other departments of Government to supplement existing standing committees and working groups. Other elements of the Defence Organisation liaise with civil industry and other national authorities to secure support for Defence. International alliances and Defence agreements require continuous formal liaison procedures and gain prominence during a defence emergency, particularly those with countries likely to provide materiel support.

**4.43** The Defence media liaison process is controlled by Australian Defence Headquarters through the Public Affairs and Corporate Communications organisation. The function of Defence Public Affairs and Corporate Communications is to provide centralised liaison with the international/national media, furnishing informed commentary on all issues and arranging access for the media to appropriate operational environments, within Government guidance. Media liaison is integral to the Government's

foreign and domestic policy and is necessary for gaining both international and domestic support for Australia's role in a defence emergency. The media play an important role during Defence mobilisation in keeping the nation informed of events and broadcasting mobilisation announcements such as call out of Reserve forces. Guidance for briefing the media in a defence emergency will be the subject of Government policy and will be different in each circumstance. Defence media liaison is a continuous process in which activity increases substantially during a defence emergency.

**4.44** Domestic security is an important consideration during a defence emergency. Defence preparedness and mobilisation planning should draw on existing liaison structures, where appropriate, to save time or to enhance familiarity and cooperation. The National Anti Terrorist Plan (NATP) is an example of an existing national structure which coordinates responses from State and Federal agencies representing legislative, executive, judicial, law enforcement and Defence agencies. The NATP is a widely understood liaison structure which provides a model for the preparation of threat assessments and coordinating domestic protective security action during Defence mobilisation.

### **Science and technology**

**4.45** Identification of the science and technology areas that provide the greatest strategic advantage for Defence is an aspect of preparedness and mobilisation planning. Responsibility for maintaining the technological base on behalf of the Defence Organisation is vested in the Chief Defence Scientist who heads the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

**4.46** Research and development (R&D) is an ongoing process and Government's policy of self-reliance in Defence acknowledges that Australia should not rely completely on imported technology and offshore support, and recommends, where appropriate enhancement of indigenous capabilities for technological support, modification and development. Further, Australia's strategic circumstances pose challenges that often call for unique and therefore local solutions. The purpose of indigenous R&D, which covers a wide field of activities and technologies, is enhancement of military capability and Defence's ability to meet preparedness objectives. The technologies which are favoured are those that provide an operational advantage, reduce personnel or life-cycle costs, avoid early obsolescence or the need for additional equipment, simplify operations and support, or are particularly suited to Australia's strategic circumstances.

**4.47** Demand on R&D resources is likely to increase significantly as a contingency develops. Defence related R&D infrastructure needs the flexibility to cater for this, including a capacity to incorporate increased use of national R&D and academic organisations. The demand for R&D resources to support the ADF during a contingency dictates the need for a national base of competency in contemporary military technology that enables force elements to achieve a 'first response capability' for specific contingencies. DSTO is the major element of this base, but the role of private industry and specialist sectors also needs to be recognised.

### **International support**

**4.48** Defence self-reliance relies upon the ability of the national infrastructure to support military operations. As well, support from other nations can be made available under specific agreements. This will include the development of arrangements with defence industry, civil infrastructure elements and overseas suppliers, in the form of MOU or MOA, contracts and other commercial and international cooperative logistic support arrangements.

## CHAPTER 5

# MOBILISATION—LEGAL ISSUES

### INTRODUCTION

**5.1** The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia gives legitimacy to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and allows for its employment in protecting national security. Legislation covering control and administration of the ADF is contained in the *Defence Act 1903*.

**5.2** In the context of this chapter the following terms are described:

- a. 'war' is synonymous with the term 'armed conflict' and defined to mean any invasion or apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on Australia, by an enemy or armed force; and
- b. 'defence emergency' is defined as the period between the publication of a proclamation by the Governor-General that a state of defence emergency exists and the publication of a proclamation that such a state no longer exists. Declaration of a 'defence emergency' would be a matter for Ministerial judgment based on the prevailing situation and the legislative necessity to declare such a state.

**5.3 Purpose.** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the legislative circumstances and constraints under which Defence will mobilise or expand to prosecute military operations in defence of Australia. It does not prescribe all of the situations which must be considered as a part of mobilisation planning, and legal advice should be sought to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the subject areas described herein.

### LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

#### Constitution and the defence power

**5.4** The Constitution gives the Commonwealth Parliament power to legislate for a limited range of matters including the defence of Australia. The relevant 'defence power' is contained in sub-section 51(vi), which reads:

'The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:

The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth.'

**5.5** The defence power does not remain constant but varies according to the state of international tension. The greater the perceived threat to the Commonwealth, the greater latitude it has in legislating to meet that threat. A High Court decision on the defence power explains:

'... unlike some other powers its application depends upon facts, and as those facts change so may its actual operation as a power enabling the legislature to make an actual law ... The existence and character of hostilities, or a threat of hostilities, against the Commonwealth are facts which will determine the extent of operation of the power.' [per Dixon J., in *Andrews v. Howell* (1941) 65 C.L.R. 255 at p278].

**5.6** The exercise of defence powers is by either legislative or executive action. The Constitution vests legislative power in the Parliament and provides that the laws created will be executed, or put into effect, by the Executive. The term Executive can mean government departments and their offices, and it is at this level that the day-to-day execution of the law takes place. The term Executive is also used to mean Cabinet or relevant members of Cabinet. Cabinet is not involved in the day-to-day execution of the law but makes policy. In a time of expanded defence power, much of the legislation created to facilitate the defence of Australia would be subordinate legislation, by way of regulations made by the Executive in this case being Cabinet or the relevant members of Cabinet. In the circumstances of a 'credible contingency' developing, Parliament could grant the Executive a regulation making power with respect to defence. If the contingency only developed slowly, this might consist of successive grants which

supplement and widen the scope of the earlier grants. Within each of the levels of conflict there will be varying degrees of defence emergencies, such that it would not be possible to predict the extent to which the defence power will need to be expanded.

### **Commonwealth powers in war time**

**5.7** In time of war the defence power is at its widest. Parliament may legislate to regulate anything which is related to the prosecution of the war and, provided its actions are authorised by Parliament, the Executive is similarly allowed to do what is necessary to prosecute the war.

### **Commonwealth powers in times of tension**

**5.8** In time of international tension short of war or defence emergency the situation is not as clear as in times of war or peace. The range of permissible actions open to the Commonwealth will increase with the degree of tension. What can be done under the defence power will depend upon the degree of the emergency that exists.

## **EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL**

### **Employment of reserve and emergency forces**

**5.9** Reserve and emergency forces are generally not required to render continuous full time service, as are members of the permanent forces. They can volunteer to render full time service, and if the offer to serve is accepted, they become bound to render that service. The only circumstance in which the service of reserve or emergency forces may be secured by other than voluntary means is for them to be 'called out'. They may be called out by the Governor-General, on advice from the Executive, in time of war or defence emergency where the Governor-General considers it desirable to do so for the defence of Australia. Under these provisions they can be called out for the duration of the war or the defence emergency.

**5.10** These forces may also be called out by the Governor-General other than in time of war or defence emergency, where the Governor-General considers it desirable to do so for the defence of Australia, subject to certain procedural constraints. The constraints are that the call out is not to exceed a period of three months. The Governor-General may extend this call out for another period not exceeding three months and, under this provision, no reserve or emergency member is bound to render continuous service for a period exceeding 12 months. Additionally, a member who serves continuously under these call out provisions and is released from that service cannot again be called out until a period equivalent to the continuous service has elapsed.

**5.11** Where the Governor-General exercises these powers under the Defence Act, it must be communicated to both Houses of Parliament which are then bound to meet within 10 days to receive the communication and possibly debate the issue.

### **Employment of women**

**5.12** The *Sex Discrimination Act 1984* allows the ADF to, as a matter of policy, preclude women from employment in positions involving combat duties. While women can be employed on combat duties, the ADF is not legally obliged to employ them in this manner. The Sex Discrimination Regulations define combat duties as those duties which require a person to commit, or participate directly in the commission of, an act of violence against an adversary in time of war. 'Time of war' has the same meaning as in the Defence Act.

**5.13 Policy.** All ADF employment categories are open to women except employment in the following combat positions: Navy—Clearance Divers; Army—Armour, Artillery, Infantry and Combat Engineers; Air Force—Ground Defence.

### **Use of civilians**

**5.14** Legal factors will often determine the extent to which civilians may be used to support ADF operations. It may well be that, in some cases, such employment will be clearly unlawful. Mobilisation planning which intends the use of civilians in support of operations needs to consider the effect of a considerable body of law including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and in particular, Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions; the Defence Act; the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982*; the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988*; and other domestic law.

**5.15** Legal guidelines applying to the use of civilians are:

- a. **Status.** A civilian employed by the military in an area of operations (AO) retains the status of a civilian.
- b. **Protection.** Under LOAC, civilians enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations unless they take a direct part in hostilities. Parties to the conflict have an obligation, to the maximum extent feasible, to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives and to protect them from the dangers arising from military operations. Under international law the concept of military necessity may allow the employment of civilians in support of operations. Civilians used in support of operations, while indirectly involved in hostilities, will not lose their protection, but will be liable to injury or death if on a military objective when it is attacked. The underlying theme of LOAC development is to maintain the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.
- c. **Loss of protection.** To use civilians directly in a combatant role is to deprive them of the protection accorded to the civilian population. If civilians take any part in direct combat functions, such as defending installations from attack, they will no longer be classed as civilians for the purposes of protection. If civilians are located/situated in or on a military objective they lose their LOAC protection.
- d. **Employment.** Civilians may be used in direct support of ADF operations where it can be shown that the presence and employment of such civilians is required for the effective conduct of operations, and where such use does not contravene the LOAC.
- e. **Use of civilians through military necessity.** While it is lawful to employ civilians for reasons of military necessity, for example, because of the need to have certain technical skills available to military forces which are not available through the use of military personnel, there is a general principle that such reliance on civilians should not be deliberately engineered solely on economic grounds. The circumstances of each case need to be determined on their merits.
- f. **Prisoner of war status.** Civilians accompanying armed forces are entitled to prisoner of war status. Civilians employed by the military, upon capture, are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war (not a protected person), although there is no guarantee that they may be so treated.
- g. **Bearing arms.** A civilian may be authorised to carry arms for the purpose of self-defence. A civilian is not to engage in direct hostilities with the enemy.
- h. **Obligation.** A civilian cannot be legally compelled to remain in, or move to, an AO as part of that person's terms of employment.
- i. **Discipline.** Civilians must consent in writing if they are to be bound by the provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act on operations against the enemy. Furthermore, only certain provisions apply. If civilians do not consent, only the domestic law of Australia applies.

**Conscription**

**5.16** The only statutory provision enabling compulsory military service is in the Defence Act. In time of war, the Governor-General may issue a proclamation requiring all persons (regardless of sex or being an Australian citizen) between the ages of 18 and 60 and who have resided in Australia for not less than six months to serve in the Defence Force for the duration of the war.

**5.17** Certain classes of persons are exempt from conscription. These classes include persons suffering from a physical or mental disability, parliamentarians, judges, those involved with religions or religious orders and those whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in war, warlike operations, particular wars or particular warlike operations. Provision is made for tribunals to be established to determine questions relating to such conscientious beliefs.

## LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

**5.18** The employment of military forces in armed conflict when dealing with an enemy is governed by LOAC. LOAC is broadly concerned with the protection of the victims of armed conflict, and how States may conduct armed conflict. Any armed conflict will be affected by LOAC and legal advisers will be available to provide advice on all operations law issues.

## REQUISITION POWERS

**5.19** During defence emergencies the ADF will need to have recourse to the assets and resources existing in the community such as vehicles, equipment, fuel and buildings. In most cases the Commonwealth will contract, lease, buy or charter the services and items it requires. In cases where material and buildings have to be requisitioned for defence purposes, the Defence Act confers the power to do so, provided that regulations have been made to prescribe the method of recompense. These regulations are necessary as the Constitution requires that acquisition of property must be on 'just terms'.

### Siting of Defence facilities

**5.20** A factor in the consideration of facilities requirements for military purposes are the provisions of article 58 of Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This article requires inter alia, that to the maximum extent feasible, military objectives should not be located near densely populated areas and that other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population are taken. This is applicable to new and existing facilities.

## CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

### Defence and civil cooperation (State emergency powers)

**5.21** The responsibility for the conduct of operations in the defence of Australia lies with the Commonwealth, not with the civil law enforcement powers of the States. The Commonwealth has full executive and, if necessary, legislative authority for the conduct of such operations. In an international armed conflict, the powers of a State or Territory government do not expand to encompass the conduct of hostilities, although those governments may legislate to carry out their own functions in a way appropriate to changed circumstances, subject to the Commonwealth's overriding authority. For example, in areas such as public safety, transport and essential services the States would play an important role through their own emergency legislation, in assisting the ADF to meet any threats. Essentially, the State or Territory is responsible for the conduct of normal domestic activities within its boundaries, including police actions against breaches of civil authority.

**5.22** Apart from the defence power, the Commonwealth will also have the primary responsibility for the conduct of national security operations in a period of tension and during hostilities as any foreign activity close to, or on Australian territory, will immediately invoke a wide range of Commonwealth powers. These include customs, fisheries, immigration, quarantine and Australian Federal Police enforcement. Significant foreign activities or hostilities occurring offshore would fall under Commonwealth control rather than under State or Territory control.

**5.23** Close coordination of all these civil enforcement activities at the national level could be expected to occur as soon as the prospect of significant foreign activity was identified. Response activities would be directed by the Federal government, with the State and Territory governments being kept informed and their cooperation sought in appropriate areas. Cooperation would include such areas as the availability and efficient use of limited resources and personnel, exchange of information and intelligence, and advice on specific local issues or problems.

**5.24** State or Territory coordination bodies would bring together their own responsibilities, ensuring they were properly taken into account by the Commonwealth. They should also ensure that State and Commonwealth directed activities did not clash and were mutually reinforcing and that State or Territory support for national and particularly defence operations was maximised. In any contingency where ADF personnel would be deployed into areas in Australia where they would come into contact with all elements of the civilian population there would need to be a regime for coordinating Defence and civil activities. Importantly, ADF members must comply with State laws unless the Commonwealth has enacted a valid law which is inconsistent with the State law.

## **Civil defence**

**5.25** ADF personnel assigned to civil defence organisations must be clearly distinguishable from other members of the ADF and are not permitted to perform military duties during the conflict. Such personnel must be permanently assigned to the civil defence task. Legal advice should be sought if such action is contemplated.

## **Aid to the civil power**

**5.26** Aid to the civil power is Defence Force aid to the Commonwealth and/or State governments and their civil authorities in the performance of law enforcement tasks. The possible application of armed force distinguishes aid to the civil power from aid to the civil community. Section 119 of the Constitution specifies that 'The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence'. Section 51 of the Defence Act provides that the Governor-General acting on a State request may:

'... call out the Permanent Forces and in the event of their numbers being insufficient may also call out such of the Emergency Forces and the Reserve Forces as may be necessary for the protection of that State, and the services of the Forces so called out may be utilised accordingly for the protection of that State against domestic violence ...'

**5.27** In the initial stages of conflict, when hostilities might be limited and ambiguous, it could be appropriate for incidents to be treated as breaches of Commonwealth or State law and Defence Force assistance for that purpose to be provided under aid to the civil power arrangements. Once hostilities with another nation are identified, or ADF security operations are being conducted on that basis, those operations would no longer be aid to the civil power, but would be the direct responsibility of the Commonwealth and conducted under the defence power laid out in the Constitution.

**5.28** It is for the Commonwealth to decide how to respond to a State's request for aid to the civil power. In the role of protecting the States against domestic violence, the Defence Force operates under conditions which are detailed in Australian Military regulations, Air Force regulations and Naval instructions.



## **CHAPTER 6**

# **WORKFORCE MOBILISATION (TO BE ISSUED)**

This chapter will be issued at a later date.



## CHAPTER 7

# FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MOBILISATION

### INTRODUCTION

**7.1** Mobilisation requires a financial policy response to support the military response. It can be expected that if government decides to commit some or all of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to a contingency, it would, at the same time, decide to provide the appropriate level of funding for mobilisation. It would be necessary for Defence to prepare realistic estimates of the additional costs of mobilisation and operations for consideration by government. In determining these estimates, Defence would be required to assess both its current year budgetary position for short-term flexibility and its proposed Five Year Defence Program (FYDP) for re-programming flexibility. Normal budgetary processes would be followed, although they might be accelerated.

**7.2 Purpose.** The purpose of this chapter is to outline the processes for funding of mobilisation, and specific issues that should be considered in the event that all or part of the ADF is committed to a contingency. The chapter also describes, in practical terms, how Defence would obtain the funds to meet both shorter and longer notice contingencies, from within the Defence budget and/or by supplementation. The existing budget process is also briefly outlined (see [annex A](#)).

### PROCESSES FOR OBTAINING FUNDING

#### Costing and funding requirements

**7.3** Funding the response to a contingency requires a comprehensive estimate of the total additional costs of such factors as deployments, augmentation, force structure increases and decreases, security and other associated activity.

**7.4** Depending on the magnitude of possible costs and the impact of those costs on other areas, resource areas within all of Defence's Executives may become involved in the costing and preparation of bids. Resources and Financial Programs (RFP) staff would play a key coordinating role in this process.

#### Shift of emphasis and pace

**7.5** During peace the emphasis of the capability development and budgetary processes is on obtaining the maximum value for every available dollar and the provision of a broad range of capabilities/options to meet an uncertain situation (a credible but undefined contingency). Consequently, the pace of the capability development process (major capital acquisition) and minor capital purchasing mechanisms must be deliberate.

**7.6** During a contingency or any mobilisation, the financial emphasis shifts to one of providing maximum capability from available, and possibly increased, funding for a more defined and more certain situation. A contingency moves the planning focus from an unknown to a known scenario, with known time frames, which constrain the range of options that are relevant and available. Assessment and justification of the option chosen will remain an essential element of the budgetary process, even though it too will be constrained by the available time.

**7.7** During a contingency the internal purchasing and budgetary processes for assessing, agreeing and obtaining capability would not be altered essentially, except that they would be accelerated to function at the pace appropriate to the given operation. An outline of the existing budgetary process is provided in [annex A](#).

## FUNDING PROCESSES

### Types of contingencies

**7.8** For the purposes of funding, a distinction can be made between two types of contingencies: shorter notice contingencies (the likely level of which would usually be reasonably accurately known) and longer notice contingencies (which would usually have an extended warning time). While the funding response to both types of conflict is essentially the same, the nature of the conflict will impose some differences.

### Shorter notice contingencies

**7.9** The cost of maintaining all force elements at high readiness levels to meet shorter notice contingencies is expensive. It requires higher rates of training activity, including expensive collective training and live weapon firing, near complete staffing and fully provisioned and maintained equipment holdings. Readiness is therefore carefully held at the level appropriate to Australia's strategic circumstances. Even with shorter notice contingencies, it is unlikely that the full financial resources will be available from within the Defence budget at the time the government commits all or part of the ADF to the conflict.

**7.10** In responding to such a conflict, Defence will be required to assess the total **additional** cost of the response, and also the extent to which it can fund this response from within the Defence budget. Defence would be expected to identify flexibility in the expenditure program (eg in the major investment program) and such offsets as the cancellation of exercises and non-essential tasks. If the response could not be funded from within the Defence budget, Defence would have to seek supplementation from government.

### Longer notice contingencies

**7.11** In the event that the ADF becomes involved in a longer notice contingency, it can be expected that its force structure would have been adjusted to meet the changed circumstances as the capabilities of an adversary for a longer notice contingency had been developed, and the resources to mount an appropriate response would have been incorporated into the budget. There might be aspects of a longer notice contingency that make it necessary to re-assess financial needs. For example, an escalation of the conflict might require a commensurate escalation in the ADF response. In this event, the balance of funding that has not been included in the current year budget would be dealt with as for a shorter notice contingency. Any force structure changes (eg re-ordering of priorities in the unapproved investment program) would be considered in the normal way, although the processes might be accelerated.

### Internal sources of funding

**7.12** The assessment of funding flexibility within Defence will commence when government, on Defence advice, decides upon the appropriate response to the contingency.

**7.13** All Defence Executives, through their Executive coordination areas, would prepare costings on an **additional** cost basis for their involvement in the response. RFP staff would coordinate this process. Executives would also have to prepare bids and identify possible offsets for consideration by the Defence Committee.

**7.14** The Service Executives are responsible for assessing the resource requirements needed to bring any of their force elements from their Minimum Level of Capability to their Operational Level of Capability. They will sponsor the costing of the work up activity and operational requirements of the force elements involved in the contingency.

**7.15** Initially, and if the operation is of limited duration, force elements would start with what they have, and funding would be more in terms of the purchase of minor capital items and sustaining and maintaining those force elements involved. Funding for such items might be at least partially met from short-term flexibility in the budget. If the operation continues and becomes of extended duration, a major re-ordering of priorities in the FYDP (especially in the unapproved investment program) would be necessary to fund the additional requirements. In the case of any major adjustment to the unapproved investment program, the normal capability development process would be followed, although the steps in the process may be accelerated.

### External sources of funding

**7.16** If funding could not be met from within Defence, supplementation would be sought from government. Cabinet submissions, which would be prepared as necessary, should identify the extent to which Defence can provide funding from within the Defence budget/FYDP, and also request Cabinet approval for any increases in funding that may be required. Once Cabinet approval has been given for increased funding, RFP staff would approach the Department of Finance seeking the appropriate level of supplementation. If a sufficiently large level of funding was required, additional Appropriation Bills may be prepared. RFP staff could also seek an Advance to the Minister of Finance to meet short-term requirements late in the financial year.

**7.17** Defence should be aware that additional funds directed by government to a war effort may have a cost in terms of a reduction of funds allocated to other departments. Also, as a conflict increases in seriousness, becomes more widespread, and/or endures, the financial focus on Defence spending adjusts. A range of fiscal options become available to government, such as borrowing from the public as bonds, increasing taxation or borrowing from overseas.

**7.18** Though it could be argued that these aspects are not of direct concern to Defence, it is important in terms of the coordination of Australia's national defence effort that Defence appreciates these external financial forces and their broader implications.

**7.19** Further clarification and/or information on the purchasing and budgetary systems within Defence can be obtained from the First Assistant Secretary Resources and Financial Programs.

#### Annex:

A. [Outline of the budget/Five Year Defence Program process](#)



## OUTLINE OF THE BUDGET/FIVE YEAR DEFENCE PROGRAM PROCESS

### Introduction

1. The Defence budget is the agreed outlays allocation (ie expenditure less receipts) for the financial year period from 01 July to 30 June. Expenditure allocations are appropriated by Parliament and made available through the annual Appropriation Acts.

### Elements of the budget process

2. There are two key elements to the budget process:
- a. The budget for the current year and the forward estimates which are presented to Parliament in May each year. Defence appropriations are included in Appropriation Act No 1 which is passed as part of the budget by the end of June each year.
  - b. The additional estimates (AE) for the current year provide for additional extra funds required to meet new and/or unforeseen expenditure, after the budget. It allows the Portfolio and Executives to reallocate resources provided in the budget. The Defence AE are incorporated in Appropriation Act No 3 and are presented to Parliament in November each year.

### Five Year Defence Program

3. The annual Five Year Defence Program (FYDP) planning cycle is the established process within Defence for the integrated development of the Defence budget and the forward estimates for the succeeding three years. The development of the FYDP is directed by the Defence Committee (DC) and is managed by the Resources and Financial Programs staff.
4. The annual budget/FYDP process is directed towards the development and continuation of detailed long-term resource planning across the Defence portfolio and the development and lodgment of the annual Defence budget and forward estimates proposals.
5. As part of the budget Cabinet process, the Government provides Defence with an indication of its likely level of funding for each year of the forward estimates period. In the light of this funding advice, the DC each year agrees on a planning basis for the development of the next FYDP.
6. Defence Executives provide advice each year of their proposed funding allocations and any additional resource requirements for the FYDP period. These bids from Executives are considered by the DC and further refined and reviewed over the period leading up to the budget. The FYDP development process culminates in the Defence Budget Cabinet Submission lodged in February each year.

### Major Capital Investment

7. Major Capital Investment is contained in three separate Programs within the FYDP, known as the Pink, White and Green Books.

### New Major Investment Program (Pink Book)

8. The Pink Book sets out plans for the unapproved major equipment component of the FYDP. A major project is defined as one which has a total cost exceeding \$20m, has a per unit cost of more than \$1m where numbers of items are being procured, or which has particular joint or strategic significance.
9. The Pink Book is a classified internal document prepared by the Chief Financial Officer. It provides information on the status and proposed scope and timing of unapproved new major equipment projects for each FYDP. It sets out estimates of years of approval, expenditure patterns and total project costs for each new major equipment proposal. An unclassified version of the Pink Book is also produced.

**Approved Major Capital Equipment Program (White Book)**

10. When projects in the Pink Book are approved by Cabinet, they are transferred to the White Book. The White Book sets out all Government approved projects on which funds will be expended during the FYDP. It is subject to review with emphasis on risk management and ensuring that the project is on schedule, within cost estimates and endorsed capability requirements. The White Book is managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation.

**Capital Facilities Planning Program (Green Book)**

11. The consolidated program statement of capital facilities projects for the FYDP are contained in the Green Book. It covers both approved and unapproved projects. The Green Book covers all facilities proposals in excess of \$250 000. The program is divided into Major Works (which are greater than \$6m), Medium Works (which are between \$250 000 and \$6m) and Acquisitions. All individual projects costing more than \$20m, as well as projects of less cost which have strategic importance, are submitted to Cabinet for approval. The Green Book is managed by the Defence Estate Executive.

## GLOSSARY

### **Concurrency**

There are two dimensions to concurrency. The first concerns competing demands for resources. The second concerns competing demands on force elements to meet simultaneous operational requirements. One or both of these dimensions will usually require the establishment of priorities of effort.

### **Force-in-being**

The current state of the planned force structure, which is represented by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as it currently exists.

### **Force Element**

A force element is a component of a unit, a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives and activities.

### **Force Element Group**

A grouping of force elements with an appropriate command and control structure for a specified role(s).

### **Force Expansion**

Force expansion is the process by which the force-in-being is increased in size, capability or both, by the acquisition of significant additional equipment, personnel, facilities or other resources.

### **Force Structure**

Force structure is the force-in-being that would be required to achieve the Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) in terms of equipment, personnel and facilities.

### **Infrastructure**

The framework of interdependent tangible and intangible networks and systems comprising industries, institutions and distribution capabilities that provide a continuous flow of goods and services essential to the defence and economic security of Australia, the smooth functioning of the Government at all levels, and society as a whole.

### **Military Capability**

Military capability is the combination of force structure and preparedness which enables the nation to exercise military power.

### **Military Response Option (MRO)**

MRO are generic joint tasks that may be performed by the ADF in various circumstances to achieve associated Military Strategic Objectives, the desired outcomes which provide the basis for operational planning. MROs are a critical element of the deliberate planning process, at both the strategic and operational levels, and are used to inform the immediate planning process. MRO assist in informing Government of the range of possible military responses to a specific circumstance. They also provide the basis for determining the preparedness and capability development requirements of the ADF.

### **Military Strategic Objective (MSO)**

A desired end-state for military operations which is communicated from the strategic to the operational level and forms the basis for operational planning. MSOs are derived from an analysis of strategic policy and the military strategies associated with particular National Security Objectives.

### **Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC)**

MLOC is the lowest level of capability (task specific) from which a force element can achieve its Operational Level of Capability within Readiness Notice, and it encompasses the maintenance of core skills, safety and professional standards.

### **Mobilisation**

Mobilisation is the process that provides the framework to generate military capabilities and marshal national resources to defend the nation and its interests. It encompasses activities associated with preparedness and the conduct of operations, and may involve force expansion. Mobilisation is a continuum of interrelated activities that occurs during the four phases: Preparation, Work-up, Operations and Reconstitution.

**National Security Objective (NSO)**

An outcome which the Government may expect the ADF to achieve. NSOs are derived from an analysis of strategic policy.

**Notice to Move (NTM)**

NTM is a tactical term which should not be confused with Readiness Notice (RN). NTM is normally expressed in hours or minutes, and is the time from when a force receives direction (notice) to move to conduct a specified operation/mission to the time it either actually moves or is required to be able to move to conduct that operation/mission. For example, in an exercise or operational setting where forces are operating at OLOC (having achieved OLOC within RN/Readiness Lead Time), the forces' administrative movement, commitment to periods of combat and other tactical movement is controlled by the issue of NTM. Battle procedure (including activities such as orders, flight planning and mission briefing) is normally conducted/completed during the NTM period.

**Operational Level of Capability (OLOC)**

OLOC is the task-specific level of capability required by a force to execute its role in an operation at an acceptable level of risk.

**Operational Viability Period (OVP)**

OVP is the period immediately following deployment on operations, during which deployed forces must be self sufficient until the logistic resupply system is in place.

**Operational Viability Resources (OVR)**

OVR are the resources required during OVP. OVR are readiness resources.

**Period of Combat**

The period of combat is the period during which committed forces should be able to conduct and sustain combat operations against an adversary. Combat operations may be of limited duration, occurring throughout a relatively long period of operations. There could be more than one period of combat during a period of operations. The period of combat commences when forces engage the adversary and ceases when forces disengage from the adversary.

**Period of Operations Phase**

One of the four phases of the Mobilisation Continuum, the Operations Phase is the period from the time designated forces complete work-up and are committed to operations until those forces complete their operational commitment and commence reconstitution.

**Period of Conflict**

The period of conflict is the period that commences at the beginning of the strategic warning period and encompasses work-up and the period of operations. The period of conflict ceases when a resolution has been achieved.

**Period of Contingency**

The Period of Contingency encompasses the following three periods: the Work-up Period, the OVP and the Sustainability Period (SP).

**Preparation Phase**

One of the four phases of the Mobilisation Continuum, the Preparation Phase is that period during which a force's Present Level of Capability (PLOC) is maintained as close as practicable to its MLOC. The Preparation Phase generally equates to peacetime.

**Preparedness**

Preparedness is the measurement of how ready and how sustainable forces are to undertake military operations. It describes the combined outcome of readiness and sustainability.

**Preparedness Objectives**

A preparedness objective is a statement of capability requirement. A preparedness objective consists of a task, readiness notice and sustainability requirements (usually expressed in the form of OVP and SP).

**Present Level of Capability (PLOC)**

PLOC is the actual level of capability of a force at any given time.

**Readiness**

Readiness denotes a force's ability to be committed to operations within a specified time. Readiness refers to the *availability* and *proficiency/serviceability* of personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables allocated to a force.

**Readiness lead Time**

Readiness lead time is the *actual* time a force requires to complete its work-up from PLOC to OLOC.

**Readiness Notice**

Readiness notice is the *specified* amount of time in which a force is to complete its work-up from MLOC to OLOC.

**Reconstitution Phase**

One of the four phases of the Mobilisation Continuum, the Reconstitution Phase is that period during which a force's level of capability is returned from OLOC to MLOC (or an appropriate PLOC) at the cessation of operations.

**Reserve stocks**

Reserve stocks are those which are unlikely to be procured quickly enough during a contingency. They are held over and above operating stock levels to support possible future contingency operations. Reserve stocks cover requirements for work-up, operational viability and sustainability.

**STRAPP**

Strategic Planning Process (described separately in ADFP 9—*Joint Planing*).

**Surge**

Surge is the process by which military and civilian elements operate at higher than normal rates of effort for a limited and usually short period in order to undertake operations and/or achieve specific objectives.

**Sustainability**

Sustainability denotes a force's ability to continue to conduct operations. It is measured in terms of the personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables necessary for the force to complete its assigned operational tasks.

**Sustainability Period (SP)**

The SP is that part of the period of operations after the OVP during which forces must be sustained on operations.

**Sustainability Resources (SR)**

SR are those resources required to sustain forces on operations for the duration of the SP.

**Strategic Warning**

Strategic warning is the period commencing when the Government first accepts the existence of a possible threat to when the Government commits military forces to operations in response to the threat.

**Work-up Phase**

One of the four phases of the Mobilisation Continuum, the Work-up Phase is the period during which a force's level of capability is raised from its PLOC to its OLOC.

**Work-up Resources**

Work-up resources are those required to raise, within readiness notice, the capabilities of a force from its PLOC to its OLOC.



## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADHQ	Australian Defence Headquarters
AO	area of operations
AUSMIMPS	Australian Standard Materiel Issue and Movement Priority System
CAF	Chief of Air Force
CA	Chief of Army
CAR	Capability Assessment Report
CD	capability development
CI	Corporate Information
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CJL	Commander Joint Logistics
CN	Chief of Navy
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
COMNORCOM	Commander Northern Command
COSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
CONOPS	concept of operations
CPD	CDF's Preparedness Directive
CS	Capability Systems
DC	Defence Committee
DCS	Defence Corporate Support
DEO	Defence Estate Organisation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
DMC	Defence Mobilisation Committee
DOD	Department of Defence
DPE	Defence Personnel Executive
DSTO	Defence Science and Technology Organisation
EMA	Emergency Management Australia
FAD	Force Activity Designator
FASIP	First Assistant Secretary International Policy
FASRFP	First Assistant Secretary Resource and Financial Programs
F&IG	Finance and Inspector-General
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
FYDP	Five Year Defence Program
HQNORCOM	Headquarters Northern Command
IP	International Policy
JET	Joint Education and Training
LCAUST	Land Commander Australia
LHQ	Land Headquarters
MCAUST	Maritime Commander Australia
MEC	Mobilisation Executive Cell
MHQ	Maritime Headquarters
MLOC	Minimum Level of Capability
MRO	Military Response Option
MSO	Military Strategic Objective
NATPOL	national policy
NSCC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
NS	National Support
NTM	Notice to Move
OLOC	Operational Level of Capability
ONA	Office of National Assessments

OOPR	On Occurrence Preparedness Report
opcomd	operational command
opcon	operational control
OPD	Operational Preparedness Directive
OPSEC	operations security
OVP	Operational Viability Period
OVR	Operational Viability Resources
PI	public information
PLOC	Present Level of Capability
PM&C	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
POC	period of contingency
POE	point of entry
SCA	Support Command Australia
SC	Strategic Command
SCG	Strategic Command Group
SCNS	Secretaries' Committee on National Security
SGADF	Surgeon General Australian Defence Force
SLPG	Strategic Logistics Planning Group
SP	Sustainability Period
SPCG	Strategic Policy Coordination Group
SPPG	Strategic Preparedness Planning Guidance
SPD	Service Preparedness Directive
S&T	Science and Technology
STRAPP	Strategic Planning Process
SWG	Strategic Watch Group
VCDF	Vice Chief of the Defence Force